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ABSTRACT 
Organized Non-violent Rejection of the Law f o r P o l i t i c a l Ends 
The Experience of Blacks m South Africa 
DAVID GARTER 
The study sets down and assesses the record of organized m i l i t a n t 
non-violent r e j e c t i o n of the law for p o l i t i c a l ends by Blacks m South 
Africa. I t s approach i s h i s t o r i c a l . The study i s intended to help 
meet a lacuna m South African historiography; i t i s thus not primarily 
concerned with the theory of non-violent resistance. 
The study focuses on the three main instances of sustained non-violent 
resisbance m South Africa The "Satyagraha"campaign of 1906-191^ led by 
M. K. Gandhi; the "Passive Resistance" campaign of 1 9 ^ - 1 9 ^ and the 
Defiance of Unjust Laws - (1952-1953) • permit comparison,, each phase i s 
examined under the same headings background; aims; planning and orga-
nization,, leaders and participants, resistance, reactLon. 
At i t s proscription m 1960, the African National Congress (ANC), and 
i t s Indian counterpart, had not succeeded m stemming the flow, l e t alone 
reversing the tide, of r a c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . There was, as a consequence, 
disillusionment with the (non-violent) t a c t i c s on which the Congresses had 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e l i e d . Moreover, the commitment of the Congress leader-
ship and i t s organizational a b i l i t y were called i n t o question. This 
study seeks to redress the balance, m the b e l i e f that the shortcomings 
m ta c t i c s and organization have been allowed unduly to overshadow the 
r e a l achievements of the resistance campaigns and those who led them. 
The progress made was essentially of a "preparatory" nature. The 
leaders succeeded, m d i f f i c u l t circumstances, m involving large numbers 
of people, of diverse background and persuasion, m co-ordinated p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y , m many cases for the f i r s t bime, with important longer-term 
implications w i t h i n and outside South Africa. 
M i l i t a n t non-violence has played a c r u c i a l role m black p o l i t i c a l 
development m South Africa, i t has a continuing relevance there m con-
junction with v i o l e n t t a c t i c s and in t e r n a t i o n a l pressure i n bringing about 
fundamental change. 
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THE INTRODUCTION 
At i t s proscription m 19&0, the African National 
Congress (ANC), and i t s Indian counterpart,had not succeeded 
m stemming the flow, l e t alone reversing the tid e of r a c i a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n . There was as a consequence disillusionment with 
the t a c t i c s the Congresses had t r a d i t i o n a l l y employed. This 
feeling was subsequently reflected m the t i t l e of Edward Feit's 
work, African Opposition m South Africa The Failure of 
Passive Resistance, though he reserves his strongest c r i t i c i s m 
for the leadership and quality of organization. 
I n the aftermath of Sharperille, consideration of the use 
of the t a c t i c s of non-violent resistance for p o l i t i c a l ends 
within South Africa was increasingly overshadowed by considera-
t i o n of alternative strategies for action, r e l y i n g p r i n c i p a l l y 
on international pressure against South Africa and recourse 
to violent means, though these have been l i t t l e used m 
practice (1). 
This study reappraises the use of non-violent resistance 
for p o l i t i c a l ends by the black population m South Africa m 
the period from 1906 t i l l 1960 m the b e l i e f that i t made a 
sig n i f i c a n t contribution at the time to furthering the respec-
t i v e interests of the African and Indian Congresses and the 
people they represented. I f the t a c t i c did not succeed,directly, 
m bringing about favourable radical change m South Africa i t 
has played a v i t a l preparatory role and may yet have a further 
part to play m the replacement of the existing economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and social systems. 
( l ) On the occasions since 19^0 m South Africa when there 
has been substantial p o l i t i c a l l y - m o t i v a t e d violence by 
blacks i t would appear generally to have been largely 
spontaneous, the number of incidents, for example, of 
organized urban g u e r i l l a a c t i v i t y have been very few. 
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Any assessment of the campaigns of non-violent resistance 
m South Africa must have par t i c u l a r regard to the circumstances 
m which they were conducted to appreciate why t h e i r tangible 
achievements do not perhaps compare with those m pre-Independent 
India or even occupied Europe ( 1 ) . I n his dismissive approach 
towards the "non-violent phase" of black South African p o l i t i c a l 
history, Feit has argued that, "the espousal of non-violent 
p o l i c i e s , however commendable for humanitarian reasons, i s an 
example of the embourgeoisement of a rad i c a l movement ... The 
ANC leadership was i n h i b i t e d by i t s tendency to think m res-
pectable forms of p o l i t i c a l action as much as by the Government's 
r e s t r i c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . Neither the leaders nor t h e i r follow-
ers were real revolutionaries" ( 2 ) . The import of these > 
remarks, and others by Fe i t , i s that the ANC, as a "bourgeois" 
organization was divorced from the mass of the people i t 
claimed to represent, that neither the leadership nor i t s 
followers were r e a l l y committed to the cause of rad i c a l change 
and that the non-violent t a c t i c s they adopted was confirmation 
of t h i s . I t i s the contention of t h i s study that these 
criticisms were not applicable to the periods during which 
the Congresses were engaged m m i l i t a n t non-violent resistance 
which achieved as much as could be expected from any available 
t a c t i c m the circumstances. The "dormant" years when the 
Congresses confined t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s to the drawing up of 
pet i t i o n s should not be taken, as Feit would seem to do, as 
being representative of the entire "non-violent phase". 
The study focuses on the three p r i n c i p a l instances of 
sustained m i l i t a n t non-violent intervention against the law by 
(1) For case studies see, A. Roberts (ed), C i v i l i a n Resistance 
as a National Defence Non-violent Action against 
Aggression. 
(2) E. Fei t , African Opposition m South Afric a , pp 31-32. 
Africans and Asians m South Africa the campaigns by the 
Asian population m 1906-1914 and 1946-1948 and the African 
led, m u l t i - r a c i a l , defiance of unjust laws campaign of 1952-
1953- I t assesses the achievements of m i l i t a n t non-violent 
resistance by blacks m South Africa m the period to 1960. 
I n doing so, the study offers an insight i n t o the p o t e n t i a l 
and p i t f a l l s of the use of non-violent action by groups, weak 
m conventional terms, m confrontation with organizations 
having at t h e i r disposal an increasingly powerful and pervading^ 
repressive apparatus which they are ready to deploy. But the 
relevance of the experience m one p a r t i c u l a r environment to 
another should not be overstressed, there i s perhaps a 
tendency to excessive generalisation about the a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
of non-violent t a c t i c s , arguably the r e s u l t of the greater 
attention given to the theoretical opportunities presented by 
non-violent resistance than to i t s use m practice. 
This study i s not concerned with theories of non-violent 
action and t h e i r potential role as panaceas of c o n f l i c t 
resolution. Nor i s i t confined to an examination of t a c t i c s 
of non-violent, per se. Much of the study involves an 
analysis of the issues associated with the use of non-violence 
m South Africa, to gam an overall understanding of the 
Campaigns. I t i s thus, m considerable measure, an h i s t o r i c a l 
study of an important, but under-researched aspect of South 
African p o l i t i c a l experience. 
The p r i n c i p a l elements of the study, which i s divided 
in t o three parts examining each of the Campaigns m turn, are 
considered under the following broad headings Background, 
Aims; Planning and Organization, Leaders and Participants, 
Resistance, and Reaction 
The purpose of the background chapters i s to examine 
contemporary domestic and foreign circumstances which may 
have had a bearing on the Campaigns, influencing, for example, 
levels of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the timing of the Campaigns and the 
precise t a c t i c s adopted. Common elements between the c i r -
cumstances of the three campaigns are considered. 
The aims of the Campaign are considered from various 
viewpoints and are not always as straightforward as they 
might at f i r s t appear, thus presenting problems m assessing 
t h e i r achievements. This applies with equal force to the 
organization and planning of the Campaigns, where the formal 
"machinery" was supplemented (and on occasions seemingly 
almost substituted f o r ) by ad hoc personal contacts. The 
themes examined include, the forms the planning and organiza-
t i o n took, i t s importance to the outcome of the Campaigns and 
to regional variations m performance. Theodor Ebert has 
argued, m the l i g h t of his assessment of the organizational 
weaknesses of the defiance campaign, that, "non-white resistanc 
can develop i n t o an alternative to v i o l e n t resistance only m 
so far as i t assumes v i s i b l e organizational shape and i s 
adequately prepared" ( 1 ) . This depends, m part, on what 
the resistance i s intended to achieve, but the implication 
of Ebert's remark i s that the t a c t i c of non-violent resistance 
can only be used "successfully" m " l i b e r a l democratic" 
circumstances and that even then i t i s a rather cumbersome 
form of action. The examination of the Campaigns forming 
the basis of the current study suggests t h i s view requires 
some modification. 
The leaders of the Campaigns and the people who 
participated with them were diverse m t h e i r b e l i e f s , motiva-
tions, o r i g i n s , occupational and educational levels and t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l experience. Regrettably, i t i s no longer possible 
( l ) T. Ebert,"Organization m C i v i l i a n Defence", C i v i l i a n 
Resistance as a National Defence, p 297• 
to establish with certainty the precise and f u l l d etails of 
the participants, but the available fragmentary evidence 
permits a reasonably comprehensive analysis. I n each of the 
Campaigns certain groups were absent amongst the participants 
but there was nevertheless a broad spectrum involved m each 
case and the study reveals how successfully people of widely 
varying backgrounds participated and interacted. 
Non-violent r e j e c t i o n of the law took many d i f f e r e n t 
forms during the three Campaigns, from p e t i t i o n s , through 
boycotts and deliberate breach of specific laws to a mass-
s t r i k e . The study sets out the circumstances m which they 
were employed and the precise form they took. Shortcomings, 
both m the t a c t i c s and the way m which they were used, 
are considered. 
The analysis of the forms which the resistance took i s 
complemented by an assessment of the reaction the Campaigns 
provoked from those against whom they were primarily directed 
and others, both with i n and outside South Afr i c a . One aspect 
of p a r t i c u l a r concern i s the reaction of successive Governments 
m South Africa and white public opinion there to the spectacle 
of non-violent resistance per se. The study suggests there 
i s l i t t l e cause for encouragement. With participants of 
"average" commitment (no more can be expected from the 
majority other than m quite exceptional and extreme circum-
stances) the t a c t i c of non-violent resistance would seem to 
evoke no "special" reaction of conscience from those against 
whom i t i s directed m circumstances such as pr e v a i l m South 
Africa. 
Certain elements of the t i t l e , "Organized non-violent 
rejection of the law for p o l i t i c a l ends The experience of 
blacks m South Africa 1906-1960", require explanation. The 
word "blacks" i s used m preference to "non-whites" or "non-
Europeans", though these were the expressions most commonly 
used during the period covered by t h i s study m r e f e r r i n g 
c o l l e c t i v e l y to Africans, Asians and Coloureds. The term 
"non-violent r e j e c t i o n of the law" i s q u a l i f i e d both by the 
word "organized", m order to exclude spontaneous acts of 
resistance, except where such acts are ine x t r i c a b l y bound up 
with the Campaigns, and the phrase " p o l i t i c a l ends" which 
l i m i t s the scope of the study by eliminating, f o r example, 
i n d u s t r i a l action of a primarily n o n - p o l i t i c a l nature, which, 
nevertheless, could be seen, i n t e r a l i a , as constituting 
r e j e c t i o n of certain laws. "Non-violent r e j e c t i o n of the 
law "may be interpreted by reference to Gene Sharp1s explana-
t i o n of non-violent action, . . " ( i t ) i s a generic term, i t i n -
cludes the large class of phenomena variously called "non-
violent resistance", "Satyagraha", "passive resistance", 
"positive action", and "non-violent dir e c t action". Whilst 
i t i s not v i o l e n t , i t i s action, and not inaction, passivity, 
submission and cowardice must be surmounted i f i t i s to be 
used. I t i s a means of conducting c o n f l i c t s and waging struggles, 
and i s not to be equated with (though i t may be accompanied by) 
purely verbal dissent or solely psychological influence. I t 
i s not "pacifism". The motives fo r the adoption of non-violent 
action may be r e l i g i o u s or e t h i c a l , or they may be based on con-
siderations of expediency ... Certain forms of non-violent action 
may be regarded as e f f o r t s to persuade by action, while others 
are more coercive" ( 1 ) . I n one sense tne term "non-violent 
action", as defined by Sharpe, i s not oroad enough for the present 
study m that what he refers to as 'Verbal dissent", whilst 
certainly being distinguishable from non-violent action, i s 
nevertheless an i n t e g r a l part of the three Campaigns to be 
studied. Hence, the use of the wider term, "non-violent r e j e c t i o n " , 
though m fact the study, as regards t a c t i c s , i s primarily concerned 
with "non-violent action". The action vjas against i n d i v i d u a l 
r a c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l y - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y laws, both m t h e i r own 
(1) G. Sharp, "The Technique of Non-Violent Action", C i v i l i a n 
Resistance as a National Defence, p 1 0 9 -
r i g h t and as synbols of a wider discontent with the body of 
the law and tne economic, social and p o l i t i c a l structure from 
which they evolved. The period from 1906 to 1960 embraces 
the p r i n c i p l e examples to date of m i l i t a n t non-violent resis-
tance for p o l i t i c a l ends by blacks m South Africa. 
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PART I - NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 1906-1914 
CHAPTER I - BACKGROUND 
This chapter sets out the p r i n c i p a l d i s a b i l i t i e s faced by 
Asians m South Africa which have some bearing on the cam-
paign of non-violent opposition to the law organized between 
1906 and 191^ by M. K. Gandhi. 
President Kruger i s said to have t o l d a group of Indian 
petitioners who called on him, "you are the descendants of 
Ishmael and therefore from your very b i r t h bound to slave for 
the descendants of Esau" ( 2 ) . For the white South African, 
the only j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the presence of Asians m South 
Africa was to further his own economic well-being. The Asians 
must never compete with the whites, nor, i t would seem, ques-
t i o n what few spoils they were offered m return f o r t h e i r 
labours. Conflict between Europeans and Asians m South Africa 
stemmed from supposed economic, social and r a c i a l mcompatabili-
t i e s , to which whites referred with growing force from the 
188O's asserting that t h e i r dominant position was being 
threatened by the increasing number of ex- and non-indentured 
Asians. 
Following the passage of enabling l e g i s l a t i o n m Natal and 
India the f i r s t indentured labourers arrived m Natal m 1861 
to work on sugar plantations and l a t e r also m the Colony's coal 
(1) The contemporary phrase was "Asiatic". Indentured 
Indians were o f f i c i a l l y termed "coolies", a word also used, 
derogatorily, of a l l Indians m South Africa, including 
those who arrived as free men - the so-called "Arab" or 
"passenger" Indians. The term " B r i t i s h Indians" was 
commonly used by the Indians themselves and outside South 
Africa. There were m the Transvaal m the early 1900's 
some 1000 free Chinese a number of whom took part m the 
1906-1^ campaign. 
(2) M. K. Gandhi, Satyagraha m South Africa, p 56 . 
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mines d ) . The indentured workers, who were of both sexes 
went only to Natal (within South Africa) and came mainly from 
the Madras Presidency, the Malabar coast and the areas around 
Calcutta. The majority were tamil speaking hindus, over 60% 
coming from the Sudra and untouchable castes. By the early 
189Cs there were over 40,000 Indians m Natal, and more than 
100,000 by 1910, the vast majority being of indentured o r i g i n . 
Normally a labourer was indentured m the f i r s t instance for 5 
years. At the end of 10 years m the Colony he was e l i g i b l e 
for a free return passage to India. Alternatively, ex-
mdentured workers could remain m Natal as free agents ( 2 ) , 
and, u n t i l 1891, might, at the Governor's discretion, be given 
a s t r i p of land m l i e u of passage. Attempts by the Natal 
Government to increase the length of compulsory indenture to 
10 years and to compel indentured workers to return to India 
were thwarted by the B r i t i s h and Indian Governments. Neverthe-
less, a f t e r 1891) no more land grants were made to freed Indians 
and m 1895> under Act 17 of that year, ex-indentured workers 
and t h e i r families became l i a b l e to a c r i p p l i n g annual tax of 
£ 3 per head ( 3 ) . These measures appear to have had a marked 
effect on the numbers who remained m Natal at the end of t h e i r 
contracts ( 4 ) . The coming of the Union m 1910 f i n a l l y spelt 
f 
(1) For comprehensive accounts of the pre-1907 phase of South 
African Indian history see, for example, E. Huttenback, 
Gandhi m South Africa B r i t i s h Imperialism and the Indian 
Question 1 1914, B. Sacks, South Africa - an Imperial 
Dilemma, M. Palmer, The History of Indians m Natal. Natal 
Regional Survey, P. u . Pillay,'The Imperial Government and 
B r i t i s h Indians m the Transvaal' (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis 
(London); H. M. Adamson, 'The Indian Question m South 
Africa 1900-1914' (unpublished M.A. Thesis Cape Town). 
For a detailed sociological study see H. Kuper, Indian 
People m Natal. 
(2) Less than one t h i r d of the e a r l i e s t groups e l i g i b l e for 
a free passage - m 1871 - took advantage of the o f f e r . 
But see footnote ( 4 ) 
(3) An Indian male's annual income as a free labourer, pre-1914, 
would generally not have much exceeded £ 1 2 . 
(4) I n 1908 of 7735 people completing t h e i r indentures 3389 
returned to India^and 33°4 re-indentured (avoiding the £ 3 
tax,though t h i s was a "loophole" of uncertain v a l i d i t y ) . 
The balance remained as free workers. Adamson, op. c i t . , 
P 50. 
the end of the indentured system, f o r , much as elements m 
Natal continued to favour i t , i t was not seen to be m the 
interests of the Union as a whole. I n t h i s changed si t u a t i o n 
an understanding was reached with the Indian Government through 
the Colonial o f f i c e to terminate the supply of indentured 
workers from 1911 on the expectation of enhanced safeguards 
for the existing Indian population m South Africa ( l ) . 
I 
From the l880's "free" Indians arrived m South Africa 
mostly from Bombay Province s e t t l i n g m Natal, the Transvaal 
and the Cape, but not i n the Orange Free State from which they 
were excluded by law (2). They were usually traders (merchants 
or hawkers) and comprised both muslims and hindus. In general 
they had l i t t l e social or p o l i t i c a l contact with the indentured 
class m the period of t h i s study. 
Agitation m Natal, primarily directed against the trading 
class, led to the passage of a measure excluding Asians from 
the franchise ( 3 ) 1 severely r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r freedom to trade (k) 
and imposing administrative l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e i r entry to 
Natal (5). Cape Indians faced increasing r e s t r i c t i o n s on immi-
gration and m trading. "Passenger" Indians began s e t t l i n g m 
the South African Republic (Transvaal) shortly a f t e r the signing 
of the Pretoria Convention (6). 
(1) For an account of the manoeuvres between the Union, B r i t i s h 
and Indian Governments on t h i s matter see Gandlii m south Africa, 
p 270ff. 
(2) Chapter XXXIII of the Orange Free State Law Book prevented 
Asians farming, trading or holding land. 
(3) Act 8, 1896. An e a r l i e r B i l l had been disallowed by HMG, 
as were attempts m 1905 to exclude Natal Indians from the 
Municipal franchise. 
(4) Under Act 18, 1897, the issue of licences was at the dis-
cretion of municipal licensing o f f i c e r s , described by Neame, 
Asiatic Danger m the Colonies, p 35i as "the Servant(s) of 
a body of white storekeepers". 
(5) Immigration Acts No 1, 1897 and 30, 1903. 
(6) 1881. The Convention accorded the Transvaal "Complete self-
government subject to the Suzerainty of Her Majesty". 
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I n the face of growing white o p i n i o n (1) the Volksraad 
passed a Law m 1885 (2) d i s b a r r i n g "persons belonging t o any 
of the Native races o f Asia i n c l u d i n g the so - c a l l e d c o o l i e s (and) 
Arabs ..." from c i t i z e n s h i p and from ownership o f f i x e d p r o p e r t y . 
I n a d d i t i o n they were r e q u i r e d t o present themselves f o r r e g i s -
t r a t i o n as r e s i d e n t s . Newly a r r i v i n g Asian immigrant t r a d e r s 
were t o r e g i s t e r w i t h i n 8 days and when the law was f i r s t passed 
to pay a s i n g l e fee of £25* The charge was waived f o r e x i s t i n g 
r e s i d e n t s . F i n a l l y the Government reserved the r i g h t " t o p o i n t 
out c e r t a i n s t r e e t s , roads and l o c a t i o n s f o r (Asians) t o l i v e 
m". The law contained no p u n i t i v e p r o v i s i o n s and was widely disregarded. 
Amending l e g i s l a t i o n was intr o d u c e d m 1886 (3) under 
pressure from the B r i t i s h Government. Their concern was met 
by j u s t i f y i n g the, p r o v i s i o n o f separate areas f o r Indians on 
sa n i t o r y , r a t h e r than, as h i t h e r t o , on r a c i a l grounds. As an 
a d d i t i o n a l gesture the R e g i s t r a t i o n tax was reduced to £ 3 , 
though HMG was r e l a t i v e l y unconcerned w i t h the r i g h t s o f new 
immigrants. I n p r a c t i c e , the A s i a t i c Act was not immediately 
enforced. When moves were made to implement i t m 1888 a d i s -
pute soon arose between the B r i t i s h and Republican Governments 
as t o whether, under the Act Indians could l e g i t i m a t e l y be forced 
i i o t only t o re s i d e but trade m separate areas. A f t e r f r u i t l e s s 
exchanges ik) and f o l l o w i n g the de c i s i o n of the Volksraad m 1893 
t h a t a l l persons covered by the Act should move by 29 January, 
189^, to r a c i a l l y separate r e s i d e n t i a l / t r a d i n g areas (known 
l o c a l l y as l o c a t i o n s or bazaars), the two Governments took the 
d ) Lord Selborne (Governor o f the Transvaal and High Commissioner 
m South A f r i c a 1905-10) claimed t h a t Asian freedom o f entry 
and employment was questioned " l e s s a t the instance o f the 
Boers themselves than o f the European t r a d e r s who were m 
great p a r t B r i t i s h subjects o f B r i t i s h o r i g i n " . 
Despatch No 529, 21 May 1906, t o Lord E l g i n , C o l o n i a l 
Secretary. CO 291/99 (20630): 
(2) Number 3(18857. 
(3) Volksraad Resolutions. A r t i c l e 1^ +19, 12 August 1886. 
(k) See "Papers R e l a t i n g t o the grievances of HM I n d i a n subjects 
i n the SAR". C 7911, 1895. 
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dispute t o a r b i t r a t i o n before the Chief J u s t i c e o f the Free 
State who r u l e d m favour o f the SAR. A subsequent court case 
m the Republic d ) gave added weight to the r u l i n g , but the Act 
was never widely implemented p r i o r t o the outbreak o f the South 
A f r i c a n War as a r e s u l t o f the c o n t i n u i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the 
B r i t i s h Agent m the Transvaal and o f h i s Government. Professor 
Hancock has commented th a t , thus, w h i l s t B r i t a i n was addressing 
"High minded p r o t e s t s to Kruger's Government" about d i s c r i m i n a -
t i o n against I n d i a n subjects, "the same impulses of r a c i a l d i s -
c r i m i n a t i o n were a t work next door m N a t a l , under the B r i t i s h 
f l a g " ( 2 ) . 
The r a t i o n a l e behind the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s approach 
to Indians m the Transvaal during the years of d i r e c t r u l e 
from 1901 t i l l the beginning o f 1907, when Responsible Government 
was introduced, i s summed up m a despatch from Lord Selborne 
to Lord E l g i n ( j ) . "The B r i t i s h Government a f t e r the War 
nec e s s a r i l y undertook the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the country u n t i l 
such time as the i n h a b i t a n t s were m a p o s i t i o n t o administer 
i t themselves, but they d i d so subject t o a pledge, m some cases 
e x p l i c i t , but m a l l i m p l i e d , t h a t the s o l u t i o n o f the fundamental 
and permanent questions should, so f a r as were p o s s i b l e , be l e f t 
over u n t i l the time when through the medium o f t h e i r own 
Responsible Government, they could discuss these questions face 
to' face w i t h the I m p e r i a l A u t h o r i t i e s ... f o r these reasons there 
was, m my op i n i o n , no course honourably open t o the Government 
of the Transvaal other than to maintain the fundamental laws 
r e l a t i n g to A s i a t i c s f o r the time being unchanged, and also 
to prevent the f u r t h e r i n f l u x o f Asiatics,however d i s t a s t e f u l 
t h i s task might be", (k) The B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n would have 
faced serious h o s t i l i t y from whites m the Transvaal and probably 
m Nat a l i f i t had s i g n i f i c a n t l y eased the l e g a l r e s t r a i n t s on 
(1) Tayob Hajee Khan Mahomed v The State, 1898. 
(2) W. Hancock, Four Studies o f War and Peace m t h i s century, 
P 63. 
(3) C o l o n i a l Secretary, 1906-1908. 
(.h) No 529, 21 May 1906. CO 291/99 (2O63O). 
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Indians xn the Transvaal. A t the same time, the SAR' s 
treatment o f i t s Asian popu l a t i o n was p u r p o r t e d l y a c o n t r i b u t o r y 
f a c t o r l e a d i n g t o the War and, under the circumstances, Transvaal 
Indians had some reason t o expect an improvement m t h e i r l o t . 
Instead, as a Times E d i t o r i a l noted, " i f the Republican 
Government chastized the Indians w i t h whips, since the annexa-
t i o n of the Transvaal, they have been chastized w i t h scorpions. 
Not only have a l l the o l d r e s t r i c t i o n s been maintained but 
a d d i t i o n a l d i s a b i l i t i e s have been imposed" ( l ) . I ndians m 
Johannesburg were r e q u i r e d to move i n t o l o c a t i o n s by the 
B r i t i s h as e a r l y as 1901 and m 1903 the p r o v i s i o n s of Law 3 of 
were, m e f f e c t , r e i n t r o d u c e d ( 2 ) . I n d i a n bazaars were 
to be set up f o r t h w i t h m every town and no new t r a d i n g l i c e n c e s 
were to be granted t o Asians except to ca r r y on a business m a 
bazaar. Indians h o l d i n g Republican l i c e n c e s a l l o w i n g them to 
trade outside l o c a t i o n s could continue t o do so, but the 
lic e n c e s could n o t be t r a n s f e r r e d . 
The Indians found r e l i e f from unexpected quarter when, m 
May 190^, the Transvaal Chief J u s t i c e , S i r James Rose-Innes r u l e d 
m the case o f Motan v The State, t h a t w h i l s t Law 3 o f 1885 res-
t r i c t e d I n d i a n r e s i d e n t i a l r i g h t s i t could n ot p r o p e r l y be con-
strue d as l i m i t i n g the areas m which they could trade ( p r e c i s e l y 
the l i n e e a r l i e r taken by the B r i t i s h Government). He commented, 
"The mischief purported to be aimed a t was the m s a n i t o r y mode 
of l i f e i n the midst o f an European p o p u l a t i o n - not an incon-
venient competition w i t h European t r a d e r s " .. "Under the 
circumstances," he said , " i t does s t r i k e one as remarkable t h a t 
w i t h o u t f r e s h l e g i s l a t i o n the o f f i c i a l s o f the Crown i n the 
Transvaal should put forward a claim which the Government o f the 
Crown m England has always contended was i l l e g a l ... and which 
(1) Times Weekly E d i t i o n , 10 January 1908. 
(2) By the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s n o t i c e 365. 
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m the past x t has strenuously r e s i s t e d . " d ) The Transvaal 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had l i t t l e o p t i o n m the short term b ut t o ob-
serve the r u l i n g , m s p i t e of heavy counter pressure from white 
t r a d e r s . Milner's subsequent attempts to r e s t r i c t the issue 
of t r a d i n g l i c e n c e s f o r Indians were r e b u f f e d by Secretary o f 
State L y t t e l t o n , a l b e i t a f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n . 
I f the Transvaal Indians gained some r e s p i t e from t r a d i n g 
r e s t r i c t i o n s they d i d n ot secure any r e l i e f from immigration 
and r e g i s t r a t i o n requirements, the issues which f i n a l l y 
p r e c i p i t a t e d a campaign o f non-co-operation. 
Before the War, there were perhaps 15,000 Indians m the 
Transvaal (2 ) , b u t , according t o P i l l a y (3 ) , c i t i n g C o l o n i a l 
O f f i c e Sources, only about 2,000 remained m the Transvaal during 
the War, many f l e e i n g to N a t a l . Serious d i f f i c u l t i e s arose as 
the refugees r e t u r n e d , many not being m possession o f r e g i s t r a -
t i o n papers issued by the former Republican a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n 
any event these were l i t t l e more than r e c e i p t s and no proof o f 
i d e n t i t y and they had been issued only haphazardly. The m i l i t a r y 
a u t h o r i t i e s , t i l l the end o f 1901, p e r m i t t e d very few Indians t o 
enter the Transvaal, but under pressure from London, the number 
markedly increased m 1902, by the end of which over ^-,000 permits 
had been granted t o Indians to reside m the Transvaal ( k ) . At 
t h a t p o i n t the nominally n o n - r a c i a l Peace Preservation Ordinance (5) 
(1) Johannesburg Star (weekly e d i t i o n ) , 1^ May 190^. Reprinted 
m Gandhi m south A.fricaP 1^7« 
(2) Two contemporary sources o f divergent o p i n i o n give t h i s 
t o t a l H. Polak, The Indians o f South A f r i c a Helots 
W i t h i n the Empire and How they are Treated, p 83, P. Duncan, 
'The A s i a t i c Question m the Transvaal', The State, v o l 1 (2) , 
Feb. 1909, p 160. 
(3) P. D. P i l l a y , op. c i t . , p 211. 
(k) These permits were issued by the permit o f f i c e ( t o which 
white immigrants also had t o apply) m con j u n c t i o n w i t h 
the Department o f A s i a t i c A f f a i r s , formed m August 1901, 
and headed by L i o n e l C u r t i s one of Miln e r ' s "Kindergarten". 
(5) No 38, 1902. I t was amended by Ordinance 5, 1903. 
was introduced,again p l a c i n g serious d i f f i c u l t i e s m the way o f 
Indians wishing t o gam entry to the Transvaal, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f 
whether or not they could prove domicile there. But t h i s d i d 
not s a t i s f y European o p i n i o n which l e d i t s e l f to b e l i e v e t h a t 
l a r g e numbers of Indians were nevertheless e n t e r i n g the Transvaal 
who were not e n t i t l e d t o residence. The s i t u a t i o n was very 
confused. C e r t a i n l y there was some i l l e g a l immigration - a t one 
stage, Gandhi put the f i g u r e a t 50 a month (1) - but there i s 
no evidence to support a l l e g a t i o n s o f widespread evasion of the 
law. And amongst the s o - c a l l e d " i l l e g a l " immigrants there w i l l 
have been some who, m f a c t , even i f they could not prove i t , 
had been domiciled m the Transvaal p r i o r t o the War. In^a 
move to counter i l l e g a l I n d i a n e n t r y M i l n e r , a t the suggestion 
o f C u r t i s , proposed to r e - r e g i s t e r a l l Asians m the Transvaal 
who could prove t h e i r r i g h t t o d o m i c i l e . Thereafter, any Asian 
r e s i d e n t s found who were not r e g i s t e r e d would be l i a b l e t o be 
charged under the Peace Preservation Ordinance and i f convicted 
subject to d e p o r t a t i o n and imprisonment. R e - r e g i s t r a t i o n was 
not a l e g a l requirement, but f o l l o w i n g t a l k s between Mil n e r and 
Gandhi the l a t t e r agreed t h a t the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n would co-
operate. Some 12,500 presented themselves f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n 
between 1903 and 1906. Gandhi claimed t h i s was a proof o f t h e i r 
" v e r a c i t y , t a c t , large-mindedness, commonsense and h u m i l i t y " . 
" I t also showed", he s a i d , " t h a t the community had no desire t o 
v i o l a t e m any way any law m f o r c e m the Transvaal"(2). 
Approximately 8,000 of the Indians who sought r e - r e g i s t r a t i o n 
could not prove t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f the R e g i s t r a r t h a t they 
had p a i d the £3 tax r e q u i r e d under Republican Law (3) and had 
t o meet t h i s fee before they could be r e g i s t e r e d . At the same 
time the Transvaal a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was t r y i n g to persuade the 
I n d i a n Government to agree to the r e c r u i t m e n t o f 10,000 indentured 
Indians to work i n the Transvaal I (k) 
(1) L e t t e r to N a t a l Witness, 9 A p r i l 1907. Gandhi refuted«n. 
inference m the paper t h a t 8,000 Indians had entered the 
Colony i l l e g a l l y . C o l l e c t e d Works o f Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 6 
(doc. kZZ). 
(2) Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , op. c i t . , p 150. 
(3) Law 3 of 1885, as amended m 1886. 
(k) Nothing came of t h i s proposal, Chinese workers being 
introduced i n s t e a d . 
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Mxlner i s s a i d to have t o l d the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n when 
they p r o t e s t e d a t the need to r e - r e g i s t e r , "once on the r e g i s t e r , 
your p o s i t i o n i s e s tablished and no f u r t h e r r e g i s t r a t i o n w i l l 
be necessary, nor a f r e s h permit r e q u i r e d . This r e g i s t r a t i o n 
gives you a r i g h t to be here and a r i g h t t o come and go" ( l ) . 
But, f o r one, L i o n e l C u r t i s was not s a t i s f i e d . I g n o r i n g the 
view expressed a t the end of 1903 by the then R e g i s t r a r o f 
A s i a t i c s , Captain Fowle, t h a t , "there i s no reason t o b e l i e v e 
t h a t A s i a t i c s are e n t e r i n g the Colony w i t h o u t A u t h o r i t y ... 
i t i s ( i n any event) p r a c t i c a l l y impossible f o r an unauthorized 
A s i a t i c to remain m the Colony f o r any l e n g t h of time w i t h o u t 
being detected" ( 2 ) , C u r t i s claimed, m 1906, 
t h a t a " f l o o d " o f unauthorized Indians had entered the Colony ( 3 ) . 
He accordingly proposed compulsory r e - r e g i s t r a t i o n o f a l l 
Indians m the Transvaal whom he be l i e v e d should be given the 
st a t u s o f l e g a l r e s i d e n t s regardless o f t h e i r p r i o r standing. 
Lord Selborne, who had succeeded Mil n e r m 1905, embodied 
C u r t i s ' proposals m a despatch (if) m which he argued r e -
r e g i s t r a t i o n was m the i n t e r e s t s of Ind i a n s and Europeans m 
the Transvaal. What he proposed was e s s e n t i a l l y a h o l d i n g 
o p e r a t i o n to a l l a y the concern o f Transvaal Europeans (5) 
pending the .grant o f Responsible Government. At the same 
time, presumably to meet s e n s i b i l i t i e s m London, Selborne 
put forward proposals which gave the appearance o f easing con-
d i t i o n s f o r e x i s t i n g I n d i a n r e s i d e n t s . He advocated, f o r 
( l ) C i t e d by L. R i t c h , B r i t i s h I ndians and the Transvaal - A 
H i s t o r y , 1907. Reprinted m Gandhi Papers, Vol 7 (appendix 8) 
(2' i b i d . 
(3) C u r t i s t o P a t r i c k Duncan (then C o l o n i a l Secretary m the 
Transvaal), 3 August 1906. Gandhi m Smith Afr-ir-.p.P 163. 
(k) No 529, 21 May 1906, to Lord E l g i n . CO 291/99 T2O63O)• 
See also pages 16 and 17 
(5) European alarm a t the a l l e g e d i n f l u x o f Asian " i l l e g a l " 
immigrants was increased by the v e r d i c t m the case o f 
Lucas Trustees v I s m a i l & Amod (1905) m which the Judge 
r u l e d Asian c h i l d r e n were not subject t o r e g i s t r a t i o n . 
The successful appeal (N. H. Moosa v Rex 1906) on behalf 
o f an 11 year o l d I n d i a n against c o n v i c t i o n f o r e n t e r i n g 
the Transvaal w i t h o u t a permit gave added weight t o white 
concern. The judgement m the Lucas case also cast doubts 
on r e g i s t r a t i o n requirements f o r Asians not t r a d i n g on t h e i r 
own b e h a l f . 
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example, the a b o l i t i o n o f the £3 r e g i s t r a t i o n tax (a gesture of 
l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l import by 1906) and the r e v i s i o n o f the procedure 
f o r i s s u i n g temporary residence permits. E l g i n was sympathetic 
to Selborne's proposals ( l ) , m what was an embarrassing s i t u a t i o n 
f o r the B r i t i s h Government, a l b e i t o f i t s own making, given i t s w a r 
preXstand on the r i g h t s of Transvaal Asians. 
The d r a f t l e g i s l a t i o n which Selborne submitted w i t h h i s 
despatch was subsequently e x t e n s i v e l y r e w r i t t e n as a s i n g l e 
ordinance (2) t o amend law no 3 of 1885. I t d i f f e r e d m impor-
t a n t respects from the d r a f t l e g i s l a t i o n e a r l i e r submitted, m 
p a r t i c u l a r by p r o v i d i n g f o r compulsory r e g i s t r a t i o n o f a l l I n d i a n 
males l a w f u l l y r e s i d e n t m the Colony. There were s p e c i a l 
p r o v i s i o n s f o r c h i l d r e n , women were exempt. C u r t i s ' proposal 
to allow f o r the r e g i s t r a t i o n o f I n d i a n r e s i d e n t s regardless o f 
t h e i r l e g a l standing was thus r e j e c t e d . R e g i s t r a t i o n was t o 
be completed by January 1, 1907, d e f a u l t e r s faced f i n e s of £100 
or 3 months imprisonment. A f t e r January 1 any Asian r e q u i r e d 
to r e g i s t e r under the Act who f a i l e d t o produce h i s c e r t i f i c a t e 
on demand was l i a b l e t o a r r e s t and t o expulsion from the 
Transvaal. I t was necessary t o produce a r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i -
cate before being granted a t r a d i n g l i c e n c e . E l g i n refused to 
sanction the Ordinance, cl a i m i n g , " I gave my assent to the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i o n d i s t i n c t l y because I a n t i c i p a t e d 
t h a t m the long run the m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f law would be f o r the 
b e n e f i t o f the B r i t i s h I n d i a n Community .." He c r i t i c i z e d , m 
p a r t i c u l a r , the compulsory nature of the r e g i s t r a t i o n and the 
absence o f r i g h t of appeal from the magistrates' Courts m 
cases o f d e p o r t a t i o n f o r non-production of permits (3)* 
The Transvaal I n d i a n s , w h i l s t sharing E l g i n ' s view, m 
p a r t i c u l a r o f the compulsory nature o f r e g i s t r a t i o n , had 
(1) Lord E l g i n ' s despatch to Lord Selborne k June 1906. 
CO 291/99. 
(2) No 29, 1906. Text m CD 3251 (doc 1, appendix A). 
(3) Lord E l g i n ' s despatches t o Lord Selborne, 27 and 29 November 
1906. CD 5508 (docs 39 & i f l ) . 
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a d d i t i o n a l s u b s t a n t i a l c r i t i c i s m s of the ordinance ( l ) which, 
u n l i k e the Peace Preservation Ordinance, was avowedly r a c i a l . 
They reflected the need f o r f u r t h e r l e g i s l a t i o n , a t a l l , denying 
t h a t there had been a l a r g e unauthorized i n f l u x o f Indians 
c l a i m i n g t h a t the Peace Preservation Ordinance, was "complete 
and e f f e c t i v e " m dealing w i t h i l l e g a l immigrants. Nor had 
they f o r g o t t e n Milner's Pledge (2) m seeking t h e i r co-operation 
f o r the 1903 r e g i s t r a t i o n exercise. They were b i t t e r l y c r i t i -
c a l of the " h u m i l i a t i n g system o f passes to be c a r r i e d by ... 
Indians r e s i d e n t m the Transvaal" (3) and o f the r e g i s t r a t i o n 
requirement f o r a f u l l set o f f i n g e r p r i n t s , something normally 
asked only of c r i m i n a l s m I n d i a . The Ordinance, which 
r e t a i n e d the i n t e n s e l y d i s l i k e d d e f i n i t i o n o f A s i a t i c s given m 
Law 3 o f 1885, was seen to cast a moral t a i n t on the I n d i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n and t o give v i r t u a l l y no r e l i e f from the i n c r e a s i n g 
hardships they experienced a t the hands o f the B r i t i s h adminis-
t r a t i o n , m p r a c t i c e o f t e n worse than under the Republican 
Government. 
The force o f I n d i a n o p p o s i t i o n t o the Ordinance and the 
prospect o f o f f e n d i n g the Government m I n d i a had a c r u c i a l 
bearing on the decision/to°^efuse ' ^ ^ 1 s ^ c % i o n r i i ^ : ' p r i t f r * 0 ^ the 
g r a n t i n g o f Responsible government m December 1906. Thereafter, 
E l g i n saw h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . I n March 
1907, w i t h i n a day o f the opening o f the f i r s t session o f the 
Transvaal l e g i s l a t u r e to be h e l d under the new C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
the Ordinance o f 1906 was re-enacted, v i r t u a l l y i n t a c t , as the 
A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act (k) - dubbed the "Black Act" by the 
I n d i a n s . E l g i n j u s t i f i e d h i s approval of the Act and h i s 
apparent v o l t e face m the f o l l o w i n g terms "The Act which i s 
now submitted has a very d i f f e r e n t weight o f a u t h o r i t y (from 
Ordinance 29, 1906). I t has been introduced by the f i r s t 
(1) See, f o r example, statement o f B r i t i s h I n d i a n delegation 
to Lord E l g i n 3 November 1906. CD 3308 (doc 2k). 
(2) Page 21 above. 
(3) Statement o f B r i t i c h I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n to Lord E l g i n . 
op. c i t . 
( i f ) No 2, 1907. Received Royal Assent A p r i l 1907-
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Responsible M i n i s t r y o f the Colony and has been passed unanimously 
by both Houses of the new L e g i s l a t u r e . ( W h i l s t ) I consider i t 
my duty to place on record t h a t Her Majesty's Government do not 
consider the p o s i t i o n o f A s i a t i c s l a w f u l l y r e s i d e n t m the 
Transvaal as s e t t l e d by t h i s Act, to be s a t i s f a c t o r y ... they 
f e e l t h a t they would not be j u s t i f i e d m o f f e r i n g r e s i s t a n c e to 
the general w i l l o f the Colony c l e a r l y expressed by i t s f i r s t 
e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .." ( l ) . Whatever the fo r c e o f the 
reasoning from a narrow c o n s t i t u t i o n a l viewpoint, the I n d i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n f e l t t r i c k e d and h u m i l i a t e d . Their d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
was compounded l a t e m 1907 w i t h the passage o f the Immigration 
R e s t r i c t i o n Act (2) which m i n t e n t , i f not so much m word,was 
aimed p r i m a r i l y a t Indians. I t s o p e r a t i o n was i n e x t r i c a b l y 
bound up w i t h the A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act. 
On coming t o o f f i c e m 1905 Selborne had urged the 
Co l o n i a l O f f i c e t o agree t o a p o l i c y "having the p r a c t i c a l 
e f f e c t of preventing a l l f u t u r e A s i a t i c immigration m r e t u r n 
f o r a s a t i s f a c t o r y assurance of the proper treatment of a l l 
A s i a t i c s already m the country"" (3) but h i s record i n o f f i c e 
suggests h i s concern was one-sided. He claimed, m forwarding 
to London, the d r a f t Immigration B i l l , t h a t such l e g i s l a t i o n 
was j u s t i f i e d , since "the i l l i c i t unauthorized i n f l u x o f 
A s i a t i c s i n t o the Transvaal i s a t present proceeding a t an 
alarming r a t e " (k)- Act 15 was intended both t o prevent 
covert I n d i a n immigration and to provide a d d i t i o n a l p e n a l t i e s 
against those declared p r o h i b i t e d immigrants. I t contained 
a nominally n o n - r a c i a l language t e s t f o r would-be immigrants, 
c l e a r l y intended as a b a r r i e r to I n d i a n immigration. Of more 
(1) Lord E l g i n t o Lord Selborne. Despatch of 0 May 1907* 
CD 3887 (doc 7 ) . 
(2) No 15, 1907. Introduced m June 1907, i t was passed by 
the Transvaal L e g i s l a t u r e m August, r e c e i v i n g Royal 
Assent m December. 
(3) Lord Selborne to Lord E l g i n . Despatch o f 21 August 1905-
CO 291/8^ (32^57). 
(4) Lord Selborne t o Lord E l g i n . Despatch ofatfune 1907. 
CD 3887 (doc 9 ) . The a l l e g a t i o n was h o t l y denied by the 
Indians and appears t o have been based on the f l i m s y 
evidence o f the Government appointed P r o t e c t o r o f A s i a t i c s , 
Mr Chamney. 
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immediate general concern were sections 2(k)~ and 5 and 6 o f the 
Act. Section 2(k) widened the d e f i n i t i o n o f p r o h i b i t e d immi-
grant to in c l u d e anyone, who, on e n t e r i n g the Transvaal, would 
be "subgect to the p r o v i s i o n of any law c u r r e n t l y m fo r c e which 
might render him l i a b l e t o be removed from or ordered t o leave 
the Colony whether on c o n v i c t i o n o f an offence against such a 
law or f o r f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h i t s p r o v i s i o n s " . Sections 5 
and 6 l a i d down p e n a l t i e s o f f i n i n g , imprisonment and deporta-
t i o n f o r contravention o f the Act. Section 6(c) i n c l u d e d w i t h i n 
the terms of the Act anyone who had been ordered t o leave the 
Colony under any law, but who had f a i l e d t o do so. To f a c i l i -
t a t e the working o f the Act, the Government was empowered to 
enter i n t o agreements w i t h "any Colony or t e r r i t o r y m South 
A f r i c a " ( 1 ) . 
Transvaal Indians were not e n t i r e l y opposed to a de/facto 
general p r o h i b i t i o n on f u r t h e r permanent I n d i a n immigration. 
Gandhi, f o r example, proposed a blanket p r o h i b i t i o n of I n d i a n 
immigration under which "every I n d i a n would have t o prove h i s 
domicile or h i s r i g h t o f residence m the Transvaal w i t h i n a 
s t i p u l a t e d time, a f t e r which he would f o r ever be stopped" ( 2 ) . 
But the form of the proposed Immigration Act offended the Indians 
m various ways. I t appeared t o make permanent the "Black Act". 
I t disregarded the residence r i g h t s of Indians who had n o t taken 
out r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s under Act 2 of 1907 y e t who might 
( l ) This may have a p p l i e d only t o B r i t i s h South A f r i c a . The 
Transvaal and Nat a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s co-operated t o harnass 
I n d i a n deportees but so d i d the Transvaal and 
Mozambique Governments, 
(see p 64 ) . 
(2) Transvaal Leader,7 January 1908. This statement was used 
m evidence against Gandhi when he subsequently sought 
agreement f o r educated Indians s t i l l t o be allowed i n t o 
South A f r i c a (see, f o r example, Despatch of Deputy Governor 
Methuen to Lord Crewe, 6 October 1908. CO 291/129 (37889)), 
but Gandhi i s here surely only r e f e r r i n g to Ind i a n s w i t h 
e x i s t i n g residence r i g h t s and not prospective new entr a n t s 
who could m p r a c t i c e be refused e n t r y except m very few 
cases on the n o n - r a c i a l education t e s t provided f o r m 
Act 15. 
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be m possession o f Republican C e r t i f i c a t e s or those issued 
under the Peace Preservation Ordinance (repealed m the Immigra-
t i o n R e s t r i c t i o n A c t ) . Previously ; Indians who refused t o take 
out r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s under Act 2 were l i a b l e to im-
prisonment i f they f a i l e d to observe a n o t i c e of removal from 
the Colony, but under the Immigration Act they could be 
deported, a sanction which was to have very serious i m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r those i n v o l v e d m the n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e campaign d ) . 
The Act made no p r o v i s i o n f o r temporary permits t o be granted 
and gave no exemption even to eminent educated I n d i a n s from the 
p r o v i s i o n s o f the A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act ( 2 ) . 
Transvaal I n d i a n o p i n i o n had been s u f f i c i e n t l y incensed by 
the "Black Act" and subsequently the Immigration Act, as w e l l 
as by an i n c r e a s i n g range o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
p r a c t i c e s , t o embark f o r the f i r s t time on a campaign of non-
co-operation w i t h the law. The key t o t h i s development l i e s 
w i t h a combination o f the l e g i s l a t i v e d i s a b i l i t i e s considered 
above and the presence m the Transvaal, since 190J5 of 
Mohandas Gandhi. 
( 1) See page 64 . 
(2) These and other c r i t i c i s m s were set out m a p e t i t i o n , 
dated 5 October 1907, from the Transvaal B r i t i s h I n d i a n 
Ass o c i a t i o n t o the C o l o n i a l Secretary. CD 3887 ( w i t h 
doc 20). 
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CHAPTER I I AIMS AND ORGANIZATION 
E f f e c t i v e I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s m South A f r i c a 
date from the time o f Gandhi's a r r i v a l . He was d i r e c t l y res-
ponsible f o r the formation m May 1894 of the N a t a l I n d i a n 
Congress (N.I.C ) and the Transvaal B r i t i s h I n d i a n Association 
(B.I.A.), a c t i v e from 1903. Gandhi played a le a d i n g r o l e m 
both from h i s p o s i t i o n f i r s t as secretary o f the NIC and a f t e r 
h i s move to the Transvaal m 1903 as secretary o f the BIA. I f 
anyone could claim leadership o f South A f r i c a n Indians m the 
pe r i o d from the 1890's t i l l 191k i t was Gandhi who was the 
lynchpm of the 1906-1^ campaign. 
South A f r i c a n Indians were not engaged m continuous 
r e s i s t a n c e from 1906-1^ but t h e i r acts o f o p p o s i t i o n to the 
Transvaal and l a t e r the Union Government during t h a t p e r i o d 
has an e s s e n t i a l u n i t y o f purpose, both m respect o f i n t e r n a l 
and e x t e r n a l goals and can be seen as c o n s t i t u t i n g a s i n g l e 
campaign d i v i d e d i n t o three p r i n c i p a l phases ( 1 ) . Except m 
1913 r e s i s t a n c e was confined to the Transvaal. The campaign 
sought to r a i s e the l e v e l o f p o l i t i c a l consciousness, determina-
t i o n and co-operation amongst South A f r i c a n Asians by means of 
op p o s i t i o n t o the law, using n o n - v i o l e n t t a c t i c s , t o be developed 
and t e s t e d d u r i n g the campaign. The e x t e r n a l goals of the cam-
paign were t o persuade the Transvaal, l a t e r the Union Government, 
through various channels, t o remove, de f a c t o and de j u r e , cer-
t a i n r a c i a l d i s a b i l i t i e s faced by Asians m South A f r i c a , as a 
step towards f u l l e q u a l i t y as between Asians and Europeans i n 
the eye of the law. I n Gandhi's view e q u a l i t y m law was essen-
t i a l t o the s e l f - r e s p e c t and esteem of Asians, not only m South 
A f r i c a but throughout the world. He commented m 1908, "the 
B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n teaches us ... t h a t every B r i t i s h subject 
i s t o be t r e a t e d on a f o o t i n g o f e q u a l i t y m the eye o f the law 
(1) The f i r s t from 1906 - January 1908, the second from 
mid-1908 - A p r i l 1911, the t h i r d from September 1913 -
January 1914. 
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and I do demand t h a t e q u a l i t y m ... the law m the Transvaal"(1). 
But he also s a i d , "The f a c t i s t h a t l e g a l i n e q u a l i t y would be 
an i n s u l t to the Race. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n would 
be a concession to p r e j u d i c e and I n d i a n acceptance o f i t would 
be a g r a c e f u l and, s h a l l I say, statesman-like r e c o g n i t i o n of 
such p r e j u d i c e , as also of the f a c t t h a t , i f we want to l i v e m 
t h i s country, we must submit to the predominance o f the 
European races" (2^. 
/through 
The campaign was organized / v a r i o u s channels, the sole 
common l i n k being Gandhi who a t times l e a d v i r t u a l l y a personal 
crasade. I n mid-1907, s h o r t l y before r e s i s t a n c e began, he 
e s t a b l i s h e d the Passive Resistance A s s o c i a t i o n t o supervise the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f what proved to be the f i r s t phase of the campaignCj). 
The reason he gave f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a separate body was t h a t he 
d i d not wish t o put the existence o f the B.I.A. - which was an 
umbrella p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n - a t r i s k from 
Government p r o s c r i p t i o n . Furthermore, not a l l B.I.A. members 
supported Gandhi's t a c t i c s and he d i d not wish to provoke defec-
t i o n from t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n . There were, of course, also 
some advantages f o r Gandhi m having a p l a t f o r m o f h i s "own", 
though m p r a c t i c e he made l i t t l e use o f i t as such. The 
Association was a r a t h e r shadowy body c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e ^ 
|the BIA 
B.I.A. (if) p o s s i b l y intended to be h e l d m reserve should/become 
h o s t i l e t o the campaign. Whether the Passive Resistance 
Association ever h e l d committee meetings i s unclear but i t may 
w e l l have done m the second phase o f the campaign when i t 
could be s a i d t o have had some embodiment m the settlements 
f o r r e s i s t e r s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s a t Tolstoy farm near 
Johannesburg (5) and a t Phoenix m Na t a l . 
(1) At a p u b l i c meeting 3 August 1908. I n d i a n Opinion, 
12 September 1908. 
(2) L e t t e r t o the Star, 18 September 1908. 
(3 D e t a i l s o f the background to the formation of the P R.A. are 
found m Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , pp 199-201. 
(if) For example, from 1908, the chairman o f the B I.A. was also 
the chairman of the P.R.A. 
(5) The farm was presented to Gandhi and h i s f e l l o w r e s i s t e r s by one 
of h i s European supporters, Herman Kallenbach. 
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The p r i n c i p a l v e h i c l e used by Gandhi throughout the 
campaign m the Transvaal was the B r i t i s h I n d i a n Association 
which enjoyed a broad base of support. Among i t s l e a d i n g mem-
bers were some o f the campaign's most a c t i v e supporters. I t s 
a c t i v i t i e s were concentrated m Johannesburg-Pretoria where the 
vast m a j o r i t y o f Indians m the Colony l i v e d , but i t had branches 
m other towns o f f e r i n g a province-wide network f o r mounting 
resistance ( l ) . The B.I.A. r e l i e d on p a r t time o f f i c i a l s who 
were, f o r example, responsible f o r the(numerous mass meetings 
arranged by the B I.A. from 1906-1^ m support of the campaign. 
Many other o r g a n i z a t i o n s , permanent and ad hoc, m the 
Transvaal, worked m support of the campaign. I n i t s f i r s t 
phase, the Hamidia I s l a m i c Society played a p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g -
n i f i c a n t r o l e . Gandhi used i t s p l a t f o r m on many occasions, and 
as an i n d i c a t i o n o f i t s degree of involvement, the Society 
organized p i c k e t s t o dissuade people from r e g i s t e r i n g under the 
A s i a t i c Act ( 2 ) . The Tamil B e n e f i t Society f u l f i l l e d a s i m i l a r 
f u n c t i o n amongst i t s members. I n d i a n women who took p a r t m 
acts of re s i s t a n c e - they d i d so only m the t h i r d phase - came 
from Phoenix and Tolstoy Farm. Those from the Transvaal may 
have acted p a r t l y under the d i r e c t i o n o f the Transvaal I n d i a n 
Women's Ass o c i a t i o n which had threatened the Government m 
May 1913 t h a t i t s members would defy the law m p r o t e s t a t the 
Searle judgement (3)» Sueh acts of r e s i s t a n c e were to be 
organized as a p a r t o f the mainstream o f the campaign ( k ) . 
(1) As some i n d i c a t i o n o f the B.I.A.'s Colony-wide a c t i v i t y , a 
p e t i t i o n i t organized m October 1907 against the A s i a t i c 
Act c o l l e c t e d 4,500 s i g n a t o r i e s ( o u t o f a male A s i a t i c pop-
u l a t i o n o f not more than 10,000) from the f o l l o w i n g centres 
Johannesburg (2,085), P r e t o r i a (577), Germiston (300), 
Krugersdorp (179), Roodepoort (136),' Boksburg (129),» Standerton 
(123), Potchefstroom (114), Newclare (108), Benoni (91), 
P i e t e r s b u r g (90), Vereemgmg (73) > Barberton (68), Heidelberg 
(66), Zeerust (59), Rustenburg (54) , Modderfontem, Klerksdorp, 
V o l k s r u s t , Middelburg, C h r i s t i a n a , B e l f a s t , B e t h a l , B a l f o u r , 
Wakkerstroom, Ventersdorp, Lichtenburg, P i e t R e t i e f , Ermelo 
(together 270>. Gandhi Papers, Vol 7 (doc 252). See also 
page 41 (Table 1) 
(2) I b i d , Vol 7 (doc 239). 
(3) See page 7 8 below. 
(4) I n d i a n Opinion, 10 May 1913-
The Transvaal Chinese As s o c i a t i o n , the p r i n c i p a l mouthpiece o f 
the Colony's 1,100 f r e e Chinese, i s the only other major group 
known to have helped m the o r g a n i z a t i o n of r e s i s t a n c e . Under 
Leung Quinn, i t co-operated w i t h the Passive Resistance Associa-
t i o n and the B.I A , m o b i l i z i n g some o f the campaign's most 
determined r e s i s t e r s . I t does not appear t o have been a c t i v e 
m the f i n a l phase. 
Other associations m the Transvaal, w h i l s t not h e l p i n g 
d i r e c t l y t o organize r e s i s t a n c e , or doing so only m a r g i n a l l y , 
nevertheless c o n t r i b u t e d to the running of the campaign or m 
some other way set out t o a s s i s t i t s ends. Reference has been 
made to the Transvaal I n d i a n Women's Association, i t comes 
i n t o t h i s category, but more prominent was the committee of 
European sympathizers, under the chairmanship of W i l l i a m Hosken, 
a member of the Transvaal L e g i s l a t u r e and an i n d u s t r i a l i s t , 
whose members were a c t i v e both c o l l e c t i v e l y and as i n d i v i d u a l s (1 
The B r i t i s h I n d i a n C o n c i l i a t i o n Committee, under Hajee Habib, 
was b r i e f l y m the p u b l i c eye m the second h a l f o f 1909. I t 
was formed "t o help the cause o f the satyagrahis" and drew 
support from those sympathetic t o Gandhi's cause but not pre-
pared, a t l e a s t by 1909, t o defy the law on the campaign's 
be h a l f . I t had Gandhi's i n i t i a l backing, and, against h i s 
b e t t e r judgement, he went to England on i t s b e h alf, w i t h the 
Committee's chairman, m 1909, t o plead w i t h the Secretary o f 
State f o r the Colonies and others on b e h a l f of Transvaal 
Indians ( 2 ) . 
(1) Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , pp 268-282. Amongst the 
Europeans most committed to Gandhi m the Transvaal/Natal 
were HjSl Polak, Herman Kallenbach, Sonja Schlesm, 
L. R i t c h ( f o r much o f the campaign m London, see page 
3 2 ) and A l b e r t West. As i n d i v i d u a l s , the f i r s t three 
were d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d m h e l p i n g to organize r e s i s t a n c e 
i n 1913-
(2) For f u r t h e r d e t a i l see Gandhi Papers, Vol 9 (docs 163, 
165 & 169). 
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I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s m N a t a l and even more m 
the Cape were on the p e r i p h e r i e s o f the campaign though several 
of t h e i r leaders were prominent as r e s i s t e r s p a r t i c u l a r l y m 
the second phase. Gandhi c e r t a i n l y consulted leaders m both 
provinces ( l ) and f r e q u e n t l y v i s i t e d N a t a l b u t there was no 
formal j o i n t c o n s u l t a t i v e committee t o prosecute the campaign 
even m the t h i r d phase, which Gandhi apparently envisaged as 
being Union-wide ( 2 ) . Both the N.I.C. and Cape I n d i a n o r g a n i -
z a t i o n s voiced support f o r the campaign and made some f i n a n c i a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s but seem to have d i s s i p a t e d much o f t h e i r energy 
m i n t e r n a l disputes. For example, m October 1913, f o l l o w i n g 
Gandhi's c a l l t o indentured workers m the Newcastle d i s t r i c t 
t o go on s t r i k e against the £3 tax, elements m the N.I.C. (a 
body made up overwhelmingly o f the "passenger" I n d i a n group), 
probably m league w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the N a t a l I n d i a n 
P a t r i o t i c Union (most o f whose members were ex-indentured 
workers), b i t t e r l y attacked Gandhi's handling o f events. 
Gandhi and h i s supporters thereupon foamed a breakaway o r g a n i -
z a t i o n , the Natal I n d i a n A s s o c i a t i o n (/N.I.C. remaining as a 
rump). The N.I.A. played a r o l e m the s t r i k e s m Durban and 
Maritzburg and m i n t e r c e d i n g between the s t r i k i n g sugar 
workers and the armed forces but t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y was n e c e s s a r i l y 
l i m i t e d . The r e s u l t o f the i n t e r n e c i n e dispute was t o dimmish 
Gandhi's chances both o f e x p l o i t i n g the r a p i d l y spreading s t r i k e 
as he might have wished,and of/f%^ema?ned n o n - v i o l e n t . 
The e x t e r n a l dimension o f the campaign i s an important one, 
given the c o n t i n u i n g , i f d i m i n i s h i n g , i n f l u e n c e m the p e r i o d 
1906-14 o f the B r i t i s h and I n d i a n Governments over South A f r i c a n 
(1) See, f o r example, Gandhi's l e t t e r t o Abdul Gool ( j o i n t sec. 
Cape B r i t i s h I n d i a n Union), 2 March 1911, and the p e t i t i o n 
Gandhi drew up m c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the N.I.C. m c r i t i c i s m 
o f the 1911 Immigration B i l l . Gandhi Papers, v o l 10 
(docs 374 and 405 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . 
(2) See A r t i c l e "How t o organize the s t r u g g l e " , M. K. Gandhi, 
In d i a n Opinion ( g u j e r a t i s e c t i o n ) , 20 September 1913. 
Reprinted m Gandhi Papers, v o l 12 (doc 134). 
administrations. Gandhi, made use of the good o f f i c e s of the 
Indian National Congressj both m India and London, maintaining 
close t i e s with the I.N.C. whose cause he considered he was 
furthering m South Afr i c a . Additionally, from the end of 
1906, Gandhi had at his disposal m B r i t a i n a new organization 
which he and his fellow delegate to England m 1906, H. 0. A l l y , 
had promoted. This was the South Africa B r i t i s h Indian 
Committee(SABIC)(l),whose president from 1907, Lord Ampthill, 
former Governor of Madras, and Secretary, L. Eitch, a lawyer 
who had been a r t i c l e d to Gandhi m South Africa, were i n d e f a t i -
gable m support of the campaign, frequently badgering the 
Colonial Office and pub l i c i z i n g the South African Indian cause. 
Gandhi was a member of t h i s committee which was, m ef f e c t , an 
i n t e g r a l part of the organisational structure of the campaign. 
The organization of campaign finances was largely on an 
ad hoc basis managed by Gandhi who made frequent appeals for 
funds within and outside South Afr i c a . The bulk of funds, 
unlike m l a t e r campaigns, m 19^6 and 1952, came from abroad 
prominent amongst the benefactors was the Indian i n d u s t r i a l i s t 
R. S. Tata. An "anti-Indian Law Fund Committee" was set up m 
1906 or 1907 but l i t t l e i s known of i t s a c t i v i t i e s (2) . 
The fund, usually called the "Passive Resistance 
Fund", remained m existence probably t i l l 191^ (3)- There 
i s no evidence of l o c a l fund r a i s i n g a c t i v i t i e s by the committee. 
The B.I.A. provided funds for ase m connection with the 
/Association's 
campaign, leading to t n e / near bankruptcy m 1909 and urgent, 
(1) For a short time the SABIC was known as the South Africa 
B r i t i s h Indian Vigilance Committee. I t s terms of reference 
were very wide - including to work generally for the ameliora-
t i o n of hardships faced by Transvaal and Natal Indians. 
Gandhi Papers, Vol 6 (doc J>hh). 
(2) The committee i s referred to by Gandhi m his regular a r t i c l e 
"Johannesburg Letter", Indian Opinion ( g u j e r a t i section), 30 
March 1907. Reprinted m Gandhi Papers, Vol 6 (doc VlO). 
(3) I t i s referred t o , for example, by Gandhi m August 1912. 
( i b i d , v o l 11 (doc 25*+)) and again m 1913 m reference to 
a donation from the Nizam of Hyderabad, Indian Opinion, 11 
January 1913» 
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appeals for funds from Gandhi. Gandhi himself contributed at 
least £5j000 from his income as a lawyer, but t h i s source 
dried up as Gandhi became f u l l y embroiled m the campaign. A 
si g n i f i c a n t proportion of expenditure from the l a t t e r h a l f of 
1908 was used for providing r e l i e f for resisters and t h e i r 
families, primarily through the organizations at Tolstoy farm 
and the Phoenix settlement ( 1 ) . 
Gandhi's concern with organizing finance for the campaign 
was matched by his e f f o r t s to ensure i t was well publicized, he 
and his supporters being highly successful m t h i s . The 
cornerstone of nis propaganda e f f o r t was the weekly journal 
Indian Opinion, founded m 1903- Produced at Phoenix, i t was 
edited from 1906 by Henry Polak, a European who was one of 
Gandhi's closest confidant s. During the campaign i t had a 
subscription of almost 3)500. Gandhi was the chief contributor, 
using the journal f o r both p o l i t i c a l and moral education as well 
as the dissemination of news. I t had both english and gujerati 
sections aimed at various levels of opinion m both Natal and 
the Transvaal (2) . To a far greater extent than m -]9k6-h8 
or 1952 Gandhi and his colleagues were able to secure a hearing 
loofch m the South African press and abroad, notably m B r i t a i n 
and India, through interviews and correspondence columns, openings 
they used to the f u l l . They also produced journal a r t i c l e s and 
pamphlets m support of t h e i r cause (3)* The South Africa 
B r i t i s h Indian Committee was prominent m t h i s work. 
Fi n a l l y , the organization of the campaign r e l i e d heavily 
on ad hoc personal contacts, not only when the number of 
(1) A detailed breakdown of income and expenditure, furnished 
for Gokhale, early m 1910,is set out m the Gandhi Papers, 
Vol 10 (doc 162). 
(2) See B. Pachai, "The History of Indian Opinion 1903-1V', 
M. A. Thesis, Archives Year Book of South Afric a , 19^1. 
(3) Various examples are cited m the bibliography. 
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partxcxpants w « small but also, for example, at the time of 
the s t r i k e of Natal indentured workers m 1913« The organiza-
t i o n of the march from Newcastle to Balfour by 2,000 of the 
workers was a masterpiece of improvision by Gandhi and a number 
of h a s t i l y gathered assistants. I n t h i s instance iime did not 
permit planning through a formally structured organizing 
committee. Gandhi had to rely on makeshift proposals, drawing 
on resources available through informal personal contacts. 
Once m prison,following the march, he issued numerous instruc-
tions related to the campaign, transmitted on a personal net ( l ) . 
( l ) See, for example, his instructions to Miss D. West, 1*+ 
December 1913* Gandhi Papers, vol 12 (doc 196). 
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CHAPTER I I I LEADERS AND PARTICIPANTS 
Mohandas Gandhi arrived m South Af r i c a m 1893 (1), 
aged 23, to conduct a law s u i t f o r a fir m of Transvaal Indian 
merchants. He remained there t i l l 191^. Said to be a 
p o l i t i c a l innocent about South Africa, Gandhi soon experienced 
at f i r s t hand the discrimination suffered by his fellow country-
men (2) and within weeks began to s t i f f e n t h e i r ranks with f a r -
reaching consequences. For without his intervention South African 
Indian p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y would have long remained effete and 
at a low ebb. 
But why did Gandhi stay and what precepts guided his ac-
tions t h e r e a f t e r 9 Erikson talks of a moment when " p o l i t i c a l 
passion seized the young lawyer" (3)* This "cataclysmic" 
explanation of Gandhi's entry into p o l i t i c s may have some basis 
but he was a man m search of a cause with a well developed 
sense, i f Erikson i s to be believed, of being no ordinary person. 
I t i s too much to believe that the d i l i g e n t Gandhi had to be 
" t o l d the whole fantastic story of race rela t i o n s m South 
Afri c a " (k) afber his a r r i v a l there. He may well have had a 
presentiment that there would be opportunities for him there 
beyond the pursuit of his profession as a lawyer. Gandhi's 
"other worldlmess" was only one part of his character, m an 
equal measure he was down to earth and extremely shrewd. He 
i s said to have remarked to 
(1) For his e a r l i e r l i f e see Gandhi Papers; M. K. Gandhi, 
an Autobiography The Story of My Experiments ' j i t h Truth, 
B. R. Nanda, Mahat.na Gandhi A Biography, Pyarelal (Nayar), 
Mahatma Gandhi (Vol 1) The Early Phase. 
(2) Gandhi's early mistreatment m South Afric a , including 
during his f i r s t journey from Durban to Pretoria i s 
recounted m Satyagraha m South Africa,p 6 ^ f f . 
(3) E. H. Erkison, Gandhi's Truth On the origins of M i l i t a n t 
non-violence, p 169. Erikson writes of Gandhi i n the 
nanner of a disciple rather than as a. dispassionate psycho-
analyst , to the detriment of his study. 
(k) I b i d , p 164. 
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Henry Polak, "men say I am a saint losing myself 
m p o l i t i c s . The fact i s that I am a p o l i t i c i a n t r y i n g my 
hardest to be a saint" d ) . The b e l i e f s to which Gandhi gave 
public expression m South Africa are m essence explicable i n 
terms of his childhood upbringing (2) but he drew i n s p i r a t i o n 
from individuals as diverse as Thoreau, Ruskm, Tolstoy (3) 
and Christ ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the Sermon on the Mount). Against 
t h i s backcloth Gandhi developed m South Africa a framework 
of principles for hi s guidance and that of his followers m 
the conduct of t h e i r everyday l i v e s . Central to t h i s frame-
work i s the concept of "satyagraha", f i r s t given expression by 
Gandhi early m 1908 on his release from prison. "Satyagraha" 
i s the compound of two Sanskrit words "satya" meaning t r u t h 
and "agraha", firm grasping ik).He explained satyagraha thus 
"The world rests on the bedrock of satya or t r u t h . Asatya 
meaning untruth also means non-existent ... i f untruth does 
not so much as exist i t s v i c t o r y i s out of the question. 
And t r u t h being that which i s can never be destroyed. This 
i s the doctrine of Satyagraha m a nut s h e l l " (5)« Truth 
Gandhi equated with God. I t was, as Horsburgh observes, "to 
be attained through self r e a l i z a t i o n , a process which only 
(1) R L Fischer, The L i f e of Mahatma Gandhi, p 120-1 
(2) Born m Porbandar, m western India, Gandhi a g u j e r a t i 
speaker, had a nindu upbringing and was of tne ^aisya Caste. 
His forebears had long been senior o f f i c i a l s (ministers) 
m minor puncedoms. 
(3) Gandhi and Tolstoy corresponded. See, for example, 
Gandhi's letber to Tolstoy of 10 November 1909. Gandhi 
Papers, Vol 9 (doc 3^5). One of Tolstoy's l e t t e r s , 
dated 8 May 1910, i s reproduced m the Gandhi Papers, 
Vol 10 (appendix I I I ) . 
ik) There i s no satisfactory English expression f o r "satyagraha". 
Neither "passive resistance" nor " m i l i t a n t non-violence" convey 
the r i g h t flavour. Close translations include "truth-force" 
and "holding f i r m l y to the t r u t h " . Erikson, op. c i t , p 198, 
uses the term "leverage of t r u t h " . For an assessment of 
"Satyagraha" see H.J.N. Horsburgh, Non Violence and Agression; 
a study of Gandhi's moral equivalent of war, J.V. Bondurant, 
Conquest of Violence, W. Morris-Jones, 'Mahatma Gandhi -
P o l i t i c a l Philosonhe^ 9' ( p o s t s c r i p t ) , P o l i t i c a l Studies 8(1) 
I9b0, and S. Panter-Brick, Gandhi against Machiavellianism. 
(5) Satyagraha m South Africa, p ^33-
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reaches completion when that which draws man to God i s wholly 
s a t i s f i e d - a consummation that cannot occur m t h i s l i f e . 
I n the meanwhile we must be guided by the t r u t h as we see i t , 
that i s to say, our own r e l a t i v e t r u t h s , where the truths 
referred to are not our b e l i e f s about the physical world but 
those which have a direct bearing on the pursuit of se l f 
r e a l i z a t i o n . These are our b e l i e f s about the nature of human 
need and the form of community which would sat i s f y i t most 
f u l l y . I t i s upon these b e l i e f s that we should act s t r i v i n g 
to enlarge and deepen our grasp of t r u t h and to create the 
society which m our estimation comes nearest to meeting the 
needs of human beings" d ) . 
Many p o l i t i c a l leaders besides Gandhi could claim to be 
experimenting with Truth but one of the factors making his 
position and that of his followers d i s t i n c t i v e was his b e l i e f 
that, "the end i s contained withi n the means" (2). The only 
means conceivable for Gandhi were those embraced by the concept 
of "^himsa" (non-violence). As Morns-Jones comments, "there 
i s no r e a l choice between violence and non-violence for the 
achievement of the end Gandhi has m mind. When violence i s 
described as a wrong means t h i s s i g n i f i e s quite simply that 
i t s use leads to a wrong end. The objection to violence i s 
that i t simply w i l l not do a pa r t i c u l a r job of transforming 
social r e l a t i o n s " (3)« Gandhi asserted that those who 
genuinely practised ahimsa as he conceived of i t , were i n v i n c i b l e , 
i t was an a l l powerful means, u t t e r l y at variance with orthodox 
(1) Non Violence and Aggressi on, p 35 • 
(2) W. Hancock, Four studies of War and Peace, p 59. 
(3) Morris-Jones, op. c i t . , p 27-
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passive resistance which, he pointed out, tended to be the 
weapon of the weak - a means to be disgarded as soon as t h e i r 
strength increased. Attachment to ahimsa f o r satyagrahis 
was to be no such passing phenomenon. Nor did i t permit 
passive acquiescence m what was considered wrong doing, 
"love, the active state of ahimsa, requires you to r e s i s t the 
wrong doer by dissociating yourself from him, even though i t 
may offend him or i n j u r e him physically" ( l ) . The task of the 
satyagrahi was to present, "a mental and, therefore, a moral 
opposition to immoralities". " I seek", said Gandhi, " e n t i r e l y 
to blunt the edge of the tyrant's sword not by putting up 
against i t a sharper edged weapon, but by disappointing his 
expectation that I would be o f f e r i n g physical resistance. The 
resistance of the soul that I should o f f e r instead would allude 
him. I t would at f i r s t dazzle him and at l a s t compel recog-
n i t i o n from him, which recognition would not humiliate him, but 
would u p l i f t him" (2) . This of course means acceptance of 
Gandhi's b e l i e f "that even a nero i s not devoid of a heart" (3)« 
I t also demands, as t h i s study of non-violent resistance m 
South Africa w i l l show, a preparedness on the part of the 
satyagrahi for suffering. 
"Tapasya" ( s e l f suffering) completes the t r i n i t y with satya 
and ahimsa. Horsburgh describes i t thus " a l l serious con-
f l i c t must lead to suffering; and the satyagrahi with his 
devotion to j u s t i c e i s sometimes forced to act m ways that 
must resul t m a great deal of suffering. Tapasya i s a v i t a l 
expression of ahimsa because i t embodies a resolution to shoulder, 
as far as possible, t h i s burden of suffering, instead of attempt-
ing to s h i f t i t over to one's opponent" (k). Tapasya i s not 
(1) Gandhi Young Indian, 19 January 1921, c i t e d by Bondurant, 
Conquest of Violence,p 2h. 
(2) M. K. Gandhi, Non-Violence m Peace and War, Vol 1, p 50. 
Gandhi m the role of a p o l i t i c a l philosopher had no need 
to secure the defeat of his opponents; for him fraterniza-
t i o n with the opposition j o i n t l y to advance the cq,u se of 
t r u t h was far more important. 
(3) i b i d , p 362. 
(If) i b i d , pp 3 9 - ^ . 
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to be equated with cowardice, f o r i t s acceptance by satyagrahi 
was intended as a mark of t h e i r , "capacity f o r s a c r i f i c e of the 
highest type m order to be free from fear" (1) . 
Satya, ahimsa and tapasya are thus the main " s p i r i t u a l " 
principles which can be said to have guided Gandhi m his 
relations with h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents. But i t must be 
stressed that his achievement m un i t i n g these concepts as a 
force f o r p o l i t i c a l action i s spread over a long period, i n -
volving much experimentation which only began during Gandhi's 
period m South A f r i c a . And far from a l l of the participants 
m the campaign of 1906-1^ can be described as satyagrahis. 
Those that r e a l l y were, were an e l i t e , the shock troopers. 
Nevertheless Gandhi, through his b e l i e f s and his personality, 
gave the non-violent resistance campaign of 1906-1^ a character 
quite d i s t i n c t from, though not unrelated t o , subsequent cam-
paigns m South Africa considered below. 
The campaign of 1906 to 191k m the Transvaal and l a t t e r l y 
Natal embraced Indians, free Chinese and a few Europeans, the 
levels of p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the three phases of opposition vary-
ing greatly. I n the f i r s t , from September 1906 t i l l the 
temporary settlement of January 1908, v i r t u a l l y the whole adult 
male Transvaal Asian population required to register under the 
Asiatic Law Amendment Act deliberately f a i l e d to do so m support 
of the campaign for i t s repeal (2) . The leadership thus 
(1) M. K. Gandhi Harajan, 1 September 19^ +0 cite d by Bondurant, 
Conquest of Violence, p 29-
(2) Only 63O people took out c e r t i f i c a t e s under Act 2, whereas 
9,158 residents applied during the period of voluntary regis-
t r a t i o n m 1908, 6,i£if9 receiving t h e i r c e r t i f i c a t e s by 1910, 
another 1,8^2 were registered, by 1910, under Act J>G, 1908. 
Government minute No 570 of 3 October 1910. Enclosure with 
despatch of 10 October 1910 from Lord Gladstone, f i r s t Governor 
General of the Union of South Afric a , to Lord Crewe (Colonial 
Secretary 1908-1910). CO 551/2 (33273). I n a statement during 
the second reading of the Asiatics Registration Amendment B i l l 
on 21 August 1908 Smuts said that of 9,158 voluntary applicants 
7,773 had at that stage been accepted as v a l i d for r e g i s t r a t i o n 
1,21^ had been rejected (and were thus l i a b l e to deportation), 
171 applications were pending. Indian Opinion, 29 August 1908. 
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succeeded xn sustaxnmg non-co-operatxon from a socxally dxsparate 
and geographically scattered populatxon, comprxsing hxndus, muslxms, 
chrxstxans and those of many other relxgxons, from varxous parts of 
Indxa and elsewhere, engaged xn employment as dxverse as hawking, 
wholesale trade and the professions. 
The second phase, from June 1908 t x l l the suspensxon of 
resxstance xn Aprxl 19Hi saw a f a l l i n g o f f m the number of 
particxpants as a consequence of steadxly mountxng penaltxes. I n 
August and September 1908 nearly 2,000 Asxans took part xn the pablxc 
destractxon of thexr regxstratxon certxfxcates, and xn some cases 
tradxng lxcences, as a mark of protest at the Government's faxlure to 
repeal the Asxatxc Law Amendment Act - as Gandhi claxmed Smuts had 
promxsed to do. The destructxon of certxfxcates was not, however, an 
offence xn x t s e l f and as Gandhx poxnted out duplxcates could be 
obtaxned quxetly a f t e r the event (1). Essentxally x t was a publxcxty 
exercxse, whxch was the precursor to a perxod of renewed resxstance 
durxng which some 2,500 - 3i000 sentences of imprisonment were meted 
out to resisters, the great majority of whom were from the Transvaal 
which had an adult Asian male population at the time probably well 
under 10,000 (2). Predictably, the majority came from Johannesburg, but 
as Table 1 shows resi s t e r s were drawn from many other parts of the 
Colony as wel l , and the figure for Volksrust includes partxcxpants 
from Natal and the Cape. The ranks of resxsters from outsxde the 
Transvaal were further strengthened by arrxvals from Indxa, claxmxng 
to be returning residents, who co-operated with the campaign by 
refusing to comply with r e g i s t r a t i o n requirements under the Asiatic 
Act or Asiatics Registration Amendment Act (3)« 
(1) By February 1909, 677 had applied for replacements. 
Indian Opinion, 27 February and 6 March 1909-
(2) There was endless dispute between Indians and Europeans as to the 
true figure. I t was certainly declining during the period 1906-lif, 
p a r t l y as a re s u l t of the s t r i c t u r e s on the Indian population, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y xn trading. See minute by Mr. Hartman Just, Assistant 
Under Secretary, of 12 August 1908, with despatch of 20 July 1908 
from Lord Selborne to Lord Elgin. CO 291/127 (28881). 
(3) See,for example, the celebrated case m September 1908 of a group 
of returnxng resxdents arrested at Komatxpoort, p63-
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TABLE I 
Transvaal Indian ( l ) Registration and Hawking Offences: 
1 January 1906 - 30 June 1910 (2) 
Non-Compliance with Trading or Hawking 
Registration Laws without Licences 
Barberton 7 
Bethal - -
Benoni - 2 
Boksburg 18 3 
Belfast - 8 
Carolina 3 2 
Christiana 21 1 
Ermelo 5 -
Germiston - 182 
Klerksdorp -
Krugersdorp 11 93 
Itchtenburg - -
Lyndenburg 
h 
-
Louis Trichardt -
Middelburg 7 2 
Nylstroom 1 
Potchefstroom 1 -
Pilgrims Rest k -
Piet Retief - -
Pietersburg 5 
Rustenburg - -
Roodepoort 9 -
Standerton 53 12 
Vereenigmg 7 19 
Volksrust 265 9 
Wakkerstroom 2 1 
Wolmaranstaad - -
Pretoria - -
Heidelberg 3 3 
Johannesburg 287 1016 
TOTAL 751 1373 212^ (3) 
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NOTES' 
(1) The term "Indian" i s used m the o r i g i n a l document (see 
below). Presumably Chinese participants - numbering at 
least 200 m the second phase - are excluded. 
(2) The numbers m the table refer to cases of imprisonment, 
the standard though not invariable punishment. Some 
resisters were imprisoned many times. 
(3) d ) The t o t a l s given m the table whilst o f f e r i n g a 
valuable breakdown, available from no other source, 
should be treated with caution as a basis for 
estimating the number of acts of resistance leading 
to conviction m the second phase because* 
(a) the table i s incomplete, e.g. no cases are 
recorded for Pretoria f o r breach of r e g i s t r a t i o n or 
licensing laws, yet they did occur (see, f o r 
instance, reference m Indian Opinion, 21 November 
1908 to the j a i l i n g of 60 "hawkers"), 
(b) i t i s unclear whether or not the t o t a l s i n -
clude Chinese re s i s t e r s , 
(c) some of the hawking offences recorded may 
have been unconnected with the campaign, 
(d) approximately 200 of the cases included m 
the table should relate to resisters sentenced m 
phase I , 
(e) the table does not cover the l a s t 9 months 
of the second phase, 
( f ) m a l e t t e r to the press on 5 November 1909, 
Gandhi claimed Indian resisters had been given j a i l 
sentences on 2,500 occasions since the campaign 
began. Gandhi Papers, Vol 9 (doc 337)• I n 
September 1913, Gandhi ( m a memorandum from the 
B.I.A. to the Government) said "as i s well known over 
3,500 imprisonments were suffered by my countrymen 
during the struggle ....", Indian Opinion, 20 
September 1913* I t would be surprising i f 1,000 
acts of resistance leading to convictions did take 
place from the end of 1909 t i l l A p r i l 1911 as t h i s 
l a t t e r figure would suggest. 
(11) The available evidence taken together suggests that 
about 2,500-3,000 successful convictions leading to 
imprisonment were brought agamst Indians and 
Chinese during the second phase. 
Source of table Union Government minute No 570 of 3 October 
1910. Enclosure with despatch from Lord Gladstone 
to Lord Crewe, 10 October 1910. CO 551/2 (33273). 
Volunteers from the Cape were of the trading class, 
as were those from Natal, other than a few 'Colonial-born' 
Indians ( l ) . They, l i k e a l l other participants were male (2). 
Resident Transvaal participants m the second phase were drawn 
from a wide cross section. A group of deportees whose cases 
were brought to the attention of the Colonial O f f l c e by the 
SABIC included artisans, domestic servants, hawkers, general 
dealers, wholesalers, a municipal o f f i c i a l and a student, of 
widely d i f f e r i n g ages and backgrounds (3). There i s no 
reason to believe such d i v e r s i t y was unrepresentative of 
participants m the phase as a whole. Though Gandhi complained 
m 1910 
(1) Indian Opinion, 19 March 1910, refers to the campaign 
receiving backing from Colonial born Indians ( i . e . indentured 
class o f f s p r i n g ) . The few who participated may have been 
organised to do so by the South African Indian Committee, 
j o i n t l y set up m 1908 by the N.I.C. and the Natal Indian 
P a t r i o t i c Union. 
(2) Women were not required to hold the r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s 
against which the f i r s t and second phases of the campaign were 
m practice p r i n c i p a l l y directed. They could have resisted the 
1907 Immigration Act (see the case of Mrs. f-Sodha - though her 
breach of the law was not an act of the campaign) but Gandhi 
was reluctant for women to pa r t i c i p a t e . 
(3) SABIC (L Ritch) l e t t e r to Colonial Office, 7 June 1910. CO 35/ 
(17311). 
4 4 
that educated Indians were f a i l i n g to play t h e i r part m the 
campaign, thereby discouraging others ( m par t i c u l a r hawkers) 
from r e s i s t i n g ( l ) , professionals did take part m the second 
phase (2) . The hard core of the second phase was drawn from 
the tamil community, parsees and the Chinese, the f i r s t two 
groups being said by Gandhi to have borne the "brunt of the 
b a t t l e " (3)* Certain predominately muslim groups, most 
notably the memoms (and thekankanis) have a poor record of 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n throughout the campaign .B ut the claim of the 
Star m January 1909 (k) that the muslim community (as a whole) 
was c r i t i c a l of i t i s too sweeping, Gandhi continued, to receive 
support from members of the Hamidia Islamic Society, the chair-
man of which, Imam Bawazeer, was a staunch r e s i s t e r . Local 
muslim associations " a l l over the Transvaal" are said (5) to 
have pledged t h e i r backing for the campaign at the end of 1908. 
Certainly throughout the whole campaign some opposition was 
voiced by muslim groups to Gandhi's leadership and t a c t i c s 
either m the Transvaal or Natal, butthisshould not be over-
stressed p a r t i c u l a r l y m the f i r s t two phases. 
Though the l e v e l of resistance f e l l from the beginning 
of 1909 (6), t h i s was not, m general,an indication that Asians 
(1) Indian Opinion ( g u j e r a t i section) 29 January 1910. 
Gandhi Papers, Vol 10 (doc 69). 
(2) See, f o r example, b a r r i s t e r Royeppen, portrayed by Gandhi 
as a "Shining example" m the a r t i c l e referred to immediate-
l y above. 
(3) Message to the Tamils. Indian Opinion, 3 March 1909. Gandhi 
Papers, Vol 9 (doc 131). 
(k) 20 January 1909, reprinted m Indian Opinion, 23 January 1909-
(5) i b i d . , 28 November 1908. Report of the proceedings of 
a Hamidia Islamic Society ^eeting. 
(6) The turn of the year represents a dividing point m participa-
t i o n levels. The period for voluntary r e g i s t r a t i o n ended on 
30 November 1908, thereafter Asian males who f a i l e d to pro-
duce v a l i d r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s as required by the 
Asiatics Registration Amendment Act 36, 1908, were l i a b l e to 
prosecution. Moreover, from that date trading licences 
were only to be issued on presentation of a r e g i s t r a t i o n 
c e r t i f i c a t e . Many people thereupon ceased r e s i s t i n g . 
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no longer sympathized with the aims of resistance, rather, 
many were simply u n w i l l i n g to make the heavy sacrifices required (1) . 
They wanted peace to carry on business as best they could (2) . 
Public meetings m support of the campaign continued to be well 
attended, one i n Johannesburg m March 1909 a t t r a c t i n g 1,500 
people. 
When the t h i r d phase of resistance began m September 1913I 
m opposition to the Immigrants Regulation Act, 1913> i t attracted, 
as Gandhi predicted, l i t t l e active support, only 35 participants 
being imprisoned by mid-October. For the f i r s t time women p a r t i -
cipated as res i s t e r s , m response to the Searle judgement and 
apparently at the dir e c t i n s t i g a t i o n of Gandhi's wife who over-
came his opposition to t h e i r involvement (3)* From mid-October 
the l e v e l and nature of p a r t i c i p a t i o n was transformed by the 
involvement m the campaign of indentured mine and public service 
workers m the Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee areas who went on 
s t r i k e for the repeal of the &3 tax (k) at Gandhi's behest. At 
least 6,000 participated. The s t r i k e spread - though not under 
the control of the campaign's leaders - to sugar estate workers 
of the north and south coasts and to Durban and Maritzburg, 
embracing the overwhelming majority of the Province's indentured 
work force, and others as well (5)- The indentured s t r i k e r s 
were mostly i l l i t e r a t e with minimal p o l i t i c a l grounding. I n 
t h e i r s t r i k e , the indentured and ex-indentured workers had some 
support from the trading class through the Natal Indian 
Association and by dir e c t welfare assistance on an i n d i v i d u a l 
(1) See, for example, the statement to t h i s effect by 69 Indian 
merchants m Standerton who nevertheless voiced continuing 
support for the campaign. Indian Opinion, 6 March 1909. 
(2) I t was people of such views who weie behind the B r i t i s h 
Indian C o n c i l i a t i o n Committee. See p 30 
(3) Indian Opinion, 1 October 1913-
(k) See p 1 4 
(5) An a r t i c l e m the Transvaal Leader, 2k November 1913» 
implies that about ijO,000 people may have been on s t r i k e 
at that time. Available Colonial Office records of 
s t r i k e t o t a l s , such as cit e d by R. A. Huttenback, Gandhi 
m South Africa, p 322, refer only to the period when the 
s t r i k e was already on the wane. 
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basis (1). Otherwise, Natal traders, l i k e t h e i r compatriots 
m the Transvaal did l i t t l e m the t h i r d phase beyond p a r t i c i -
pating m meetings and providing l i m i t e d funds. 
A few of Gandhi's European sympathizers took part m 
resistance m 1913 - the only time t h i s happened during the 
campaign - playing a crucial role m the march of indentured 
workers from Newcastle to Balfour. 
Outright opposition amongst Indians to the campaign and 
the terms of settlement was strongest m the f i n a l phase. 
I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y evident m Natal, both from disaffected 
elements m the N.I.C. and from the Natal Indian P a t r i o t i c 
/N I P U) 
Union/which Gandhi had e f f e c t i v e l y upstaged by making a direct 
appeal to the very class i t claimed to represent (2). The con-
f l i c t was m part a clash of personalities but had some substance 
to i t as well, p a r t i c u l a r l y as regards the 191^ settlement. 
The settlement was c r i t i c i z e d by P. Aiyar of the NIPU (3) and, 
for example, by certain muslim groups m the Transvaal (k)• 
I n spite of such opposition and the h o s t i l i t y of the 
Government, Gandhi and his fellow leaders succeeded between 
1906 and 191^ m involving v i r t u a l l y a l l sections of the 
Transvaal and Natal Asian population - whose p o l i t i c a l experience 
was generally rudimentary - m a sustained campaign of opposition 
which, save for certain events m 19131 for which the leadership 
cannot be held e n t i r e l y responsible, remained non-violent. 
(1) See,for example, the help given to Newcastle s t r i k e r s by l o c a l 
Indian traders,albeit a f t e r some hesitation. Satyagraha m 
South Africa, p V38. 
(2J The NIPU was not the only group representing ex-indentured 
workers, there was also the Colonial Born Indians Association, 
some of whose members supported Gandhi (Natal Mercury,18 October 
1913)- The N.I.C./N.I.A. had some ex-indentured members,one of 
whom,Mr Budree, was prominent m the campaign m 1913' 
(3) For Aiyar's views and a c t i v i t i e s see, P.S.Aiyar, Conflict of 
Races i n South Africa, p a r t i c u l a r l y chps 13 and 15-
(k) Transvaal muslims were d i s s a t i s f i e d at Gandhi's f a i l u r e to secure 
unlimited recognition of polygamous marriages and certain elem-
ents were deeply h o s t i l e to Gandhi himself. These points are r e f -
lected m a meeting held on 15 July 191^- B Pachai,"The History 
of Indian Opinion 1903-1^",(M A Thesis),Archives Year Book of 
South Africa, 1961-pp 70-71 
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CHAPTER IV RESISTANCE AND REACTION F i r s t Phase 1906-1908 (1) 
Opposition to the proposed Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance 
began m conventional form with a l e t t e r from the B.I.A., 
wr i t t e n by Gandhi, to Jan Smuts, then Colonial Secretary m 
Pretoria (2). I t gave no warning that Transvaal Indians would 
refuse to comply with the Ordinance i f i t were passed, but 
said the Ordinance was "calculated to provoke the b i t t e r e s t 
i r r i t a t i o n among the Indian Community and to wound i t s suscepti-
b i l i t i e s to an extent which i t i s d i f f i c u l t to measure. ( i t 
wasJ an unnecessary a f f r o n t " (3) ' Already at t h i s early stage 
the question of pr i n c i p l e was being stressed. 
The prospect of resistance was brought nearer at a mass 
meeting of Transvaal Indians m September 1906 when a resolution 
was passed, moved by Gandhi, stating that "m the event of ... 
the Authorities r e j e c t i n g the humble prayer of the B r i t i s h 
Indian Community ... t h i s mass meeting of B r i t i s h Indians ... 
solemnly and r e g r e t f u l l y resolves that, rather than submit to 
the g a l l i n g , tyrannous and un-British requirements l a i d down m 
the Draft Ordinance, every B r i t i s h Indian m the Transvaal shall 
submit himself to imprisonment and s h a l l continue so to do 
u n t i l i t s h a l l please His most gracious Majesty the King -
Emperor to grant r e l i e f " (k)• The audience took an oath not to 
submit to the Ordinance. 
(1) The varied nature of the three i n t e r r e l a t e d phases of the cam-
paign and the need to see the Government's reaction to the 
f i r s t and m turn the second stage, m order to make sense of 
the next phase, would seem to j u s t i f y examining resistance and 
reaction m three chronologically divided chapters. I n the 
f i r s t phase non-co-operation began i n mid-1907 but the cam-
paign r e a l l y started m September 1906. 
(2) 25 August 1906, Gandhi Papers, Vol 5, (doc 420). The l e t t e r 
was sent only three days a f t e r the Ordinance was gazetted. 
(3) i b i d . 
(k) Resolution IV. Gandhi Papers (doc Vf1). 
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S h o r t l y a f t e r the meeting, a deputation comprising Gandhi 
and H. 0 . A l l y d ) went to England t o lobby the I m p e r i a l 
Government i n an e f f o r t to f o r e s t a l l the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 
Ordinance. The deputation was received by the Secretaries 
of State f o r the Colonies and I n d i a , t h e i r deputies and o f f i -
c i a l s , Members of Parliament and the press corps ( 2 ) . Against 
South A f r i c a n I n d i a n expectations, the Ordinance was d i s -
allowed, though the r e s p i t e proved s h o r t l i v e d ( 3 ) » L e t t e r s , 
p e t i t i o n s and deputations f a i l e d t o prevent the passage and 
assent ( i n A p r i l 1907) o f the A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act, d i r e c t 
successor to the d r a f t Ordinance. Transvaal Indians were thus 
placed m a p o s i t i o n of having e i t h e r t o renege on t h e i r oath 
( f o r some., a t l e a s t , a very serious matter, given t h e i r upbringing) 
or undertake some form of a c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n . For the vast 
m a j o r i t y , p o s s i b l y excluding the pathans, recourse t o vio l e n c e , 
even i f they had had the means f o r t h i s , would have been out 
of the question. Even the prospect of organized and o v e r t 
n o n - v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n f i l l e d many w i t h concern. Gandhi, 
r e f l e c t i n g , and a t the same time e x p l o i t i n g t h i s sense of 
caution commented, "passive r e s i s t a n c e (by s u b m i t t i n g to im-
prisonment provided by the law as a c o n d i t i o n of non-
f u l f i l l m e n t o f i t s p r o v i s i o n s ) ... i s undoubtedly open t o 
serious o b j e c t i o n and can only be j u s t i f i e d when i t i s c l e a r l y 
proved t h a t there i s no other course l e f t open t o honourable 
and l o y a l men" (k)• Given the Indians' exclusion from the 
b a l l o t box, the f a i l u r e of t h e i r proposal f o r v o l u n t a r y r e -
r e g i s t r a t i o n ( 5 ) and the passage o f the Act, despite t h e i r 
d ) Chairman, Hamidia I s l a m i c Society. A merchant. 
( 2 ) D e t a i l s o f various representations by the deputation, of 
which Gandhi was the e f f e c t i v e leader, are given m Gandhi 
Papers, Vol 6 . 
(3 ) See pages 2 2 - 2 4 
(k) I n d i a n Opinion, 30 March 1907-
( 5 ) Put forward a t e j a B.I.A. mass meeting, 29 March 1907. The 
proposal was/by" the B.I.A. t o the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e by telegram 
dated 6 A p r i l 1907- CD 3887 (doc 2 ) . As l a t e as June 1907 
the B.I A. were s t i l l pressing t h i s s o l u t i o n on the Government. 
See, f o r example, a l e t t e r from Chairman Mia t o the a c t i n g 
secretary to the Transvaal Prime M i n i s t e r , 12 June 1907. 
I n d i a n Opinion, 22 June 1907-
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pleas, Gandhi c l e a r l y f e l t there was no a l t e r n a t i v e but to 
r e s i s t and no other way of convincing the c o l o n i s t s of the s t r e n g t h 
of I n d i a n f e e l i n g . 
The Act came i n t o f o r c e on 1 J u l y , permit o f f i c e s opening 
f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n s h o r t l y a f t e r , the o f f i c e r s moving from town 
to town. Opposition was confined i n i t i a l l y to b o y c o t t i n g 
r e g i s t r a t i o n o f f i c e s . To strengthen the population's resolve 
p u b l i c meetings d ) were organized by the B.I.A. and other groups 
and p i c k e t s p o s i t i o n e d outside o f f i c e s to dissuade waiverers. 
For the most p a r t the p i c k e t s appear t o have acted m a r e s -
t r a i n e d manner, though Gandhi admitted, "there arose a body of 
men m connection w i t h the movement who w i t h o u t being volunteers 
p r i v a t e l y threatened those who would take out permits w i t h 
violence and i n j u r y " ( 2 ) . C l e a r l y t h i s was not the s p i r i t of 
"passive r e s i s t a n c e " as conceived by Gandhi, f o r whom persuasion 
and v o l u n t a r y conversion, r a t h e r than crude i n t i m i d a t i o n was 
fundamental. But h i s approach, m p a r t a t l e a s t , r e f l e c t e d 
longer term i n t e r e s t s than those of the immediate phase of the 
campaign and could n o t be expected to appeal to the e n t i r e 
I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n . The f i r m r e s i s t a n c e o f the Indians and 
Chinese l e d the Government t o extend the f i n a l date f o r r e g i s -
t e r i n g from J u l y 31 t o November 30 but t h i s , the t h r e a t of 
r e f u s i n g t r a d i n g l i c e n c e s to u n r e g i s t e r e d Asians from 31 December ( 3 ) 
and the imprisoning o f the campaign's leaders brought no sudden 
collapse. I n response t o the Government's a c t i o n a number of 
B.I.A. supporters drew a t t e n t i o n t o the campaign by seeking 
a r r e s t f o r hawking w i t h o u t l i c e n c e s , a means of making p l a i n 
t h e i r non-compliance w i t h the A s i a t i c Act. By the time of 
settlement, a t the end of January, over 200 people were m 
(1 ) I n t h i s campaign, as m 19^f6-19^+8 and 1952, p u b l i c meetings 
played a very important r o l e as v e h i c l e s f o r developing 
popular support and p o l i t i c a l ' consciousness. 
(2) Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , p 212 . 
( 3 ) Announced m the Transvaal Government Gazette, 3 October 
1907. 
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p r i s o n f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n and hawking offences. Many were 
defended by Gandhi, t i l l he himself was imprisoned, but he would 
only appear f o r defendants i f they s i g n i f i e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s 
to go to j a i l r a t h e r than accept f i n e s . With the exception of 
a number who were a c q u i t t e d , a l l the r e s i s t e r s charged d i d go 
to p r i s o n . Court hearings were e x p l o i t e d by Gandhi to p u b l i -
cize the campaign and a t the time of h i s own t r i a l he addressed 
p u b l i c meetings and the press to maximize the impact. 
January 1908 represented the hi g h p o i n t of the f i r s t phase, 
but m j a i l Gandhi cannot have been too sanguine of the pros-
pect of h i s supporters remaining r e s o l u t e much longer, having 
held out f o r s i x months ( 1 ) . I f the campaign crumbled w h i l s t 
the leaders were detained the Government would claim to have 
proved i t s argument t h a t the m a j o r i t y of Asians were w i l l i n g to 
r e g i s t e r i f i t were not f o r the i n t i m i d a t i o n of Gandhi and h i s 
colleagues. Gandhi's a s s e r t i o n a t the mass meeting m 
September 1906, where the oath against the A s i a t i c Ordinance 
had been taken, t h a t v i c t o r y was assured even i f a handful of 
men remained f i r m (2 ) would not prevent the m a j o r i t y from 
waivermg. Presumably w i t h t h i s m mind, and given t h a t i t 
was the f i r s t time Transvaal Indians had r e s i s t e d , Gandhi and 
the B.I.A had throughout maintained contact w i t h the Government, 
side by side w i t h the operation of the boycott weapon,m an 
e f f o r t to secure a settlement. By the t u r n of the year there 
was an i n c r e a s i n g d i s p o s i t i o n on both sides t o seek a mutually 
acceptable s o l u t i o n m what had become a stalemate. 
However, the r e a c t i o n o f the Transvaal A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o 
the t h r e a t o f r e s i s t a n c e , and f o r most o f the time during the 
(1) Force i s l e n t t o t h i s view by Gandhi w r i t i n g m I n d i a n 
Opinion, 29 February 1908, where he gave as one of the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r an e a r l y settlement discouraging r e p o r t s 
reaching him m j a i l " t h a t people were l o s i n g courage". 
Gandhi Papers, Vol 8 (doc 5'+)-
(2) Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , p 168. 
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f i r s t phase o f the campaign, was one of intra n s i g e n c e m which 
a t best the Asian leadership was seen as misguided m i t s ac-
t i o n s and i l l informed as to the " r e a l " ( b e n e f i c i a l ) nature of 
the A s i a t i c Act and the preceding d r a f t Ordinance d ) . The 
Government sought to confuse the p u b l i c as t o the r e a l issues 
a t stake, g i v i n g f a l s e prominence to the matter of f i n g e r p r i n t i n g , 
and i t denigrated the campaign leadership f o r encouraging people 
to break the law and f o r a l l e g e d acts of i n t i m i d a t i o n . At the 
same time the Government d i d n ot h e s i t a t e t o use i t s own 
powers o f i n t i m i d a t i o n by t h r e a t e n i n g w i t h d e p o r t a t i o n those 
who d i d not r e g i s t e r and m some instances t a k i n g steps to 
carry t h i s out, by r e f u s i n g to issue t r a d i n g l i c e n c e s except 
on proof of r e g i s t r a t i o n , and by prosecution and imprisonment ( 2 ) . 
I t even attempted to undermine the boycott by r e g i s t e r i n g Asian 
" d e f e c t o r s " c o v e r t l y a t n i g h t , but^nevertheless, so few people 
r e g i s t e r e d t h a t the Government twice f e l t o b l i g e d t o put back 
the f i n a l date f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n ( 3 ) . This " f a i l u r e " on the 
p a r t of the Government t o take d e c i s i v e a c t i o n , w h i l s t b r i n g i n g 
a temporary stay of execution f o r the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n from 
the p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act, posed t a c t i c a l problems f o r I n d i a n 
leaders m ma i n t a i n i n g the momentum o f popular support. As 
a consequence they welcomed the Government's d e c i s i o n a t the 
end of November 1907 to take a c t i o n against those who had not 
r e g i s t e r e d , " f o r the present c o n d i t i o n s o f n o n - r e g i s t r a t i o n are 
very boresome ( s i c ) and we badly want our l i v e r s shaken up" (k)• 
T i l l December, the Government had made l i t t l e use of the courts 
(1 ) See, f o r example, the statement o f Smuts t o a deputation 
from the B.I.A., A p r i l 1907. Gandhi Papers, Vol 6 (doc i06) . 
(2) Smuts mentioned a l l of these t a c t i c s m a p u b l i c speech 
a t P r e t o r i a on k January 1908 s h o r t l y before the settlement, 
and on other occasions. I n d i a n Opinion, 11 January 1908. 
(3 ) F i r s t t i l l the end of October, then November. The 
Government j u s t i f i e d delay on the grounds t h a t Indians 
claimed t o have been i n t i m i d a t e d and wished t o have longer 
to r e g i s t e r . 
(k) I n d i a n Opinion, 3 ° November 1907-
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to break r e s i s t a n c e , the few cases brought against p i c k e t s f o r 
o b s t r u c t i o n being notably unsuccessful, but from then on the 
courts were used e x t e n s i v e l y . At the time of settlement 200 
Indians and 3 Chinese were m p r i s o n , another 158 ( i n c l u d i n g 
58 Chinese) were under n o t i c e from the courts t o leave the 
Colony and a f u r t h e r 20 cases were pending. I n most instances 
those accused of non-possession o f c e r t i f i c a t e s were not 
a r r e s t e d but simply i n s t r u c t e d t o appear m court a t a given 
time, a device which both sides could claim r e f l e c t e d t o t h e i r 
advantage. 
Gandhi and a number o f other leaders were ordered t o 
appear m court, " t o show cause why having f a i l e d to apply f o r 
r e g i s t r a t i o n , as r e q u i r e d by law, they should not be ordered 
to leave the Transvaal" ( 1 ) . Subsequently, having been ordered 
to leave, and having f a i l e d to do so, the leaders were charged 
under the Peace Preservation 0rdmanc^2) and sentenced t o im-
prisonment, Gandhi ( t o h i s chagrin) i n i t i a l l y r e c e i v i n g l e s s 
than other leaders who were t r i e d separately. I n the end, 
the l a t t e r ' s sentences were reduced, a l l being given, l i k e 
Gandhi, two months imprisonment, w i t h the o p t i o n of a f i n e . 
The Government's options were l i m i t e d . W h i l s t i t determined 
not t o repeal the Act and I n d i a n leaders were equally f i r m , 
the Government had l i t t l e choice but to take p e r i o d i c p u n i t i v e 
measures, i f f o r no other reasons than t o s a t i s f y i t s e l e c t o r a t e 
and m an attempt t o confine the scale o f resistance a c t i v i t i e s . 
Some measure of Smuts' concern may be gauged from the l e t t e r he 
wrote on 8 January 1908 to J. Mernman ( 3 ) where he admits how 
d i f f i c u l t the I n d i a n question was pr o v i n g and how successful 
d ) Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , p 226 . They were charged 
under Section 8(3) o f Act 2 and appeared m court on 
28 December 1907. 
(2) Section 7 . 
(3 ) M i n i s t e r m various Cape A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s and the Cape 
Prime M i n i s t e r from February 1908-1910. 
the r e s i s t a n c e campaign had been. He b e l i e v e d the 
Government would "m the end be f o r c e d t o r e s o r t to d r a s t i c 
steps such as d e p o r t a t i o n o f leaders ..." d ) . The r e p l y 
from Merriman, who was not noted f o r h i s sympathies t o the 
Asian p o p u l a t i o n , may have helped to convince Smuts, i f he 
needed much convincing, o f tne need f o r a change o f t a c t i c s . 
" I s i t n o t p o s s i b l e " , said Merriman "now a t the eleventh 
hour, when you have asserted your r i g h t , t o y i e l d g r a c e f u l l y 
and by so doing pave the way f o r f u t u r e concessions on the 
p a r t of the power who would be o b l i g e d by your a c t i o n 9 " ( 2 ) . 
Merriman's views r e f l e c t e d those Smuts was r e c e i v i n g from the 
Transvaal Agent-General m London, S i r Richard Solomon, who 
was c l e a r l y anxious f o r a settlement t o a l l a y p u b l i c f e e l i n g 
m B r i t a i n . Even C h u r c h i l l , who as Under Secretary f o r the 
Colonies had shown l i t t l e sympathy f o r Transvaal I n d i a n s , 
urged on Solomon some moderation m the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the 
A s i a t i c Act ( 3 ) - Smuts from h i s personal contacts a t t h i s 
time w i t h Lord Morley, Secretary o f State f o r I n d i a , must have 
been aware of mounting concern m I n d i a a t events i n the 
Transvaal ( k ) . 
Smuts h i n t e d a t a possible s o l u t i o n of the c r i s i s m a 
c u r i o u s l y worded statement a t a p u b l i c meeting on 11 January 
when he s a i d , "as a matter of f a c t r e g i s t r a t i o n i s no longer 
per m i s s i b l e under the law. The A s i a t i c s w i l l have t o admit 
t h i s and o f f e r t o r e g i s t e r v o l u n t a r i l y " ( 5 ) - I n the second 
h a l f of January A l b e r t C a r t w r i g h t , e d i t o r of the Transvaal Leader, 
w i t h Smuts' backing, a f t e r meeting w i t h Gandhi, by then m 
( 1 ) W. Hancock & J. Vanderpoel, Selections from the Smuts 
Papers, Vol I I (doc 363^. 
( 2 ) 13 January 1908, i b i d , (doc 3 6 5 ) . This c l e a r reference t o 
prospects f o r Union i s l i k e l y t o have struck a chord w i t h Smuts. 
( 3 ) S i r Richard Solomon to J. C. Smuts, 17 & 2k January 1908, i b i d , 
(docs 366 & 3 6 7 ) . 
(k) Reference t o Smuts' contact w i t h Morley i s found m the 
former's l e t t e r to Merriman o f 27 January 1908, i b i d . ( d o c 3 6 8 ) . 
(5 ) Rand D a i l y M a i l , 13 January 1908. 
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p r i s o n , presented the l a t t e r w i t h the d r a f t of a proposed agree-
ment t o s e t t l e the c o n f l i c t d ) . I t would seem to have been 
ge n e r a l l y acceptable, and Gandhi, Thambi Naidoo, and Leung Quinn 
duly submitted the document, dated 28 January, m s l i g h t l y 
amended form t o the Government as the basis f o r a settlement. 
On 30 January, Gandhi was brought from h i s c e l l f o r an i n t e r v i e w 
w i t h Smuts m which the l a t t e r i s s a i d t o have agreed t o the 
proposals of Gandhi and h i s two colleagues, l a t e r s e t t i n g out 
h i s understanding m a b r i e f l e t t e r r e p l y ( 2 ) . I t was agreed 
t h a t Asians e l i g i b l e to r e g i s t e r should be allowed t o do so 
v o l u n t a r i l y . Those l i v i n g m the Transvaal a t the time of the 
settlement were t o r e g i s t e r w i t h i n a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d . By 
r e g i s t e r i n g a person would no longer be subject t o the p r o v i s i o n s 
of the A s i a t i c Act, but i t was l e f t t o the Government to take 
"whatever steps they deem advisable" to l e g a l i s e v o l u n t a r y 
r e g i s t r a t i o n s . I n c e r t a i n circumstances the requirement f o r 
f i n g e r p r i n t s could be dispensed w i t h . Gandhi and h i s colleagues 
agreed t o commend the settlement terms t o t h e i r f o l l o w e r s , 
p r o v i d i n g the government, f o r i t s p a r t , set aside a l l prosecu-
t i o n s brought against r e s i s t e r s , which i t d i d , the leaders 
themselves being released immediately ( 3 ) -
A c r u c i a l p o i n t remains, and one which prompted the second 
phase o f the campaign. Did the two sides, more p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Gandhi and Smuts, agree m unequivocal terms t h a t the A s i a t i c 
Act would be repealed, p r o v i d i n g t h a t the Asian p o p u l a t i o n 
r e g i s t e r e d v o l u n t a r i l y as envisaged m the s e t t l e m e n t 9 Subsequently, 
( 1 ) The authorship o f the d r a f t i s ascribed t o Cartwright by 
Gandhi m a contemporary r e p o r t (Gandhi Papers, Vol 8 (doc 3 8 ) , 
February 1908, but h i s Autobiography, p 239 suggests the 
document o r i g i n a t e d w i t n Smuts. 
(2 ) The t e x t of the l e t t e r from Gandhi e t a l t o Smuts i s set 
out m Lord Selborne's telegram dated 29 January 1908 t o 
Lord E l g i n . CO 291/125 ( 3 ^ ) . For Smuts' r e p l y of 30 
January 1908 through h i s p r i v a t e secretary, see I n d i a n Opinion, 
11 J u l y 1908. 
(3) The f a c t t h a t the leaders were o b l i g e d t o consider the terms m 
p r i s o n d i d not mean t h a t the settlement c o n s t i t u t e d a d i k t a t from 
the Government, whatever the s t r e n g t h of i t s p o s i t i o n . 
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m sworn a f f i d a v i t s ( 1 ) , the two rnen showed themselves -co be t o t a l l y 
ai\variance m t h e i r understandmgof the terms of settlement 
on t h i s p a r t i c u l a i p o i n t . Though some commentators (2 ) 
take a categoric standpoint, conclusive evidence i s s i n g u l a r -
l y l a c k i n g . The l e t t e r s of settlement give no 
c l e a r cut answer but the r e a l source o f the confusion i s the 
Gandhi-Smuts meeting of JO January. Gandhi, m a contempor-
ary account, r e f e r r i n g to the settlement commented, "there are 
some t h i n g s t h a t can be put down m w r i t i n g and f o r others 
one has t o r e l y on o r a l understanding" ( 3 ) - The mmutae 
of the dispute i s not the concern of t h i s study. What 
can be s a i d i s t h a t the evidence suggests t h a t the two men 
may have come to some understanding about r e p e a l i n g the 
A s i a t i c Act consequent on the s a t i s f a c t o r y completion of 
v o l u n t a r y r e g i s t r a t i o n ( ^ ) . Whether i t was categoric as 
Gandhi sometimes, but not i n v a r i a b l y suggested (5 ) or im-
p l i c i t as some of Smuts' comments would seem to imply (6 ) 
i s a matter o f conjecture. I f there was no commitment a t 
a l l , however i m p l i c i t , i t i s , f o r e x a m p l e , d i f f i c u l t t o see 
d ) Published m I n d i a n Opinion, 11 J u l y 1908. 
( 2 ) E. H. Enkson, Gandhi's Tr u t h , p 202 and S. Panter-Brick, 
Gandhi against Machiavellianism, p h~5-
(3 ) Gandhi Papers, Vol 8 (doc 3 8 ) . From an a r t i c l e m the 
g u j e r a t i s e c t i o n o f I n d i a n Opinion, February 1908. 
(k) Both r e f e r to the question of r e p e a l i n g the Act, f o l l o w i n g 
r e g i s t r a t i o n , i f w i t h very d i f f e r e n t emphasis. See Gandhi's 
speech to the B.I.A., 31 January 1908. Gandhi Papers, Vol 8 
(doc 22) and Smuts'speech a t Richmond, February 1908. 
I n d i a n Opinion, 15 February 1908. 
(5) See p e t i t i o n , dated 9 September 1908 from B.I.A.(one o f the 
s i g n a t o r i e s being Gandhi, the other being Essop MIA ) t o 
&brd Crewe ( C o l o n i a l Secretary 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 1 0 ) . Enclosed w i t h 
despatch of Ik September 1908 from Lord Selborne to Lord 
Crewe, C029 l /128 (36129) and f o r a more cautious approach, 
Gandhi's c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r t o Smuts, 1 February 1908, 
the t e x t of which was submitted, along w i t h others m the 
exchange, by the SABIC to the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e under 
cover of a l e t t e r o f 28 J u l y 1908, CD ^-327 (doc 1 1 ) . 
(6 ) Smuts' Richmond speech. I n d i a n Opinion, 15 February 1908. 
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why Gandhi continued to urge h i s f o l l o w e r s t o r e g i s t e r f o l l o w -
i n g h i s meeting w i t h Smuts on 3 February apparently t o seek 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the f u t u r e of the A s i a t i c Act. Perhaps xn 
t h e i r haste to s e t t l e , both men, s k i l l e d as they were, though 
Gandhi had l i t t l e experience o f h i g h l e v e l n e g o t i a t i o n , gave 
too l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the settlement and 
may also have reckoned w i t h o u t the degree of suspicion and 
even h o s t i l i t y d ) w i t h which i t was greeted m some qu a r t e r s , 
making subsequent compromise correspondingly harder. But i n 
the uneasy peace from January t o June 1908, Smuts, by whatever 
means, persuaded Gandhi and those he l e d to r e g i s t e r ( 2 ) , the 
process subsequently being l e g a l i z e d under the A s i a t i c 
R e g i s t r a t i o n Amendment Act No 36 of 1908. 
The white p o p u l a t i o n a t l a r g e , whose re p r e s e n t a t i v e s had 
unanimously voted i n favour of the "Black Act", show no signs 
o f having been persuaded or coerced by the campaign t o moderate 
t h e i r approach, as witnessed by the f o l l o w i n g , by no means 
unusual sentiments, expressed i n the correspondence columns o f 
the Transvaal Leader m January 1908. "those anna gatherers 
who came here by forgery and chicane, by misrepresentation and 
b r i b e r y , who s t i n k m g l y peddle t h e i r back-borne goods to the 
undoing of the t a x paying white man, who xn t h e i r s o c i a l customs 
are anathema to us - I say l e t them go and go q u i c k l y " ( 3 ) . 
And when the e d i t o r of the P r e t o r i a News proposed a c o n c i l x a t o r y 
r e s o l u t i o n a t a meeting c a l l e d by the mayor o f P r e t o r i a t o 
discuss the " A s i a t i c question", "he was greeted w i t h a pandemonxum 
of boos and x r o n i c a l cheers" (k). At a time when the Colony 
(1 ) Gandhi, en route t o r e g i s t e r , was severely beaten by a group 
of •pathans, h o s t i l e to the settlement. Satyagraha i n South 
A f r i c a , pp 2 ^ - 6 7 . 
(2) By June 1908 approximately 9 ,000 people had v o l u n t a r i l y 
presented themselves f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n , but not a l l o f the 
a p p l i c a t i o n s had been processed by then. 
(3) 8 January 1908. 
(^) Rand D a i l y M a i l , 16 January 1908. Other such meetings 
were h e l d , "appeasers" r e c e i v i n g s i m i l a r treatment. 
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faced a severe recession, economic, r a c i a l and s o c i a l f e a r s could 
be,and were, fanned w i t h p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t . I n European eyes, defiance 
of the law ( l ) by the Transvaal Asians presented a double t h r e a t -
from the Asians themselves and from the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n vdio, i t was 
judged, might be tempted i n t o a c t i o n by the Asians' example. But 
t f l i s does not seem to have provoked Europeans to take the law i n t o 
t h e i r own hands, against the Asians, p r i o r t o 1913- There were 
however instances where Asian employees were dismissed f o r 
n o n - r e g i s t r a t i o n (2 ) and European wholesalers w i t h e l d c r e d i t from 
I n d i a n t r a d e r s a t times daring the campaign ( 3 ) Few Transvaal 
Europeans were prepared to look a t the campaign a t a l l o b j e c t i v e l y 
or t o heed Gandhi's words m a l e t t e r bo the Anti-Asian Rand 
Pioneers, that, "as a matter of f a c t , there i s very l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e 
between what i s r e q u i r e d by the white c o l o n i s t s and what has been 
accepted by B r i t i s h I ndians ... my As s o c i a t i o n i s f i r m l y of the 
op i n i o n t h a t much of the ( w h i t e ) a g i t a t i o n i s due e n t i r e l y to a 
misunderstanding of the mutual p o s i t i o n " (h) 
White r e a c t i o n , from the Asian p o i n t of view was not e n t i r e l y 
w i t h o u t b e n e f i t . I n d i a n Opinion claimed t h a t , "The idea ( o f I n d i a n 
r e s i s t a n c e ) has caused an immense sensation here, and already one 
perceives something of a sense of respect, on the p a r t of Europeans . . . " ( 5 ) . 
C e r t a i n l y Europeans m the Transvaal had a t l e a s t been brought face to 
face w i t h Asian discontent and could not as r e a d i l y as h i t h e r t o ignore 
i t . The P r e t o r i a News commented m J u l y 1907, "we may say very f r a n k l y 
t h a t we have up to the present disregarded the t h r e a t s of the B.I.A. 
and looked upon what i s known as the "gaol r e s o l u t i o n " as not a very 
serious undertaking ... I n view of the l a t e developments, however, tne 
matter assumes a more serious aspect...". I t f u r t h e r commented t h a t 
w h i l s t r e g i s t r a t i o n was e s s e n t i a l , " i t i s n ot necessary t h a t we 
should do t h i s m 
t l ) Gandhi d i d not himself see the campaign c o n s t i t u t i n g a defiance of the 
law. His view i s t h a t o f Sarates a t h i s t r i a l " i t i s l a w f u l t o 
disregard a law ... when i t i s against one's conscience ... but i t i s 
not l a w f u l t o t r y to escape the punishment t h a t the law imposes f o r 
such disregard". I n d i a n Opinion, 16 November 1907• 
( 2 ) M.K. Gandhi, L e t t e r to the Star, 18 October 1907-
( 3 ) Gandhi Papers Vol 7 (doc 251) 
( 4 ) L e t t e r to Rand Pi oneers, May 1907. Gandhi Papers, Vol 6 (doc 4 5 0 ) . 
( 5 ) 13 J u l y 1907 . 
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any manner c a l c u l a t e d to i n j u r e the s o c i a l or r e l i g i o u s sus-
c e p t i b i l i t i e s o f a s e n s i t i v e race" ( 1 ) . General acceptance 
of t h i s view would have l a r g e l y obviated the need f o r r e s i s t a n c e . 
The number of Europeans m the Transvaal prepared t o 
i d e n t i f y w i t h the I n d i a n cause were few indeed, but those who 
d i d had an importance f o r the campaign out o f a l l p r o p o r t i o n 
to t h e i r numbers ( 2 ) . 
The B r i t i s h Government made great play o f i t s l i m i t e d 
powers to intervene i n the Transvaal but as the Times p o i n t e d 
out m a leader on the South A f r i c a n I n d i a n question, "we 
(the B r i t i s h ) are not a l t o g e t h e r w i t h o u t means of safeguarding 
our own i n t e r e s t s or of i n s i s t i n g upon reasonable compromises " . . ( 3 ) » 
I n August 1907 the House o f Commons debated a £ 5 m i l l i o n loan 
to the Transvaal, an o p p o r t u n i t y seized on by a number o f MP's 
to r a i s e questions about the p l i g h t of Transvaal B r i t i s h 
I n d i a n s . Responsible Government c e r t a i n l y d i d not prevent 
Lord Selborne from sending Smuts d e t a i l e d suggestions f o r thwart-
i n g the f i r s t phase of the campaign ( k ) . Lord A m p t h i l l , 
Chairman of SABIC, was m frequent communication w i t h the 
B r i t i s h Government a t the highest l e v e l s , but the Secretary of 
State f o r the Colonies does not appear t o have been moved t o 
take any major i n i t i a t i v e w i t h the South A f r i c a n s , though i t i s 
i 
questionable how much longer the B r i t i s h Government would have 
remained on the s i d e l i n e s , given wider I m p e r i a l considerations 
manifest m pressure m I n d i a and a t home ( 5 ) - I n the 
(1) P r e t o r i a News, o p . c i t . 
(2) A p o i n t seized on by Gandhi's opponents amongst the I n d i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n m N a t a l . 
(3) 1 January 1908. 
(k) Lord Selborne t o J. C. Smuts, 9 December 1907. Selections 
from the Smuts Papers, Vol I I (doc 3 6 1 ) . 
(5) The B r i t i s h Government was also being approached by the 
Chinese Government about the treatment o f t h e i r subjects m 
the Transvaal. L e t t e r s of 20 November and 2 December 1907 
from the Chinese Consulate-General m the Transvaal t o the 
Governor. Enclosed w i t h despatch No +^22 of 7 December 1907 
t o the CP. CO 291/120 
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circumstances the B r i t i s h Government greeted the settlement 
w i t h audible r e l i e f and i l l founded optimism ( 1 ) . 
( l ) There was warm pr a i s e f o r the Transvaal Government f o r 
showing "so much consideration f o r I m p e r i a l I n t e r e s t s " . 
E l g i n had some r e s e r v a t i o n about i t s t a c t i c s but con-
cluded " a l l s w e l l t h a t ends w e l l " . CO 291/120 Minutes 
w i t h despatch ~5k&k of 29 January 1908 from Lord Selborne 
to Lord E l g i n . 
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CHAPTER V: RESISTANCE AND REACTION• Second Phase 1908-1911 
The second phase of the campaign was e s s e n t i a l l y a b a t t l e 
of p r i n c i p l e , m which the p u r s u i t of the i d e a l o f r a c i a l 
e q u a l i t y before the law assumed greater importance than s h o r t -
term ends. 
By May 1908 most Asians l i v i n g m the Transvaal a t the time 
and r e q u i r e d to r e g i s t e r had done so. The Government revealed 
i t s e l f ready, m p r i n c i p l e , t o repeal the A s i a t i c Law Amendment 
Act ( l ) , but a dispute arose as to what should be s u b s t i t u t e d . 
This question and the f a i l u r e to f i n d a mutually acceptable 
answer brought the Immigration R e s t r i c t i o n Act (2 ) t o the f o r e 
m the renewed c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 
The Government was warned on several occasions between June 
and August by the B.I.A. t h a t the Assoc i a t i o n would be f o r c e d 
to resume a p o l i c y o f non-co-operation w i t h the law i f i t s 
demands were not met. The f i n a l warning, m a l e t t e r of 
20 August 1908, was taken by the Government as an ultimatum ( 3 ) -
Mass meetings and acts of non-co-operation w i t h the law 
took place throughout the second h a l f of 1908, c o n t i n u i n g t i l l 
A p r i l 1911-
As m the other phases of the campaign p u b l i c meetings 
played an important p a r t m maint a i n i n g popular involvement. 
The unsuccessful attempt o f Gandhi and some o f h i s f e l l o w 
(1 ) See minute No 528 o f 5 September 1908 from Prime M i n i s t e r 
Botha, w i t h Lord Selborne's despatch dated 7 September 1908 
t o Lord Crewe. CO 291 /128 ( 3 5 0 7 6 ) . I t should be seen 
m conjunct i o n w i t h Gandhi's statement m I n d i a n Opinion 
( g u j e r a t i s e c t i o n ) k J u l y 1908, Gandhi Papers, Vol 8 
(doc 195) and other contemporary p u b l i c r e p o r t s . 
(2) No 15, 1907- See pp 24-6above. 
(3 ) Published m I n d i a n Opinion, 29 August 1908. 
leaders, m the face of the conti n u i n g i m p o s i t i o n of the 
A s i a t i c Act, to secure the r e t u r n of the r e g i s t r a t i o n papers 
they had e a r l i e r f i l e d ( l ) prompted a c a l l from the B I A. 
f o r Asians t o hand m t h e i r r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s to the 
Association f o r p u b l i c burning as a mark of t h e i r d i s c o n t e n t . 
Over 2 ,000 c e r t i f i c a t e s were destroyed, the bulk a t a mass 
meeting m Johannesburg. Another form of demonstration used 
once and po s s i b l y more, was t h a t of h a r t a l - the c l o s i n g 
of shops f o r a b r i e f p e r i o d - m the case recorded, f o r one 
day ( 2 ) . 
Non-co-operation took various forms,the l a r g e s t number 
of cases i n v o l v i n g hawking w i t h o u t l i c e n c e s f o r which there 
were between 1 , J 0 0 and 1,700 c o n v i c t i o n s ( 3 )• Professi o n a l s 
and others augmented uhe ranks of the " r e a l " hawkers, any 
p r o f i t s they made being ploughed back i n t o r e s i s t a n c e funds. 
"Hawker-resisters", went through the motions of appl y i n g 
f o r a li c e n c e but refused t o give thumb p r i n t s demanded of 
them, since these were taken on the a u t h o r i t y of the A s i a t i c 
Act, once the p e r i o d of vo l u n t a r y r e g i s t r a t i o n ended m 
May 1908 ( 4 ) . No attempt was made to seek exemption from 
the requirement, thougn t h i s was po s s i b l e . I n some cases 
the hawkers were defended m cou r t , presumably f o r p u b l i c i t y 
(1 ) A p p l i c a t i o n was made t o the Re g i s t r a r of A s i a t i c s and 
the Courts. Gandhi's request i s set out m I n d i a n 
Opinion, 30 May and 11 J u l y 1908. 
(2 ) i b i d . , 12 September 1908. 
(3 ) See Table I above,p4l . The f i r s t f i g u r e i s based 
on o f f i c i a l t o t a l s , the l a t t e r on Gandhi's estimates 
o f the t o t a l number of a l l c o n v i c t i o n s a t various 
stages m the campaign. The hawkers were l i a b l e f o r 
c o n v i c t i o n under Ordinance 23 5 1905-
(if) The r a t i o n a l e f o r i l l i c i t hawking m the f i r s t phase 
of the campaign had a d i f f e r e n t emphasis, f o r then i t 
was a means o f drawing a t t e n t i o n t o the f a c t t h a t the 
offenders had no t r e g i s t e r e d . 
reasons, f o r they were not seeking a c q u i t a l ( 1 ) . The hawkers, 
l i k e other r e s i s t e r s , never v o l u n t a r i l y accepted f i n e s , the 
overwhelming magority going t o p r i s o n . 
I l l i c i t hawking was f o r the m a j o r i t y of r e s i s t e r s , the 
p e n a l t i e s , presuming a r e s i s t e r was charged s o l e l y w i t h t h a t 
offence, as was the p r a c t i c e m the e a r l y months of the cam-
paign when most cases were recorded, were not p a r t i c u l a r l y 
severe ( 2 ) . 
The second category o f r e s i s t e r s comprised Transvaal 
r e s i d e n t s , and a c t i v i s t s from N a t a l and some r e t u r n i n g r e s i d e n t s (3) 
from abroad who d e l i b e r a t e l y v i o l a t e d immigration and r e g i s -
t r a t i o n r e g u l a t i o n s , rendering them l i a b l e t o i n c r e a s i n g l y 
severe p e n a l t i e s i n c l u d i n g d e p o r t a t i o n ( t o I n d i a or China). 
There were, m the second phase, approximately a thousand con-
v i c t i o n s f o r such offences - m terms o f the Immigration 
R e s t r i c t i o n Act, the A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act ( i n t e r a c t i n g 
w i t h the Peace Preservation Ordinance) and the A s i a t i c s 
R e g i s t r a t i o n Amendment Act. Resistance t o these laws took 
various forms and was d i r e c t e d both a t a s s e r t i n g the r i g h t of 
educated Asians to enter the Transvaal, and against the continued 
existence of the A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act ( ^ ) . 
(1 ) Indeed, m a case i n v o l v i n g H a r i l a l Gandhi and Thambi Naidoo, 
the defendants c a l l e d f o r the maximum sentence, warning t h a t 
i f a l i g h t sentence was imposed they intended to repeat t h e i r 
offences as soon as they were released. I t was t o no a v a i l , 
but Thambi Naidoo, duly r e s i s t e d nine times during the 
second phase. Gandhi Papers, Vol 8 (doc 2^+5) • M. K. Gandhi 
was defence counsel. 
(2 ) T y p i c a l l y , they received a sentence of 7 days f o r afy^st 
offence w i t h the o p t i o n of a f i n e . 
(3) The Government doubted t h e i r bona f i d e s but the term i s used 
here w i t h o u t commitment on t h i s p o i n t . 
(k) Case studies are contained m the Annex a t pages 108-111 
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The p l i g h t of the t h i r d group of p a r t i c i p a n t s , namely 
those c l a i m i n g to be r e t u r n i n g r e s i d e n t s t o the Transvaal, 
most of whom came from I n d i a , i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the case of 
76 Indians who a r r i v e d m Mozambique m September 1908, enter-
i n g the Transvaal a t Komatipoort ( 1). The a d u l t s were 
declared p r o h i b i t e d immigrants under the Immigration R e s t r i c -
t i o n Act, f o r e n t e r i n g the Colony m contravention of s e c t i o n hiZ) 
o f the A s i a t i c s R e g i s t r a t i o n Amendment Act which r e q u i r e d r e t u r n -
i n g r e s i d e n t s to apply f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n from outside the Colony. 
None had produced r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s , nor would they 
give other means of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ( 2 ) . They were sentenced 
to 2 months imprisonment but were very soon deported, whereupon 
3k o f the o r i g i n a l 58 defendants r e t u r n e d , again being j a i l e d 
f o r 3 months, under Act 15 as p r o h i b i t e d immigrants. An 
appeal was entered on behalf of one of the convicted - Moosa 
vwas 
I s m a i l - and h i s sentence\set aside on 13 November. The 
Supreme Court condemned the Government f o r t r e a t i n g him as a 
p r o h i b i t e d immigrant a s , u n t i l the f i r s t o f December 1908, 
when the r e g i s t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of Act 36 became f u l l y opera-
t i v e , Asians had the r i g h t to enter the Transvaal, before apply-
i n g f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n under the A s i a t i c Law Amendment Act ( 3 ) . 
The Chief J u s t i c e commented, " I have seldom seen a d e f i n i t i o n 
(here r e f e r r i n g to the term " p r o h i b i t e d immigrant") which needs 
so much d e f i n i n g and which i s so d i f f i c u l t o f a p p l i c a t i o n to 
the s t a t u t e t o which i t r e l a t e s " (4"). 
Despite the Chief J u s t i c e ' s cautionary words and those 
of Mr J u s t i c e Mason (5A the flow of deportees, whether e x i s t i n g 
(1) The case was widely r e p o r t e d . See I n d i a n Opinion, 
26 September - 5 December 1908. 
(2) P r e c i s e l y how and when they were approached about t a k i n g 
p a r t m the campaign i s unclear. Their d e c i s i o n was cer-
t a i n l y d e l i b e r a t e , many other r e t u r n i n g r e s i d e n t s entered 
the Transvaal a f t e r complying w i t h the Government's 
requirements. 
(3) That I s m a i l and h i s colleagues, as p a r t i c i p a n t s m the 
campaignjwould not have done so i s beside the p o i n t . 
(k) I n d i a n Opinion, 5-December 1908. 
(5) See page 1_10L 
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r e s i d e n t s , r e t u r n i n g r e s i d e n t s , o r n o n - r e s i d e n t s f r o m N a t a l and 
th e Cape, c o n t i n u e d , t h e h a r d s h i p s t h e y f a c e d i n c r e a s i n g m a r k e d l y 
m 1909. T i l l J a n uary 1909 t h o s e d e p o r t e d were e s c o r t e d t o t h e 
T r a n s v a a l b o r d e r s , wncxioe they i m m e d i a t e l y r e t u r n s I t o seek 
a r r e s t . -^rom t h a t t i m e , w i t h t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n o f t h e N a t a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p r o h i b i t e d i m m i g r a n t s were d e p o r t e d by t r a m t o 
N a t a l where t h e y were d e t a i n e d and s u b j e c t e d t o an i m m i g r a t i o n 
e d u c a t i o n t e s t . U n l e ss t h e y passed t h i s . , o r c o u l d p r o v e N a t a l 
d o m i c i l e , t h e y were s e n t back t o t h e T r a n s v a a l , t o f a c e 
p e n a l t i e s under t h e I m m i g r a t i o n A c t (1) . I n March 1909 t h e 
s i t u a t i o n f o r d e p o r t e e s was made s t i l l worse by t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
r e a c h e d between t h e T r a n s v a a l Government and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
m Portuguese E a s t A f r i c a under w h i c h A s i a n s d e c l a r e d as 
p r o h i b i t e d i m m i g r a n t s m t h e T r a n s v a a l were d e p o r t e d t o t h e 
Transvaal/Mozambique b o r d e r where t h e y were s e i z e d by t h e 
Portuguese and d e p o r t e d summarily t o I n d i a o r China (2) . T h i s 
arrangement, w h i c h was o f d o u b t f u l l e g a l i t y (3)? c l e a r l y p r e s e n t e d 
a f u r t h e r s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o t h e campaign, Gandhi r e m a r k i n g "Many 
more f e l l away and o n l y t h e r e a l f i g h t e r s r e m a i n e d " ( k ) . P r o h i b i t e d 
i m m i g r a n t s w i t h d o m i c i l e anywhere m South A f r i c a had a s t r o n g 
c l a i m m law n o t t o be d e p o r t e d f r o m South A f r i c a , b u t t h e 
o n l y assurance t h e T r a n s v a a l Government appears t o have made m 
response t o e n q u i r i e s f r o m t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e was t h a t no 
I n d i a n s who had produce d s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o o f o f r e g i s t r a t i o n m 
th e T r a n s v a a l o r d o m i c i l e m N a t a l had ever been d e p o r t e d by 
(1) I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 9 January 1909-
(2) I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 26 March 1910, r e p r i n t e d m Gandhi Papers, 
V o l 10 (doc 12?)- I 
(3) See, f o r example,Qthe r e p o r t o f H.M. V i c e - C o n s u l m 
Lourenco Marques> ( A l s o t h e T r a n s v a a l ' s Agent and Immigra-
t i o n O f f i c e r t h e r e ) - f o r w a a " d e d t o London m T r a n s v a a l 
M i n i s t e r s ' m i n u t e No 156 o£ k J u l y 1910, e n c l o s e d w i t h 
L o r d G l a d s t o n e ' s d e s p a t c h o f 9 J u l y 1910 t o L o r d Crewe, 
CO 351 / 1 (23^13)5 and (11) t h e dou b t s r a i s e d by B. Sacks, 
South A f r i c a - An I m p e r i a l Dilemma, p 221 
( k ) Satyagraha m South A f r i c a , p 3^3* 
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them t o I n d i a d ) . Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f r e s i s t a n c e 
t h i s was an a l m o s t m e a n i n g l e s s s t a t e m e n t . The B.I.A. sug g e s t e d 
t h a t o f f i c i a l s c o u l d r e a d i l y check on a r e s i s t e r ' s r e g i s -
t r a t i o n d e t a i l s s i m p l y by a s k i n g f o r h i s name w h i c h was r a r e l y 
r e f u s e d (2). Through t h e SABIC, t h e B.I.A. s u b m i t t e d many 
cases t o t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e o f a l l e g e d i m p r o p e r d e p o r t a t i o n o f 
As i a n s w i t h South A f r i c a n d o m i c i l e (3)- Some were open t o 
q u e s t i o n , b u t amongst t h o s e d e p o r t e d t o A s i a were p r o m i n e n t 
f i g u r e s , such as Leung Quinn, t h e l e a d e r o f t h e Chinese Community 
who was d e p o r t e d t h r o u g h Mozambique (k)• A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
T r a n s v a a l Government, between June 1907 and August 1910, t h e r e 
were 162 cases o f d e p o r t a t i o n o f I n d i a n s from t h e T r a n s v a a l t o 
o t h e r p a r t s o f what became t h e Un i o n and 261 t o o u t s i d e South 
A f r i c a , t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y b e i n g t o I n d i a (5). The b u l k o f 
t h e s e d e p o r t a t i o n o r d e r s - and t h e t o t a l s may be an u n d e r e s t i m a t e -
w i l l have o c c u r r e d f r o m t h e second h a l f o f 1908 and, m t h e case 
o f t h o s e t o beyond South A f r i c a , f r o m March 1909-
I n s p i t e o f t h e s e v e r i t y o f a r b i t r a r y d e p o r t a t i o n , s e p a r a t i n g 
t h o s e a f f e c t e d from t h e i r f a m i l i e s ( 6 ) and l i v e l i h o o d , r e s i s t e r s 
n o t o n l y c o n t i n u e d t o come f o r w a r d , b u t some o f t h o s e d e p o r t e d 
t o I n d i a , h a v i n g s u f f e r e d t h e h a r d s h i p s o f t h e j o u r n e y , r e t u r n e d 
t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i r d e p o r t a t i o n s , m some i n s t a n c e s b e i n g r e f u s e d 
p e r m i s s i o n t o l a n d (7)- I n October 1910, a group o f 80 d e p o r t e e s 
r e t u r n e d from I n d i a and, a c c o r d i n g t o I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 32 were 
(1) Telegram o f k May 1910 f r o m Deputy Governor T r a n s v a a l t o 
L o r d Crewe, CO 2 9 l / l H (1325^)-
(2) L e t t e r o f 18 May 1910 from t h e SABIC (on b e h a l f o f B . I A.) t o 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , CD 3363 (doc 155). 
(3) See, f o r example, e n c l o s u r e w i t h SABIC l e t t e r o f 7 June 1910 
t o t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e g i v i n g an a n a l y s i s o f t h e d e p o r t e e s 
t o I n d i a from T r a n s v a a l , CO 55V7 (17311) -
( k ) I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 30 J u l y 1910. 
(5) T r a n s v a a l M i n i s t e r s ' m i n u t e 570 o f 3 October 1910 w i t h L o r d 
G l a d s t o n e ' s d e s p a t c h o f 10 October 1910 t o L o r d Crewe, 
CO 551/2 (33273). 
(6) T o l s t o y Farm, f r o m 1910 Gandhi's base m t h e T r a n s v a a l , 
became t h e r e f u g e f o r t h e s e f a m i l i e s . 
(7) L e t t e r f r o m t h e SABIC o f k August 1910 t o C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , 
CO 551/7 (24006) 
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i m m e d i a t e l y a b l e t o pro v e d o m i c i l i a r y r i g h t s m N a t a l , o t h e r s 
f i n a l l y b e i n g a l l o w e d t o l a n d m t h e Cape, some s u b s e q u e n t l y 
a p p l y i n g f o r d u p l i c a t e r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s f r o m t h e 
T r a n s v a a l as a means o f p r o v i n g t h e i r w r o n g f u l d e p o r t a t i o n (1). 
E e s i s t e r s once charged (2) f a c e d m a g i s t r a t e s who were 
f r e q u e n t l y h o s t i l e and uncomprehending (3) b u t t h e w o r s t abuses 
o c c u r r e d m p r i s o n s . I n 1909, t h e B.I.A. s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g 
t e l e g r a m t o t h e SABIC, "Urgent l e t t e r r e c e i v e d H e i d e l b e r g 
p r i s o n e r s s t a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , s t a r v a t i o n , i m p r o p e r d i e t , 
f i l t h y s u r r o u n d i n g s , u t t e r m s a n i t a t i o n , no washing, b a t h i n g 
f a c i l i t i e s , no change o f c l o t h i n g . I n d i a n p r ' s t r e a t e d worse 
( t h a n ) K a f f i r c o n v i c t s ... g a o l a u t h o r i t i e s b r u t a l . Govern-
ment e n d e a v o u r i n g breakdown movement by t o r t u r e " (4) . There 
a r e cases where r e s i s t e r s were d e l i b e r a t e l y s i n g l e d o u t f o r 
h a r r a s s m e n t by p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s , a t w o r s t , m t h e case o f 
Sammy Nagappan, l e a d i n g t o d e a t h (5) . Other i n s t a n c e s o f 
m i s t r e a t m e n t may/ W ^ ^ i b u t e d t o i g n o r a n c e and l a c k o f 
s e n s i t i v i t y , r a t h e r t h a n d e l i b e r a t e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t on t h e p a r t 
o f p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e m a n i f o l d s o c i a l and 
d i e t a r y c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e i r p r i s o n e r s (6) . For t h e i r 
(1) I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 2h September - 10 December 1910. 
(2, T h i s d i d n o t i n v a r i a b l y happen, f o r example, t h e Government, 
m March 1910, d e c l i n e d t o d e t a i n Gandhi when he c r o s s e d i n t o 
t h e T r a n s v a a l , S t a r , 17 March 1910. R e p r i n t e d m Gandhi 
Papers, V o l 10 (doc 1 1 7 ) . 
(3) " I t i s m a n i f e s t t h a t m Mr Jordan's c o u r t , I n d i a n P a s s i v e 
E e s i s t e r s must n o t e x p e c t t o be h e a r d on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e i r 
case". I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 6 F e b r u a r y 1909- There were e x c e p t i o n s , 
f o r i n s t a n c e when Gandhi's h e a r i n g was p u t back by t h e c o u r t 
because t h e m a g i s t r a t e knew o f t h e s e r i o u s i l l n e s s o f K a s t u r b a i 
Gandhi. Gandhi Papers, V o l 9 (doc 1 2 9 ) . 
( k ) i b i d . , doc 138. 
(5) I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 10 J u l y 1909 - k September 1909- H. C. Lambert, 
a p r i n c i p a l c l e r k m t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , commented on t h e 
Government e n q u i r y i n t o t h e case, " I am a f r a i d t h a t t h i s i s a 
bad b u s i n e s s . I t i s a complete w h i t e w a s h i n g and i s a c c o r d i n g l y 
h e a r t i l y endorsed by m i n i s t e r s b u t t h e e v i d e n c e , i t i s f a i r l y 
c l e a r , h a r d l y s u p p o r t s t h e c o n c l u s i o n s " . M i n u t e o f 1 October 
1909 w i t h an u n d a t e d l e t t e r f r o m t h e SABIC t o C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . 
CO 291/1 V i (32M6). 
(6) Take, f o r example, t h e case o f Mr S h e l a t , a b r a h m i n , who a c c e p t -
ed s o l i t a r y c o n f i n e m e n t r a t h e r t h a n comply w i t h o r d e r s t o c a r r y 
s l o p p a i l s . Gandhi Papers, V o l 10 (doc 36). 
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p a r t t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n , p a r t l y f o r p u b l i c i t y r e a s o n s a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h t h e campaign, was v e r y r e a d y t o s e i z e on r e p o r t s o f i n d i g n i -
t i e s s u f f e r e d by r e s i s t e r s w h i l s t m d e t e n t i o n . Gandhi's t r e a t -
ment was t h e subgect o f p a r t i c u l a r comment d ) . 
D e m o n s t r a t i o n a g a i n s t and d e f i a n c e o f t h e law m t h e second 
phase o f t h e campaign, as w i t h t h e f i r s t , went on s i m u l t a n e o u s l y 
w i t h n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e p r o g r e s s o f w h i c h from 1908 t o 1911 
p r o v i d e a b a c k c l o t h a g a i n s t w h i c h t o examine t h e " m i l i t a n t " a s p e c t s 
o f t h e second phase (2) . As e a r l y as 22 F e b r u a r y 1908 Gandhi 
p l a c e d b e f o r e Smuts s u g g e s t i o n s f o r t h e amendment o f t h e 
I m m i g r a t i o n R e s t r i c t i o n A c t t o make p o s s i b l e t h e r e p e a l o f t h e 
A s i a t i c A c t (3)- I n d o i n g so he was concerned s o l e l y w i t h 
p r o t e c t i n g t h e r i g h t s o f r e s i d e n t s and t h o s e o u t s i d e t h e 
Colony who c l a i m e d d o m i c i l e . He c l a i m s n o t t o have c o n s i d e r e d 
i t n e c e s s a r y t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e o f t h e e n t r y o f e d u c a t e d 
I n d i a n s a t t h i s s t a g e s i n c e i f t h e A s i a t i c A c t had been r e p e a l e d 
and r e p l a c e d as he e n v i s a g e d educated I n d i a n s w o u ld have had 
t h e t h e o r e t i c a l r i g h t o f e q u a l e n t r y under t h e I m m i g r a t i o n 
R e s t r i c t i o n A c t ( k ) . Not u n t i l May d i d t h e makings o f a 
s e r i o u s d i s p u t e a r i s e , t i l l t h e n Smuts had been c a r e f u l n o t t o 
r e v e a l h i s hand (5)- I n i t i a l l y - m May and June 1908 -
disagreement c e n t r e d on p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e e n t r y o f r e t u r n i n g 
r e s i d e n t s as w e l l as t h a t o f r e c o g n i t i o n o f R e p u b l i c a n 
" c e r t i f i c a t e s " h e l d by e x i s t i n g r e s i d e n t s ( 6 ) y b u t ^ f r o m J u l y , 
a f t e r v a r i o u s c o n c e s s i o n s on t h e Government's p a r t ( 7 ) 1 a s i n g l e 
(1) See, f o r example, t h e shocked t o n e s o f I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 31 October 
1908 r e p o r t i n g t h a t Gandhi had marched a l o n g t h e s t r e e t s m con-
v i c t d r e s s t o appear m c o u r t ( a s a w i t n e s s ) . 
(2) The m mutae o f t h e s e complex d i s c u s s i o n s and n e g o t i a t i o n s i s 
o m i t t e d . 
(3) L e t t e r o f Gandhi t o Smuts 22 F e b r u a r y 1908. CD -^327 (doc 11). 
U ) L e t t e r o f Gandhi t o L o r d A m p t h i l l , 5 August 1909- Gandhi 
Papers, V o l 9 (doc 200). 
(5) See, f o r example, t h e n o n - c o m m i t a l l e t t e r f r o m Smuts' s e c r e t a r y 
t o Gandhi, 12 March 1908, CD ,4327 (doc 11). 
(6) i b i d . 
(7) See "Johannesburg L e t t e r " , August 1908, r e p r i n t e d m Gandhi Papers, 
V o l 8 (doc 277),and s t a t e m e n t m I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 18 J u l y 1908. 
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o b s t a c l e o f r e a l consequence remained. T h i s was Gandhi's 
demand (1) t h a t e d ucated A s i a n I m m i g r a n t s n o t p r e v i o u s l y 
d o m i c i l e d m t h e T r a n s v a a l s h o u l d have t h e r i g h t t o e n t e r t h e 
Colony on t h e same f o o t i n g and by t h e same means as Europeans. 
I n p r a c t i c a l t e r m s , l i t t l e d i v i d e d t h e two s i d e s on t h i s 
m a t t e r , Gandhi b e i n g unconcerned about how few educated A s i a n s 
were m f a c t p e r m i t t e d t o e n t e r , p r o v i d i n g t h e r i g h t e x i s t e d 
f o r them t o do so t h r o u g h n o n - r a c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n p e r m i t t i n g them 
permanent d o m i c i l e ( 2 ) . The T r a n s v a a l Government m i n d f u l o f 
i t s e l e c t o r a t e , , w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d t o a g r e e . I f i t had n o t been 
f o r t h i s s t u m b l i n g b l o c k t h e A s i a t i c A c t would p r o b a b l y have 
been r e p e a l e d m 1908 and t h e substance o f t h e p r o p o s e d A s i a t i c s 
R e g i s t r a t i o n Amendment A c t i n c o r p o r a t e d m t h e I m m i g r a t i o n 
R e s t r i c t i o n A c t w h i c h w o u l d t h e n have become t h e s o l e l e g i s l a -
t i v e s a n c t i o n f o r A s i a n r e g i s t r a t i o n and i m m i g r a t i o n , as 
Gandhi had demanded (3 ) ' Other r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r p o i n t s o f 
d i f f e r e n c e w o u l d have been r e s o l v e d f o l l o w i n g agreement on t h e 
major i s s u e (4) . As i t was, p e n d i n g a s e t t l e m e n t , t h e A s i a t i c 
Law Amendment A c t r e m a i n e d on t h e S t a t u t e Book, f a r f r o m a dead 
l e t t e r , i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h t h e I m m i g r a t i o n R e s t r i c t i o n A c t and 
t h e A s i a t i c s R e g i s t r a t i o n Amendment A c t ( w h i c h came i n t o f o r c e 
m September 1908 a f t e r e x t e n s i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n , a t Gandhi's 
b e h e s t ) . 
(1) F i r s t e x p r e s s e d p u b l i c l y m February' ( I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 29 
F e b r u a r y 1908) b u t seemingly n o t p u t t o Smuts, a t l e a s t m 
w r i t i n g t i l l June ( l e t t e r o f 13 June. CD ^527 (doc 11) ) . 
(2) Gandhi made t h i s c l e a r , f o r example, m a l e t t e r o f 19 
September 1908 t o W. Hosken, Chairman o f t h e Committee o f 
Europeans a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e campaign. Gandhi Papers, V o l 9 
(doc 30). He was n o t p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t Smuts' o f f e r f o r t h e 
i s s u e o f t e m p o r a r y p e r m i t s t o educated A s i a n i m m i g r a n t s . 
(3) The Government's w i l l i n g n e s s t o implement such a package, sub-
g p c t t o Gandhi's agreement t o f o r e g o e q u a l r i g h t s o f e n t r y f o r 
educated A s i a n s i s shown m a m i n u t e s e n t by T r a n s v a a l m i n i s t e r s 
t o L o r d S e l b o r n e , e n c l o s e d w i t h h i s d e s p a t c h o f 20 J u l y t o 
L o r d E l g i n . CO 291/127 (28881). 
( k ) D e t a i l s o f s u b s i d i a r y i s s u e s a r e s e t o u t m m i n u t e No 528 f r o m 
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o L o r d S e l b o r n e e n c l o s e d w i t h t h e l a t t e r ' s 
d e s p a t c h o f 7 September 1908 t o L o r d Crewe. CO 291/128 (35076). 
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N e g o t i a t i o n s e n t e r e d a new phase m mid-1909 m England 
d u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n s t h e r e l e a d i n g up t o U n i o n . Two 
d e l e g a t i o n s o f South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s - one fr o m N a t a l , t h e 
o t h e r from t h e T r a n s v a a l , c o m p r i s i n g H. Habib and Gandhi were 
m B r i t a i n a t t h e t i m e t o p r e s s t h e i r case ( l ) . As a r e s u l t 
o f t a l k s i n v o l v i n g Gandni, Smuts, t h e E a i l o f Crewe ( S e c r e t a r y 
o f S t a t e f o r t h e C o l o n i e s s i n c e mid-1908), t h e I n d i a O f f i c e and 
t h e SABIC, as w e l l as o t h e r s , Smuts ag r e e d m p r i n c i p l e t o r e p e a l 
t h e A s i a t i c A c t and t o a d m i t , a n n u a l l y , t o t h e T r a n s v a a l up t o 
s i x educated A s i a n s on a permanent b a s i s , b u t he w o u l d n o t p e r m i t 
t h e e n t r y o f any I n d i a n s under a g e n e r a l and n o n - r a c i a l i m m i g r a -
t i o n t e s t , even i f i t was agreed i t w o u l d be a d m i n i s t e r e d m a 
f a s h i o n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t A s i a n s . He exp r e s s e d t h e f e a r 
o f w h i t e South A f r i c a n s t h a t u l t i m a t e l y t h e p r a c t i c e w o u l d have 
t o conform t o t h e p r i n c i p l e (2). Gandhi was adamant, a s s e r t i n g 
t h a t , "There must be l e g a l e q u a l i t y w i t h t h e w h i t e s , i t w i l l 
n o t m a t t e r t h e n , i f m p r a c t i c e , n o t even a s i n g l e I n d i a n i s 
a b l e t o g e t m ... b u t i t w ould n o t s e r v e o u r purpose even i f 
p e r m i t s a r e i s s u e d t o f i f t y men so l o n g as t h e law i s t a i n t e d . . . 
i t i s n o t a f i g h t on b e h a l f o f t h e educated ... b u t f o r I n d i a n s ' 
honour. For our s e l f r e s p e c t , f o r t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f o u r p l e d g e " (3)-
The T a l k s s t a l l e d , n o t res u m i n g m any m e a n i n g f u l way t i l l 
F e b r u a r y 1911 w i t h t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e d r a f t Union-wide Immi-
g r a t i o n R e g u l a t i o n B i l l . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e months t h e r e 
was a f a i r l y i n t e n s i v e r o u n d o f exchanges between Gandhi and 
Smuts t h r o u g h m e e t i n g s and l e t t e r s (4). The B i l l p r o v i d e d f o r 
(1) R e f e r r e d t o page 3 0 above. The d e l e g a t i o n h a r d l y made 
an a u s p i c i o u s s t a r t . The T r a n s v a a l Government a r r e s t e d 
i t s members s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i r a p p o i n t m e n t , c l a i m i n g n o t 
t o know o f t h e m i s s i o n . 
(2) J . C. Smuts t o E a r l o f Crewe, 26 August 1909. CO 291/1^3 
(28796). 
(3) I n d i a n O p i n i o n , g u j e r a t i s e c t i o n , 2 October 1909« R e p r i n t e d 
m Gandhi Papers, V o l 9 (doc 2^5). 
(4) D e t a i l s and t e x t s o f t h e exchanges from 2 March 1911 -
20 May 1911 appear m I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 18 March - 27 May 1911 
and Gandhi Papers, V o l s 10 and 11. 
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t h e r e p e a l o f t h e A s i a t i c A c t (1) b u t l e f t u n r e s o l v e d t h e 
q u e s t i o n o f e n t r y by educated A s i a n s , a m a t t e r c o m p l i c a t e d by 
t h i s t i m e by t h e need t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s i t i o n n o t o n l y o f t h e 
T r a n s v a a l , t o w h i c h t h e second phase o f r e s i s t a n c e c o n f i n e d 
i t s e l f , b u t a l s o t h e o t h e r p r o v i n c e s . I n t h e o r y , a t l e a s t , 
t h e r e was no r e s t r i c t i o n on educated A s i a n s e n t e r i n g t h e Cape 
and N a t a l , whereas m t h e Orange Free S t a t e t h e r e was a r a c i a l 
b a r r i e r t o A s i a n s e t t l e m e n t (2) . Gandhi, m c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
I n d i a n l e a d e r s m N a t a l and t h e Cape, sought t o a r r i v e a t a 
s o l u t i o n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t hemselves and a t t h e same t i m e t o 
w h i t e o p i n i o n (3), b u t t h e B i l l f o u n d e r e d , Smuts f i n d i n g i t 
i m p o s s i b l e t o r e a c h an a c c o r d w i t h Free S t a t e Members o f 
P a r l i a m e n t on t h e p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n o f A s i a n r i g h t s 
o f e n t r y t o t h e P r o v i n c e . 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s s e t b a c k , b o t h Smuts and Gandhi 
wished t o see an e a r l y end t o t h e p r o t r a c t e d c o n f l i c t between 
them ( k ) and a c c o r d was r e a c h e d on 22 A p r i l , 1911, t h e t e r m s 
b e i n g approved a t a mass m e e t i n g o f A s i a n s m Johannesburg on 
27 A p r i l , w r i t t e n c o n f i r m a t i o n f o l l o w e d a f t e r t h e r e s o l u t i o n 
o f c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t t e c h n i c a l i t i e s on 20 May. Smuts under-
t o o k t o i n t r o d u c e l e g i s l a t i o n r e p e a l i n g t h e A s i a t i c A c t and 
g r a n t i n g l e g a l e q u a l i t y o f e n t r y f o r a l l i m m i g r a n t s w i t h 
d i f f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t o f an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , as d i s t i n c t 
f rom s t a t u t o r y c h a r a c t e r , o f A s i a n s and Europeans. No 
(1) Except m so f a r as i t was a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n 
o f m i n o r s l a w f u l l y r e s i d e n t m t h e T r a n s v a a l . T h i s p r o v i s i o n 
a r o s e o u t o f t h e case o f C h o t o b h a i v s Rex ( 1 9 1 0 ) . Gandhi 
Papers, V o l 10 (docs 256, 2?6, 317, 359). 
(2) Chp X X X I I I o f t h e Orange Free S t a t e Law Book. 
(3) The p r o p o s a l s a g r e e d between t h e Union's I n d i a n l e a d e r s a r e 
s e t o u t m l e t t e r s o f 7 and 8 A p r i l f r o m Gandhi t o Smuts' 
P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y , Mr Lane, Gandhi Papers, V o l 11 (docs 12 
and 16). I f implemented i t i s l i k e l y t h e y w o u l d have l e d 
t o some l o s s , m p r a c t i c e , o f A s i a n i m m i g r a t i o n r i g h t s t o 
t h e Cape and N a t a l . 
( k ) The a n x i e t y o f t h e two l e a d e r s t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t i s c l e a r l y 
e x pressed m t h e exchange o f l e t t e r s between Gandhi and Lane 
on 21 and 22 A p r i l . E n c l o s u r e w i t h d e s p a t c h o f 29 A p r i l 1911 
f r o m L o r d G l a d s t o n e t o Mr L. V. H a r c o u r t ( C o l o n i a l S e c r e t a r y 
1910 - 1915), co 351/10 (16586). 
d e c i s i o n was t a k e n as t o whether a Union-wide B i l l w o u l d be 
i n t r o d u c e d o r one s i m p l y r e l a t i n g t o t h e T r a n s v a a l ( l ) , b u t 
m t h e s e t t l e m e n t Gandhi sought an u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t t h e s e p a r a t e 
e x i s t i n g r i g h t s o f A s i a n s m t h e v a r i o u s P r o v i n c e s w o u ld be 
p r o t e c t e d m t h e l e g i s l a t i o n t o be i n t r o d u c e d , always assuming, 
o f c o u r s e , t h e A c t a p p l i e d t o t h e p r o v i n c e concerned. The 
Government's r e p l y t h a t , " w h i l e i t i s n o t p r o p o s e d t o t a k e 
away a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e p o s i t i o n s 
m t h e v a r i o u s p r o v i n c e s w i l l no doubt be a f f e c t e d by any law 
w h i c h i s i n t e n d e d t o be g e n e r a l and u n i f o r m f o r t h e whole 
u n i o n " (2), however ambiguous, d i d n o t p r e v e n t acceptance o f 
t h e p r o v i s i o n a l s e t t l e m e n t . The agreement, as L o r d Lucas, 
P a r l i a m e n t a r y Under S e c r e t a r y f o r t h e C o l o n i e s , m i n u t e d was 
"a f r i e n d l y t r u c e t i l l n e x t s e s s i o n " (3) and n o t h i n g more ( k ) . 
The second phase o f t h e campaign r e s u l t e d m i n c r e a s i n g 
r e s e n t m e n t m I n d i a a t t h e t r e a t m e n t o f T r a n s v a a l I n d i a n s , ex-
p r e s s e d t h r o u g h p u b l i c m e e t i n g s , t h e p r e s s , r e v i e w s and 
p e t i t i o n s (5)« T h i s c o n c e r n was f u r t h e r e d b o t h by t h e presence 
m I n d i a o f d e p o r t e e s and, f r o m J u l y t i l l September 19091 o f 
Henry Polak who had been s e n t t h e r e by t h e B r i t i s h I n d i a n 
C o n c i l i a t i o n Committee (6) t o p u b l i c i s e t h e p l i g h t o f T r a n s v a a l 
f l ) Gandhi f i r s t p r oposed, as a way o u t o f t h e impasse o^er t h e 
1911 I m m i g r a t i o n R e s t r i c t i o n B i l l , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f l e g i s -
l a t i o n a p p l y i n g s o l e l y t o t h e T r a n s v a a l . Gandhi Papers, 
V o l 11 (doc 12, op. c i t . ) . 
(2) Lane t o Gandhi, 20 May 1911. I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 27 May 1911-
(3) CO. m i n u t e o f 22 May w i t h d e s p a t c h o f 26 A p r i l 1911 f r o m 
L o r d G l a d s tone t o Mr H a r c o u r t . CO 331/1O (15711). 
( k ) Q u i t e a p a r t f r o m t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
r eached, i t c o v e r e d o n l y one o f t h e many f i e l d s o f g r i e v a n c e 
o f t h e A s i a n p o p u l a t i o n . Gandhi, d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , gave 
w a r n i n g t h a t s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e i m m i g r a t i o n i s s u e w o u ld n o t 
a f f e c t t h e r i g h t and d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f South A f r i c a n A s i a n s 
t o work f o r an improvement o f t h e i r l o t m o t h e r r e s p e c t s . 
Gandhi Papers, V o l 11 (doc 12). 
(5) D e t a i l s o f w h i c h appeared r e g u l a r l y m I n d i a n O p i n i o n . 
See, f o r example, e d i t i o n o f 6 November 1909. 
(6) See page 30 above. 
I n d i a n s and r a i s e f u n d s . The v i c e r o y was s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s -
t u r b e d , by October 1908, t o f e e l o b l i g e d t o i n f o r m t h e I n d i a 
O f f i c e t h a t , " P r o t e s t s have been r e c e i v e d f r o m a l l p a r t s o f 
I n d i a a g a i n s t t h e t r e a t m e n t to w h i c h B r i t i s h I n d i a n s a r e b e i n g 
s u b j e c t e d ... i t i s most d e s i r a b l e m my o p i n i o n t h a t some 
s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e q u e s t i o n s m d i s p u t e s h o u l d be a r r i v e d a t 
w i t h o u t d e l a y ... we r e g a r d as a v e r y s e r i o u s m a t t e r t h e 
p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t m t h i s c o u n t r y o f t h e measures t a k e n t o 
e n f o r c e t h e law ..." ( 1 ) . 
The C o l o n i a l O f f i c e f o u n d i t s e l f m an awkward p o s i t i o n , 
a s s a i l e d by t h e I n d i a O f f i c e , by q u e s t i o n s m P a r l i a m e n t , by 
memoranda from members o f t h e SABIC, and by t h e T r a n s v a a l 
A s i a n s t h e m s e l v e s , b u t , a t t h e same t i m e , m i n d f u l o f t h e 
T r a n s v a a l ' s R e s p o n s i b l e s t a t u s ( 2 ) . C o l o n i a l O f f i c e 
» o f f i c i a l s were g e n e r a l l y c r i t i c a l a t t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e 
campaign^ r e j e c t i n g Gandhi's a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r e p e a l o f t h e 
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A s i a t i c A c t was an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e 1908 Agreement (3), 
and c h i d i n g him f o r r a i s i n g a new i s s u e , m demanding r i g h t s 
o f e n t r y f o r ed u c a t e d A s i a n s (4). Nor was t h e S e c r e t a r y o f 
(1) Telegram o f 22 October 1908 from V i c e r o y t o I n d i a O f f i c e , c o p i e d 
t o t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . CD ^38^ (doc 7 ) . 
(2) L o r d Crewe w r o t e t o L o r d A m p t h i l l , "we a r e a l l o b l i g e d t o a d m i t 
t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - g o v e r n i n g c o l o n i e s t o e x c l u d e ( w o u l d be 
i m m i g r a n t s ) b u t we a r e bound t o see t h a t no h e e d l e s s h a r d s h i p s 
a r e i n f l i c t e d and t o make r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s when we a r e n o t m 
a p o s i t i o n t o g i v e o r d e r s " . 13 September 1908. CO 291/133- (3^983)-
(3) See mi n u t e by Mr. Hartman J u s t , A s s i s t a n t Under S e c r e t a r y , o f 
12 August 1908 w i t h d e s p a t c h o f 20 J u l y 1908 f r o m L o r d Selborne 
t o L o r d E l g i n . CO 291/127 (28881). 
( i f ) L o r d Crewe t o L o r d A m p t h i l l , 13 September 1908. CO 291/133 (3^983). 
The C o l o n i a l O f f i c e argued t h a t t h i s i s s u e was c l o s e d w i t h t h e 
passage m 1907 o f t h e I m m i g r a t i o n R e s t r i c t i o n and A s i a t i c 
R e g i s t r a t i o n A c t s , w h i c h e x c l u d e d new A s i a n i m m i g r a n t s " i r r e s p e c t i v e 
o f t h e i r p e r s o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s m t h e hope t h a t ... ( t h e 
r e s t r i c t i o n s ) w o u l d r e s u l t m more f a v o u r a b l e t r e a t m e n t o f 
A s i a t i c s r e s i d e n t m t h e Colony". M i n u t e o f L o r d Crewe t o L o r d 
M o r l e y , 6 October 1908 w i t h d e s p a t c h o f 7 September 1908 f r o m L o r d 
S e l b o r n e t o L o r d Crewe. CO 291/128 (35076). 
The C o l o n i a l O f f i c e f u r t h e r c l a i m e d t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n had been made 
c l e a r as l o n g ago as J u l y - A u g u s t 1907 w i t h t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f a 
B l u e Book CD 3308 on " l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t i n g A s i a t i c s m t h e T r a n s v a a l " 
and t h a t Gandhi had r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o n l y m mid-1908. See pages 
25 and 67 f o r Gandhi's v i e w s . 
S t a t e d i s p o s e d t o re-open t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f T r a n s v a a l 
B r i t i s h I n d i a n s ' r i g h t s as s u b j e c t s o f t h e Crown, and h i s o f f i -
c i a l s doubted t h a t he had t h e f o r m a l l o c u s s t a n d i t o do so ( l ) . 
And w h i l s t t h e r e was some d i s g u s t m t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e a t t h e 
d e p o r t a t i o n o f I n d i a n s from South A f r i c a , Mr J u s t commented, 
" T h i s p r o c e d u r e i n f l i c t s no s u b s t a n t i a l h a r d s h i p on I n d i a n s . 
They may be d e p o r t e d b u t b e f o r e e j e c t m e n t f r o m South A f r i c a 
t h e y a r e i n v i t e d t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t o f a p p e a l " (2) . L o r d 
Crewe t o o k a s i m i l a r l i n e m t h e House ®f Lo r d s (3) ' 
The C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , busy s h e d d i n g i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
m South A f r i c a , c l e a r l y had no i n t e n t i o n o f h a v i n g t h i s p r o c e s s 
m t e r u p t e d by A s i a n s m t h e T r a n s v a a l . A t t h e same t i m e t h e 
d e s i r e o f Smuts and Botha t o b r i n g a b o u t Union m South A f r i c a 
gave t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e a c e r t a i n l e v e r a g e . And, on o c c a s i o n s , 
t h e C o l o n i a l Off103 d i d i n t e r v e n e , e i t h e r t o ex p r e s s concern a t 
t h e t r e a t m e n t o f t h o s e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e campaign ( k ) o r t o 
a c t as a m e d i a t o r ( b e i n g " e x t r e m e l y a n x i o u s t h a t ( t h e campaign) 
s h o u l d be b r o u g h t t o a c l o s e " ) (5)- I n November 1908, m r e s -
ponse t o a guarded o f f e r from Botha aimed a t a c h i e v i n g a f i n a l 
s e t t l e m e n t o f I n d i a n demands (6), t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e p u t 
f o r w a r d p r o p o s a l s ( i n a most d e f e r e n t i a l manner) w h i c h e n v i s a g e d 
(1) See Mr J u s t ' s minute o f 6 October 1908 w i t h d e s p a t c h o f 
14 September 1908 from L o r d S e l b o r n e t o L o r d Crewe. 
co 291/128 (36129). 
(2) M i n u t e o f 18 March 1909 w i t h t e l e g r a m o f 17 March 1909 f r o m 
L o r d S e l b o r n e t o L o r d Crewe. CO 291/137 (9539). Mr J u s t 
f u r t h e r commented on 22 March, "The T r a n s v a a l have a c l e a r 
r i g h t t o d e p o r t ... HMG a r e n o t m a p o s i t i o n t o expr e s s 
any o p i n i o n ... on what i s t a k i n g p l a c e m Portuguese 
T e r r i t o r y as we do n o t know w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h e f a c t s as 
t o t h e law t h e r e b u t i t must be assumed t h a t t h e B r i t i s h 
I n d i a n s have been l a w f u l l y d e p o r t e d f r o m Alagoa Bay". 
(3) On 2k March 1909-
( k ) S e e , f o r example, L o r d Crewe's s u g g e s t i o n o f 23 October 1908 t o 
L o r d Se l b o r n e t h a t r e s i s t e r s m i g h t be g i v e n l i g h t e r s e n t e n c e s . 
R e f e r r e d t o by t h e l a t t e r m h i s t e l e g r a m o f 2 November 1908. 
CO 291/129 (39986). 
(5) Telegram o f 5 November 1908 f r o m L o r d Crewe t o L o r d S e l b o r n e . 
co 291/129 (39986). 
(6) The o f f e r i s c o n t a i n e d m a t e l e g r a m o f 2 November 1908 f r o m 
L o r d S e l b o r n e t o L o r d Crewe, op. c i t . 
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t h e r e p e a l o f t h e A s i a t i c Law Amendment A c t and t h e A s i a t i c s 
R e g i s t r a t i o n Amendment A c t , when t h e A s i a n p o p u l a t i o n had 
r e g i s t e r e d , and a l i b e r a l i s i n g o f e n t r y r i g h t s f o r c e r t a i n p r e -
war T r a n s v a a l I n d i a n r e s i d e n t s ( l ) . As Se l b o r n e p r e d i c t e d (2) 
t h e p r o p o s a l s were r e j e c t e d (3). I n 1909, d u r i n g t h e d i s -
c u s s i o n s l e a d i n g t o Union, when Gandhi vas m B r i t a i n , t h e 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e a c t e d as a f o c a l p o i n t f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s t o end 
t h e c o n f l i c t , b u t were n e i ther i m p a r t i a l i \ o r , i t w o u l d seem J 
p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f i c i e n t m e d i a t o r s (k). S e t t l e m e n t was b r o u g h t 
n e a r e r , b u t m t h e end t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e a c c e p t e d , a l b e i t 
w i t h some r e l u c t a n c e , Smuts' recommendation t h a t i n s t e a d o f 
p u r s u i n g t h e m a t t e r m t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e T r a n s v a a l , " t h e b e t t e r 
course would be t o s h e l v e t h i s d i f f i c u l t y f o r t h e p r e s e n t and 
l e t t h e more i m p a r t i a l t r i b u n a l o f t h e Union Government and 
P a r l i a m e n t d e a l w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n " (5) . 
When t h e U n i o n Government m 1911 c o n s i d e r e d i n t r o d u c t i o n 
o f new i m m i g r a t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e a g a i n i n t e r -
vened s e e i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e c u r i n g c o n c e s s i o n s t o meet 
Gandhi's r e q u i r e m e n t s , m r e t u r n f o r agreement f r o m t h e I n d i a n 
Government t o end t h e s u p p l y o f i n d e n t u r e d l a b o u r (6) . 
(1) P r o p o s a l s m t e l e g r a m o f L o r d Crewe t o L o r d S e l b o r n e , 
5 November, op. c i t . 
(2) Telegram o f 8 November 1908 t o L o r d Crewe. CO 291/129 
(3) L o r d S e l b o r n e t o L o r d Crewe, 16 December 1908. CO 291/129 
(287). 
( k ) See, f o r example, t h e d e l a y on t h e p a r t o f t h e C o l o n i a l 
O f f i c e m s e n d i n g Gandhi's s e t t l e m e n t p r o p o s a l s t o Smuts. 
Papers w i t h l e t t e r s o f 6 September 1909 f r o m Gandhi t o t h e 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , CO 291/1^2 (3OOO8), and m i n u t e s w i t h 
Gandhi's l e t t e r o f 8 October 1909 t o t h e C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , 
CO 291 /1^2 (33205). 
(5) L e t t e r o f 13 August 1909 f r o m Smuts t o Crewe. CO 291/1*Q 
(27188). 
(6) Whereas elements m s u c c e s s i v e N a t a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had a l -
ways p r e s s e d f o r t h e r e t e n t i o n o f i n d e n t u r e d l a b o u r , i t d i d 
n o t a t a l l a c c o r d w i t h Union Government i n t e r e s t s and Botha 
and Smuts were, m 19111 l o o k i n g f o r a s o l u t i o n w h i c h would 
n o t p r o v o k e a c l a s h w i t h i n t e r e s t s m N a t a l . See a l s o 
pages 1 4 -15 
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The r e s u l t was h i g h l y s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t h e Union Government, b u t 
t h e 1911 I m m i g r a t i o n B i l l h a r d l y s a t i s f i e d t h e I n d i a n o r B r i t i s h 
Governments, l e t a l o n e South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s . 
R e a c t i o n o f w h i t e s m t h e T r a n s v a a l t o t h e second phase, 
much as t h e f i r s t , was one o f i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n and deep m i s t r u s t . 
S e l b o r n e commented /"they a r e e x a s p e r a t e d w i t h t h e I n d i a n s whom 
th e y c o n s i d e r t o have been g u i l t y o f a b r e a c h o f f a i t h and t o 
have t r i c k e d them" d ) . They were m no mood f o r compromise, 
as t h e Rand D a i l y M a i l was q u i c k t o p o i n t o u t m s u g g e s t i n g 
t h a t i f t h e Government "gave way" i t c o u l d be t u r n e d o u t o f 
o f f i c e (2) . Some elements a d v o c a t e d d e p o r t a t i o n o f A s i a n s 
a l r e a d y m t h e T r a n s v a a l (3)- N o t h i n g , i t w o u l d seem, c o u l d 
c o n v i n c e t h e e l e c t o r a t e t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l e q u a l r i g h t o f 
e n t r y f o r a l l r a c e s demanded by Gandhi w o u l d n o t l e a d t o an 
i n f l u x " o f thousands o f I n d i a n l a d s who have been o r a r e b e i n g 
educated ... m N a t a l , t o say n o t h i n g o f t h o s e ... m I n d i a " ( h ) . 
The T r a n s v a a l p r e s s , m g e n e r a l , w i t h t h e n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n o f 
t h e T r a n s v a a l Leader b o t h r e f l e c t e d and i n c i t e d European p r e j u -
d i c e s "The o b j e c t ( o f r e s i s t a n c e ) i s t o f o r c e f r o m t h e 
Government a c o n c e s s i o n w h i c h t h e A s i a t i c s have n o t c o n v i n c e d 
t h e p u b l i c need be made. I t i s hoped t o b r i n g t h e Government 
o f t h e l a n d i n t o r i d i c u l e and contempt ... a p p a r e n t l y n o t h i n g 
w i l l s a t i s f y t h e I n d i a n l e a d e r s b u t h u m b l i n g t h e Government ... 
m t h e eyes o f hundreds o f thousands o f N a t i v e s " (5)- W h i l s t 
t h e p r e s s gave d i r e w a r n i n g s t h a t anarchy and c i v i l war c o u l d 
r e s u l t f r o m " p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e " t h e p a p e r s d i d what t h e y c o u l d 
t o b e l i t t l e t h e campaign, p o r t r a y i n g i t as u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f 
(1) Telegram o f 8 November 1908 f r o m L o r d S e l b o r n e t o L o r d Crewe. 
CO 291/129 (^105^). 
(2) op. c i t . , 27 January 1909-
(3) For example, Mr Neser, member o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly. 
Rand D a i l y M a i l , 1 March 1911. 
( k ) S t a r , 11 August 1908. 
(5) Rand D a i l y M a i l , 9 November 1908. G u e r i l l a a c t i v i t y m 
I n d i a a t t h e t i m e may have g i v e n such comments added i m p a c t . 
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I n d i a n o p i n i o n m t h e Colony. The Rand D a i l y M a i l concluded, 
" i t o n l y needs dog owners t o r e f u s e t o pay r e n t as a p r o t e s t 
a g a i n s t t h e dog l i c e n c e system and c h i l d r e n t o p a s s i v e l y r e s i s t 
g o i n g t o s c h o o l because t h e y may n o t e a t sweets t o have t h e 
a b s u r d i t y o f t h e whole b u s i n e s s made p l a i n " ( l ) . There i s 
s i n g u l a r l y l i t t l e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f w h i t e o p i n i o n 
r o s e above t h e l e v e l o f such comments m s p i t e o f t h e u n c e a s i n g 
e f f o r t s o f Gandhi and h i s c o l l e a g u e s t o educate o p i n i o n t h r o u g h 
t h e p r e s s ( w h i c h sometimes p r i n t e d t h e i r l e t t e r s and s t a t e m e n t s ) 
and p u b l i c m e e t i n g s (2). A c t i v e European b a c k i n g was c o n f i n e d 
t o members and s u p p o r t e r s o f W i l l i a m Hosken's committee (3)« 
Smuts h i m s e l f commented d u r i n g a debate on t h e f r r s t Union 
I m m i g r a n t s R e g u l a t i o n B i l l , "We cannot t r e a t I n d i a n s and A s i a t i c s 
g e n e r a l l y l i k e b a r b a r i a n s . They b e l o n g t o an a n c i e n t r a c e who 
know how t o f i g h t and s u f f e r f o r t h e i r r i g h t s ... t h e y know 
how t o t a k e c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n under t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f men o f h i g h 
c h a r a c t e r and g r e a t i n t e l l i g e n c e " ... (4) . I t i s some measure 
o f t h e campaign and m p a r t i c u l a r i t s second phase t h a t Smuts 
s h o u l d have made such a s t a t e m e n t , a t a l l , b u t h i s was a 
v o i c e m t h e w i l d e r n e s s and t h e r e s p e c t i t i n d i c a t e d f o r t h e 
A s i a n s i s by no means borne o u t by h i s a c t u a l conduct o f a f f a i r s (5)« 
d ) i b i d . , 12 December 1908. 
(2) I n December 1908 t h e B.I.A. convened a m e e t i n g t o 
a f f o r d Europeans an o p p o r t u n i t y t o ask q u e s t i o n s a bout 
t h e campaign. 100 a t t e n d e d . T r a n s v a a l Leader, 
21 December 1908. 
(3) See page 3 0 above. 
( k ) Rand D a i l y M a i l , 1 March 1911. 
(5) Smuts' r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Gandhi i s c o n s i d e r e d , page 107 
below. 
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CHAPTER VT RESISTANCE AND REACTION: T h i r d Phase 1913-191^ 
The campaign was suspended from A p r i l 1911 
t i l l September 1913 when Gandhi l a u n c h e d a f u r t h e r phase o f 
r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t " t h e monster o f r a c i a l p r e j u d i c e m t h e 
h e a r t o f t h e Government and l o c a l w h i t e s " c o i n c i d e n t w i t h 
t h e passage i n t o l a w, a t t h e t h i r d a t t e m p t , o f an I m m i g r a n t s 
R e g u l a t i o n B i l l w h i c h was o f Union-wide a p p l i c a t i o n . 
Gandhi had been m f r e q u e n t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Government (2) 
about t h e B i l l and i t s a n t e c e d e n t s , s e e k i n g c l a r i f i c a t i o n and 
amendments (3) . The A c t , w i t h one i m p o r t a n t n o t i o n a l q u a l i f i -
c a t i o n , met Gandhi's r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t I n d i a n s s h o u l d have t h e 
r i g h t m law t o e n t e r South A f r i c a on a n o n - r a c i a l b a s i s , t h o u g h 
t h e r e was p r o v i s i o n m t h e A c t f o r t h e r e f u s a l o f e n t r y , by 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n t o any p e r s o n o r " c l a s s o f per s o n s ... 
on economic grounds o r on account o f s t a n d a r d o r h a b i t s o f l i f e 
(deemed) t o be u n s u i t e d t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e Union o r any 
p a r t t h e r e o f " (5) . I t was g e n e r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h i s 
c l a u s e would be used t o e x c l u d e A s i a n i m m i g r a n t s b u t i t was n o t 
o v e r t l y r a c i a l . W i t h t h e passage o f t h e B i l l , t h e A s i a t i c 
Law Amendment A c t ceased t o have e f f e c t . 
A number o f p o i n t s o f i s s u e n e v e r t h e l e s s remained o f 
s u f f i c i e n t i m p o r t a n c e t o provoke a r e s u m p t i o n o f n o n - c o - o p e r a t i o n . 
These a r e summarised m t h e memorandum s e n t t o t h e Government by 
th e B.I.A. on 12 September 1913 (^  ) f o l l o w i n g Gandhi's w a r n i n g 
t o Smuts m p e r s o n a l correspondence t h a t a r e s u m p t i o n o f 
(1) I n d i a n O p i n i o n ( g u j e r a t i s e c t i o n ) , 13 September 1913« 
R e p r i n t e d i n Gandhi Papers, V o l 12 (doc 128). 
(2) I t i s n o t c l e a r t o what e x t e n t he c o n s u l t e d members o f t h e 
B.I.A. b e f o r e making h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . 
(3) The Government d i d , f o r example, agree as a r e s u l t t o r e c o g -
n i s e monogamous m a r r i a g e s p e r f o r m e d under n o n - c h r i s t i a n r i t e s 
m I n d i a ( b u t n o t South A f r i c a ) , (k) Ho 22, 1913. 
(,^ > Chapter I I , S e c t i o n 4 d ) ( a ) . 
( 5) The f u l l t e x t was p r i n t e d m I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 20 September 1913-
The Government i n t e r p r e t e d t h e memorandum as an u l t i m a t u m . 
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r e s i s t a n c e m h i s v i e w had become i m p e r a t i v e ( l ) . The i s s u e s were 
as f o l l o w s t h e A c t c o n t a i n e d a s p e c i f i c a l l y r a c i a l p r o v i s i o n as 
r e g a r d s e n t r y t o t h e Free S t a t e (2 ) ; c e r t a i n r i g h t s h e l d by I n d i a n s 
p r i o r t o t h e A c t were e i t h e r n o t r e s t o r e d o r m a i n t a i n e d (3) ; t h e 
S t a t u s o f A s i a n women m a r r i e d m South A f r i c a was n o t s e c u r e d , 
(1) L e t t e r o f 10 September 1913, I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 13 September 1913-
(2) S e c t i o n 7 o f t h e A c t . T h i s m a t t e r had e f f e c t i v e l y been r e s o l v e d 
m correspondence between Gandhi and t h e M i n i s t r y o f t h e I n t e r i o r 
r e s t i n g w i t h Mr Gorges' ( P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y t o M i n i s t e r o f I n t e r i o r ) 
l e t t e r o f 19 August 1913, Gandhi Papers, V o l 1 2 ,(appendix 8 ) . 
(3) There was concern ( a ) a t t h e l o s s o f r i g h t s o f d o m i c i l e f o r I n d i a n s 
i n d e n t u r e d a f t e r 1895, t h o u g h t h i s was p a r t l y r e s o l v e d m Gorges' 
l e t t e r t o Gandhi op. c i t . , ( b ) a t t h e a b r o g a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s 
o f N a t a l - b o r n I n d i a n s t o e n t e r t h e Cape, and ( c ) t h e e x c l u s i o n o f 
t h e c o u r t s f r o m a p p e a l s a g a i n s t i m m i g r a t i o n b o a r d d e c i s i o n s ex-
c e p t on p o i n t s o f law. 
(k) Problems o v e r t h e s t a t u s o f I n d i a n m a r r i a g e s m South A f r i c a were 
b r o u g h t s h a r p l y i n t o f o c u s between 1911 and 1913 as a r e s u l t o f 
a number o f c o u r t cases J u s t i c e Wessels m t h e T r a n s v a a l m 1911, 
m a case i n v o l v i n g an i n t e n d i n g i m m i g r a n t , B a i R a s u l , r u l e d t h a t 
an I n d i a n m i g h t n o t b r i n g more t h a n one w i f e i n t o t h e P r o v i n c e 
(Summary r e p o r t , I n d i a n Opinion, 8 J u l y 19H)- A y e a r l a t e r , 
Mr J o r d a n , r e s i d e n t m a g i s t r a t e m Johannesburg, r u l e d m t h e case 
o f Mrs J u s s a t t h a t i f a man was m a r r i e d t o more t h a n one w i f e 
w h i l s t t h e f i r s t w i f e was a l i v e a l l t h e w i v e s became p r o h i b i t e d 
i m m i g r a n t s on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e m a r r i a g e was n o t p e r m i t t e d m t h e 
law o f t h e T r a n s v a a l (Summary r e p o r t , I n d i a n Opinion, 9 March and 
11 May 1912). T h i s d e c i s i o n was p a r a l l e l l e d m t h e Cape, m March 
1913, by t h e judgement o f Mr J u s t i c e S e a r l e r e j e c t i n g t h e a p p e a l 
o f B a i Mariam a g a i n s t d e p o r t a t i o n f r o m t h e Cape ( t e x t o f j u d g e -
ment r e p r i n t e d m Gandhi Papers, V o l 12 ( a p p e n d i x 1 ) . S e a r l e made 
c l e a r , what few may t i l l t h e n have r e a l i z e d , t h a t polygamous 
m a r r i a g e s , o r m a r r i a g e s a c c o r d i n g t o customs p e r m i t t i n g polygamy, 
were n o t r e c o g n i z e d m t h e Cape and had n o t been f o r many y e a r s . 
S e a r l e ' s recommendation t h a t B a i Mariam m i g h t l e g a l i z e h e r m a r r i a g e 
m South A f r i c a , under A c t 16 o f 1860 o f t h e Cape, h a r d l y l e s s e n e d 
t h e anger o f South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s f a c e d w i t h a s i t u a t i o n m w h i c h 
t h e i r w i v e s were redu c e d t o t h e l e v e l o f c o n c u b i n e s . The M i n i s t e r 
o f t h e I n t e r i o r a t t e m p t e d t o calm t h e r e s u l t a n t i n f l a m e d s i t u a t i o n 
m a l e t t e r t o Gandhi, d a t e d 10 A p r i l 1913, hy s t a t i n g t h a t , " t h e 
Government has no i n t e n t i o n o f d e p a r t i n g from t h e p r e s e n t p r a c t i c e 
m r e g a r d t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f w i v e s and m i n o r c h i l d r e n o f 
B r i t i s h I n d i a n s l a w f u l l y r e s i d e n t m South A f r i c a " (Gandhi Papers, 
V o l 12 w i t h document 1 ) . T h i s was r e c e i v e d w i t h s c e p t i c i s m w h i c h 
t h e case, a few months l a t e r m N a t a l , o f Kulsam B i b i who was r e -
f u s e d e n t r y , i n t e r a l i a , on t h e Grounds t h a t h e r ' s was n o t a 
monogamous m a r r i a g e , d i d n o t h i n g t o a l l a y (Summary r e p o r t , I n d i a n 
O p i n i o n , 27 August and 8 October 1913). The i s s u e o f t h e r e c o g n i -
t i o n o f n o n - c h r i s t i a n m a r r i a g e s e x c i t e d h i g h e m o t i o n m b o t h 
European and I n d i a n South A f r i c a n s , p r e s e n t i n g Gandhi w i t h an 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o m o b i l i z e I n d i a n o p i n i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e Union, 
t h o u g h , as s u c h , i t o f f e r e d l i t t l e p r o s p e c t f o r d i r e c t n o n - v i o l e n t 
r e s i s t a n c e . 
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and t h e £3 t a x l e v i e d on e x - i n d e n t u r e d w o r k e r s had n o t been 
r e p e a l e d . The B.I.A. c o n s i d e r e d t h a t b o t h t h e l e t t e r and t h e 
s p i r i t o f t h e 1911 Agreement had been b r e a c h e d by t h e Government 
and a c c o r d i n g l y r e s o l v e d t o c o n t i n u e w i t h a campaign o f (non-
v i o l e n t ) r e s i s t a n c e t i l l t h e s e p o i n t s had been met and " G e n e r a l l y 
so l o n g as t h e s p i r i t o f g e n e r o s i t y and j u s t i c e does n o t pervade 
t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e laws ( a f f e c t i n g A s i a n s ) " (1). The 
memorandum was f o l l o w e d up m a l e t t e r f rom Gandhi d a t e d 
28 September 1913 (2J. 
The o n l y m a j or new demand m t h e t h i r d phase was f o r t h e 
r e p e a l o f t h e £3 t a x (3) ' I t s i n c l u s i o n was t h e r e s u l t o f an 
(1) I t i s p o s s i b l e t h e B.I.A. was prompted t o add t h i s p r o v i s i o n 
as a r e s u l t o f t h e h a r s h way m w h i c h A c t 22 was b e i n g im-
plemented, s y m b o l i z e d by t h e i n a d v e r t e n t and ( t o t h e Government) 
e m b a r r a s s i n g d i s c l o s u r e by t h e chairman o f t h e Durban I m m i g r a t i o n 
A p peal B o a r d t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y f o r t h e I n t e r i o r had "deemed 
e v e r y A s i a t i c p e r s o n t o be ( a n ) u n d e s i r a b l e ( i m m i g r a n t ) on 
economic grounds ..." ( m term s o f s e c t i o n * * ( l ) ( a ) o f A c t 22, 
r e f e r r e d t o a b o v e ) . L e t t e r o f 18 August 1913 f r o m L o r d G l a d s t o n e 
t o Prime M i n i s t e r B otha. CO 551/11 (31229). 
(2) Gandhi Papers, V o l 12 (doc 146). 
(3) A p p r o x i m a t e l y 10,800 p e o p l e were l i a b l e f o r t h e a n n u a l t a x . 
I n 1910, by A c t 19 o f t h a t y e a r , women n o r m a l l y l i a b l e t o 
pay t h e t a x c o u l d be r e l e a s e d f r o m d o i n g so a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n 
o f a m a g i s t r a t e . Many p e o p l e o f b o t h sexes d i d d e f a u l t 
on payments, t a k i n g advantage o f a p r o v i s i o n i n s i s t e d upon 
by t h e I n d i a n Government t h a t no p u n i t i v e measures be 
t a k e n a g a i n s t t h o s e who f a i l e d t o pay (Mabel Palmer, The 
H i s t o r y o f I n d i a n s m N a t a l , p 58, r e c o r d s t h a t l e s s t h a n 
one t h i r d o f t h o s e supposed t o pay t h e t a x were d o i n g so 
m t h e y e a r s up t o 1914). B u t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n m N a t a l 
d i d p e n a l i z e some d e f a u l t e r s f o r contempt o f c o u r t m f a i l i n g 
t o obey a m a g i s t r a t e ' s o r d e r t o pay t h e l i c e n c e , and women 
c o n t i n u e d t o be b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s f o r non-payment 
o f t h e t a x . I n December 1910, 5 women a t Dannhauser were 
each se n t e n c e d t o 1 month i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r non-payment o f 
t h e t a x . I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 17 December 1910. 
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alleged breach of promise by the South African Government to 
G. K. Gokhale, a member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council 
and one of the foremost Indian p o l i t i c i a n s of the time. He 
v i s i t e d South Africa m November 1912 on a fact finding mission, 
being made a guest of the Union Government (a quite remarkable 
event m the circumstances and when the Botha-Hertzog c o n f l i c t 
was coming to a head). According to Gandhi, w r i t i n g some 
years af t e r the event, Gokhale had informed him shortly a f t e r 
discussions with Union Ministers,"Everything has been se t t l e d . 
The Black Act w i l l be repealed. The r a c i a l bar w i l l be 
removed from the immigration law. The £3 tax w i l l be abolished". 
Smuts and Botha, however, denied any promise to repeal the 
licence and said t h e i r only undertaking was to consult Natal 
representatives m Parliament about the p o s s i b i l i t y . There 
i s some evidence to support t h e i r view (1) but Gandhi i n t e r -
preted the Government's f a i l u r e to do more than waive the tax 
for women (2) as a breach of pledge. Gandhi commented, "the 
undertaking given to Gokhale cleared the way for the Satyagrahis . 
breach of pledge would be a most cogent reason for continuing 
the struggle. And t h i s was exactly what happened" (3)* The 
Government, plagued by serious discontent amongst white mine-
workers (4) was i n f u r i a t e d by the memorandum, accusing the 
Indians of s h i f t i n g t h e i r ground j u s t as a settlement was m 
sight. Ministers reasoned that they had moved "as far as they 
\Soutk Africa An Imperial Dilemma 
(1) See, for example, B Sacks A p 247- For counter evidence 
see Natal Mercury, 29 November 1913-
(2) Gandhi Papers, Vol 12 (doc 74). 
(3) Satyagraha m South Afric a , p 410-11. Aiyar 
and certain other Natal Indian leaders were angered by 
Gandhi's i n i t i a t i v e , but Gandhi had for many years been 
prodding them to take action against the £3 tax with 
l i t t l e r e s u l t . Gandhi Papers, Vol 7 (1907) (doc 31) 
et seq. 
(4) Gandhi claimed that he delayed the resumption of 
resistance to avoid adding to the Government's problems 
at the height of the unrest amongst white workers. 
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dared" given the opinions of the electorate ( l ) , but negotiations 
and exchanges continued throughout the campaign. 
When resistance resumed on September 15, 1913, i t took 
i t s former course of non-co-operation with the law through 
breach of immigration requirements. The f i r s t group, who 
crossed from Natal i n t o the Transvaal ( 2 ) , presented themselves 
to immigration o f f i c e r s refusing to speak except through a 
spokesman O ) - They were declared prohibited immigrants but 
not arrested, m spite of refusing the o f f e r of appeal. The 
resisters' spokesman then addressed a l e t t e r to the immigration 
o f f i c i a l s warning them, "unless you take charge of the party we 
shal l entrain f o r Johannesburg ... and i f you o f f e r physical 
resistance at the time as passive resisters we can only y i e l d 
to i t f or the time being. But i f you set us free afterwards 
and do not hold us bodily, we sha l l seek some other means of 
continuing our forward journey" ( 4 ) . O f f i c i a l s at Volksrust 
were uncertain how to respond but the group was f i n a l l y arrested, 
i t s members being deported. They returned immediately to the 
Transvaal where they were sentenced to three months imprisonment, 
the maximum permitted 
(1) Telegram of 17 July 1913 from Lord Gladstone to Mr Harcourt. 
GO 551A2 (2^793). 
(2) No attempt was made to enter the Free State because of 
fears that t h i s would provoke incidents. 
(3) He read a declaration: " I on behalf of the party t r a v e l l i n g 
with me make t h i s declaration that — we are entering the 
Transvaal now without any documentary reasons for doing 
so and that we are not prepared to undergo the education 
test nor any other tests required by the present law (Act 22, 
1913) ••• further that we, being passive r e s i s t e r s , refuse 
to recognize any of the provisions of the existing law ...". 
Indian Opinion, 20 September 1913- The group gave no 
warning of t h e i r action, nor would they i d e n t i f y themselves, 
apparently for fear of non-arrest given t h e i r close associa-
t i o n with Gandhi. Satyagraha m South Africa, p ^28. 
(k) Indian Opinion, 2k September 1913-
(5) Under sec. 27 Act 22. 
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The only other form that resistance took, i n i t i a l l y , was 
that of hawking without licences for which sentences varied 
from 1 to 10 days hard labour, at least one group which i n -
cluded Gandhi's son, Manilal Gandhi being charged not only 
for t h i s offence but for non-production of r e g i s t r a t i o n 
c e r t i f i c a t e s under the Asiatics Registration Amendment Act 
Whilst resistance was confined to the foregoing t a c t i c s 
there was l i t t l e or no prospect of the campaign a t t r a c t i n g 
popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The circumstances changed r a d i c a l l y 
when at Gandhi's behest, one month a f t e r the campaign resumed, 
a small group of his followers under Mrs PKNaidoo and including 
Gandhi's wife and other women resisters (2) i n c i t e d indentured 
workers m the mining d i s t r i c t of Newcastle to s t r i k e and to 
remain out as long as the £J tax was not repealed. The 
s t r i k e began on 16 October spreading rapidly and being fanned 
by the arrest and imprisonment of the women s t r i k e leaders ( 3 ) . 
Whether Gandhi had much idea m advance of the s t r i k e as to 
how i t should be managed and where i t might spread seems highly 
doubtful. I t appears that Gandhi's disclosure to Smuts (k) m 
warning him of the decision to broaden the base of resistance 
that, " I know ... that once taken (the decision) i t may be d i f f i -
c u l t to control the spread of the movement beyond the l i m i t s 
one may set" came true more quickly than he anticipated, both 
he and Polak departing h a s t i l y for Newcastle to assist the hard 
(1) Indian Opinion, 8 October 1913- The paper recorded that the 
resisters became "depressed" when not arrested a f t e r a whole 
day's hawking. They were charged the following day. 
(2) These women, a l l tamil speakers - of v i t a l importance m mobi-
l i z i n g the indentured workers - had violated imagination regula-
tions by entering Natal and refusing to comply/the requirements 
of Act 22, but they were not arrested and hence, as e a r l i e r agreed, 
they proceeded to Newcastle. Satyagraha m South Africa, pp ^ 2 8 f f . 
This work contains a useful account of the s t r i k e and i t s a f t e r -
math, but suffers from being w r i t t e n years a f t e r the event. 
(3) Under Natal Vagrancy Laws. They went to prison f o r 3 months 
(no. 36, 1908) ( 1 ) . 
(if) 
(the maximum sentenc^Jgather than pay a f i n e of £3 
Letter of 28 September^ Gandhi Papers, Vol 12 (doc 
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pressed Naidoo and his few helpers ( l ) , who, by 20 October, 
only k days a f t e r the s t r i k e began, had re s p o n s i b i l i t y for the 
welfare of 2000 s t r i k e * s . The s t r i k e soon assumed two 
separate forms. One, d i r e c t l y under the control of Gandhi 
and his aides was disciplined and non-violent. The other, 
whilst clearly r e s u l t i n g from the o r i g i n a l c a l l to s t r i k e , 
spread m an anarchic fashion with outbreaks of violence. 
The element under Gandhi's direc t i o n comprised the 
st r i k e r s of the Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee d i s t r i c t s . 
Faced by a si t u a t i o n m which some mine owners were cutting 
o f f services to the workers' compounds, Gandhi, making v i r t u e 
of necessity, claimed that i t was improper f o r the miners to 
l i v e on mine rations whilst on s t r i k e . We thereupon called 
on the workers to leave t h e i r quarters for a h a s t i l y provided 
"camp" near Newcastle. Between four and six thousand res-
ponded, more than Gandhi anticipated, many subsequently moving 
to Charlestown close to the Transvaal border. Faced with 
the problem of what to do wit h t h i s large following, Gandhi, 
m consultation with his colleagues, decided, whilst m Newcastle, 
to lead the s t r i k e r s m a mass demonstration across the Natal/ 
Transvaal border as "an effective protest against the Minister's 
breach of pledge and as a pure demonstration of our distress at 
the loss of our self respect" ( 2 ) . Gandhi expressed himself 
(1) Naidoo and his two aides were arrested f i r s t under ordinance 
2 of 185O for i n c i t i n g indentured workers (of which they were 
aquitted)and l a t e r were charged under railway regulations 
(fo r i l l e g a l l y v i s i t i n g a barracks for indentured railway 
workers). They were fined but refused to pay and were 
not further detained on t h i s charge - at least p r i o r to the 
march. Indian Opinion, 22 October 1913* 
(2) Satyagraha m South Africa, p k^>2. O r i g i n a l l y Gandhi thought 
of sending some of the s t r i k e r s to the Natal farm of Mr Budree 
(a wealthy ex-mdentee and re s i s t e r ) and also to divide i n t o 
batches those crossing in t o the Transvaal. The intention of 
crossing the border was not an in d i c a t i o n that indentured worker 
were being brought in t o action against the Immigration Act. 
E. H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth, p 213 suggests the idea for the 
march may have come from the Great Trek. He could be r i g h t , 
but i f so i t i s a l i t t l e surprising Gandhi does not mention 
t h i s . 
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ready to lead the marchers to Tolstoy Farm, some 35 miles from 
Johannesburg• 
Over 2,000 s t r i k e r s , some accompanied by t h e i r families^ 
crossed the border without incident on 6 November, m the next 
four days reaching Balfour, some 130 miles from Newcastle, where, 
on 10 November, they were f i n a l l y detained ;being sent back to 
imprisonment m Natal. During the march Gandhi was arrested t h r e e 
times, f i n a l l y leaving the column m the hands of Henry Polak 
who, l i k e Hermann Kallenbach, and the other leaders of the 
march were themselves, m turn, arrested ( 1 ) . The march took 
place without violence, despite the absence of planning, l i m i t e d 
manpower resources to di r e c t the march and the complete lack of 
p o l i t i c a l education, l e t alone knowledge of the practice of 
non-violent resistance, of the participants. Apart from the 
obvious s k i l l of the leaders, time was probably of the essence, 
for the whole episode was f a i r l y shortlived and dependent on 
the assumption that the Government would be bound to react, 
at the most, within days of the beginning of the march. 
The s t r i k e spread rapidly to the sugar estates of Natal's 
North and South Coast and to factories m Durban and Maritzburg. 
Indian Opinion described these developments as, "spontaneous 
gestures of support for the campaign", thus seeking to distinguish 
them from those acts more clearly under the conbrol of Gandhi 
and his fellow leaders ( 2 ) . The wave of uncontrolled str i k e s 
(1) See below p 87 Gandhi used his subsequent court appearances m 
Dundee and Volksrust,as was his usual practice, to make a state-
ment m explanation of the cause of resistance. He pleaded 
g u i l t y on both occasions but was defended. 
(2) No attempt i s being made here to argue that Gandhi and his 
colleagues made serious e f f o r t s to confine the s t r i k e to the 
Newcastle-Dundee areas, i t would have been impossible to do so 
and both Gandhi and Kallenbach are recorded,prior to the march, 
as indicating that the s t r i k e was l i a b l e to extend to workers else-
where m the Province. See Transvaal Leader,2k October 1913I and 
Indian Opinion,29 October 1913- Polak, however, stressed at the 
time m a l e t t e r of 12 November 1913 to Lord Ampthill that the 
spread of the s t r i k e was "strongly against our advice as we did 
not wish i t to get beyond manageable proportions. But the Govern-
ment must now bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " . Enclosure with l e t t e r of 
Lord Ampthill to Mr Harcourt, 5 December 1913. CO 551/52 (42209) . 
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began ;just as the march was ending and lasted f o r approximately 
one month, involving as many as ^0,000 workers d ) . Their 
r e a l motive, m so far as i t can be defined, was to give vent 
to long simmering discontent at t h e i r conditions. As the 
s t r i k e spread outbreaks of violence occurred ( 2 ) . 
Outside the Newcastle-Dundee area only the str i k e s m 
Durban and Maritzburg appear to have been actively encouraged 
by a c t i v i s t s d i r e c t l y associated with Gandhi. Records of 
th e i r speeches at Durban make i t clear that the leaders con-
cerned stressed the need for the s t r i k e to be peaceful (3)* 
With the exception of these two centres, NIA leaders concen-
trated t h e i r e f f o r t s on providing welfare services for s t r i k e r s (k) 
and helping to prevent c o n f l i c t between workers and government 
forces. Indians elsewhere m South Af r i c a contented themselves 
with passing resolutions at mass meetings c a l l i n g for the 
repeal of the tax and release of Gandhi and hi s colleagues, as 
the only viable formula for peace ( 5 ) . 
I n i t s response, the Government, whilst taking cognizance 
of opinion abroad, was primarily concerned at the l i k e l y 
reaction at home, where they faced a very d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . 
There was unrest amongst white workers, with the constant threat 
of a general s t r i k e and there was African discontent both about 
the recently passed Natives Land Act and the new requirement 
(1) See p45ft5above. 
(2) Many of the i n d i v i d u a l strikes were peaceful but a serious 
outbreak of violence, at Verulam, on 10 November, was 
followed by others m the Mount Edgecombe d i s t r i c t , 
Lady smith, Esperanza. and m several other centres, involving 
the death m clashes with Government forces of at least 
8 Indians and provoking an atmosphere m the Province of 
considerable tension. There were extensive press reports 
of the incidents. 
(3) See, for example, report of N.I.A. meeting, 17 November, 
Natal Mercury, 18 November 1913- Even so, several leaders 
there were arrested f o r incitement ( p88 ) . 
(k) Indian Opinion, 19 November 1913. 
(5) For example, see the report of a meeting of Johannesburg 
Indians under B.I.A. auspices, 19 November 1913) Transvaal 
Leader, 20 November 1913-
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for women to carry passes. I n addition, the c r i s i s between 
Botha and Hertzog which led to the l a t t e r ' s departure from 
Botha's South Africa Party to form the National Party was 
nearmg i t s climax ( 1 ) . 
I n i t i a l l y , the Government uras slow to act against the 
resisters, m some cases r e f r a i n i n g from making arrests. 
Once the str i k e s began the Government adopted a range of res-
ponses to the participants, non-interference, recourse to the 
courts, police and defence force action, and negotiation. 
The f i r s t three of these categories are represented m the 
Government's reaction to the s t r i k e of the Newcastle workers 
and t h e i r subsequent march to Balfour and return to Natal. 
On the day the s t r i k e began police arrested 150 s t r i k e r s at 
the Ballengeich c o l l i e r y and by k November Gandhi claimed a 
further 350 had been imprisoned or charged for s t r i k i n g work, 
but the majority were l e f t to Gandhi's care, no attempt being 
made to arrest the marchers at Charlestown (as Gandhi seems 
to have wished) (2) or when they crossed the border. The 
rationale behind t h i s policy i s disclosed m a despatch from 
Lord Gladstone to the Secretary of State, following a conversa-
t i o n between his Private Secretary and Smuts. Smuts apparently 
claimed that "his refusal to i n t e r f e r e with many of the Passive 
Resisters m the Transvaal had led to a collapse, for the time 
being, at any rate, of the movement and he thought that a 
similar policy of laissez-faire might produce similar results 
m the case of the Natal s t r i k e s . Mr Gandhi appeared to be 
m a position of much d i f f i c u l t y , l i k e Frankenstein he found his 
monster an uncomfortable creation ... i f Mr Gandhi were arres-
ted he would be able to disclaim further r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the 
maintenance of hi s army of s t r i k e r s ...". Smuts added that 
since the s t r i k e r s did not belong to the trading classes they 
could do l i t t l e harm and he evidently believed they would 
(1) Oxford History of South Africa, Vol I I , pp 369-70. 
(2) Satyagraha m South Africa, p 452. 
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eventually ask to be sent back to Natal. I n the meantime he 
hoped that once the marchers "were well inside the Province, 
Mr Kallenbach and Mr Polak might be tempted by the supmess 
of the Authorities to lead further bodies of men across the 
f r o n t i e r . These two gentlemen, whom the Department (of 
Interior)were p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to secure, would then be 
arrested on a charge of aiding and abetting the entry of 
P.I.'s i n t o the Province"(1). Whether Smuts' nerve f i n a l l y 
broke, possibly m the face of growing concern amongst the 
electorate, i s not clear ( 2 ) . I n the event, the s t r i k e r s 
were f i n a l l y arrested and returned by t r a i n to Natal where 
they were confronted with a detachment of the South African 
Mounted Rifles and police. They were charged with 
s t r i k i n g work (3) and sent to t h e i r places of work which were 
specially declared as prisons for the occasion (k) a move 
which avoided f i l l i n g the ordinary a a i l s and was intended to 
secure a resumption of work, European overseers being temporarily 
enlisted as warders. A standard sentence appears to have been 
7 days imprisonment, but m a number of cases the s t r i k e r s con-
tinued to refuse to work and received additional sentences of 
between 3 _ 6 months (5)-
Gandhi was arrested on three separate occasions a f t e r 
entering the Transvaal at the head of the marchers, but on 
two of the occasions was granted b a i l which he did not refuse, 
given the p o t e n t i a l r i s k of disturbances breaking out m the 
column, p a r t i c u l a r l y as on the second occasion 5 of his 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ' • '—' i—1 1 ' *r 
(1) Lord Gladstone to Mr Harcourt, 6 November 1913- CO 5 5 l A 5 
(i+0709). Smuts was p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to see Polak 
arrested to prevent him leaving f o r a speaking and fund 
ra i s i n g v i s i t to India m connection with the campaign. 
(2) Gandhi, of course, argues so. Satyagraha m South Africa, 
p tf>h. 
(3) Probably under Law 14, 1859, which l a i d down terms of work 
for indentured labourers. 
(k) I n terms of Act 13, 1911 (sec. 13(1) ) . 
(5) Under Act 25, 1891 (sec. 35) . 
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co-workers were detained m j a i l ( 1 ) . He was charged on 
11 November on three counts "with inducing indentured immi-
grants to leave the province", receiving a 9 month sentence p ^ i — 
Three days l a t e r he was taken to Volksrust being given an 
additional 3 months for aiding and abetting contravention 
of the Immigiation Act (J>J. Polak and Kallenbach received 
the same sentences. 
As the strikes spread the Government, which may not have 
reckoned with t h i s development ( 4 ) , became increasingly tough 
i n t h e i r response. To them, as for the electorate as a whole, 
the strikes were the work of agitators whose interests lay at 
least p a r t l y outside South Afr i c a . O f f i c i a l reaction took 
two basic forms, m i l i t a r y (the police included) and j u d i c i a l , 
the former being more important. Many of the s t r i k e r s seem 
never to have been charged with s t r i k i n g work, but those that 
were, t y p i c a l l y received 7 days imprisonment, though a number 
of non-indentured workers m Durban charged for s t r i k i n g were 
not imprisoned, being fined instead (5) - I n a number of cases 
alleged agitators - numbered amongst them 7 N.I.A. o f f i c i a l s 
m Durban - were charged with incitement to violence ( 6 ) . On 
more than one occasion and m d i f f e r e n t contexts during the 
strikes the p o s s i b i l i t y was raised by the Government of com-
pu l s o n l y r e p a t r i a t i n g the s t r i k i n g indentured workers, but 
m the event no action was taken (7)-
(1) Presumably authority for these arrests came from the highest 
levels. The Government's disruptive t a c t i c could be i n t e r -
preted as intended to provoke a "scene" enabling armed forces 
to take decisive action,thus s u l l y i n g the image of the march, 
but t h i s can only be speculation and i f true was anyway 
unsuccessful. 
(2) From a singularly h o s t i l e magistrate who countered Gandhi's 
" p o l i t i c a l " speech with one of his own. Gandhi Papers, Vol 12 
(doc 191) . 
(3) Section 20. Gandhi Papers, Vol 12 (doc 194) . 
(4) This i s i m p l i c i t m Smuts' comments to h i s Private Secretary, 
though the p o s s i b i l i t y i s not e n t i r e l y ruled out. Lord Gladstone's 
despatch of 6 November 1913 to Mr Harcourt, CO 551/43 (4709) refers. 
(5) Transvaal Leader, 20 November 1913-
(6) Under Ordinance 2,1850. Transvaal Leader, 21 & 22 November 1913-
(7) Indian Opinion, 26 November 1913, and Letter of 9 December 1913 
from Smuts to Gladstone, enclosure with Lord Gladstone's private 
l e t t e r of 9 December 1913 to Mr Harcourt. CO 551/46 (2673). 
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As l a t e as 17 November the Government apparently did not 
consider the s t r i k e s i t u a t i o n serious, but at the same time 
General Lukin, commander of the Defence Forces,was seeking 
reinforcements and the l i k e l i h o o d was mentioned of mobilizing 
the part time iforce ( l ) . Forces were deployed to r i n g the 
barracks where s t r i k i n g workers l i v e d preventing them leaving. 
In a p a r t i c u l a r l y blatant example of in t i m i d a t i o n , at the 
Magazine barracks m Durban, s t r i k e r s were given two options 
by the police - to go to work under police protection or to 
go to j a i l ( 2 ) . On a number of occasions the Government's 
reaction was much more rigorous, involving clashes with 
s t r i k e r s . These appear to have arisen from minor incidents 
with provocation on both sides ( 3 ) . 
B r u t a l i t y by o f f i c i a l s , whether sanctioned or not, was 
one of the weapons m the armoury of reaction to the campaign, 
and the subject of widespread c r i t i c i s m abroad, fanned by 
reports from Indians m South Africa. Allegations by the 
resisters and counter claims from the Government about the 
conduct of i t s o f f i c e r s became increasingly strident as the 
str i k e developed, a feature of a l l phases of t h i s campaign 
and those to be examined below. The Governor General wrote 
to the Secretary of State m response to Indian Office 
anxieties, " ( I ) am confident that my ministers would deal 
severely with offenders ( o f f i c i a l s ) should any case of i l l -
treatment occur ... the false or exaggerated statements which 
seems current m England and India are roost mischievous ... 
there w i l l be no i l l - t r e a t m e n t and force w i l l only be used to 
put down unprovoked violence by s t r i k e r s themselves" (k). 
(1) See telegram of 17 November 1913 from Lord Gladstone to 
Mr Ear court. CO 551A5 (397^3). 
(2) Indian Opinion, 26 November 1913-
(3) Take, for example, the outbreak of violence at Ladysmith when 
' a group of Indians, on whatever provocation or pretext, hurled 
stones at the police,"the police both European and Native were 
it c h i n g to r e t a l i a t e (and when one of them was knocked uncon-
cious) at once his comrades, some eighty m number, raised a 
war cry and flung themselves on the Indians." Transvaal 
Leader, 19 November 1913-
(k) Telegram of 19 November 1913 from Lord Gladstone to Mr Harcourt. 
CO 351A5 (39982). 
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Government o f f i c i a l s did t h e i r best to provide testimony m 
support of Gladstone's contentions d ) but t h e i r accounts bear 
ample witness to the use of force on prisoners, including 
N. A. Nardu who died shortly a f t e r being released. An inspec-
tor of prisons commented, "Indian prisoner N. A. Nardu died 
from natural causes, but there i s evidence indicating he was 
subjected when m custody to rough treatment when m a state 
of feebleness f i v e days before death" ( 2 ) . 
I t i s possible the Government by a combination of coercion, 
leadership-culling and a t t r i t i o n could have beaten the Indians 
into submission without making any concessions, thereby enhancing 
i t s reputation with the electorate, but at the expense of 
relations with the Imperial power and at the r i s k of subsequent 
Indian unrest. I n the event, once the stri k e s appeared to be 
past t h e i r peak, the Government was able to negotiate from what 
i t could claim was a position of strength. 
At the outset of the Newcastle s t r i k e and m the weeks 
preceedmg, a f t e r the t h i r d phase had begun, the Government 
showed l i t t l e disposition to compromise ( 3 ) . But i t i s evident 
that Smuts, even at that time, was keen f o r a negotiated s e t t l e -
ment, whilst biding his time, p a r t l y f o r reasons of face (^f) and, 
(1) See the reports from prison o f f i c i a l s and the Durban Chief 
Magistrate m enclosure 18 with Lord Gladstone's despatch of 
k December 1913 to Mr Harcourt. CO 551A6 ( W l 8 6 ) . 
(2) i b i d . 
(3) I n an exchange by telephone between Gandhi and Smuts' secretary 
Mr Gorges^on the eve of the march, Gorges i s reported to have 
said "General Smuts w i l l have nothing to do with you. You 
may do j u s t as you please", Satyagraha m South Africa, p h5& 
The possible motives f o r t h i s approach on Smuts' part are re-
ferred to above pp86-87. 
(k) This of course does not answer the question - why did the 
Government and the Indians get i n t o an impasse m the f i r s t 
place 7 How much t h i s can be a t t r i b u t e d to the role of the 
unsympathetic Fischer, and how much to Gandhi or others i s 
a moot point. 
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i t would seen, "to educate Natal public opinion to a point 
which might render nugatory the opposition to repeal" d ) . 
I n e f f e c t , by the time of the march, i f not before, Smuts was 
conceding repeal of the £3 tax - at least m private ( 2 ) . 
The Government might even have given <vay i f the strikes had 
not developed to the extent that they did (3)- Prospects 
for c o n c i l i a t i o n grew towards the end of November when a 
Government o f f i c i a l , m a l e t t e r to the press, underlined the 
Government's willingness to consider Indian complaints, once 
peace was restored (k)• On 11 December the press announced 
the s e t t i ng up of the Indian Grievances 6ommission (5)- I t was a 
move interpreted by both sides to t h e i r own benefit Gandhi 
took i t to be a victor y for the campaign, showing that the 
Government "had not the power to keep thousands of innocent men 
m j a l M (6) and arguing that Smuts was m the position of "a 
snake which had made the mouthful of a r a t , but can neither gulp 
i t down nor cast i t out" (7). Government sources were equally 
adamant that the administration was acting from a point of 
strength, having brought the st r i k e s more or less to an end. 
(1) Lord Gladstone to Mr. Harcourt, 13 November 1913- CO 551A5 (^1612). 
(2) And he had consulted some Natal MP's about the future of the tax, 
following Gokhale's v i s i t . Moreover the tax had already been 
discounted as a source of revenue m assessing the share of Union 
finances to be a l l o t e d to Natal. 
(3) Whether Gandhi would have favoured t h i s i s debatable, depending 
on what educative value he may have considaed the strikes to have had. 
(k) Natal Mercury, 25 November 1913-
(5) I t s terms were "to inquire i n t o and report as to the disturbances 
m connection with the recent s t r i k e of Indians m Natal, the 
causes and circumstances which led to that s t r i k e and those dis-
turbances, the amount of force used m the suppression of the 
disturbances and the necessity for the use of such force, and 
as to any acts of violence alleged to have been committed upon 
prisoners sentenced m connection with the s t r i k e " The Chairman 
was Mr. Justice Solomon assisted by Mr. Esselen and CoL Wylie, both 
of known anti-Indian views. Indian Opinion, 17 December 1913* 
(6) Satyagraha m South Africa, p ^ 5 -
(7) i b i d . 
The Government's off e r was less of a concession to Indian 
opinion than i t might have at f i r s t seemed, for m spite of 
representations, there were no Indian or Indian appointed 
representatives on the Commission, nor did Indians have any 
say m i t s composition or terms of reference, points which 
caused Gandhi and his fellow leaders on release from J a i l , at 
the behest of the commission, to voice t h e i r opposition to i t . 
Not only did they refuse to co-operate but warned that i f con-
cessions were not made,"we are sorry that we s h a l l have to ex-
plore fresh avenues fo r going to gaol". They threatened to 
organize another march, to begin on 1 January 1914 ( l ) . 
Smuts' reply of 24 December (2) w h i l s t unbending m 
substance was, as Gandhi said m reply, of a "conciliatory 
tone". His answer was m a similar vein ( 3 ) . He requested 
a meeting with Smuts to submit suggestions f o r the removal of 
the deadlock" without loss of dignity for Government or honour 
for Indians". Smuts welcomed Gandhi's a t t i t u d e but suggested 
"m view of misunderstanding ... m the past he would prefer 
that the points ... be formally set out m w r i t i n g " ( 4 ) . Mean-
while, Gandhi m a speech on 28 December, described by the 
Mercury as one of "noteworthy moderation" ( 5 ) , announced the 
postponement of the march whilst i n d u s t r i a l unrest amongst 
white railwaymen continued ( 6 ) . Gandhi said that he did not 
wish to cause the Government embarrassment at such a time. 
Whatever the mixture of Gandhi's motives, i t earned him 
appreciation and materially improved the prospects for 
(1) Letter of Gandhi, Polak and Kallenbach to Smuts, 21 
December 1913- Indian Opinion, 24 December 1913-
(2) Natal Mercury, 27 December 1913. 
(3) Gandhi Papers, Vol 12 (doc 215). 
(4) i b i d . 
(5) Natal Mercury, 29 December 1913. 
(6) This took a s u f f i c i e n t l y serious turn to prompt the 
declaration of Marshal Law on 14 January 1914. 
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settlement ( 1 ) . By i t s e l f t h i s gesture was not s u f f i c i e n t , 
but the process of settlement, once begun,was taken further 
by the intervention of Sir Benjamin Robertson and Charles 
Andrews - who arrived from India as Government intermediaries 
at the beginning of January and also, i t would seem, by 
Emily Hobhouse who interceded with Smuts at Gandhi's requsst (2) 
Even with such help, progress was d i f f i c u l t , Smuts 
having to contend with the i n d u s t r i a l s i t u a t i o n as well as the 
Indian problem, but on both sides there was a disposition f o r 
agreement. 
A provisional understanding, ending the t h i r d phase of 
the campaign was reached m the t h i r d week of January, there 
being an exchange of l e t t e r s between Gandhi and Gorges (acting 
on Smuts' behalf) on 21 January (3)- Both sides maintained 
t h e i r stand v i s a v i s the Commission of Enquiry whilst recog-
nizing t h e other's position. The Government was spared the 
embarrassment of revelations before the Commission about 
b r u t a l i t i e s to s t r i k e r s and Gandhi the d i f f i c u l t y of securing 
adequately documented evidence — which, i f i t had been led, 
would have provoked high emotions at home and abroad jeapordismg 
(1) This i s the clear import of Lord Gladstone's comments to 
Mr Harcourt, "Mr G's action m holding his hand while the 
Govt, were m d i f f i c u l t i e s has been much appreciated. 
I f concessions are now made to the B r i t i s h Indians no 
one can alledge that they are made with coercion". 
Despatch of 1^ January 191^, CO 331/33 (^218). See 
also his e a r l i e r despatch of 31 December 1912, CO 5 5 l A 6 
(2387)' Gandhi gives a more dramatic account. Satyagraha 
m South Afric a , p ^91. 
(2) W. Hancock, The Sanguine Years, p 3 ^ , and l e t t e r of 29 
December 1913 from Miss Hobhouse to Smuts, Smuts Papers, 
Vol 3 (doc 565). 
(3) For texts see Indian Opinion, 28 January 191^. The 
' Colonial Secretary minuted " I am well content. I expect 
Sir J. Robertson came with "straight t a l k " from Lord Hardinge 
and Mr Gokhale - and of such i s the Kingdom of ..." ( s i c ) . 
But Mr Lambert, a p r i n c i p a l clerk, was more cautious, "the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of future trouble are obvious", minutes of 
23 January 1914 on Lord Gladstone's telegram 
of 22 January 1913- CO 331/3^ (2770). 
the chances of a satisfactory settlement ( 1 ) . In private 
Gandhi was given certain understandings. Gladstone commented 
on 22 January, "J. C. Smuts has allowed i t to be understood 
that subject to the recommendations of the commission he i s 
w i l l i n g to l e g i s l a t e i n regard to the marriage question and 
the £3 tax and to deal administratively " i t h the question of 
admission of South African born Indians to the Cape and with 
OFS l e g i s l a t i o n and that he anticipates the Commission's 
recommendations w i l l be satisfactory to Gandhi" ( 2 ) . 
The Solomon Commission reported on 7 March 1914, the 
o r i g i n a l claims of the Indians at the outset of the t h i r d 
phase being met ( 3 ) . Legislation was introduced to give 
effect to the Commission's recommendations m May 191^ 5 rapidly 
becoming law as the Indians Relief Act No. 22 of 191^. I t 
was supplemented by correspondence between Gandhi and Smuts 
(the Smuts-Gandhi Agreement of 30 June 1 9 1 c o v e r i n g adminis-
t r a t i v e matters not requiring l e g i s l a t i v e action ( 4 ) . In 
one important respect, at least, the understanding meant a l l 
things to a l l men. Smuts, m his l e t t e r from Gorges of 
30 June said he "wished no doubt ... to remain that the placing 
of the Indians Relief B i l l on the Statute Book of the Union, 
coupled with the f u l f i l l m e n t of the assurance (given) ... m 
th i s l e t t e r m regard to the other matters referred to herein .. 
w i l l constitute a complete and f i n a l settlement of the controver 
which has unfortunately existed for so long and w i l l be un-
reservedly accepted as such by the Indian Community". Gandhi, 
m reply, referred to the grievances Indians s t i l l entertained, 
(1) Mr Justice Solomon, to the Governor's alarm, nearly 
resigned over the Indians' non-co-operation. Lord 
Gladstone's despatch of 31 December 1912 to Mr Harcourt, 
co (2387). 
(2) Lord Gladstone's telegram of 22 January, op. c i t . . The 
Union Government had already m 1913 discounted revenue 
from the £3 tax i n assessing the sum of Union revenue to 
be a l l o t t e d to Natal. 
(3) Report of the Indian Inquiry Commission, UG 16/191^. 
The summary of t h e i r recommendations i s given at annex B. 
(k) See annex C f o r Smuts' l e t t e r , which deta i l s the issues, 
and Gandhi's reply. 
for example, against trading regulations and pointed out,"as 
you are aware some of my countrymen have wished me to go 
further ... I have been unable to comply with t h e i r wishes. 
Whilst, therefore, they (trading r e s t r i c t i o n s , etc.) have 
not been included m the programme of Satyagraha, i t w i l l not 
be denied that some day ... these matters w i l l require further 
and sympathetic consideration by the Government. Complete 
satisfaction cannot be expected u n t i l f u l l c i v i c r i g h t s are 
conceded to the resident Indian population". 
For the time being theprotagonists r e t i r e d to t h e i r 
corners. Gandhi l e f t South Africa l a t e r m the year for the 
challenges of India d ) . 
White opinion m South Africa remained unshaken m i t s 
b e l i e f that the Asian's r e a l i n t e n t i o n m the campaign was to 
obtain f u l l and immediate equality ( 2 ) . The Natal Mercury 
probably summed up the opinion of many m saying, "there can 
be no disagreeing the fact that the Indians as a body have 
considerable cause for complaint ... on the other hand ... 
European opinion generally i s altogether opposed to extension 
of t h e i r present pr i v i l e g e s , or perhaps to put i t more accurate-
l y , any mitigation of t h e i r d i s a b i l i t i e s ... they (Indians) are 
m effect crying for the moon and are preventing those who 
sympathize with them m t h e i r grievances from giving them the 
assistance which they might otherwise be able and inc l i n e d to 
afford them" (j>)« Others w i l l have taken the more openly 
hos t i l e l i n e of the Transvaal Leader (k) which commented shortly 
(1) Whether Gandhi came to any agreement with Smuts about his 
departure i s unclear, there i s no evidence he did 
but i t i s not out of the question. He probably needed 
l i t t l e persuasion, m any event. 
(2) See, for example, the views expressed to t h i s e f f e c t m 
the correspondence columns of the Natal Mercury, 10 November 
1913 and the Transvaal Leader, 26 November 1913-
(3) Natal Mercury, 16 September 1913. 
(k) From A p r i l 1911, i t was no longer under the editorship of 
Albert Cartwright. 
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a f t e r resistance resumed, "considering how ali e n they (Asians) 
are to us m speech, blood, r e l i g i o n and type of c i v i l i s a t i o n 
and the economic danger to our race that t h e i r presence spells 
the new Act (Immigrants Act) makes substantial concessions" d ) . 
Whilst the scale of resistance remained low i t attracted 
l i t t l e comment, a f t e r i n i t i a l reactions, but when, against 
predictions (2), i t assumed mass proportions there was i n -
creasing alarm. When Gandhi met employers of indentured labour, 
at t h e i r i n v i t a t i o n , on 26 October, he sought to allay fears 
that he had i t m mind to involve Africans m the s t r i k e or 
that the s t r i k e was for purposes other than the removal of the 
£3 tax (3>)« Whether they were convinced by t h i s and impressed 
by his temporary suspension of the plan to lead indentured 
workers in t o the Transvaal i s unclear but they produced no 
solution of t h e i r own. The ensuing march provoked mixed 
reactions. I n some quarters Gandhi and the participants were 
accorded a grudging respect and there was evident surprise at 
i t s peaceful nature (k), but, m general, popular comment was 
ho s t i l e . The most v i r u l e n t opposition came from the Volksrust 
Vigilance Association which at a meeting (from which Kallenbach 
was egected for pleading the Indian cause) threatened to take 
the law into i t s own hands to prevent the s t r i k e r s entering the 
border town (5)« I n the event the s t r i k e r s were not serious-
l y molested en route. 
With the spread of the strikes and outbreaks of violence 
European emotions became more excited (6) . The white 
(1) Transvaal Leader, 19 September 1913. 
(2) See the forecasts of collapse m Transvaal Leader, 30 
September 1913 and Natal Mercury, 26 October 1913. 
(3) Indian Opinion, 29 October 1913-
(k) Satyagraha m South Africa, p hh5- See also the contem-
porary editions of the Transvaal Leader, the Natal Mercury 
and Indian Opinion which give many insights of European 
attitudes towards the campaign. 
(5) Indian Opinion, 12 November 1913-
(6) There i s a clear p a r a l l e l with events m the Eastern Cape 
m October/November 1952, see p 3 i 6 
9 7 
population was by no means united m i t s commitment to the £3 
tax d ) but supported the Government's policy of putting down 
the strikes before taking any ameliorative action. Strike 
leaders were condemned m the roundest of terms, the imprisoned 
Gandhi being cast as the v i l l a i n of the piece. Rank and f i l e 
participants were seen as pawns working for the interests of 
the trading class and "agitators" xn Indxa. Crxtxcxsm abroad 
of the treatment of strxkers was angrily brushed aside i n c a l l s 
for the wholesale deportation of Indians "to remove t h i s b l o t 
upon the f a i r face of the Garden Colony" (2) and the imposition 
of marshal law- Employers took t h e i r own action against 
s t r i k e r s , food supplies being cut o f f and some ex-indentured 
workers dxsmxssed (3)« The refusal of Gandhx and the N.I.A. 
to co-operate wxth the Commission on Indian Grievances and the 
threat of further resistance served to confirm whites continuing 
h o s t i l i t y and suspicion. 
At the same time, a small element of Europeans continued 
to give backing to the Indian cause. Not only did t h i s come 
from members and supporters of Hosken's Committee but also, 
during the s t r i k e s , from more radical quarters. J. T. Bam of 
the mxneworkers unxon spoke at a B.I.A. meetxng xn Johannesburg 
on 12 November (4) and L. H. Greene, then a socxalxst, addressed 
a meetxng of Indxan strxkers i n Maritzburg (5)« 
(1) This i s shown from Smuts' incomplete and controversial 
sounding out of Natal Legislative Assembly members (a 
move taken m f u l f i l l m e n t of an undertaking to Gokhale) 
and from press reports. Indian Opinxon, 5 November 1913) 
Transvaal Leader, 11 November 1913- Natal Mercury, 23 
October and 11 December 1913 (the Mercury's c r i t i c i s m of 
Government policy on the £3 tax must be seen against the 
backcloth of i t s support for a federal system of Govern-
ment for South A f r i c a ) . 
(2) Correspondence column, Natal Mercury, 21 November 1913-
(3) Indian Opinion, 19 November 1913> Natal Mercury, 2^ f 
December 1913-
(k) See despatch of Lord Gladstone to Mr Harcourt of 13 
November 1913, CO 551A5 (V1612). 
(5) Natal Mercury, 1 December 1913-
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Abroad, the t h i r d phase of the campaign, attracted 
considerable a t t e n t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y as a res u l t of the t r e a t -
ment meted out to the s t r i k e r s , both m the Newcastle-Dundee 
d i s t r i c t s and elsewhere. The most celebrated and remarkable 
intervention, which incensed the South African Government and 
nearly precipitated his removal was that of the Viceroy, 
Lord Hardinge. I n response to a g i t a t i o n m India against 
what was happening m Natal, he commented, "recently your 
compatriots m South Africa have taken matters in t o t h e i r own 
hands, organizing passive resistance to laws which they con-
sider invidious and unjust, an opinion which we, who are 
watching t h e i r struggles ... cannot but share ... m a l l t h i s 
they have the deep and burning sympathy of India and also of 
those who, l i k e myself, without being Indians, sympathize with 
the people of t h i s country". He referred to reports of the 
resistance being met "by measures which would not be tolerated 
for a moment m any country claiming to be c i v i l i z e d " and 
suggested that " i f the South African Government desires to 
j u s t i f y i t s e l f m the eyes of India and the world, the only 
course open i s to appoint a strong impartial committee, thereon 
Indian interests w i l l be represented, to conduct the most 
searching i n q u i r y " ( l ) . Hardinge had summed up the widespread, 
though by no means universal, disquiet expressed m India (2) 
and m B r i t a i n . 
Lord Gladstone, the B r i t i s h Representative m South Africa, 
however, voiced continuing h o s t i l i t y to the Indians and sympathy 
for the problems of the Union Government m handling the c r i s i s , 
views which were reflected m Colonial Office thinking at the 
time (3). He c r i t i c i s e d "the truculent and minatory attitude" 
d ) Indian Opinion, 3 December 1913-
(2) The India Office, m i t s concern minuted to the Colonial Office, 
"from our point of view i t i s very important to l e t i t be known 
we have taken an active i n t e r e s t m the £3 tax (and m l i c e n -
sing) questions", 13 November 1913. CO 55lA5 (k086k). 
(3) Colonial Office o f f i c i a l s , for example, were ready to counten-
ance the compulsory r e p a t r i a t i o n of indentured workers and the 
deportation to India of Indian "agitators" not able (or unwilling) 
to prove t h e i r domicile m South Africa. Minuting by Mr Lambert 
and Sir Hartmann Just,23 December 1913- CO 55lA6 (2673). 
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of the Indian community generally and of Mr Gandhi m par t i c u l a r d ) 
and staunchly defended the Union Government, "my ministers, 
since the outbreak of the Passive Resistance movement have dis-
played exemplary forebearance and patience under very great 
provocation" (2) . He claimed that allegations of "shooting, 
flogging (and) coercing Indians to work are absolutely false" 
and spoke out b i t t e r l y against "the h y s t e r i c a l condition of the 
English press" as well as agitators m India. whilst admitting 
the Union Government had erred m not repealing the £3 tax and 
had revealed shortcomings over the Immigration Act Gladstone 
argued,"ministers cannot give way to carefully organized con-
spiracy against law and order, otherwise worse trouble may be 
expected from syndicalists and natives" (3)- He did, however, 
impress on Smuts the serious repercussions the events were 
having m India (k) and urged the setting up of a commission 
of enquiry (5) . 
(1) Lord Gladstone's despatch of 
co 551A1 (23197)-
(2) Lord Gladstone's despatch of 
Harcourt. CO 55lA5 ( W £ 8 ) . 
(3) Lord Gladstone's despatch of 
i b i d . , (i(O02l). 
(k) Lord Gladstone's despatch of 
i b i d . , A l 612V 
(5) Lord Gladstone's despatch of 
i b i d . , (it09^3> 
16 June 1913 to Mr Harcourt. 
20 November 1913 to Mr 
20 November 1913 to Mr Harcourt. 
13 November 1913 to Mr Harcourt. 
13 November 1913 to Mr Harcourt. 
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CHAPTER V I I : AN ASSESSMENT: 1906-1^ 
One of Gandhi's c r i t i c s , a South African Indian, wrote m 
191^ , shortly a f t e r the settlement, "The Indian Community has 
materially gained nothing except a few b i t s of administrative 
concessions which are, more or less, of a l i q u i d nature ... 
neither the people of India ... nor the Indian residents m 
the Union can accept t h i s arrangement between Mr Gandhi and the 
Minister as any settlement at a l l . The whole of t h i s so-called 
settlement presents the ugly look of a farce" ( l ) . 
The campaign was a response to l i m i t e d specific current 
decisions by South African governments perceived by the Asian 
population or elements of i t as running counter to t h e i r 
i nterests. The points m dispute were not necessarily those 
most immediately and seriously a f f e c t i n g the well-being of the 
Asians. But the campaign's leaders saw i t as a step towards 
securing a general improvement m the status of t h e i r people. 
The campaign brought few immediate p r a c t i c a l benefits by way of 
amendments to the laws at issue. I t secured the repeal of the 
£ 3 tax, the re-establishment of the r i g h t s of entry to the 
Transvaal of certain pre-war residents and, arguably, the 
provisions for the validation of monogamous marriages preformed 
under r i t e s permitting polygamy. Discriminatory practices 
m other spheres - notably trading - of central concern to many 
Asians i n t e n s i f i e d during the period of the campaign. 
To judge the campaign's achievements solely by i t s score 
of l e g i s l a t i v e amendments, of immediate p r a c t i c a l import, however, 
i s surely to adopt the wrong c r i t e r i o n . Moreover, whilst Gandhi 
has been c r i t i c i s e d for not broadening the base of the campaign -
p a r t i c u l a r l y when the Indian population could be said to have 
(1 ) Probably w r i t t e n by P. Aiyar of the Natal Indian P a t r i o t i c 
Union, African Chronicle, 11 July 191^. Reprinted m 
P. Aiyar, Conflict of Races m South Africa, p 133-
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had the i n i t i a t i v e m 1913 ( l ) - i t i s doubtful whether they 
were r e a l l y m a position e f f e c t i v e l y to embark on a wider 
confrontation which, whatever the Imperial implications, 
would have i n v i t e d an increasingly harsh response from the 
South African Government 
For Gandhi, at least, the events of 1906-1^ probably 
represented a preliminary round m which, i n t e r a l i a , he 
attempted to win the Government's acceptance of certain 
principles which could pave the way for future adjustments, 
of p r a c t i c a l advantage to the Asian population. I t i s for 
conjecture what form the Immigrants Regulation Act would 
have taken without pressure, through negotiation and non-violent 
resistance, from the Asian population, but i t would not so 
nearly have f u l f i l l e d Gandhi's often repeated aim of securing 
equal status m the eyes of the law for the South African 
Asian population. That the practice of the Immigrants 
Act should be so much at variance with the theory was not his 
immediate concern. Once the p r i n c i p l e was established - as 
the Asians hoped and the Europeans feared - the practice 
could eventually follow ( 2 ) . 
I n the prevailing climate of European opinion, and given 
the disparity of the resources at the disposal of Asians and 
Europeans m South Africa, the Asians could not r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
have expected early substantial p r a c t i c a l concessions except, 
as occurred, on very specific l i m i t e d issues, but i f they had 
f a i l e d to take determined action m the crucial period of the 
establishment of Union t h e i r lnterestsw^e l i k e l y to have 
(1) This i s one of Aiyar's c r i t i c i s m s and likewise, more recently, 
of Fatima Meer and H. J. & E. E. Simons Class and Colour 
m South Africa, pp 161-2, c i t i n g Meer, "Satyagraha m South 
Africa", Africa South, Vol 3 (2) 1959-
(2) But as far as immigration was concerned the campaign leader-
ship made clear to the Government they had no r e a l expecta-
t i o n of equal treatment, an aim they were far more anxious 
to achieve m other f i e l d s a f f e c t i n g theresident South 
African Asian population. 
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been to t a l l y ignored d ) . As i t was t h e i r stand - on a 
pri n c i p l e of Empire-wide concern - struck at a weak point which 
the Governments m South Africa and B r i t a i n could not e n t i r e l y 
ignore m the introduction of new l e g i s l a t i o n , even i f the short 
term p r a c t i c a l benefits to South African Asians were minimal. 
Throughout the campaign, as the very existence and the 
con bent of Indian Opinion demonstrated, Gandhi recognized the 
foundation requirement of rai s i n g the very low le v e l of p o l i t i -
cal consciousness of the people whom he wished to mobilise, m 
the process developing t h e i r self respect, determination and 
unity ( 2 ) . Mass meetings for which the campaign provided a 
focus, held m the Cape (which otherwise played l i t t l e part m 
support of resistance) as well as m the Transvaal and Nalal 
where the meetings were frequently attended by a thousand people 
or more, played an important role m t h i s task. Whilst the 
process of mobilising Asian opinion pre-dates 1906, the campaign 
transformed the scale and nature of popular involvement. The 
campaign embraced most elements of the Indian population as well 
as the Chinese community. I n the Transvaal i t was sustained, 
and involved severe suffering. Increased p o l i t i c a l awareness 
did not r e s u l t m unity amongst South African Asians. Hindu-Muslim 
and "free"-colonial born Indian divisions, as well as others, 
remained, manifesting themselves at the most d i f f i c u l t times, 
none more so than the N.I.C.-N.I.A. s p l i t m October 1913-
(1) I t i s a matter for speculation what l e g i s l a t i o n and 
regulations of a s p e c i f i c a l l y r a c i a l nature directed at 
the Asians might have been introduced between 1906 and 
191 or l a t e r , and passed i f i t had not been for Asian 
agita t i o n m South Africa (and elsewhere) - a point to 
which Gandhi gives some emphasis. Indian Opinion, 
3 June 1911 -
(2) "The Transvaal struggle i s intended to teach the majority 
of Indians the use of t h i s magnificent force (Satyagraha) 
so as to make them t r u l y independent men" ..."the educative 
value of the disc i p l i n e of Satyagraha can never be over-
estimated". Gandhi Papers, Vol 10 (doc 38 and 57),January 1910. 
But the degree of co-operation achieved between 1906 and 191 
i s more remarkable than the di v i s i o n - from people lacking m 
p o l i t i c a l experience, disparate m origins and b e l i e f s and con-
s t i t u t i n g a minority under incessant but d i f f e r i n g threats. 
As a part of the educative process,, many people through 
the campaign gained f i r s t hand experience of organizing for 
p o l i t i c a l ends. An e l i t e received i n s t r u c t i o n at Tolstoy 
farm and the Phoenix settlement (where Gandhi, mindful of the 
importance to his aims of education, m general, set up a 
school), others receiving a more basic grounding as the cam-
paign proceeded. But a cautionary note should be entered 
about the value of the campaign as a medium for developing 
organizational s k i l l s . Gandhi directed i t s course m a highly 
idiosyncratic way. And some, i f not most, of his closest 
aides were Europeans whose role m the campaign, for example 
during the march of 1913i was c r u c i a l . His "formula" for 
organization may have been successful m mobilizing support 
whilst he was there but i t provided an inadequate model for 
the future, l i k e a mediaeval administration foundering with 
the departure of i t s originator. However great the immediate 
impact of the campaign on South African Asians the subsequent 
prolonged period m which there was a dearth of popularly based 
Asian p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y against the discriminatory practices 
of successive governments raises serious doubt as to the prac-
t i c a l longer-term effect of the campaign on i t s participants 
and supporters. 
Gandhi's attempts to persuade white South Africans and 
people abroad of the j u s t i c e of his claims on behalf of the 
Asian population met with l i m i t e d success. Whites m South 
Africa, with the exception of a small but vocal group, demon-
strated l i t t l e sympathy for the Asians, viewing the campaign 
with the deepest suspicion, sharing Neame's concern, voiced 
m 1908, that, "looked at from a l l standpoints, with special 
regard to the future, the presence of a large Asiatic population 
m those Colonies which can be considered as white man's country 
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i s a d i s t i n c t danger to the Colony concerned and to the 
welfare of the Empire i t s e l f " ( l ) . Indeed, the campaign 
may well have served to confirm and excite white fears, high-
l i g h t i n g the issues which divided Asians and Europeans. 
Neame expressed the view, which may have been shared by other 
Europeans, that whilst the i n f l u x of Asians should cease, 
" f a i r , even generous treatment should be accorded to those 
Asiatics who have become part of the population of the 
country" ( 2 ) . But the endorsement of t h i s view, m p r i n c i p l e , 
had l i t t l e e f f e c t , m practice. 
Gandhi made no attempt to canvas African or Coloured 
support, there being a considerable psychological hurdle to 
overcome, for which Ghandi 
and his supporters were seemingly not then prepared. 
Outside South Africa, Gandhi was assiduous m seeking support 
for the campaign m India and B r i t a i n , having p a r t i c u l a r success 
m the former where his task was one of informing rather than 
having to persuade. He was m frequent contact with Indian 
leaders, p a r t i c u l a r l y Gokhale. I n encouraging support for 
the campaign from India, on "the basis that the d i s a b i l i t i e s 
suffered by Indians m South Africa raised Empire-wide issues, 
Gandhi created f o r himself a standing m India as a p a t r i o t and 
guardian of i t s honour (3) ' 
The treatment of South African Indians evoked extensive 
comment, much of i t sympathetic, m B r i t a i n during the campaign. 
Under the direc t i o n of Lord Ampthill, the South African B r i t i s h 
Committee provided Gandhi with a r e l i a b l e means of putting 
d ) L. Neame, The Asiatic Danger m the Colonies, p 9 1 -
(2) i b i d . , p 106T 
(3) I n laying so much stress on the theoretical r i g h t to equality 
before the law, as between B r i t i s h subjects m the Empire i t 
could be argued Gandhi was preparing the ground fo r under-
mining B r i t i s h rule m India but, i f so, i t i s not born out 
by his sentiments towards Empire expressed whilst m South 
Afri c a . 
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across the South African Asian point of view both m the press 
and m Parliament and Government c i r c l e s . I t s most notable 
achievement was m helping to persuade Lord Elgin to disallow 
the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance m 1906, but i t was an 
achievement which was short l i v e d . Thereafter the Committee's 
achievements are less easily assessed. But i f i t had no"c 
been for the continuing pressure on the Colonial Office of the 
SABIC and groups m India i t i s u n l i k e l y that the B r i t i s h 
Government would have been as exercised as i t was over the 
fate of B r i t i s h Asians m South Afr i c a . I n turn t h i s led, 
on occasions, to pressure from HMG on successive governments 
m South Africa to s e t t l e with Gandhi and his followers. 
I n a campaign m which negotiations, outside pressures 
and strikes played a considerable part m the outcome of the 
successive phases i t i s not always easy to isol a t e and assess 
the role of acts of non-violent non-compliance with the law. 
I t may be argued that there was no other t a c t i c available to 
South African Asians which could more nearly have achieved the 
external and i n t e r n a l goals set by t h e i r leaders. The 1907 
boycott of r e g i s t r a t i o n o f f i c e s was, for example, d i r e c t l y 
responsible for the January 1908 settlement, but i t i s stretching 
credulity to divorce the January 191^ settlement from the spon-
taneous and sometimes vi o l e n t manifestations which immediately 
preceded i t . The a r r i v a l of an Indian Government mediator and 
s t r i f e amongst white South African workers added to the pressures 
for settlement. 
According to Gandhi, one of Smuts' secretaries (presumably 
Mr Gorges) remarked early m 191*+ ( a f t e r Gandhi had called o f f 
his second march) ,"How can we lay hands upon you 9 I often wish 
you took to violence l i k e the English Strikers, and then we 
would know at once how to dispose of you. But you w i l l not 
in j u r e even the enemy. You desire vict o r y by se l f - s u f f e r i n g 
alone and never transgress your/self-imposed l i m i t s of courtesy 
and chivalry. And that i s what reduces us to sheer 
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/This statement i s scarcely borne out by evidence, 
helplessness For example, from December 1907 the 
Transvaal Government made the issue of trading licences 
dependent for Asians on the production of a r e g i s t r a t i o n 
c e r t i f i c a t e . How long many Asian traders would have held 
out i f a settlement had not soon been reached i s doubtful ( 2 ) . 
The Government's reaction to the second phase of resistance 
suggests they considered themselves neither to be helpless 
noi to be softened by i t s non-violent t a c t i c s , since they 
acted m the harshest terms the law would permit, and connived 
m the deportation of participants to India and China. The 
spectacle of non-violent resistance was embarrassing for 
South African governments, but p r i n c i p a l l y because i t evoked 
a response abroad which m turn led to various pressures being 
put on the South Africans to bring the c o n f l i c t to an end 
Without imperial constraints, however half-heartedly applied, 
successive South Africa administrations, encouraged by electoral 
opinions, would have been less disposed than they were to meet 
the demands of the Asian population. 
As a means of meeting i n t e r n a l goals, notably to raise 
Asian p o l i t i c a l consciousness, the t a c t i c of non-violent resis-
tance proved p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e , neither recourse solely, 
on the one hand, to p e t i t i o n s or, on the other, to violence 
would have so involved a broad spectrum of the population. 
The impact of non-violent resistance was heightened by the 
d i s t i n c t i v e form i t assumed during the campaign. What Gandhi 
evolved was not an ideology m the conventional sense but i t had 
much the same purpose. The concept of Satyagraha played an 
important part m maintaining the resolve of the core of resisters 
(1) Satyagraha m South Africa, p ^92. 
(2) This can be deduced from the numbers who took out 
r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s from December 1908 when these 
were again required before a trading licence was issued. 
p4 4 footnote6 
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who persisted m t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s to the embarrassment of 
successive South African administrations, m the period from 
1909 to 1911 and who provided the impetus without which the 
f i n a l phase of the campaign would not have taken place. 
An assessment of the campaign would be incomplete without 
reference to the relationship of the two p r i n c i p a l actors m 
the confrontations of 1906-14, Gandhi and Smuts ( 1 ) . I f i t 
had not been for the curious coincidence that Gandhi should 
have faced Smuts as the responsible minister both m the 
Transvaal and Union Administrations m the period of c o n f l i c t 
the res u l t might well have been less satisfactory for Gandhi 
than i t proved to be. I s i t , f or example, conceivable that 
Fischer would have arrived at a settlement with Gandhi such 
as that achieved m 191V 7 The empathy between Gandhi and 
Smuts (2) should not, however, be exaggerated, as p o l i t i c i a n s 
they were implacably opposed to the others practices. And 
whilst, as Hancock noted, "from t h e i r separate bases of 
ancestral b e l i e f Gandhi and Smuts were both exploring the 
sim p l i c i t y of d i v i n i t y and morality and i f they sometimes 
discovered opposite norms of conduct ... for example ... of force m 
p o l i t i c s they could at least understand the purpose of each 
other's "quest" ( 3 ) / t h i s very "understanding" caused i t s own 
peculiar problems as evidenced by the confusion r e s u l t i n g from 
the agreement between them drawn up m January 1908. 
(1) There i s a dearth of detailed information, but see 
W. Hancock, The Sanguine Years, pp 309~3^7« 
(2) Symbolised by the books sent by Smuts to Gandhi m 
^ j a i l and the Sandals made by Gandhi for Smuts. 
(3) Hancock, op. c i t . , p 323-
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ANNEX A 
CASE STUDIES IN RESISTANCE 1908-1909 
Sorabji Shapurji Adajania, a Natal Indian b a r r i s t e r , 
was selected to spearhead resistance to the r e s t r i c t i o n on the 
entry of educated non-resident Indians to the Transvaal ( l ) . 
Between mid-1908 and the suspension of h o s t i l i t i e s he was im-
prisoned on eight occasions for v i o l a t i o n of immigration 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . However, when he f i r s t entered the Transvaal, 
m June 1908, having warned the £Ove mine n-^rn advance of his 
inte n t i o n to test his r i g h t to remain m the Transvaal solely 
m terms of the Immigration Act he was not subjected to an 
education test being allowed to enter without r e s t r i c t i o n . 
He subsequently f a i l e d zo register w i t h i n 8 days as required 
under section ^ ( 2 ) of the Asiatic Act, for which he was 
summonsed, being defended m court by Gandhi and acquitted 
on a tec h n i c a l i t y . On 10 July at the High Court, Sorabji 
was ordered to leave the Colony within 7 days m terms of 
section 8 (3 ) of the Asiatic Act* Gandhi's plea that every 
Asian who could read and write a European language had the 
r i g h t to entry was brushed aside. Having f a i l e d to depart, 
Sorabji was charged on 20 July under Section 7 of the Peace 
Preservation Ordinance, going to j a i l f o r one month. At the 
end of his sentence he was deported, under quite what provision, 
i t i s unclear ( 2 ) , along with a number of other Natal Indian 
leaders, some formerly resident m the Transvaal who had 
followed him there. A l l immediately returned, and were 
charged under section 2(k) of the Immigration Restriction Act, 
under which anyone entering the Colony and subject to the 
provisions of any laws rendering them l i a b l e , either immediately 
(1) The account which follows i s taken from Indian Opinion, 18 
July 1908 - 17 October 1908, and Gandhi Papers, Vols 9 and 10. 
(2) The PPO, section 8, provided prison sentences, not deportation 
for those who, having been charged and sentenced, as Sorabji 
was, under section 7 i f a i l e d to leave the Colony at the end of 
th e i r sentences. Neither Act 2 nor Act 15 appear to give 
sanction for deportation m circumstances such as Sorabji's 
on release from his f i r s t period of imprisonment. 
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on entry, or subsequently,to deportation were classed as 
prohibited immigrants ( l ) . This provision clearly applied 
to the Natal leaders, as a res u l t of t h e i r e a r l i e r conviction 
under the Peace Preservation Ordinance ( 2 ) . At t h e i r t r i a l s 
m September, Sorabji and most of his colleagues were sent to 
prison for a 3 month term lesser figures receiving 6 weeks. 
Most, i f not a l l , were deported before completion of t h e i r 
sentences, thereafter repeatedly returning to the Transvaal 
m defiance of the law, facing increasingly severe penalties. 
They were joined by others from Natal and the Cape. 
In October 1908, Gandhi, a f t e r a v i s i t to Natal, returned 
to the Transvaal, at the border refusing to produce a regis-
t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e or other means of i d e n t i t y (finger p r i n t s , 
for example) ( 3 ) - He was charged for t h i s under section 9 
of the Regulations framed under the Asiatics Registration Amend-
ment Act, a law which had been m force only since September 2 1 . 
Gandhi took the opportunity of his appearance m court to explain 
his reasons fo r leading resistance to the Asiatic Amendment Act 
and the related Registration Amendment Act. He was sentenced 
to two months imprisonment, those charged with him receiving 
terms of between 2 and 6 weeks. The convictions provoked 
much comment, there being a c o n f l i c t of opinion as to whether 
or not i t was proper for the Gove r n i o n t *t° demand to see 
r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s before the end of November 1908, the 
f i n a l date for Asian residents who had not previously regis-
tered or were no longer m possession of a c e r t i f i c a t e to apply 
(1) The Immigration Restriction Act No. 15 1907 i s considered 
above pj>24-25. Minors were not exempted from deportation 
provisions. See, for example, R. Lalloo vs Rex or the 
case of H. Moolji, the subject of Transvaal Ministers' 
minute no. 7 of 8 January 1909- Enclosure with 
Lord Selborne's despatch of 9 January 1909 to Lord Crewe. 
CO 291/136 (3^99 ) . 
(2) Section 8 of the PPO refers. 
(3) Gandhi's t r i a l was reported m Indian Opinion, 10 and 17 
October 1908. He was s i m i l a r l y charged on other occasions. 
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for r e g i s t r a t i o n d ) . The conviction also drew attention to 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a legitimate Asian resident being removed 
from the Colony as a prohibited immigrant. 
This issue was central to an important case involving a 
number of Transvaal residents, including Thambi Naidoo, who 
were arrested whilst on picket duty outside a r e g i s t r a t i o n 
o f f i c e (2^ and charged m terms of Act 36, 1908, for non-
possession of r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e s . The group was summari-
l y deported m terms of section 7 of that Act, under a magis-
t e r i a l order from which there was no r i g h t of appeal. Those 
who returned were declared prohibited immigrants and sentenced 
to 3 months imprisonment or a fine of £ 5 0 - An appeal was 
unsuccessful but Justice Mason did emphasize, according to the 
report m Indian Opinion, that Asians who had registered, 
whether v o l u n t a r i l y or otherwise, could not be deported ( 3 ) * 
The problem was that under the Immigration Restriction Act, 
and likewise the Asiatics' Registration Amendment Act, the burden 
of proof rested squarely on the defendant, who, m the case of 
participants m the campaign, were not m a position to meet 
t h i s requirement without undermining t h e i r stance on non-
co-operation. 
D i f f i c u l t i e s for resisters were compounded by judgements 
handed down during the appeals of S. Randeira, one of the 
group of Natal leaders previously referred t o , a l l of whom had 
become l i a b l e from 1 December to the sanctions of Act 36 1908, 
and were charged under the Regulations made m terms of section 
9 (k)• An appeal against deportation under a magistrate's 
d ) Henry Polak, the lawyer-editor of Indian Opinion f i r s t raised 
the issues m the Transvaal Leader,3 November 1908, and Indian 
Opinion, 28 November 1908, the constrastmg views of the Attorney 
General also being published m the l a t t e r . The Attorney General 
ruled that the Act applied immediately to those who had regis-
tered, but not t i l l 1 December 1908 for others. E a r l i e r , m 
October, J. Randeree, an imprisoned res i s t e r was released on t h i s 
very ground,ibid. ,17 October 1908. 
( 2 ' The case i s referred to m the Gandhi Papers, Vol 9 (doc 72) and 
Indian Opinion, 2 January - 30 January 1909-
(3~) i b i d . , 30 January 1909. 
(k Details of the appeals were published m Indian Opinion, 26 
December 1908 - 13 February 1909. 
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order was dismissed on the basis that an appeal could not be 
entertained from a decision based on administrative regulations. 
Subsequently, Randeira was deported and on return charged as a 
prohibited immigrant under section 5 of the Immigration 
Restriction Act. On appeal against his declaration as a pro-
h i b i t e d immigrant Judge Wessels determined that "a man who 
has been f o r c i b l y banished from the country cannot be said to 
be a resident of the country whence he has been deported"( /\). 
The Judge claimed to be bound to accept the correctness of the 
magistrate's decision m previously deporting Randeira since there 
was no appeal from such a determination. 
The decisions m the Randeira appeals confirmed the 
degree of s a c r i f i c e resisters had to be prepared to make. 
Gandhi commented, "some Indians appear to have l o s t heart 
altogether because of t h i s appeal ... (they) should be taken 
to be cowards" ( 2 ) . But resident and non-resident p a r t i c i -
pants alik e continued to be arrested for non-possession of 
c e r t i f i c a t e s , suffering deportation and subsequent imprisonment 
of from 3 to 6 months on return. 
(1) i b i d . , 13 February 1909. 
(2) Gandhi Papers, Vol 9 (doc 119) . 
ANNEX B 
SUMMARY O F T H E RECOMMENDATIONS OF T H E INDIAN E N Q U I R Y 
COMMISSION, 1914 
"Come of these recommendations will require legislation to give effect to them 
whilst others can be sufficiently dealt with by administrative action 
1. Section 5 (g) of the Iminigiants Regulation Act of 1913 should be amended so 
as to bring the law into conformity with the practice of the Immigration Depart-
ment, which is 'to admit one wife and the minor children by her of an Indian 
now entitled to reside^n any Province or may in future be permitted to enter 
the Union, irrespective of the fact that his mamagc to such wife may have been 
solemnised according to tenets that recognise polygamy, or that she is one of 
several wives married abroad, so long as she is his only wife in South Africa' 
2. Instructions should be given to the Immigiation Ofliccrs to open registers in 
each Province for the registration by Indians of, say, three1 or moie years' 
residence in South Africa, who have at piesent or have had in the past more 
than one wife living with them in South Africa, of such wives, who are to be 
fice to travel to and from India with their minor children so long as the husband 
continues to reside in this countiy 
3. There should be legislation on the lines of Act 16 of 1860 of the Cape Colony 
making provisions for the appointment of Mairiage Officers fiom amongst 
Indian Priests of different denominations for the purpose of solemnising 
main.igcs in accordance with the rites of the respective religions of the parlies 
4. There should be legislation for the validation by means of registration ot existing 
de facto monogamous marriages, by which arc understood marriages of one 
man with one woman under a system which recognises the right of the husband 
to marry one or more othci wives 
Directions as to the mode of registration and ol the paiticulais to be entered 
in the lcgister might be given by regulations framed under the Statute 
5. Section 6 of Act 17 of 1895 of Natal which requues ccitain Indians to take out 
year by year a pass or licence to icmain in the Colony and which provides 
for the payment of £3 a ycai for such licence should be u pealed 
6. The conditions under which identification certificates under the Immigrants' 
Regulation Act, 1913, are issued should be amended so as to provide that such 
certificates shall remain in force for a penod of three years, 
7. An interpreter should be attached to the office of the Immigration Department 
m Cape Town who should be a whole-time officer 
8. Application forms for permits, ceitificales, etc, from the Immigiation Depart-
ment should be filled in by a clerk in the office upon information supplied to 
hurt by the applicant, if the latter so desires 
9. The practice at present existing in the Cape Town office of this Department 
of taking, in certain cases, the prints of all the fingers of both hands instead 
of the thumbs only should be discontinued 
10, The Resident Magistrate of a district in which there is no Immigration Officer 
should have authority to issue temporary permits to Indians residing in his 
district who desire to travel from the Province in which they are living to another 
Proviricc of the Union 
11 The peimit fee of £1 for an identification certificate or a tcmporaiy peimit 
should be materially reduced, and no chaige should be made for an extension 
12. The present practice of the Immigration Officer of one Province of communi-
cating by telegraph with the Immigration Officer of another Province when an 
application is made by an Indian for a permit to travel from one Province to 
the other should be discontinued. 
1 1 3 
13. Domicile certificates which have been issued to Indians in Natal by the Immi-
gration Officers of that Piovincc, and winch bear the thumb impression of the 
holder of the permit, should be recognised as conclusive evidence of the right 
of the holder to enter the Union as soon us his identity has been established 
14 An arrangement should, if possible, be made with the Government of India 
for the holding of official enquiries bv the Magistrate or other Government 
official in the case of women and children proceeding from India to join their 
husbands and fathers in South Africa If, on enquiry, the official is satisfied 
that the women and children are the wile and childicn of the man in South 
Africa whom they claim as their husband or father, a certificate should be given 
by him to that effect, and such evidence should be treated by the Immigration 
Officers as conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it" 
(Indian Inquiry CoVnmission Report, U G 16/1914, Cape Town, 7th March, 
1914, Summary of the Recommendations) 
•i 
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ANNEX C 
T H E SMUTS-GANDHI A G R E E M E N T 
"The following correspondence between Mr Gandhi and General Smuts, in con-
firmation of a series of interviews, constitutes a perfect understanding between the 
Indian community and the Government, in regard to those administrative matters 
which do not come under the Indians Relief Bill — 
Department of the Interior, 
Cape Town, Cape of Good Hope, 
| 30lh June, 1914 
Dear Mr Gandhi, 
Adverting to the discussion you have recently had with Geneial Smuts 
on the subject of the position of the Indian community in the Union, at the first of 
which you expressed yourself as satisfied with the provisions of the Indians Relief 
Bill and accepted it as a definite settlement of the points, which required legislative 
action, at issue between that community and the Government, and at the second of 
which you submitted for the consideration of the Government a list of other matters 
requiring adirunistiative action, over and above those specifically dealt with in that 
Bill, I am desired by General Smuts to state with reference to those mattcts that — 
(1) He sees no difficulty in arranging that the Piotcctor of the Indian Immigrants 
m Natal will in future issue to evciy Indian, who is subject to the provisions of 
Natal Act 17 of 1895, on completion of his period of indenture, or re-indenture, 
a certificate of discharge, ficc of charge, similar in form to that issued under 
the provisions of Section 106 of Natal Law No 25 of 1891 
(2) On the question of allowing existing plural wives and the children of such 
wives to join their husbands (or fathcis) in South Africa, no difficulty will be 
laised by the Government if, on enquiiy, it is found, as you stated, that the 
number is a very limited one 
(3) In admmisteiing the piovisions of Section (4) (1) (a) of the Union Immigrants 
Regulation Act, No 22 of 1913, the practice hitherto existing at the Cape will 
be continued in respect of South Afncan-born Indians who seek to enter the 
Cape Province, so long as the movement of such persons to that Province assumes 
no greater dimensions than has been the case in the past, the Government, 
however, reserves the right as soon as the number of such entrants sensibly 
increase, to apply the provisions of the Immigration Act 
(4) In the case of the 'specially exempted educated entrants into the Union' (i e, 
the limited number who will be allowed by the Government to enter the Union 
each year for some purpose connected with the general welfare of the Indian 
community), the declarations to be made by such persons will not be requned 
at the Provincial bordeis, as the general declarations which are made in terms 
of Section 19 of the Immigrants Regulation Act at the port of entry are sufiicient 
(5) Those Indians who have been admitled within the last three years, either to the 
Cape Province or Natal, aftei passing the education test imposed by the Immi-
gration Laws which were in force therein prior to the coming into effect of Act 
22 of 1913, but who, by reason of the wording of Section 30 thereof, are not 
yet regarded as being 'domiciled* in the sense in which that term is defined in 
the Section in question, shall, in the event of their absenting themselves tempo-
rarily from the Province in which they are lawfully resident, be treated, on their 
return, as if the term 'domicile' as so defined did apply to them 
(6) He will submit to the Minister of Justice the cases of those pcisons who have 
been in the past convicted of 'bona fide passive resistance offences' (a term 
which is mutually understood) and that he anticipates no objection on Mr. 
de Wet's part to the suggestion that convictions for such offences will not be 
used by the Government against such persons in the future 
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(7) A document will be issued to every 'specially exempted educated entrant* who 
is passed by the Immigration Officers under the instructions of the Minister 
issued under Section 25 of Act No 22 or 1911 
(8) AH the recommendations of the Indian Gnevances Commission enumerated 
at the conclusion of their Report, which remain over and above the points 
dealt with m the Indians Relief Bill, will be adopted by the Government, and 
subject to the stipulation contained in the last parjgraph of this letter the 
necessary further action in regard to those matters will be issued without delay 
With regard to the administration of! existing laws, the Minister desires 
me to say that it has always been and will continue to be the desire of the Govern-
ment to see that they are administered in a just manner and with due regard to vested 
rights 
In conclusion, General Smuts desires mc to say that it is, of course, under-
stood, and he wishes no dooibt on the subject to remain, that the placing of the 
Indians Relief Bill on the Statute Book of the Union, coupled with the fullilment 
of the assurances he is giving in this letter in regard to the other matters referred to 
herein, touched upon at the recent interview, will constitute a complete and final 
settlement of the controversy which has unfoitunately existed for so long, and will 
be unreservedly accepted as such by the Indian community 
I am, etc, 
(Sgd) E M Gorges" 
(Andrews. Documents Relating to the New Asiatic Bill, Appendix B, pp 17-18). 
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Text of Reply from Gandhi to Smuts 
"The passing of the Indians R e l i e f B i l l and t h i s corres-
pondence have f i n a l l y closed the satyagraha struggle which 
commenced m September, 1906, and which to the Indian community 
cost much physical suffering and pecuniary l o s s , and to the 
Government much anxioas thought and consideration. 
As you are aware, some of my countrymen have wished me to 
go further. They are d i s s a t i s f i e d that the Trade Licence Laws 
of the different Provinces, the Transvaal Gold Law,the Transvaal 
Townships Act and the Transvaal Law 3 of 1885 have not been a l -
tered so as to give them f u l l r i g h t s of residence, trade and owner-
ship of land. Some of them are d i s s a t i s f i e d that f u l l l n t e r -
P rovmcial migration i s not permitted, and some are d i s s a t i s f i e d 
that on the marriage question the R e l i e f B i l l goes no further than 
i t does. They have asked me that a l l the above matters might be 
included m the satyagraha struggle. I have been unable to comply 
with the i r wishes. Whilst, therefore, they have not been included 
m the programme of satyagraha, i t w i l l not be denied that some day 
or other these matters w i l l require further and sympathetic con-
sideration by the Government. Complete s a t i s f a c t i o n cannot be 
expected u n t i l f u l l c i v i c r ights are conceded to the resident 
Indian population. I have told my countrymen that they w i l l have 
to exercise patience, and by a l l honourable means at t h e i r disposal 
educate public opinion, so as to enable the Government of the day 
to go further than the present correspondence does. I s h a l l hope 
that when the Europeans of South A f r i c a f u l l y appreciate the fact 
that now the importation of indentured labour from India i s pro-
hibited, and the Immigrants Regulation Act of l a s t year has m 
practice a l l but stopped further free Indian immigration, and that 
my countrymen do not entertain any p o l i t i c a l ambition, they, the 
Europeans, w i l l see the j u s t i c e and, indeed, the necessity, of my 
countrymen being granted the rights I have j u s t referred to. 
Meanwhile, i f the generous s p i r i t that the Government have applied 
to the treatment of the problem during the l a s t few months con-
tinues to be applied, as promised m your l e t t e r , m the adminis-
tration of the existing laws, I am quite certain that the Indian 
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community throughout bhe Union w i l l be able to enjoy some 
measure of peace and never be a source of trouble to the 
Government." 
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PART I I THE PASSIVE RESISTANCEd) CAMPAIGN 19^6-19^3 
CHAPTER I BACKGROUND 
The campaign by South African Indians against the 
A s i a t i c Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act (2 ) was 
the f i r s t instance of sustained organized non-violent defiance 
of the law for p o l i t i c a l ends by non-whites m the Union since 
191^. 
There were examples of defiance and threats of defiance 
of the law m the intervening years but black p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i -
ty (3 ) u n t i l the mid-l9 iK)'s was largely confined to meetings, 
statements, petitions and deputations. The persistent f a i l u r e 
of these t a c t i c s to stem the flow of r a c i a l l y discriminatory 
l e g i s l a t i o n paved the way m the 19^0's for new r a d i c a l popu-
l i s t leaders m the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses who advocated more 
militant means. The growing s p i r i t of militancy amongst 
urban non-whites was manifest m the 19^4 Anti-Pass campaign 
and the Alexandra Bus boycott and m the campaign which i s 
the subject of t h i s study. The passive resistance campaign 
heralded a new phase of militant non-violent action which had 
i t s zenith m the defiance campaign and which was brought 
abruptly to a h a l t m 196O-61. 
The A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act which provoked the passive 
resistance campaign brought to a head f r u s t r a t i o n with a 
succession of r a c i a l land tenure acts, increasingly severe 
m thei r implementation, extending back to 1885 ( k ) . 
(1) This was the term used by i t s leaders. 
(2) No. 28 , 19^6. 
(3) For an account of Black p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y 1921-19^9 see T. 
K a r i s and G. C a r t e r , From Protest to Challenge Documents 
of African p o l i t i c s m South A f r i c a , Vol I (introduction 
to Parts I & I I ) , PT Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism 
m South Africa, Clemens Kadalie, My L i f e and the I.C.U., 
H. J . and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour m South A f r i c a . 
(k) Annex A. 
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Grievances about land l e g i s l a t i o n were, however, only part 
of a much wider discontent amongst Asians m South A f r i c a at 
the conditions under which they l i v e d . 
Most Asians l i v e d m Natal d ) to which they were 
confined, notwithstanding the i r objections, by the 1913 
Immigration Act ( 2 ) . According to Professor Burrows of 
Natal University, writing m 19^7? "The majority of (them) 
are i l l i t e r a t e , very poor, under-nourished and wretchedly 
housed" ( 3 ) » Problems were p a r t i c u l a r l y acute m Durban, 
where, as Hilda Kuper remarked,"(Indians) paid rates on the 
same scale as whites (but) the roads, l i g h t s , water and 
sanitary services m their areas were generally l e f t con-
spicuously i n f e r i o r , r e f l e c t i n g the exclusion of non-
Europeans from the municipal voters' r o l l " (k)• Many 
Indians m the c i t y l i v e d m slums from which they faced the 
threat of eviction, sometimes without any provision being made 
for a lternative housing (^ >). Serious deficiencies m educa-
tion f a c i l i t i e s for Indians, p a r t i c u l a r l y at the higher l e v e l s , 
( 1 ) According to the 1 9 ^ census there were 283,000 Asians ( v i r t u a l l y 
a l l of Indian descent, except for ^,000 Chinese) m South A f r i c a 
of whom about 75% l i v e d m a coastal s t r i p of Natal extending 
90 miles south and 60 miles north of Durban. Natal's Asian 
and white population was sim i l a r m t o t a l (232 ,000 and 237?000 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , 117,000 Asians and 130,000 whites l i v i n g m 
Durban. The Asian population of the Transvaal was 38 ,000 and 
of the Cape 1 5 , 0 0 0 . Approximately 75% of the Asian population 
were hmdus, 20% muslims and 5% c h r i s t i a n s . I n Natal, where 
most of the Indians were the descendants of indentured workers, 
Tamil and Hindi were most widely spoken, i n the Transvaal, the 
"Trader c l a s s " spoke Gujerati. Sources of background informa-
tion on the South African Indian population, which have been 
consulted for t h i s chapter, include, E. Hellmann (ed), Handbook 
of Race Relations m South Africa; H. Kuper, Indian People m 
Natal, M. Palmer, The History of Indians m Natal Natal 
Regional Survey, Race Relations Journal (SAIRR), Vol 1^ (1 ) and 
( 3 ) , 19V7-
(2 ) The Immigrants Regulation Act No. 22 , 1913-
(3) "A note on the Indo-European sit u a t i o n m Natal." Race Relations 
Journal, Vol -]k ( 1 ) , 19^7-
(k) H. Kuper, op c i t . , pxiv. 
(5 ) The programme of public house building for Indians m Durban m 
the period 19^5-50,though more extensive than hitherto, f a i l e d to 
cope even with the natural increase m the population. H.Burrows, 
Indian L i f e and Labour m Natal, New A f r i c a Pamphlet no. 23 , p 5 5 . 
the s c a r c i t y o f employment and the i n i q u i t i e s of job r e s e r v a t i o n 
provided f e r t i l e sources o f discontent- Whatever an Asian's 
standing, he could not escape the h u m i l i a t i o n of r a c i a l d i s c n m i 
n a t i o n . The Second World War, m which many South A f r i c a n 
Indians had served w i t h the Union defence f o r c e s , and which had 
been fought over the very issues of r a c i a l i s m and oppression, 
such as e x i s t e d m South A f r i c a , had r a i s e d hopes amongst 
some South A f r i c a n Indians o f change m South A f r i c a , which Prim 
M i n i s t e r Smuts had encouraged by h i s advocacy o f the " s p i r i t " 
o f the A t l a n t i c Charter, h i s authorship o f the preamble to the 
TIN Charter and h i s speech m Capetown m 19^2 when he remarked 
t h a t "Segregation has f a l l e n on e v i l days" ( 1 ) . Smuts' sub-
sequent f a i l u r e to a c t , a t a time o f i n c r e a s i n g changes abroad, 
served t o i n t e n s i f y the sense of f r u s t r a t i o n f e l t by the 
I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n . 
I n January 19^6 South A f r i c a n Asians learned o f a f u r t h e r 
t h r e a t t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s when Smuts announced the Government's 
i n t e n t i o n to introduce a b i l l t o impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on the 
a c q u i s i t i o n and occupation o f f i x e d property by Asians m 
Natal and f u r t h e r t o c o n t r o l Asian r i g h t s t o h o l d and occupy 
pr o p e r t y m the Transvaal ( 2 ) . The A s i a t i c Land Tenure and 
I n d i a n Representation B i l l ( 3 ) introduced m the House o f 
Assembly on 1 if March, was intended as a substantive replace-
ment f o r the Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and 
Natal) R e s t r i c t i o n Act of 19^3 ( k ) . 
The B i l l was intended t o s a t i s f y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i n t e r e s t s . 
Smuts was under considerable e l e c t o r a l pressure m Na t a l to 
put a stop t o what the white p o p u l a t i o n there saw as I n d i a n 
(1 ) K a r i s and Carter, op. c i t . , Vol 2 , p 73-
(2) The B u l l was not intended t o apply t o the Cape, but the 
Land tenure p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act were extended t o cover 
the Province m October 19^9* 
(3 ) The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n clauses are r e f e r r e d t o below, p 1 2 z 
(h) Act 35 , 19^3- This so-called,"Pegging Act" was preceded 
by Act 28 , 1939 and Act 28, 19^1, both of which a p p l i e d 
only m the Transvaal, p 1 9 6 
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" p e n e t r a t i o n " of predominantly white areas through the 
a c q u i s i t i o n and occupation o f prope r t y . At the same time, Smuts 
must have been aware t h a t the land tenure p r o v i s i o n s of the B i l l 
would be i n t e r p r e t e d abroad, notably m I n d i a , as a breach o f 
the u p l i f t m e n t clauses of the 1927 Cape Town Agreement d ) and 
t h a t t h i s could prove damaging t o South A f r i c a ' s image abroad 
m the changed post-war c l i m a t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y as the B i l l was 
before Parliament m the months immediately preceding the f i r s t 
session o f the United Nations Assembly. Smuts also faced d i s -
s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h i n h i s own m i n i s t e r i a l ranks, n o t a b l y from 
J. H. Hofmeyer ( 2 ) and from the many United Party supporters 
and members who opposed the g r a n t i n g of any p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s 
to the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n . Whether Smuts was s e r i o u s l y con-
cerned a t po s s i b l e South A f r i c a n I n d i a n r e a c t i o n t o the B i l l i s 
d o u b t f u l , except m so f a r as t h e i r r e a c t i o n might have had 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l repercussions. 
The Land Tenure and I n d i a n Representation Act,which 
became law on 3 June 19^6, f o r the f i r s t time made p r o v i s i o n 
f o r the s t a t u t o r y d i v i s i o n o f Nat a l on r a c i a l grounds by i t s 
demarcation i n t o exempted and c o n t r o l l e d areas. Except m 
nominally n o n - r a c i a l "exempted" areas m N a t a l , the Act forbade 
Asians from a c q u i r i n g landed property owned by non-Asians (j>j 
( U P167 footnote 2 . Mabel Palmer s a i d t h a t the r e s t r i c t i o n s , m 
a d d i t i o n , constituted the f i r s t formal breach o f the terms 
under which I n d i a n indentured labourers were sent t o N a t a l . 
Included m the c o n d i t i o n s was the p r o v i s i o n t h a t a t the end 
of t h e i r indentures the labourers were t o be subject t o the 
general laws of the land and were not t o be d i s c r i m i n a t e d 
against. Palmer o p . c i t . , pp 137 -8 . 
(2 ) Hofmeyr expressed b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m o f the treatment o f Indians 
by whites m Na t a l , and during the debates on the B i l l ex-
pressed the hope t h a t the p r o v i s i o n f o r the communal fra n c h i s e 
( w i t h which he was not happy) would a t l e a s t s t a r t the process 
of r e s t o r i n g to the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n the r i g h t s p r e v i o u s l y 
taken away from them. Debates of the House o f Assembly, Vol 551 
Cols kk30-kk39, 27 March 19^6. 
( 3 ) Section 2 d ) . I t a p p l i e d only t o N a t a l , a c q u i s i t i o n of 
property by Asians m the Transvaal was already c o n t r o l l e d , 
though Act 28 strengthened e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n s t h e r e . 
and from occupying land or premises of which a non-Asian was 
m l a w f u l occupation ( l ) . The Act contained i d e n t i c a l 
p r o v i s i o n s b a r r i n g non-Asians from a c q u i r i n g or occupying 
Asian prop e r t y . 
R e s t r i c t i o n s on the a c q u i s i t i o n and occupation o f f i x e d 
property were q u a l i f i e d m vari o u s ways. The term "occupation 
was construed so as not t o prevent a member o f e i t h e r race 
group "occupying land or premises e x c l u s i v e l y f o r the purposes 
o f any business or trade f o r the c a r r y i n g on o f which a 
li c e n c e i s r e q u i r e d under law" ( 2 ) . The M i n i s t e r o f the 
I n t e r i o r was empowered t o grant i n d i v i d u a l exemptions from 
the r e s t r i c t i o n s o f the Act ( 3 ) subject to the advice of the 
Land Tenure Advisory Board created by the Act on which there 
was p r o v i s i o n f o r Asian r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( k ) . T e c h n i c a l l y , 
any p a r t o f Natal (but not the Transvaal) could be declared 
an "exempted" area (5 ) and m the f i r s t year of the Act com-
pensatory adjustments could be made between the exempt and 
c o n t r o l l e d areas. 
Chapter I I of the Act made p r o v i s i o n f o r i n d i r e c t I n d i a n 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m the Senate and the House o f Assembly, and 
f o r the e l e c t i o n o f two Indians t o the Natal P r o v i n c i a l Council 
There was to be a r e s t r i c t e d I n d i a n communal fr a n c h i s e ( 6 ) . 
I n Parliament the B i l l was received w i t h very l i t t l e 
enthusiasm, there being p a r t i c u l a r l y vehement and widespread 
o b j e c t i o n to g r a n t i n g Indians r i g h t s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and 
(1) Sections k (Natal) and 5 (Transvaal). 
(2 ) Section 7 . 
(3 ) Section 8 . 
(k) Section 10 . As a mark o f t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the 
Act, no Asians would agree to s i t on the Board. 
(5 ) 15 of the 22 Areas so declared were m Durban. 
(6) Section hf>. 
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the Act was the subject of many extreme speeches from the 
op p o s i t i o n benches d ) . Nevertheless, i t was passed w i t h 
i t s p r i n c i p a l p r o v i s i o n s i n t a c t ( 2 ) . The Land Tenure 
p r o v i s i o n s were made r e t r o a c t i v e (j>). 
The Act was r a c i a l m i t s t i t l e and m i t s content, 
however i m p a r t i a l the various p r o v i s i o n s of the Act might 
appear on paper. The c o n t r o l l e d areas ^ere overwhelmingly 
white occupied and owned. They covered a l l o f the Transvaal 
(except proclaimed land where there were s p e c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on non-whites and " l o c a t i o n s " set aside f o r Asians) and most 
of N a t a l . Exempted areas, found only m N a t a l , were predomin-
a n t l y I n d i a n occupied. The apportionment bore no r e l a t i o n t o 
the r e l a t i v e s i z e of the Asian and European po p u l a t i o n i n 
Natal ik). Nor were Asians secure from European "encroachment" 
m exempted areas since these zones were nominally n o n - r a c i a l . 
I n Durban, the c i t y c o u n c i l took the o p p o r t u n i t y of the 
(1) Mr E. Strauss, the Na t i o n a l Party MP f o r H a m s m i t h , 
remarked about the i n t r o d u c t i o n under the Act of 
exempt areas, " W i l l t h i s not lea d t o endless mis-
cegenation the Ind i a n s , w i t h t h e i r s l y 
methods and corr u p t ways ... w i l l dominate and 
squeeze out the others ... the net r e s u l t w i l l be 
a h a l f - c a s t e breed ..." . He concluded h i s speech 
by saying, "Let me t e l l you t h i s , t h a t the Free State 
i s prepared f o r b a t t l e , ... I represent a border 
d i s t r i c t on the Natal Border where the f i r s t I ndians 
w i l l be met who w i l l swarm over the Drakensberg m a 
black cloud i f the gates are thrown open, but I t e l l 
you t h a t we w i l l stand a t the ready w i t h machine guns 
to a v e r t the danger. I f we have to p e r i s h , l e t us 
then p e r i s h f i g h t i n g as honourable people". Assembly 
Debates, o p . c i t . , Cols ^327-^336. 
(2) The amendments passed were m support of white not I n d i a n 
i n t e r e s t s . Leader, 13 A p r i l 19^6. 
(3) I n the Transvaal the p r o v i s i o n s a p p l i e d from 15 March 
19^6, t o coincide w i t h the exp i r y of the 19^3 "Pegging" Act. 
I n N a t a l the " f i x e d " date was 21 January, the day the b i l l 
was f i r s t announced, thus preventing Asians from occupying 
or a c q u i r i n g property m the p e r i o d between the B i l l ' s 
announcement and f i n a l approval m areas of N a t a l where 
there were otherwise no s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s p reventing them 
from doing so. 
(k) The Act, f o r example, r e i n f o r c e d the i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n 
of l a n d m the o l d borough o f Durban where, m 19^ 4-6, 
2 5 » 0 0 0 Indians l i v e d m an area of 350 acres w h i l s t n e a r l y 
3,000 acres were reserved f o r 65 ,000 whites and f u r t h e r land 
was m municipal ownership. 
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p r o v i s i o n s of the Act a l l o w i n g f o r adjustments m the 
boundaries of exempted and c o n t r o l l e d areas to excise c e r t a i n 
exempted areas m the o l d e r , more c e n t r a l p a r t s of the c i t y , 
a l l o w i n g the Indians m r e t u r n new exempted land on the extremi-
t i e s o f Durban. D i s c r e t i o n a r y p r o v i s i o n s m the Act g i v i n g the 
I n t e r i o r M i n i s t e r power t o o v e r r i d e r e s t r i c t i o n s on occupation 
and a c q u i s i t i o n were more l i k e l y t o b e n e f i t whites than Asians 
and, m any event, h i s a u t h o r i t y was l i m i t e d because he could 
not grant an exemption where t h i s would i n v o l v e o v e r r i d i n g 
r a c i a l l y - r e s t r i c t i v e clauses m t i t l e deeds d ) . Equally, d i s -
pensation m the Act p e r m i t t i n g e i t h e r race group to trade m 
c o n t r o l l e d areas was of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l value to most Asian 
businessmen because they would be u n l i k e l y t o secure approval 
from the l o c a l l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , except f o r e x i s t i n g under-
ta k i n g s and even then obgections were l i a b l e to be r a i s e d . 
Asian owned property m the c o n t r o l l e d areas was normally 
un a f f e c t e d by the Act, but the owners were vulnerable and i f 
they should wish to s e l l , the p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act, m p r a c t i c e , 
encouraged the t r a n s f e r of the pr o p e r t y i n t o European hands (2). 
(1) These were commonplace w i t h white owned p r o p e r t i e s . 
(2) The term " f i x e d p r o p e r t y " was defined m the Act as i n -
c l u d i n g a mortgage bond f o r more than 50% o f the 
value o f the pr o p e r t y . Hence, from I9h6, m the 
absence of Asian b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s , Asians could only 
o b t a i n 50% mortgages f o r the purchase of property m 
the c o n t r o l l e d area unless they secured a permit from 
the M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r ( l i k e l y t o be a lengthy 
process and one i n v o l v i n g recourse t o the Land Tenure 
Act which Asians had undertaken to b o y c o t t ) . The 
a l t e r n a t i v e f o r an Asian w i t h p r o p e r t y to s e l l m a 
c o n t r o l l e d area was t o seek a European purchaser, who 
would be e l i g i b l e f o r a t l e a s t a 75% mortgage and 
would be u n l i k e l y t o have d i f f i c u l t y m securing a 
permit from the M i n i s t e r a u t h o r i s i n g purchase of an 
Asian p r o p e r t y . I f an Asian who already had a mortgage 
f o r more than 50% o f the value of a property wished t o 
t r a n s f e r t h i s to cover a new purchase he had t o secure 
m i n i s t e r i a l approval. 
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The Act was condemned by a l l sections of South A f r i c a n 
I n d i a n o p i n i o n d ) . Indians dubbed i t the "Ghetto Act" and 
described i t as a " c r i p p l i n g blow to I n d i a n economic and 
s o c i a l progress ( m South A f r i c a ) " ( 2 ) as w e l l as "an i n s u l t 
to the n a t i o n a l honour and d i g n i t y of the I n d i a n n a t i o n " ( 3 ) . 
The i m p o s i t i o n of permanent s t a t u t o r y segregation o f land f o r 
the f i r s t time m Na t a l and the r e f u s a l of the government to 
admit Indians t o a common e l e c t o r a l r o l l were seen by South A f r i c a n 
Indians as f u r t h e r evidence t h a t the Government, i n s t e a d of 
implementing the u p l i f t m e n t clauses of the Cape Town agreement, 
was i n t e n t on reducing the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n t o the l e v e l of 
the m a j o r i t y o f the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n ( k ) . For most Indians 
the Act f i n a l l y dashed any l i n g e r i n g hopes of t h e i r being able 
to a r r i v e a t an e q u i t a b l e "accommodation" w i t h the Government. 
For the more m i l i t a n t Indians the p r o v i s i o n m the Act f o r a 
communal fr a n c h i s e was taken as an i n s u l t , both because i t was 
so r e s t r i c t i v e as to have excluded a l l but a few thousand 
Indians and because i t was seen to set the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n 
aside as i n f e r i o r - a t the very time when the I n d i a n sub-
continent was approaching Independence, and about to become a 
f u l l co-equal member, w i t h South A f r i c a , o f the Commonwealth 
and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l assemblies ( 5 ) « 
(1) See, f o r example, the meeting o f the South A f r i c a n I n d i a n 
Congress (SAIC), 11 February 19^6, Cape Town. Leader, 
16 February -\9h6. 
(2 ) Statement a t a j o i n t meeting o f the N a t a l and Transvaal 
passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l s 15 May 19^-6. i b i d . , 18 May 19^6-
(3) M. D. Barmania, leader of SAIC delega t i o n before the Bar 
of the House, 3 May 19^6. i b i d . , 11 May 1 9 ^ . 
(h) The awaremess o f t h i s f a c t o r may have c o n t r i b u t e d t o I n d i a n 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o co-operate to an i n c r e a s i n g extent w i t h the 
A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n m opposing government r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . 
( 5 ) There are v a r i o u s summaries of I n d i a n c r i t i c i s m s o f the 
A s i a t i c Act Y. Dadoo, Facts about the Ghetto Act The 
I n d i a n People m South A f r i c a , G. Singh, The A s i a t i c Act ... 
a b r i e f survey o f i t s Background, Terms and I m p l i c a t i o n s , 
A. Choudree and R. P a t e l , A Commentary on the A s i a t i c Land 
Tenure and I n d i a n Representation Act and a Short Survey of 
the I n d i a n Question m South A f r i c a . Counter views were 
put m Government and Durban C i t y Council pamphlets, f o r 
example, The I n d i a n m Nata l - I s he the V i c t i m of Oppression? 
Durban C i t y Council. 
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Wealthy and educated Asians were most l i k e l y to be 
d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the i m p o s i t i o n of the Act, though those 
whovfere already e s t a b l i s h e d need not have experienced any 
immediate m a t e r i a l l o s s . Indeed, Asian l a n d l o r d s stood to 
gam f i n a n c i a l l y because tenanted p r o p e r t i e s a v a i l a b l e t o 
Asians m e x i s t i n g c e n t r a l urban areas m Natal would be a t 
an i n c r e a s i n g premium. The poorer and l e s s educated, w h i l s t 
s u p e r f i c i a l l y having l i t t l e a t stake m the Land Tenure Act, 
m p r a c t i c e , stood t o lose by i t , f o r i t had a d i r e c t bearing 
on t h e i r s o c i a l and economic prospects and m p a r t i c u l a r f o r 
those l i v i n g m the urban areas of N a t a l made them i n c r e a s i n g l y 
vulnerable t o pressures from t h e i r employers, l a n d l o r d s and 
l o c a l c o u n c i l s d ) . 
There were, thus, i n 1 9 ^ 5 numerous grounds f o r d i s s a t i s -
f a c t i o n amongst South A f r i c a n Asians and they had every reason 
to be apprehensive about f u t u r e developments, but t h i s was 
scarcely a new s t a t e of a f f a i r s and, w h i l s t i t provided an 
e s s e n t i a l basis f o r the launching of the passive r e s i s t a n c e 
campaign i t d i d not ensure such a response. 
The key determining f a c t o r was the gradual replacement, 
from the m i d - l ^ ' s , of "moderate" I n d i a n leaders, l i k e 
A. I . Kajee, by " m i l i t a n t " (2 ) elements headed by Drs. Dadoo 
and Naicker who r e j e c t e d the "compromise" p o l i c i e s t y p i f i e d 
by the a b o r t i v e "]9kk P r e t o r i a Agreement ( 3 ) 7 which were the 
( 1 ) There were various s p e c i f i c r e p o r t s i n the South A f r i c a n 
I n d i a n press about the t h r e a t the Act posed to I n d i a n 
workers. Leader, 25 May 19A6, 15 June 19^-6, 3 August I9k6. 
(2 ) The terms "moderates" and " m i l i t a n t s " were those t y p i c a l l y 
employed by the South A f r i c a n I n d i a n press m the 19^+0's, 
though such l a b e l s as " p r o g r e s s i v i s t s " and " r e a c t i o n a r i e s " 
or "conservatives" were also used. 
(3 ) The aim of which was t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r the Pegging Act of 
19^ +3 a "v o l u n t a r y " system of c o n t r o l on I n d i a n occupation 
of property m the urban areas of N a t a l . I t was conceived 
m haste by Smuts on the eve o f an important v i s i t to 
B r i t a i n and provoked a f u r o r e from N a t a l whites and from 
I n d i a n m i l i t a n t s . The Agreement, the terms o f which were 
the subject o f much confusion, was never implemented. 
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u l t i m a t e downfall of the conservatives. Dr Naicker won c o n t r o l 
of the Natal I n d i a n Congress (N.I.C.) m October 19^+5, having 
secured a p l a t f o r m by e s t a b l i s h i n g the Anti-Segregation Council 
m 1 9 ^ m o p p o s i t i o n t o the P r e t o r i a Agreement. Dr Dadoo, 
who had been a c t i v e m p o l i t i c s since the 1930's, became 
President of the Transvaal I n d i a n Congress ( T I C . ) s h o r t l y 
afterwards w i t h the support of the Congress Democratic A c t i o n 
Committee, a r a d i c a l pressure group w i t h i n the T.I.C which 
he l e d . However, the conservatives eontmued to h o l d the 
chairmanship of the S.A.I.C. ( l ) u n t i l September 19^8, when 
they were o b l i g e d t o h o l d e l e c t i o n s f o l l o w i n g a p r o t r a c t e d 
l e g a l b a t t l e between m i l i t a n t and conservative elements which 
was f i n a l l y resolved m the m i l i t a n t s ' favour m March 1 9 ^ . 
Conservatives remained on the provmc3al congress executives 
u n t i l 19V? when they formed separate o r g a n i s a t i o n s - the N a t a l 
I n d i a n and Transvaal I n d i a n o r g anisations (2 ) - f o l l o w i n g 
p r o t r a c t e d i n t e r n e c i n e disputes w i t h the m i l i t a n t s , the r e s u l t 
of both p e r s o n a l i t y and p o l i c y clashes. The conservatives, 
who were a f a r from u n i t e d group, denounced the Congress 
organizations as being communist dominated. They had v i r t u -
a l l y no support amongst the "rank and f i l e " , drawing t h e i r 
membership, in s t e a d , from merchants and t r a d e r s . W h i l s t the 
conservatives voiced c r i t i c i s m of the A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act, 
they d i d not, w i t h very few exceptions, p a r t i c i p a t e m the 
programme of n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , p r e f e r r i n g i n s t e a d , t o 
seek the ear of the Government through i n t e r v i e w s w i t h the 
Prime M i n i s t e r and other members of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
(1 ) The South A f r i c a n I n d i a n Congress was a c o - o r d i n a t i n g body 
f o r the various p r o v i n c i a l I n d i a n Congresses. I t was 
e s t a b l i s h e d m 1920, i t s Chairman during the passive 
resistance campaign was Ahmed Meer. 
(2 ) The NIO was e s t a b l i s h e d on k May 19^7 and the TIO 
m December 19^7- See also p175 
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CHAPTER I I AIMS, PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION 
The passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign was one of p r o t e s t . Acts 
o f resistance against the law m the campaign were confined t o 
the A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act and l a t e r , a d d i t i o n a l l y , t o the 
Immigrants Regulation Act 1913 as thp instrument which denied 
Asians freedom of movement across p r o v i n c i a l boundaries. But 
the m o t i v a t i o n f o r the campaign, c e r t a i n l y m the eyes o f the 
m i l i t a n t members o f Congress who l e d i t , was much broader based 
than the a c t u a l t a r g e t s f o r r e s i s t a n c e suggest. Two l e a d i n g 
N a t a l Congress members, H. A. Naidoo and S. Rustojnjee, m an 
a r t i c l e w r i t t e n a t the end of 19^6 commented, "We oppose not 
only the A s i a t i c Land Tenure and I n d i a n Representation Act. 
To confine our complaint t o a p a r t i c u l a r law would be a gross 
misunderstanding o f the s i t u a t i o n . We are c h a l l e n g i n g the 
very basis of the politico-economic s t r u c t u r e o f South A f r i c a 
which would r e l e g a t e us, and other persons o f colour, t o a 
p o s i t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y . Let us not be mistaken 
about t h i s . I t i s a s t r u g g l e f o r e q u a l i t y - f o r equal p a r t n e r -
ship w i t h the European" d ) . This view was put m perspective 
by Dr Naicker: " I t would be wrong to give the impression t h a t 
we demand our l i b e r t y by one sweep of the pen, t h a t i s not so. 
What we ask f o r i s the u n c o n d i t i o n a l repeal of the Ghetto Act. 
Secondly, a programme of progressive removal of a l l the laws 
t h a t place Indians m an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n " ( 2 ) . 
Opinion v a r i e d amongst I n d i a n leaders as t o the prospect 
of securing r e l i e f from r a c i a l laws through the passive r e s i s -
tance campaign (3) b u t , m any event, there were other o b j e c t i v e s 
(1) Victims o f R a c i a l Oppression, 19^6. E x t r a c t s r e p r i n t e d 
m Passive Resister, 13 December 19^6. 
(2) Speech a t N.I.C. Conference. Leader, 7 June 19V7. 
(3) I t i s now too long a f t e r the event to be sure of the 
leaders' precise expectations a t the time. Michael Scott 
b e l i e v e d t h a t the I n d i a n leadership as a whole was o p t i m i s -
t i c of securing the repeal of the Act, I n t e r v i e w , 8 May 19^9, 
but Dr Dadoo, f o r one, s a i d he had not expected t h i s to 
happen, I n t e r v i e w , 22 May 1969-
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to achxeve. The m a j o r i t y o f the South A f r i c a n Indians m 
the mid-1940's were u n p o l i t i c i s e d . I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l organiza-
t i o n s were con s t a n t l y feuding amongst themselves and xn a 
parlous c o n d i t i o n . By embarking on a r e s i s t a n c e campaign, 
designed t o have popular appeal, the new m i l i t a n t I n d i a n 
leaders saw the o p p o r t u n i t y both t o strengthen t h e i r organiza-
t i o n s , making bhem i n t o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e mass bodies run by 
p o l i t i c a l l y experienced members and t o secure t h e i r own p o s i t i o n 
as the leaders of I n d i a n o p i n i o n , undermining the vestiges o f 
i n f l u e n c e o f the conservatives. I f they were successful, they 
could i n f u s e a new sense of purpose and determination m the 
I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n whose w i l l t o r e s i s t had been a t a very low 
ebb since a t l e a s t 1914. And by demonstrating a new s p i r i t of 
m i l i t a n c y and by showing themselves t o be l a r g e l y u n i t e d m 
t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to government p o l i c i e s the Indians hoped to 
discourage the South A f r i c a n Government from i n t r o d u c i n g f u r t h e r 
repressive measures. They were strengthened m t h i s hope by 
the b e l i e f t h a t once the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community had been 
a l e r t e d t o the p l i g h t o f the South A f r i c a n Indians through the 
spectacle o f the passive resistance campaign pressure would be 
brought t o bear on the South A f r i c a n Government to mend i t s 
ways m conformity w i t h the "new c l i m a t e " of world o p i n i o n , 
symbolised by the founding o f tne United Nations. 
I n the satyagraha campaign o f 1906-14 and, subsequently, 
I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l leaders had devoted l i t t l e i f any a t t e n t i o n 
to f o r g i n g l i n k s w i t h A f r i c a n s . A f r i c a n - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s , a t 
a l l l e v e l s , were gen e r a l l y d i s t a n t and sometimes openly h o s t i l e . 
The new I n d i a n leaders recognised t h a t the Indians would be tne 
p r i n c i p a l l o s e r s i f t h i s continued and t h a t w h i l s t the g u l f 
remained the chances o f e i t h e r A f r i c a n s or Indians r e v e r s i n g 
government p o l i c y were s e r i o u s l y weakened d ) . I t thus 
( l ) Dr Dadoo, f o r one, had recognised t h i s f o r many years 
and was one of the founders of tne Non-European U n i t y 
Front set up m A p r i l 1939 m an attempt to pool the e f f o r t s 
of democrats of a l l races m South A f r i c a . H.J. & R-E 
Simons, Class and Colour m South A f r i c a , pp ^ 0J>-k. 
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became a p r i n c i p a l concern of the leadership t o demonstrate 
I n d i a n commitment to r a d i c a l change m South A f r i c a and the 
p o t e n t i a l v a l u e of j o i n t a c t i o n to achieve t h a t common goal. 
Morevoer, the passive resistance campaign o f f e r e d g u i d e l i n e s 
as to p o s s i b l e t a c t i c s which could be used t o mobilize support 
against the Government. 
I n the campaign Drs Dadoo and Naicker had the task o f 
r e p a i r i n g the omissions m I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of 
more than 30 years. They thus had to s t a r t v i r t u a l l y from 
scratch t o b u i l d up,as r a p i d l y as p o s s i b l e , an o r g a n i z a t i o n 
which would a t t r a c t popular I n d i a n support, p r e s e n t a 
c r e d i b l e o p p o s i t i o n to government p o l i c i e s which the Govern-
ment could not ignore and which would a t t r a c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
support, as w e l l as convincing A f r i c a n o p i n i o n m South 
A f r i c a of the seriousness of the I n d i a n s ' purpose and bhe 
m e r i t of j o i n i n g w i t h them m concerted a c t i o n . 
The genesis of bhe passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign was a 
meeting of the S.A.I.C. h e l d on 11 February 19A-6 m response 
to the Government's announcement on 21 January of i t s i n t e n t i o n 
to i n t r o d u c e l e g i s l a t i o n f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i n g Asian r i g h t s to 
acquire and occupy prope r t y . A d e l e g a t i o n from the conference 
c a l l e d on Smuts on the day of t h e i r meeting t o urge t h a t he 
abandon the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n and agree to a round t a b l e 
conference between the South A f r i c a n and I n d i a n Governments (1) 
as the best means of s e t t l i n g the impasse, but Smuts was un-
y i e l d i n g . The conference, m s p i t e of sharp d i v i s i o n s of 
o p i n i o n on t a c t i c s between the conservatives and m i l i t a n t s , 
was equally uncompromising, and resolved " t o mobilize a l l the 
(1) An idea advocated by J u s t i c e Broome m the i n t e r i m 
r e p o r t of the Commission of Enquiry i n t o matters 
a f f e c t i n g the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n o f the Province o f 
N a t a l , UG 22, 19^5- Annex A r e f e r s . The 
proposal was subsequently taken up by the I n d i a n 
Government. 
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resources of the I n d i a n people i n t h i s country m order t o 
take every measure possible t o secure the l a p s i n g of the 
Pegging Act and to oppose the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n " , which 
they unanimously agreed was " t o t a l l y unacceptable". 
Dr Dadoo argued t h a t the s i t u a t i o n demanded t h a t "we prepare 
ourselves t o o f f e r c i v i l disobedience", but the r e s o l u t i o n 
which was adopted, and which was proposed by A. I . Kajee, 
was not s p e c i f i c on t h i s p o i n t , simply i n s t r u c t i n g t h a t the 
S.A.I.C. executive should proceed "immediately t o prepare 
the I n d i a n people of South A f r i c a f o r a concerted and prolonged 
r e s i s t a n c e , the d e t a i l s of which t h i s conference i n s t r u c t s i t s 
executive to prepare f o r submission and a c t i o n t o i t s c o n s t i t u -
ent bodies" ( 1 ) . At a meeting of the Executive m Cape Town 
on 2k March, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the implementation of the 
r e s o l u t i o n s was passed to the Natal and Transvaal Congresses, 
tnough i t was intended t h a t the campaign would be m the name 
of the S.A.I.C. ( 2 ) . I n p r a c t i c e , the N.I.C. apparently 
already had the task m hand, f o r , s h o r t l y a f t e r the Land 
Tenure Act was introduced m the Assembly, on 1^ March, 
M D. Naidoo, J o i n t Secretary of the N.I.C., announced t h a t 
the N.I.C. Executive had prepared a plan of r e s i s t a n c e f o r the 
Province (3)» This was put to a delegate conference o f the 
N.I.C. on 30 March when i t was agreed to launch a campaign of 
passive r e s i s t a n c e . The N.I.C. executive was empowered to 
(1) Conference also resolved (a.) t o send a de l e g a t i o n t o 
I n d i a m support of i t s demand f o r a round-table conference, 
(b) t h a t i f the Union Government d i d not r e l e n t on t h i s 
matter I n d i a should be asked to sever i t s economic and 
diplo m a t i c t i e s w i t h South A f r i c a , (c) to carry out a 
campaign of propaganda m I n d i a , (d) t h a t South A f r i c a n 
Indians had the r i g h t bo take t h e i r grievances t o the 
United Nations on the grounds t h a t agreements between the 
Governments of I n d i a and South A f r i c a on the treatment of 
Indians m South A f r i c a had been ( u n i l a t e r a l l y ) breached 
by the South A f r i c a n s . I n d i a n Opinion, 15 February 19^6, 
Leader, 16 February 19^6. 
(2) Y. Dadoo Leader, 6 A p r i l 19^6, and Y. Dadoo, 5 months 
of s t r u g g l e a b r i e f account of the Passive Resistance 
Struggle from 13 June - 13 November 19 MS, p 5-
(3) Leader, 23 March '\3k&. 
appoint a passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l (PRC) o f 25 members 
which would have a u t h o r i t y " t o organize a volunteer corps of a 
s u b s t a n t i a l number t o conduct the s t r u g g l e , to launch a 
f i g h t i n g fund .•. and to launch the s t r u g g l e a t the opportune 
moment and m a manner i t deemed advisable ..." ( l ) . The 
conference issued a "manifesto of r e s i s t a n c e " (2) and endorsed 
the r e s o l u t i o n s passed a t the S.A.I.C. Conference on 11 February 
The decisions of the Natal delegate conference were r a t i f i e d a t 
a p u b l i c meeting m Durban on 31 March ( 3 )* There were 
p a r a l l e l developments m the Transvaal, the formation of the 
Transvaal passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l was unanimously agreed 
a t a mass meeting on 20 A p r i l m Johannesburg ( 4 ) . 
An S.A I C. delegation appeared before the Senate on 
3 May to s t a t e I n d i a n o b j e c t i o n s t o the A s i a t i c Act, both i t s 
(1) i b i d . , 6 A p r i l 1946. 
(2) "To the I n d i a n people of South A f r i c a r a l l y t o the j u s t 
cause of the community The B i l l , i f i t becomes law, 
w i l l mean our economic and s o c i a l death. Workers, 
businessmen, p r o f e s s i o n a l s and farmers, only yoar u n i t e d 
a c t i o n can save u s l E i t h e r we p e r i s h as a whole or we 
r e s i s t as a whole. There i s no t u r n i n g back. The time 
has come f o r s u f f e r i n g and s a c r i f i c e . I t i s your duty 
to give t o the utmost, p h y s i c a l l y , f i n a n c i a l l y and 
mor a l l y . 
Any I n d i a n , man or woman, who serves on the Advisory Board 
accepts the communal franchise or o b s t r u c t s the s t r u g g l e 
m any way whatsoever w i l l be g u i l t y o f an act of despic-
able treachery against h i s f a m i l y , h i s community and the 
p r i n c i p l e s of democracy. Fellow Indians forward to 
u n i t e d a c t i o n l Down w i t h the Ghetto B i l l I " 
The manifesto f u r t h e r appealed f o r the support of the 
people of I n d i a and of "the A f r i c a n , the coloured and a l l 
t r u l y democratic peoples of South A f r i c a and the World", 
i b i d . 
(3) i b i d . 
(k) Attended by Dr Xuma, President of the ANC, who pledged 
A f r i c a n support f o r the passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign. 
I n k u l u l e k o , May 19^6, Leader, 20 A p r i l 19^6. 
land tenure and communal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s ( 1 ) . 
I n the eyes of the m i l i t a n t s , a t l e a s t , the i n i t i a t i v e was 
a f o r m a l i t y which served to strengthen the Indians' moral 
p o s i t i o n , i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , since i t u n d e r l i n e d t h e i r con-
ti n u e d readiness to r e s o r t to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means where 
a v a i l a b l e . They had no expectation t h a t i t would i n f l u e n c e 
the Senate and continued preparations f o r the campaign. 
I n mid-May, the N a t a l and Transvaal r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l s , 
l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y by Drs Naicker and Dadoo, met m j o i n t 
session agreeing t o e s t a b l i s h a standing j o i n t passive r e s i s -
tance c o u n c i l (2) " t o give general d i r e c t i o n to the e n t i r e 
campaign of r e s i s t a n c e " ( 3 ) - The de c i s i o n t o launch the 
campaign on 13 June was announced the preceding week f o l l o w i n g 
the passage of tne A s i a t i c Act on 3 June. 
The campaign began w i t h very slender human and f i n a n c i a l 
resources (4) and witho u t any d e t a i l e d b l u e p r i n t f o r a c t i o n . 
Nevertheless, p u b l i c meetings had been h e l d under N.I.C. and 
T I.C. auspices to mo b i l i z e support and m P r e t o r i a i t was 
announced t h a t a committee was being organized f o r women 
r e s i s t e r s . The Transvaal I n d i a n Youth Volunteers Corp, 
several of whose leaders served on the Transvaal PRC,was 
also a c t i v e on i t s b ehalf before the campaign began 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n of the campaign m the two years o f 
i t s spasmodic existence was extremely f l e x i b l e . I n the 
f i r s t s i x months, the p e r i o d during which the m a j o r i t y of 
acts of resi s t a n c e took place, references m the South A f r i c a n 
press t o the meetings and a c t i v i t i e s o f the v a r i o u s resistance 
councils were r e l a t i v e l y commonplace. Thereafter, the 
(1) Hansard, 3 May 1946, Leader, 20 May 1946. 
(2) 
A l i s t of members i s a t Annex B. 
(3) i b i d . , 18 May 194-6. 
(4) Statement by Debi Singh, A c t i n g President N.I.C., 
22 September 1946. Leader, 28 September 1946. 
(5) i b i d . , 4 May 1946, I n k u l u l e k o , May 1946. 
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p r o v i n c i a l PRC's were much le s s m evidence, as the v e h i c l e s 
f o r d i r e c t i n g the campaign, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
resi s t a n c e c o u n c i l s and p r o v i n c i a l and branch congresses was 
apt i n c r e a s i n g l y to be b l u r r e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y once the con-
s e r v a t i v e elements m the congresses no longer c o n s t i t u t e d a 
t h r e a t t o the m i l i t a n t s ( 1 ) . 
The j o i n t passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l e f f e c t i v e l y sub-
s t i t u t e d f o r the conservative dominated S.A.I.C. which played 
no p a r t m name or m the a c t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of the campaign ( 2 ) . 
According t o Dr Dadoo the c o u n c i l met as f r e q u e n t l y as once a 
week during the h e i g h t o f the campaign ( 3 ) . He was probably 
r e f e r r i n g to the cou n c i l ' s working committee(s) and press 
r e p o r t s suggest t h a t f u l l meetings of the c o u n c i l may have 
occurred a t monthly i n t e r v a l s ( 4 ) . The f u l l c o u n c i l issued 
a wide range of p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e s on the running o f the cam-
paign, i t took the i n i t i a t i v e m sending delegations abroad, 
(1) W h i l s t tnere would have been o p e r a t i o n a l and p r e s e n t a t i o n a l 
reasons f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g separate r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l s 
even i f conservatives had not s t i l l been m the congresses, 
the formation of the cou n c i l s may be seen m p a r t as a 
device by the m i l i t a n t s f o r by-passing congress when i t 
s u i t e d t h e i r purposes to do so to avoid the danger o f 
o b s t r u c t i o n from conservative elements. 
(2) The j o i n t c o u n c i l s u b s t i t u t e d not only f o r the c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
of r e s i s t a n c e campaign issues, but also provided a forum 
f o r discussion amongst the m i l i t a n t s of other matters of 
j o i n t i n t e r e s t , m p a r t i c u l a r how they should respond to 
the independent i n i t i a t i v e s o f the conservatives on the 
S.A.I.C. Council t o the Government. Passive Resister, 
7 October 1946. 
(3) I n t e r v i e w , 22 May 196?. Dr. Dadoo sai d there was no 
question of members of the councils "rubber-stamping" the 
views o f himself or Dr Naicker. Substantive discussions 
were hel d and minutes produced. 
(4) At what was probably a t y p i c a l meeting m Durban on 
21 August 19^6I the c o u n c i l assessed progress m m o b i l i z -
i n g support f o r the campaign, i t issued i n s t r u c t i o n s 
f o r a day of h a r t a l and the h o l d i n g of mass meetings to 
coincide w i t h the convening of the UN General Assembly, 
i t passed a r e s o l u t i o n expressing s a t i s f a c t i o n a t the 
" r i s i n g t i d e o f o p p o s i t i o n " amongst non-Europeans m South 
A f r i c a t o Government r a c i a l p o l i c i e s and congratulated 
A f r i c a n mineworkers on t h e i r s t r i k e . Passive Resister, 
9 September 1946. 
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which acted m i t s name, i t had o v e r a l l f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l 
and p u b l i c a t i o n s were issued by i t s a u t h o r i t y . Relations 
w i t h o r g a n i s a t i ons other than the I n d i a n Congresses were 
generally conducted through the j o i n t c o u n c i l . 
The day to day running of the campaign f e l l to the 
p r o v i n c i a l r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l s m Na t a l and the Transvaal (1) 
a c t i n g m va r y i n g degrees w i t h i n the e s t a b l i s h e d Congress 
p r o v i n c i a l frameworks (2) from which the m a j o r i t y of members 
of the resistance c o u n c i l s were drawn ( 3 ) - Some of the PRC 
members m Na t a l and the Transvaal were f u l l - t i m e employees of t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e councils and Congresses, others had outside 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as w e l l . The coun c i l s appear t o have functioned 
w i t h reasonable e f f i c i e n c y , meeting as circumstances p e r m i t t e d . 
P a r t i c u l a r l y a t the peak periods of the campaign the f u l l - t i m e 
" s e c r e t a r i a t s " were h e a v i l y r e l i a n t on ad hoc assistance from 
students, housewives and other volunteers to carry out 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e work, such as the production and d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of p u b l i c i t y m a t e r i a l (k). Some of the PRC's tasks were 
a l l o c a t e d to i n d i v i d u a l c o u n c i l members. Both the N a t a l 
and Transvaal PRC's had re c r u i t i n g o f f i c e r s (5 ) 
(1) I n the Cape a passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l was formed on 
3 J u l y 1 9 ^ i but i t was not represented on the j o i n t c o u n c i l 
and i t s a c t i v i t i e s appear to have been confined to Cape Town. 
Leader, 15 J u l y 1 9 ^ . 
(2) There i s no recor d of any f r i c t i o n a t the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l 
between the PRC's and the Congresses, and given the 
interchange of personnel l i t t l e was to be expected. At the 
branch l e v e l , m centres where r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l s were 
establ i s h e d , r e l a t i o n s v a r i e d depending p a r t l y whether or not 
the branch remained m conservative hands. A d i f f e r e n c e of 
opini o n developed between the Congress branch and d i s t r i c t PRC m 
Pie t e r m a r i t z b u r g m December 1 9 ^ - Leader, lk December 1 9 ^ -
(3) A l i s t o f members i s a t Annex B. 
(k) Passive R e s i s t e r , 12 August 19k6, lk October 19^6, 
I n t e r v i e w , H. P i l l a y , 26 February 1969-
(5) S. Reddy and L. R. Williams r e s p e c t i v e l y . Reddy was the General 
Secretary o f the I n d i a n Tin Workers Union and an N.I.C. 
branch o f f i c i a l . 
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and xn the case of the Transvaal an i n f o r m a t i o n o f f i c e r as 
w e l l I n Nat a l the c o u n c i l had sub-committees, one 
supervising f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s ( 2 ) . But tnere was no question 
of the PRC members c o n f i n i n g themselves t o a s i n g l e r o l e , and 
Dr Dadoo's a s s e r t i o n t h a t "large and complex machinery had 
been b u i l t up" (j>) to cope w i t h the running c f the campaign 
should not be taken too l i t e r a l l y . 
The r e c r u i t m e n t , t r a i n i n g and deployment of r e s i s t e r s 
took up much of the time o f PRC members and p a r t i c u l a r l y m 
the f i r s t 6 months o f the campaign presented considerable 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems ( 4 ) . I n some instances, m Natal, 
the c o uncils received assistance w i t h the p r e l i m i n a r y screening 
of volunteers from branch l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n s but the dispatch 
of r e c r u i t s to Durban, where res i s t a n c e was concentrated, had 
to be co-ordinated a t the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . Volunteers were 
i 
r e q u i r e d to take an oath (5) committing them to non-violence, 
whatever provocation they faced as passive r e s i s t e r s . T r a i n i n g 
and p o l i t i c a l education of volunteers v a r i e d g r e a t l y , but a l l 
were given some i n s t r u c t i o n ( 6 ) . Each group of r e s i s t e r s was 
m trie charge o f a person w i t h p o l i t i c a l experience, o f t e n a 
Congress branch o f f i c i a l . 
P a r t i c u l a r importance was attached t o p u b l i c i t y f o r the 
campaign and t h i s was p r i m a r i l y a p r o v i n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The Transvaal PRC, w i t h the help of sponsors, produced a 
weekly newspaper, the Passive Resister ( 7 ) , throughout the 
d ) N. Thandray, Secretary of the Transvaal PRC and of tne 
Transvaal I n d i a n Youth Volunteer Corps. 
(2) A. Choudree was a member. Leader, 25 January 1947-
(3) Five months o f s t r u g g l e , p 10. 
(4) I t i s a measure o f the methodical approach of the PRC's 
t h a t they compiled d e t a i l e d s t a t i s t i c s o f r e s i s t e r s , a t 
l e a s t m the f i r s t year of the campaign. 
(5) This i s i m p l i e d m the Leader, 22 June 1946, but no t e x t 
i s a v a i l a b l e . 
(6) Five months o f s t r u g g l e , p 9> M. Scott A Time to Speak, 
P 135. 
(7) I am g r e a t l y indebted to Paul Joseph f o r the loan o f a 
complete set of Passive Resister newspapers. 
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campaign which played an important p a r t m i n f o r m i n g Indians, 
m N a t a l as w e l l as the Transvaal of the progress of the cam-
paign, and m p u t t i n g across the m i l i t a n t s ' p o i n t of view. 
I t also contained extensive coverage o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l news to 
educate I n d i a n o p i n i o n d ) . The PRC's, m a d d i t i o n , issued 
pamphlets, c i r c u l a r s and press statements. 
Fund r a i s i n g f o r the campaign was a p r o v i n c i a l responsi-
b i l i t y . The p r o v i n c i a l PRC's had t h e i r own accounts from 
which sums were disbursed e i t h e r on t h e i r a u t h o r i t y or t h a t 
of the j o i n t r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l . Members of the resi s t a n c e 
councils and other congress o f f i c i a l s s o l i c i t e d funds, w i t h 
considerable success, a t p u b l i c meetings c a l l e d m connection 
w i t h the campaign (2) and by m d i v i d a a l approaches t o I n d i a n 
businessmen and workers. Small sums were received from abroad ( 3 ) -
Women's orga n i s a t i o n s played a p a r t i c u l a r l y important p a r t m 
r a i s i n g funds on behalf of the r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l s and, according 
to Dr Dadoo, m the f i r s t f i v e months o f the campaign one t m r d 
of a l l the money r a i s e d had been c o l l e c t e d by the Durban I n d i a n 
Women's Acti o n Committee ( 4 ) . S i m i l a r bodies functioned m 
the Transvaal ( 5 ) . Outgoings were h i g h , t o t a l l i n g £ 1 7 , 0 0 0 
m the p e r i o d up t o November 19^6, p r i n c i p a l l y t o finance 
welfare assistance t o the f a m i l i e s o f imprisoned r e s i s t e r s and 
to meet the cost of sending delegates abroad ( 6 ) . 
(1) There were two other South A f r i c a n I n d i a n papers, both 
weekly's, The Leader, published m Durban, which claimed 
a readership of 250,000,and I n d i a n Opinion, e d i t e d by 
M a n i l a l Gandhi which had a c i r c u l a t i o n o f a few thousand. 
The Leader gave f a i r l y extensive coverage t o the campaign, 
but was n o t committed t o the m i l i t a n t s . I n d i a n Opinion 
gave l e s s comprehensive r e p o r t s and v a c i l l a t e d m i t s 
approach. 
(2) At a s i n g l e meeting on 23 October 19^6, c o i n c i d i n g w i t h the 
opening o f the UN General Assembly, £ 2 , 0 0 0 was c o l l e c t e d . 
Leader, 26 October 19^-6. There are numerous other examples 
m the Passive Resister and Leader. 
(3) For example,£500 from Tata and Sons m I n d i a ,Leader, 13 J u l y 19^6. 
(h) Five months of Struggle, p 9. 
(5) Transvaal I n d i a n Women's Association and Women's Ac t i o n Committee 
and autonomous d i s t r i c t l e v e l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Passive Resister, 
k August 19^6. 
(6) Five Month's of Struggle,P 9 . 
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The p r o v i n c i a l r esistance c o u n c i l s shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r l o o k i n g afber the welfare of r e s i s t e r s w i t h the p r o v i n c i a l 
Congresses and l o c a l committees d ) . 
P r o v i n c i a l c o u n c i l and otner Congress o f f i c i a l s r e c r u i t e d 
people d i r e c t l y t o take p a r t m the campaign 'jut tney were 
a s s i s t e d , m N a t a l , by " l o c a l a c t i o n committees o f the r e s i s -
tance c o u n c i l " . There were a t l e a s t 12 such committees (2) of 
which the one m Pi e t e r m a r i t z b u r g was probably the most a c t i v e 
outside Durban, h o l d i n g p u b l i c meetings, r e c r u i t i n g v olunteers 
and r a i s i n g funds ( 3 ) - On one occasion and perhaps otners, 
the p r o v i n c i a l r esistance c o u n c i l c a l l e d a meeting s p e c i f i -
c a l l y f o r the a c t i o n committees to discuss p o l i c y w i t h them ( 4 ) . 
I n some instances Congress branches may have c o n t r i b u t e d t o 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the campaign, but a number were moribund 
and several were m conservative hands, p o s s i b l y a reason f o r 
s e t t i n g up some o f the a c t i o n committees ( 5 ) -
(1) The N I.C. had a welfare department which was active during 
the campaign, and there was a "Resistance Welfare O f f i c e r " , 
P. Singh. Passive Resister, 14 October 1946, Leader, 
2 November 1946. I t also set up an unemployment bureau 
p a r t l y t o meet the meeds of r e s i s t e r s released from p r i s o n , 
Passive Resister, 14 February 1947* The N a t a l r e s i s t a n c e 
c o u n c i l apparently had the use of a farm where unemployed 
r e s i s t e r s could be given work, but no d e t a i l s are a v a i l a b l e . 
Leader, 26 A p r i l 1947-
(2) Leader, 1 March 1947-
(3) There were analagous bodies m the Cape a t Port E l i z a b e t h , 
East London and p o s s i b l y Kimberley, which, along w i t h the 
passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l m Cape Town, supported the 
campaign by o r g a n i z i n g r e s i s t a n c e volunteers and r a i s i n g 
funds which were sent t o N a t a l . Five months of s t r u g g l e , 
p 8, Passive Resister, 1 August 1946, 2 September 1946. 
(4) Durban, 15 December 1946. Leader, 21 December 1946. 
(5) I t was ageeed a t an N.I.C. p r o v i n c i a l conference m December 
1946 t h a t the N.I C. should be r e s t r u c t u r e d , g i v i n g more 
power to the grass-roots, and p e r m i t t i n g the existence of 
separate organizations w i t h i n the N.I C. ( t o take account 
o f conservative opinion) but there i s no evidence t h a t 
the plan was implemented w h i l s t the campaign was m pro-
gress, i b i d . , 7 December 1946. The N.I.C. headquarters 
was, however, reorganized on a departmental basis m 
March 1947- Passive Resister, 19 June 1947-
The r o l e o f women's and youth organizations m h e l p i n g 
to organize support f o r the campaign have already been men-
ti o n e d , the most prominent groups, notably the N a t a l (Durban) 
Women's Ac t i o n Committee, The Transvaal I n d i a n Women's 
Associat i o n and Women's Ac t i o n Committee and the Transvaal 
I n d i a n Youth Volunteers Coips were autonomous D o d i e s and 
though they were not f o r m a l l y represented on the r e s i s t a n c e 
c o u n c i l s were m p r a c t i c e a p a r t of the mam o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
framework of the campaign ( l ) . Other groups, on i t s margins, 
were much more l o o s e l y associated m the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the 
campaign and were not subject, m any meaningful sense, t o the 
resi s t a n c e leadership. For example, white South A f r i c a n 
supporters of the campaign established the C o u n c i l f o r A s i a t i c 
^ . g h t s , w i t h the aim o f m o b i l i z i n g *rhite o p i n i o n against the 
A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act and other d i s c r i m i n a t o r y l e g i s l a t i o n , 
b ut i t s c a r c e l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the 
campaign ( 2 ) . 
The planning and o r g a n i z a t i o n of the campaign cannot be 
explained s o l e l y m terms o f a hier a r c h y of committees. They 
had a r o l e t o play but the l i f e b l o o d o f the campaign was 
personal contact. I t i s evident from the degree of support 
which the m i l i t a n t s achieved, m d i f f i c u l t circumstances and 
w i t h only makeshift bureaucracy a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l , t h a t they 
e x p l o i t e d such contacts t o the f u l l . Such was the nature of 
t r a d i t i o n amongst I n d i a n communities m South A f r i c a t h a t 
there was r e a l l y no a l t e r n a t i v e , i f the campaign was to have 
had any chance o f success. 
(1) O f f i c i a l s o f the youth and women's org a n i z a t i o n s were 
members o f resi s t a n c e c o u n c i l s and congress committees, 
but m t h e i r personal capacity. 
(2) The Council f o r A s i a t i c Rights was formed m June 19^6 
and was based m Johannesburg. I t s Chairman was 
V. C Berrange and i t comprised members of the South 
A f r i c a n Communist Party, such as H i l d a Watts, as w e l l as 
L i b e r a l s of whom the most notable was the Rev. Michael 
Scott. I n t e r v i e w , Michael Scott, 8 May 19^9 Leader, 
22 June 19^6. 
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CHAPTER I I I LEADERS AND PARTICIPANTS 
The leaders ( l ) o f the passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign 
conformed to no s i n g l e stereotype, they comprised men and 
women o f v a r i e d backgrounds and b e l i e f s , prepared t o act m 
consort f o r the u l t i m a t e purpose o f r i d d i n g South A f r i c a o f 
i t s r a c i a l l y d i v i s i v e and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y , white imposed, 
s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic s t r u c t u r e s . 
F i r s t and foremost they were pragmatists, i n s o f a r as 
they shared a common p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f i t was the espousal o f 
democratic i d e a l s . I n d i a n leaders before them m South A f r i c a , 
Gandhi included, had advocated the extension of democratic 
r i g h t s , but not w i t h the same sense of urgency nor w i t h any 
consideration f o r the i n t e r e s t s o f other, non-Indian, black 
groups who were s i m i l a r l y deprived of t h e i r r i g h t s . I n t h e i r 
demand f o r democratic r i g h t s , the campaign's leaders were 
s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by developments abroad i t was of con-
siderable importance t o the leadership to know and t o be able 
t o demonstrate t h a t t h e i r campaign was not being fought m 
i s o l a t i o n , but as a p a r t o f a world-wide democratic "movement". 
There could be no c l e a r e r i n d i c a t i o n s f o r Indians m South 
A f r i c a o f the force of t h i s "movement" than the knowledge o f 
the forthcoming independence of I n d i a , a development which 
boosted the morale o f South A f r i c a n Indians and apparently 
gave them some grounds f o r optimism about the prospects o f 
promoting change m South A f r i c a ( 2 ) . 
The pragmatism o f the leaders i s shown c l e a r l y m t h e i r 
approach towards non-violence. With a very few exceptions, 
notably Dr Naicker and Nana S i t a (3) > those who d i r e c t e d the 
d ) Here defined as those i n d i v i d u a l s who played a lea d i n g 
p a r t m the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the campaign a t the p r o v i n c i a l 
and n a t i o n a l r a t h e r than branch l e v e l . 
(2) I n t e r v i e w s , Y. Dadoo,?? May 1969.M. Scott, 8 May 1969, 
P. Joseph, 26 February '\9b3. 
(3) Vice Chairman Transvaal passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l , 
Member of T.I C. Executive and one of the T.I.C. 
re p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the S.A.I.C. 
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campaign had no strong p h i l o s o p h i c a l attachment to non-violence 
and r e s o r t e d to " p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e " because they b e l i e v e d i t 
to be the only t a c t i c a v a i l a b l e a t the time through which they 
could pursue t h e i r g o a l s d ) . Dr Dadoo observed, r e t r o s p e c -
t i v e l y , " P a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e was never the ideology of the 
or g a n i z a t i o n (Congress) ... the p r i n c i p l e of satyagraha a s 
enunciated by Gandhi was never accepted a s a creed ..." (2) 
and he h i m s e l f claimed to have been i n f l u e n c e d m h i s views 
on non-violence more by Nehru than Gandhi (3)• N e v e r t h e l e s s 
Gandhi 1s backing was sought and obtained f o r the p a s s i v e 
r e s i s t a n c e campaign (k) and on h i s a s s a s s i n a t i o n the l e a d e r s h i p 
di d not h e s i t a t e to a s s o c i a t e the campaign w i t h what Gandhi 
had stood f o r , "we who are l e f t behind and who claim to 
c h e r i s h h i s i d e a l s have a heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - t h a t of 
c a r r y i n g out those i d e a l s and p r i n c i p l e s f o r which he l i v e d 
and died. No g r e a t e r t r i b u t e could be p a i d by the I n d i a n 
people of South A f r i c a to t h a t g r e a t s o u l than to a s s i s t m 
the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the P a s s i v e R e s i s t a n c e s t r u g g l e , the match-
l e s s weapon which he di s c o v e r e d m t h i s very l a n d ..." ( 5 ) . 
Ideology d i d not p l a y an important p a r t m determining 
the conduct and form of the campaign. The campaign was l e d , 
f o r the most p a r t , by people who i n c l i n e d to take a r a d i c a l 
(1) Their commitment to non-violence was made e x p l i c i t m a 
j o i n t passive r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l pamphlet issued m May/June 
19^6 which s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t e d the t a c t i c o f "armed and 
open r e v o l t " as being impossible. I t also argued t h a t 
a general s t r i k e would not be p r o d u c t i v e . N a t a l Mercury, 
8 June 19^6. 
(2) Sechaba, Vol 2 ( 6 ) , June 1968, p 8. 
(3) I n t e r v i e w , op. c i t . 
(4) i b i d . Dadoo was c l e a r l y m no doubt as to the con t i n u i n g 
i n f l u e n c e of Gandhi's name amongst South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s . 
Gandhi's message to South A f r i c a n Indians u r g i n g r e s i s -
tance t o the A s i a t i c Act was c a r r i e d m the Leader, 8 June 19*4-6. 
(5) E d i t o r i a l , Passive Resister, 6 February 1 9 ^ . There i s 
no i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e as to who was the e d i t o r during 
t h i s p e r i o d , but the paper continued to be the mouthpiece 
o f the Transvaal re s i s t a n c e council/T.I.C. and presumably 
the e d i t o r i a l had the c o l l e c t i v e backing o f the p r o v i n c i a l 
leadership. 
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l e f t - w i n g posture m i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s and who made no 
attempt to d i s g u i s e t h i s on p u b l i c p l a t f o r m s during the campaign, 
but to i n f e r from t h i s , a s d i d c o n s e r v a t i v e I n d i a n l e a d e r s and 
the white population, t h a t i t was a p r i o r i t y of the l e a d e r s h i p 
m l9^6- i f8 to i n f l u e n c e South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s towards a 
p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l standpoint i s s u r e l y mistaken. I n any 
event, the l e a d e r s were f a r from u n i t e d m t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
b e l i e f s , t h e r e were only a m i n o r i t y of communist p a r t y members, 
o f whom the most prominent were H. A. Naidoo and Dr Dadoo d ) . 
The l e a d e r s won popular support f o r the campaign because i t 
c o i n c i d e d w i t h a p e r i o d of growing f r u s t r a t i o n and i t 
enabled the "rank and f i l e " , f o r the f i r s t time f o r some y e a r s , 
\meaningful 
to t a k e \ p o s i t i v e a c t i o n to p r o t e s t a t the treatment they 
r e c e i v e d ' .Theology lorobably n l a y e d l i t t l e p a r t m pe o p l e ' s d e c i s i o n 
to p a r t i c i p a t e ( 2 ) . 
The s o c i a l d i v e r s i t y of the l e a d e r s was a c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r 
m the l e v e l of support the campaign ach i e v e d . They were drawn 
from the p r i n c i p a l r e l i g i o u s groupings amongst the I n d i a n s -
hindu, muslim and c h r i s t i a n (3) - thus a t l e a s t m p a r t overcoming 
the r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n which c o n t r i b u t e d to the d i s a r r a y of South 
A f r i c a n I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s m the 1 9 3 0 's and e a r l y 
19^3's. E q u a l l y the l e a d e r s h i p i n c l u d e d people of a l l ages and 
of d i f f e r e n t e d u c a t i o n a l l e v e l s , but the o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
was h e a v i l y b i a s e d towards the p r o f e s s i o n s . Medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s 
were p a r t i c u l a r l y numerous, there were t e a c h e r s and lawyers as 
w e l l T r a d e r s , who comprised the bulk of the T r a n s v a a l 
(1 ) H. A. Naidoo j o i n e d the South A f r i c a n Communist P a r t y (SACP) 
m 1935I one of the f i r s t to do so. Yusuf Dadoo, once a 
member of the Independent Labour P a r t y , j o i n e d the SACP m 
1939AO. E. Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp 308 and 359. 
(2) Many r e s i s t e r s would probably have echoed the words of M a n i l a l 
Gandhi who was h o s t i l e to communists but n e v e r t h e l e s s remarked, 
" I f communists have l e d t h i s movement then a l l c r e d i t i s due 
them f o r launching the s t r u g g l e ... Communists may have u l t e r i o 
motives ... but I c o n g r a t u l a t e them f o r f i g h t i n g t h i s b a t t l e .. 
P a s s i v e R e s i s t e r , 23 A p r i l 1 9 ^ . 
(3) H. A. Naidoo was a C h r i s t i a n m a d d i t i o n to being a member of 
the SACP. H.J. and R.E. Simons, C l a s s and Colour m South 
A f r i c a , p 505. 
1 4 3 
I n d i a n population, were w e l l represented, but the only prominent 
businessmen amongst the l e a d e r s h i p appear to have been M. A. 
Dmath ( l ) and S. Rustomjee ( 2 ) . More s u r p r i s i n g was the 
seeming u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m N a t a l of the urban workers, 
though S. Reddy, the p r o v i n c i a l r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l ' s r e c r u i t -
i n g o f f i c e r was a tx*ade u n i o n i s t , a s was R. A. P i l l a y , a former 
clerk/book-keeper, who was appointed a f u l l time o f f i c i a l of 
the c o u n c i l towards the end of the campaign. 
During the campaign th e r e were approximately 2,100 
" s u c c e s s f u l " p r o s e c u t i o n s brought a g a i n s t r e s i s t e r s , about 300 
of whom were c o n v i c t e d more than once. An unknown number, 
probably not l a r g e , p a r t i c i p a t e d m a c t s of r e s i s t a n c e but were 
never charged. J o s h i suggests t h a t 2,300 I n d i a n s "courted" 
imprisonment ( 3 ) 1 a v a i l a b l e evidence i n d i c a t e s a t o t a l of 
about 2,000, between one and two percent of the a d u l t I n d i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , approximately 70 non-Indians 
p a r t i c i p a t e d . 
The motivation of i n d i v i d u a l rank and f i l e r e s i s t e r s 
cannot be a s s e s s e d w i t h any p r e c i s i o n m the absence of d e t a i l e d 
contemporary r e c o r d s but some impr e s s i o n can be gained from 
court statements and from i n t e r v i e w s . W h i l s t the A s i a t i c Act 
was the focus of t h e i r a t t e n t i o n they were concerned to demon-
s t r a t e t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to the whole system of r a c i a l d i s c r i m i -
n a t i o n . One r e s i s t e r remarked "we are t i r e d of seei n g the 
hated s i g n s "Europeans only" wherever we t u r n ... we have decided 
once and for a l l to f i g h t such colour l e g i s l a t i o n " ( 4 ) . The sense 
of f r u s t r a t i o n and anger m the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n a t the i n t r o -
duction of the Act and t h e i r r e a d i n e s s to demonstrate t h e i r 
(1) Chairman of the Congress Democratic A c t i o n Committee and 
a V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of the T.I.C. 
(2) V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of the T.I.C. 
(3) P. S. J o s h i , The Strugg l e f o r E q u a l i t y , p 294. 
(4) I . Eo J l i a y a t Statement m Court. Leader, 17 August 
1946. 
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opposition to i t and the system which i t was designed to bolster 
was i n part a response to international developments. An 
Indian ex-serviceman declared, "We heard so much about the 
four freedoms ... that we began to believe a new era was dawn-
ing i n the l i f e of the Indian people ... When, however, a few 
months ago I heard Field Marshal Smuts himself p i l o bed the 
Asiatic Land Tenure Act (through) Parliament ... I became dis-
i l l u s i o n e d , for here was the l i k e of something which we had 
fought against and many given up t h e i r l i v e s " ( l ) . The 
juxtaposition of the imposition of the Asiatic Act and con-
s t i t u t i o n a l developments i n India i s of pa r t i c u l a r importance, 
for i t served to heighten the sense of bitterness and f r u s t r a -
t i o n f e l t by South African Indians, at the same time i t was 
an incentive to action. The passive resistance campaign 
presented the Indian population with an opportunity for positive 
action, unparalleled since Gandhi's departure, and at the very 
moment when many were l i k e l y to be receptive to i t s c a l l , and 
thoroughly d i s i l l u s i o n e d with the t a c t i c s of the conservatives. 
Whether there was much discussion of the t a c t i c of 
"passive resistance" i s unclear, probably the majority accep-
ted i t as the only alternative available i n the circumstances, 
scarcely considering i t s p o t e n t i a l strengths and weaknesses. 
A few may have been influenced by Gandhian b e l i e f s . 
d ) J. M. Francis (ex-Sergeant Union Defence Forces). I n 
his court statement Francis referred to a l e t t e r issued 
i n Smuts' name xn 19^ +5 praxsxng Indian ex-servicemen for 
t h e i r s a c r i f i c e for South Africa and for the "wider cause 
of world freedom". lbxd., 13 July 19^6-
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TABLE I Origins of Resisters by Province* 
Natal 
Transvaal 
1386 
28k 
Cape 
(Basutoland) 
27 
8 
1710** 
* only availabe f o r the period June I9k6 - June 19^ +7• 
** The figures m t h i s and the following Tables are 
not e n t i r e l y compatible and should be taken as 
approximations, s u f f i c i e n t l y accurate to indicate 
broad trends. 
The t o t a l of 1710 represents the number of convic-
tions and includes 210 second offences, 21 t h i r d 
offences and 3 fourth offences, m these cases the 
resister has a separate entry for each occasion. 
Source Leader, 21.6.V? (based on resistance council 
Most resisters came from Natal (Table I ) , where the 
overwhelming majority of Indians l i v e d (1 ) , and where the 
campaign was conducted (2 ) , but on the basis of t h e i r res-
pective Asian populations, the proportion of resisters from 
the Transvaal was rather higher and that from Natal somewhat 
lower than would be expected. This probably r e f l e c t s the 
superior organization of the Transvaal resistance leaders 
and possibly a greater concern amongst Transvaal Indians with 
the Asiatic Land Tenure Act, as a res u l t of t h e i r b i t t e r 
experience of e a r l i e r land tenure l e g i s l a t i o n , most of which 
had not applied m Natal. I t may also, m part, be due to 
fi g u r e s ) . 
(1) Details of the Asian population, by Province, are at 
footnote (1) on P 1 1 9 . 
(2) This i s explained on pages 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 
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the d i f f e r e n t circumstances of employment of Transvaal and Natal 
Indians, the former being predominantly s e l f employed or em-
ployees of fellow Indians, whilst many of the l a t t e r worked for 
white owned companies and were, hence, more vulnerable to dis-
missal. Only a small number of Cape Indians participated m 
the campaign, primarily because the Asiatic Act did not have 
effect there u n t i l 19^9? and because t h e i r l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l 
organization and involvement was low. 
) 
TABLE I I Origin of Resisters by Town/District* 
Male Female 
Durban Central 358 37 
Clairwood 55 13 
Sea-view / B e l l a i r 18 -
Merebank 9 -
Isipmgo 17 -
Tongaat 15 -
Stanger k -
Pietermaritzburg 59 11 
Dannhauser 12 2 
Glencoe 10 -
Ladysmith 8 -
Johannesburg / Pretoria h9 16 
Cape Town 15 3 
Port Elizabeth 9 -
638 82 
* available only for period June - September 19^6 
Source Leader, 28.9-^6 
There i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence to b u i l d up a detailed 
picture of the town and d i s t r i c t l e v e l origins of the resi s t e r s , 
other than for the f i r s t four months of the campaign (Table I I 
r e f e r s ) . Clearly, the greatest number came from Durban and 
i t s environs but resistance leaders made strenuous e f f o r t s to 
develop support for the campaign m the Province as a whole 
and i t would be surprising i f the l i s t of towns m Natal from 
which resisters were drawn was not rather wider than Table I I 
suggests, though the numbers of people involved would have been 
small. I t i s perhaps relevant m t h i s context that whereas m 
the f i r s t six months of the campaign a g r i c u l t u r a l workers made 
up a very small proportion of th t o t a l number of resisters, by 
June 19^7 they were one of the more important elements: 
TABLE I I I Resisters' Occupations 
unskilled urban workers 
craftsmen, s k i l l e d 
workers 
a g r i c u l t u r a l workers, 
farmers, fishermen, sea-
men 
housewives 
shopkeepers, hawkers 
businessmen 
clerks/secretaries 
professionals, college 
students 
miscellaneous 
Total 
June - November 
19^6 
62k 
195 
22 
176 
78 
31 
^9 
Total 
by_ 
June 19V7 
922 
2^7 
101 
233 
90 
31 
60 
65 
kz 
1257 1791 
Source Y. Dadoo, Five Months of Struggle, 
Leader, 21.6.k7• Each l i s t s some 70 separate 
occupations. 
P 12, 
A l l the p r i n c i p a l occupation groups were represented amongst 
the ranks of the resisters, but the success of the leadership 
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m securing the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of factory and other urban 
workers who were the backbone of the campaign i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
noteworthy, and i s a clear indication of the populist appeal 
of the m i l i t a n t leaders, m contrast to the conservatives. 
I n building up t h e i r support amongst urban workers the m i l i -
tants benefitted from l i n k s with trade unions ( l ) and m some 
cases may have been able to mobilize l i m i t e d support through 
Communist Party channels ( 2 ) . The number of urban workers 
who took part m resistance i s a clear indication of the 
strength of dissatisfaction amongst t h i s element of the popu-
l a t i o n , for m pa r t i c i p a t i n g they faced the pr o b a b i l i t y of 
losing t h e i r jobs and having considerable d i f f i c u l t y m f i n d -
ing another (3) - Their involvement also helps to confirm 
that m the eyes of the rank and f i l e the campaign was a 
protest against r a c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n and practices, m general, 
and not j u s t against the Asiatic Act, f o r i t seems un l i k e l y 
that so many would have risked t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d m 19^6-7 
solely m opposition to a law which at that stage had had l i t t l e 
or no direc t effect on the vast majority. 
There i s no record as to how many of the resisters were 
unemployed, but that some should be so i s scarcely remarkable 
given the state of the 30b market. Durban City Council, m 
an attempt to denigrate the campaign, claimed that "a large 
percentage of the Passive Resisters are unemployed Indians 
(1) For example, the Tobacco Workers Union, the Coal Mine 
Workers and the Tin Workers. Passive Resister, 6 November 
1947, 17 January 19V7, 28 February 19^7-
(2) The SACP had resolved to o f f e r f u l l support for the cam-
paign (see resolutions passed at i t s National Conference, 
January 19^7- Passive Resister, 10 January 19V7). A number 
of i t s Indian members, such as R. P i l l a y and G. Taikissoon, 
were active at the branch l e v e l m the N.I.C. during the 
campaign. They may have used the platform of l o c a l SACP 
meetings to encourage workers to p a r t i c i p a t e . 
(3) The increasing problem of Indian unemployment m Durban 
i s referred to m Race Relations News, Vol 9 (6), June 19V7, 
P 67. 
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who have nothing to lose by going to gaol. While they are 
serving t h e i r b r i e f sentences, the movement ... supports t h e i r 
wives and families ... I n t h i s case, therefore, "martyrdom" 
has a d e f i n i t e f i n a n c i a l value" d ) . But according to Debi 
Singh, at a meeting m September 19^6 (2 ) , less than half of 
the resisters at that stage had claimed the family allowance ( j ) 
for which they were e l i g i b l e whilst m prison and f o r a certain 
time thereafter i f they had no job. I n any case the t r e a t -
ment of resisters m prison would surely have acted as a 
deterrent to anyone contemplating taking part m the campaign 
as a "soft option" (^f). 
Housewives were one of the largest occupational groups 
amongst the resisters but the proportion of women out of the 
t o t a l number of resisters i s quite small - approximately 1 i n 9 
m the early months of the campaign (Table I I ) and, o v e r a l l , 
about 1 m 6 ( 5 ) . I t would seem that, generally, presumably 
p a r t l y because of prevailing social mores, Indian women con-
centrated on fund ra i s i n g and welfare a c t i v i t i e s rather than 
engaging m resistance, though those that did participate m 
breaking the law were from diverse backgrounds and did not, 
for example, consist solely of the young ( 6 ) . 
(1) The Indian m South Africa. Durban City Council pamphlet. 
(2) Leader, ~\h September 19^+6. 
(3) &8 per month, which was above the salary of an unskilled 
factory worker m Durban, many of whom earned about 
£6.10.0 How We Live - Living Conditions of Indian 
People m South Afr i c a . Joint passive resistance council 
pamphlet," Race Relations News, Vol 9 0 ) ) January 19^+7-
(k) There were many complaints from resisters about t h e i r mis-
treatment whilst m detention. In November 19^6 the N.I.C. 
sent a protest message to the Government. Passive Resister, 
11 November 19^6. 
(5) Out of a t o t a l of 1926 acts of resistance recorded by the 
end of November 19^7, 15>88 were by males and 338 by women, 
Leader, 6 December 19^7* 
(6) Mrs P. K. Naidoo who was sent to j a i l as a r e s i s t e r m 
19^6 was also a volunteer m the 1906-1^ period. Passive 
Resister, k August 19^6. 
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TABLE IV Age Di s t r i b u t i o n of resisters" 
Age Numbers 
18 - 25 980 
26 - 35 278 
36 - 45 67 
46 - 55 33 
56 and over 25 
* June - November 1946. 
Source Five Months of Struggle, p i 1 
The youthfulness of the resisters (Table IV) was never-
theless very marked, broadly m keeping with the p r o f i l e of 
the Asian population, a factor which may have had quite impor-
tant long term implications, m that, as a re s u l t of the cam-
paign there was a much enlarged group of p o l i t i c a l l y experienced 
people amongst the Indians capable of playing an active p o l i t i -
cal role for many years ahead. 
The leadership sought the backing of non-Indians for the 
campaign but were not primarily concerned to involve them m 
acts of resistance. Nevertheless, a small number did participate 
TABLE V Non-Indian r e s i s t e r s * 
48 Coloureds (male) 33 ) (female) 15 ) 
Africans (male) 16 16 
8 Europeans (male) 4 ) (female) 4 ) 
* June 1946 - June 1947- There i s no 
record of any non-Indian resi s t e r s a f t e r 
June 1947. 
Source Leader, 21.6.47, p 7. 
By p a r t i c i p a t i n g , d i r e c t l y , m the campaign non-Indians gave 
substance and impetus to the l i n k s being forged at the time 
between representatives of radical opinion of a l l races m 
South Africa and the impact of t h e i r involvement was much 
greater than t h e i r numbers would suggest. I t seems l i k e l y 
that the non-Indian resisters acted essentially m a personal 
capacity, but m some instances with the support and approval 
of the p o l i t i c a l organizations to which they belonged ( l ) . 
A number were members of the SACP (2) but by no means a l l (jO-
The 2,000 people who took part m acts of resistance 
did not do so m i s o l a t i o n of the communities from which they 
were drawn fo r they had the active support, m pa r t i c u l a r , of 
a sizeable element of the Indian population who, whilst not 
actually p a r t i c i p a t i n g m resistance, did demonstrate t h e i r 
involvement m other ways, by attending public meetings (^), 
and helping to finance and administer the campaign. A mark 
of the popular backing for the m i l i t a n t leadership and i t s 
p olicies was the rapid increase m the membership of the 
N.I C. m the period 19^+6-^7 to a recorded figure of 
35,000 (5 ) . 
(1) For example, George Carr who was on the Executive of the 
African Peoples Organization presumably consulted other 
members before joining the campaign. 
(2) Examples include H. C. Holland and Miss C. George from 
Cape Town. 
(3) For instance, Michael Scott, Miss Mary Barr or Rev. W. Satchel. 
(k) These were numerous and sometimes thousands attended. For 
example, according to the Leader, 5 October 19^6, more than 
10,000 people were present at a meeting on 29 September I9k& 
on the occasion of the release of a number of prominent 
res i s t e r s . 
(5) Report to Provincial Conference of the N.I.C., JO May 19^7-
Passive Resister, 6 June 19^ +7• 
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CHAPTER IV RESISTANCE AND REACTION 
The leaders of the passive resistance campaign adopted 
two p r i n c i p a l courses of action m response to the imposition 
of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act and 
as a protest at the general conditions suffered by Indians as 
a re s u l t of r a c i a l discrimination. The f i r s t , the subject 
of t h i s chapter, comprised acts of organized non-violent 
re j e c t i o n of the law, against the Asiatic Act and the 
Immigrants Regulation Act d ) . The second, considered m 
the following Chapter, was to mobilise in t e r n a t i o n a l opinion 
as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the South African 
Government to change i t s r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . 
The term "passive resistance" was deliberately adopted 
by the leadership to describe the campaign and the in d i v i d u a l 
acts of resistance, as i t was fa m i l i a r to South African Indians 
and because of i t s associations with Gandhi whose achievements 
m South Africa and India were held m high regard by South 
African Indians ( 2 ) . 
Acts of resistance against the land tenure provisions 
of the Asiatic Act took place solely m Natal both because 
i t was the focal point for those provisions and because, 
unlike m the Transvaal, there were no other Land Tenure 
Acts, under which resisters might be charged, as a ploy on 
the part of the Government to blunt the impact of the cam-
paign ( 3 ) ' Within Natal resistance to the Land Tenure Act 
was m practice confined to Durban. This enabled pro v i n c i a l 
leaders to supervise the resistance closely ; i t maximised 
(1) No. 22, 1913- Resistance was directed against provisions 
m that Act which r e s t r i c t e d freedom of i n t e r - p r o v i n c i a l 
movement. 
(2) Gandhi's t a c t i c s could be cited by South African Indian 
leaders as having been successfully deployed against 
B r i t i s h rule m India, suggesting t h e i r p o tential m 
South Africa. 
(3) See, however, p 1|6 2 
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the xmpact of the campaign and demonstrated to participants 
that they were not acting m i s o l a t i o n but as a part of a 
nationwide campaign. 
Almost a l l resistance m the campaign against the 
Asiatic Act took place on a half-acre municipally owned 
vacant p l o t m a non-exempt ( i . e . r a c i a l l y controlled) area 
of Durban, two miles from the c i t y centre, at the intersection 
of TJmbilo Road and Gale Street ( l ) . Before occupying the 
s i t e , m deliberate contravention of the Act, groups of resis-
ters informed the police of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n . Participants 
usually assembled at the congress/resistance council o f f i c e s 
and, on occasions, a public meeting was held, which they 
attended as a prelude to resistance ( 2 ) . On no occasion 
did any r e s i s t e r resort to violence, m spite of provocation. 
The f i r s t phase of the campaign began on 13 June 1946 with 
a day of Hartal when Indian owned shops m Durban and else-
where closed as a symbol of mourning at the imposition of the 
Asiatic Act. Indian schools were also shut. Resistance 
to the Act at the Gale Street s i t e started on the same day. 
The f i r s t phase was concluded on 5 July 194-6 (3) though 
the significance of t h i s decision by the j o i n t resistance 
council i s unclear and within a matter of days a second, m 
practice v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l , phase had begun. An additional 
s i t e was designated but almost immediately abandoned on the 
discovery that i t was leased to a youth club ( 4 ) . The only 
other innovation of the second phase was the occupation of 
(1) For an eyewitness account of the s i t e during i t s occupa-
t i o n see M. Scott, A Time to Speak, pp 135-9* 
(2) Meetings were s i m i l a r l y held to welcome resisters on 
t h e i r release from prison, to encourage them to further 
acts of resistance and to a t t r a c t new r e c r u i t s and 
backing for the campaign. 
(3) Natal Mercury, 6 July 1946, Leader, 13 July 1946. 
(4) The p l o t was on the corner of Umgeni and Walter Gilbert 
Roads. Natal Mercury, 13 July 1946, Leader, 20 July 194-6. 
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two plots i n controlled areas of Durban owned by Indians who 
had not hitherto taken up residence d ) . The owners and 
i 
a few others with them courted arrest claiming they were 
contravening the Asiatic Act and i t s regulations (2) but 
the Attorney-General declined to prosecute ( j ) and no further 
attempts were made to pursue t h i s course of action elsewhere. 
The Gale Street s i t e was the only centre for resistance 
from September 1946 u n t i l January 1948. Statements by 
resistance leaders m 1947 foreshadowing an early expansion 
of resistance m Natal, outside Durban, and m the Transvaal 
came to nothing ( 4 ) . But, at a meeting convened by the 
j o i n t resistance council on 10 January, 1948 (5) the decision 
was taken to develop the campaign by o f f e r i n g resistance to the 
Immigrants Regulation Act. The council sent a l e t t e r to the 
Prime Minister which called for the repeal of the Act and other 
discriminatory l e g i s l a t i o n and stated t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to lead 
a campaign of resistance against the Immigration Act, "rather 
than submit any longer to an undemocratic, inhuman and barbarous 
piece of l e g i s l a t i o n and as a further protest against the 1946 
Act" ( 6 ) . The decision was a response to the claims of South 
Africa's delegates at the United Nations m November 1947, 
(1) George Singh occupied a vacant s i t e he owned m Brighton 
Road, Weivfcworth, and Rugnath Singh moved to his house m 
the Merebank-Wentworth area. 
(2) Regulations were introduced under the Act on 19 July 
1946 a f f e c t i n g controlled areas m Durban where i t became 
necessary to obtain permits for the development of plots. 
Government Gazette, 19 July 1946. 
(3) I n the case of G. Singh, the Attorney-General claimed that 
m law his p l o t had been Asian-occupied on 21 January 1946, 
the operative date. Leader, 14 September 1946. The N.I C 
challenged t h i s ( i b i d . , 21 September 1946) but apparently 
without r e s u l t . 
(4) An example i s the "second f r o n t " proposed by the j o i n t r e s i s -
tance council. i b i d . , 19 July 1947-
(5) Attended by 100 delegates, the m i l i t a n t s claimed that the 
meeting was the most representative of South African Indian 
opinion since the S.A.I.C. conference of February 1946. 
Passive Resister, 15 January 1948. 
(6) The l e t t e r (n.d.) was reprinted m the Leader, 24 January 1948. 
that the Asians were South African nationals and, hence, the 
question of t h e i r r i g h t s and wellbemg was essentially a 
domestic matter. The leaders of the campaign were doubtless 
disappointed at the outcome of the debate, m contrast to the 
previous year ( l ) and t h i s may have added to t h e i r determina-
t i o n to embarrass the Government abroad by demonstrating how 
l i t t l e substance there was to the claim that Asians were 
South African nationals when they were not even permitted to 
tr a v e l freely w i t h i n the country. There were other reasons, 
too, for reviving the campaign by r e s i s t i n g the Immigration 
Act, including the d e s i r a b i l i t y of maintaining a certain 
momentum of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y amongst South African Indians, thu 
giving on-going purpose to the resistance a c t i v i t i e s of the 
preceding^^S^iofflSis. The Government's f a i l u r e " except m a 
few instances, to prosecute resisters under the Asiatic Act 
gave added grounds\for finding an alternative focus i e a c j e r _ 
ship also faced the t a c t i c a l problem of the Government's i n -
creasing tendency not to arrest or charge occupants of the 
Gale Street s i t e . Opposition to the Immigration Act offered 
a way out of the impasse w i t h a general 
election imminent, the Government could not readily ignore 
acts of deliberate v i o l a t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l boundaries. 
There i s no evidence that the campaign leaders seriously 
envisaged mass v i o l a t i o n of provincial boundaries, repeating 
Gandhi's 1913 March (2 ) , but the thought had apparently been 
mooted (3) and may have had a certain appeal, especially 
m the aftermath of Gandhi's death. 
I n practice about 85 people took part m resistance to 
the Immigration Act before the campaign was "temporarily" 
(2) PP 8 3 - 8if-
(3) At the meeting convened by the resistance council on 
10 January 1948. Natal Mercury, 12 January 1948. I t 
had also been raised by A. Choudree, the Natal Indian 
leader, as early as July 1946. Leader, 27 July 1946. 
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suspended by the j o i n t passive resistance council on 
3 June 19^8, following the general election and pending the 
outcome of an interview the council sought with Dr Malan to 
hear of his intentions toward the Indian population ( 1 ) . 
The campaign was not resumed. 
Resistance to the Asiatic Act nevertheless continued 
on an i n d i v i d u a l basis as long as i t remained m force (2). 
At the behest of both m i l i t a n t and conservative leaders no 
Indians ever accepted membership of the Land Tenure Advisory 
Board (3) nor, with comparatively few exceptions, did they 
co-operate with the Act by applying for permits required, for 
example, i f an Indian wished to take up residence m a house 
he owned m a controlled area which on the operative date for 
the Act had been occupied by European tenants ( 4 ) . 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n of acts of organized resistance 
(Table VI) reveals d i s t i n c t peaks and troughs, most a c t i v i t y 
occurring m the f i r s t six months of the campaign and m 
parti c u l a r at the time of the debate m the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) m November 1946 about the treatment of 
Indians m South Africa (5 ) . There was a subsequent smaller 
surge of a c t i v i t y m the weeks before the 1947 UNGA session, 
an indication of the orientation of the campaign. 
The number who participated m the e a r l i e s t weeks (phase I ) 
shows the responsive note struck by the campaign. I n spite of 
acts of violence against the Gale Street resisters,groups of 
(1) Statement by the passive resistance council. Leader, 
5 June 1948. Drs Dadoo and Naicker were m prison at 
the time. The N.I.C. Executive caused a considerable 
furore amongst N.I.C. members by sending a message of 
congratulation to Malan on his election. 
(2) 1950. I t was replaced by the Group Areas Act. 
(3) P 1 2 2 
(4) For i t s part the Government was slow to prosecute. Natal 
Mercury, 7 January 1948, 8 January 1948. 
(5) p w o 
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TABLE VI Recorded Acts of Resistance- D i s t r i b u t i o n by Period. 
Totals Comments 
1 9 4 6 J U N E 
J U L 
A U G 
S E P 
O C T 
N O V 
D E C 
1 9 4 7 J A N 
F E B 
M A R 
A P R 
M A Y 
J U N 
J U L 
A U G 
S E P 
O C T 
N O V 
D E C 
1 9 4 8 J A N 
F E B 4 1 9 2 6 
M A R 
A P R 
M A Y 
J U N 
i 
3 3 2* 
3 3 2 
3 9 2 
7 2 4 
6 4 9 
1 3 7 6 
1 2 8 
1 5 6 1 
1 7 1 0 
9 6 
1 8 0 4 
1 2 2 
1 9 2 6 
2 0 0 0 + 
Resistance starts June 13 
End of Phase 1 
U.N. Debate on South African Indians 
F i r s t Anniversary of s t a r t of resistance 
U.N. Debate on South African Indians 
New Phase Immigration Act 
Resistance suspended June 3 
* Cumulative Total 
** Period Total 
about 50 volunteers occupied, the s i t e on each successive day 
at the end of June and m early July ( 1 ) . The announcement 
on 22 June that the Indian Government had f i l e d a complaint 
with the United Nations about the treatment of Indians m South 
Africa acted as a spur, as did the arrest of the f i r s t group 
of r esisters, amongst them Drs. Dadoo and Naicker, on the 
following day ( 2 ) . One other development had a bearing. 
On 24 June an Indian police constable, Krishnensamy P i l l a y 
was f a t a l l y injured near Gale Street, allegedly by a group of 
whites ( 3 ) - His murder made a considerable impact on the 
Indian population which the leadership exploited. He was 
accorded a hero's funeral ( 4 ) . 
Whilst the i n i t i a l l e v e l of resistance was not sustained, 
400 people resisted m the following 10 weeks, s t i l l leaving 
a s u f f i c i e n t pool of volunteers to despatch a further 65O to 
the s i t e between 20 September and 13 November ( 5 ) - On the 
eve of the UNGA on 23 October, 325 volunteers occupied the 
s i t e , the largest group of the campaign, amongst them Indians 
from Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape, as well as Africans and 
Europeans. The favourable response at the United Nations to 
India's plea on behalf of Indians m South Africa boosted 
morale and seems temporarily to have encouraged more people 
to volunteer as resisters. By the end of the year approxi-
mately 1 ,500 acts of resistance had occurred ( 6 ) , but thereafter 
the l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n f e l l sharply away. 
(1) According to Dr Dadoo, Indians were incensed by the violenc 
and "thousands turned up n i g h t l y at the resistance camp 
to demonstrate t h e i r support and admiration for the passive 
res i s t e r s " . Five months of Struggle, p 7-
( 2 ) "This gave a tremendous impetus to the Resistance Campaign. 
Y. Dadoo, i b i d . 
( 3 ) Leader, 6 July 1946 , Natal Mercury, 3 August 1946 . 
( 4 ) Scott suggests that the atmosphere was so tense that there 
was a prospect that the campaign might have had to be sus-
pended. A i w Tn f f r ^ f t , p 1 3 7 . 
(5) Dr Dadoo said that during that period the resistance counci 
had "four times more" applications from would-be resisters 
than i t could cope with. Leader, 26 October 1 9 4 6 . 
( 6 ) According to o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s 1 ,338 resisters had been 
convicted by 31 January 1947 • i b i d . , 7 February 1947-
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The passive resistance council, m a statement on 
20 December d ) , called for continuing support f o r the cam-
paign to exert pressure on the Government to implement the 
UN resolution ( 2 ) , a few days l a t e r the Minister of the 
I n t e r i o r stated that the Asiatic Act would not be repealed ( 3 ) . 
Some former supporters of the campaign may not have had the 
stomach to resume resistance, either being di s i l l u s i o n e d at 
the Government's response or content to rest on t h e i r laurels, 
having secured the "defeaf'of South Africa at the United 
Nations and hoping that the Government would convene a meeting 
with the Indian Government, as advocated by the N.I.C (4 ) , 
from which a settlement would arise. The loss of a sense of 
urgency, following the UN debate, took i t s t o l l on the cam-
paign's organizational network. This led to the c a l l i n g of 
an emergency conference by the N.I.C. of a l l the groups m 
Natal concerned with the running of the campaign m an e f f o r t 
to revive a c t i v i t y I t would appear to have had minimal 
p r a c t i c a l impact, a situ a t i o n which may have been made worse 
by the departure of Drs Dadoo and Naicker, immediately a f t e r 
the conference, f o r a two month v i s i t to India to consult with 
the Government and other interested bodies there ( 6 ) . To 
add to the problems of the resistance campaign m the f i r s t 
quarter of the year, the police and judiciary took an unusually 
lenient l i n e with resisters m an evident e f f o r t to minimise 
the impact of the campaign at the time of the Royal V i s i t to 
South Africa ( 7 ) . 
(1) Passive Resister, 27 December 1946. 
(2) p 1 7 0 
(3) Natal Mercury, 27 December 1946. 
(4) I n a l e t t e r to Smuts, 27 February 1947- Leader, 8 March 
1947. 
(3) Durban, 23 February 1947. Passive Resister, 28 February 
1947, Leader, 1 March 1947-
(6) They were to attend the Asian conference. Their depart-
ure provoked a cartoon m the Leader with the caption 
"Abandoning the ship?", 15 March 1947-
(7) March 1947- Indian leaders were divided as to whether 
or not to boycott the v i s i t , the m i l i t a n t s did. 
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R e s i s t a n c e remained a t a low ebb u n t i l t h e f i n a l q u a r t e r 
o f 19^7, th o u g h t h e r e was a l i m i t e d r e v i v a l o f a c t i v i t y t o 
c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e f i r s t a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e campaign. The 
Leader r e p o r t e d ( l ) a r e v i v a l o f r e s i s t a n c e m mid-September, 
a f t e r a gap o f a month ( 2 ) , b u t , a p a r t f r o m one g r o u p , t h e r e 
was no r e s i s t a n c e a c t i v i t y u n t i l m id-October. Then, m a 
p e r i o d o f 3 weeks a p p r o x i m a t e l y 120 p e o p l e o c c u p i e d t h e Gale 
S t r e e t s i t e d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e campaign on t h e eve o f 
t h e UNGA. 
The f a i l u r e o f I n d i a t o secure t h e n e c e s s a r y t w o - t h i r d s 
m a j o r i t y f o r i t s r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g on t h e South A f r i c a n 
government t o h o l d a c o n f e r e n c e t o d i s c u s s t h e t r e a t m e n t o f 
South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s d i d n o t d e t e r t h e campaign's l e a d e r s 
who r e s o l v e d t o c o n t i n u e p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e ( 3 ) - B u t m 
p r a c t i c e t h e r e i s no r e c o r d o f any r e s i s t a n c e h a v i n g t a k e n 
p l a c e m t h e e n s u i n g two months u n t i l a f t e r a m e e t i n g o f t h e 
j o i n t p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l on 10 J a n u a r y 1 9 ^ {h) when i t 
was d e c i d e d t o mount o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e I m m i g r a t i o n R e g u l a t i o n 
A c t ( 5 ) . Between t h e end o f January and m i d - A p r i l 63 I n d i a n s 
d e l i b e r a t e l y c o n t r a v e n e d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A c t by c r o s s i n g 
t h e T r a n s v a a l / N a t a l b o r d e r w i t h o u t a p e r m i t . P e n a l t i e s were 
severe compared w i t h t h o s e f o r o c c u p y i n g t h e Gale S t r e e t s i t e (6) 
and t h i s may have been one o f t h e reasons w h i c h d e t e r r e d more 
p e o p l e from v o l u n t e e r i n g f r o m m i d - A p r i l . U n t i l t h e s u s p e n s i o n 
o f t h e campaign on 3 June t h e r e was v e r y l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e 
a c t i v i t y e i t h e r a t Gale S t r e e t o r on t h e N a t a l / T r a n s v a a l b o r d e r . 
(1) 20 September 19V7-
(2) T h i s absence o f a c t i v i t y and t h e l a c k o f r e f e r e n c e s m t h e 
p r e s s t o a c t s o f r e s i s t a n c e m t h e p r e c e d i n g weeks c a s t s 
doubt on t h e t o t a l o f n e a r l y 100 r e s i s t e r s f o r t h e p e r i o d 
from mid-June t o mid-September ( T a b l e V I ) w h i c h i s based 
on r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l f i g u r e s . 
(3) A t a m e e t i n g on t h e Gale S t r e e t s i t e , 26 November 19^7-
Leader, 29 November 19V7. 
( k ) P154 
(5) £ 7 7 
(6) p 1 6 3 
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The a c t s o f p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e d i d n o t succeed i n c a u s i n g 
t h e Government t o r e p e a l o r amend t h e A s i a t i c A c t n o r d i d t h e y 
r e s u l t i n any s i g n i f i c a n t f a v o u r a b l e changes o f p o l i c y o r 
o p i n i o n by government a t t h e n a t i o n a l o r l o c a l l e v e l . The 
Government was t e m p o r a r i l y embarrassed a b r o a d and Smuts p u t 
on t h e d e f e n s i v e , b u t t h i s was i n s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r them 
s e r i o u s l y t o c o n t e m p l a t e coming t o terms w i t h t h e r e s i s t e r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n drew n e a r . w h i l s t 
e x e r c i s i n g a degree o f c a u t i o n , t h e Government s e t o u t t o 
c r u s h t h e p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e campaign ( l ) , p r i n c i p a l l y , b u t 
n o t s o l e l y , by r e c o u r s e t o t h e p r o c e s s o f law. 
The Government's response t o t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e Gale 
S t r e e t s i t e and t o o t h e r a c t s o f n o n - v i o l e n t r e o e c t i o n o f t h e 
law was t o p l a y " c a t and mouse" w i t h t h e r e s i s t e r s . F r e q u e n t l y , 
t h e p o l i c e d e c l i n e d t o t a k e a c t i o n , a t l e a s t f o r some h o u r s o r 
days. The f i r s t group t o occupy t h e Gale S t r e e t s i t e w a i t e d 
10 days b e f o r e t h e y were a r r e s t e d and m t h a t t i m e had t o 
endure t a u n t s and p h y s i c a l v i o l e n c e from w h i t e s , w h i c h t h e 
p o l i c e d i d l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g t o p r e v e n t u n t i l 23 June, t h e day 
a f t e r t h e f i r s t a r r e s t s . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e 19V7 UNGA a group 
o f r e s i s t e r s under Ashwm Choudree w a i t e d x n vaxn f o r t h r e e 
weeks t o be d e t a x n e d . The Government a d o p t e d s i m i l a r t a c t i c s 
o f n o n - c o - o p e r a t i o n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e R o y a l V i s i t i n March 
19^+7- E q u a l l y , t h e y r e f u s e d t o p r o s e c u t e George and Rugnath 
Smgh (2) and I n d i a n s n o t d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e campaign 
who o c c u p i e d p r o p e r t y w h i c h t h e y owned b u t w h i c h had n o t had 
I n d i a n o c c u p a n t s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e A c t . 
The Government c o u l d n o t , however, e n t i r e l y i g n o r e t h e 
r e s i s t e r s . To have done so w o uld have i n v i t e d a w h i t e back-
l a s h and m i g h t , i n t h e v i e w o f t h e Government, have c r e a t e d a 
(1) As m 1914, b u t even more s t r o n g l y xn iSkS, Smuts was n o t 
t o be d e f l e c t e d by any l i n g e r i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l f a s c i n a t i o n 
w i t h n o n - v i o l e n t a c t i o n . 
(2) p 1 5 4 
p r e c e d e n t w h i c h would have encouraged n o t o n l y I n d i a n s b u t 
o t h e r b l a c k s t o v i o l a t e t h e law ( l ) . I t was t h e number o f 
r e s i s t e r s m t h e e a r l y months o f t h e campaign and, more 
i m p o r t a n t , t h e a t t e n t i o n t h e y r e c e i v e d a b r o a d , and m South 
A f r i c a , w h i c h f o r c e d t h e Government's hand. But when t h e 
p o l i c e t o o k a c t i o n by a r r e s t i n g t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h e Gale 
S t r e e t s i t e t h e y a l m o s t i n v a r i a b l y charged them under a 
Trespass law (2) o r t h e R i o t o u s A s semblies A c t (3) and n o t , 
as t h e r e s i s t e r s would have w i s h e d , under t h e A s i a t i c A c t . 
I t was m t h e v a i n hope o f t h w a r t i n g t h i s " d i v e r s i o n a r y " t a c t i c 
t h a t George and Rugnath Singh u n d e r t o o k t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e , 
b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e y c o u l d o n l y be p r o s e c u t e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n 
under t h e A s i a t i c A c t . But v i r t u a l l y t h e o n l y r e s i s t e r s 
who were m f a c t charged w i t h t h e o f f e n c e s t h e y had s e t o u t t o 
commit were t h o s e who v i o l a t e d t h e I m m i g r a t i o n A c t . T h i s may 
have d i s a p p o i n t e d t h e l e a d e r s h i p b u t appears t o have had l i t t l e 
i m p a c t on t h e r a n k and f i l e . 
The p a r t i c i p a n t s c o - o p e r a t e d a t a l l t i m e s w i t h t h e law 
e n f orcement a g e n c i e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e h o s t i l i t y shown t o 
them by some p o l i c e , c o u r t and p r i s o n o f f i c i a l s . The r e s i s -
t e r s were g e n e r a l l y r e l e a s e d on b a i l a f t e r b e i n g charged and 
when t h e y appeared u i c o u r t p l e a d e d g u i l t y , wherever p o s s i b l e 
e x p l a i n i n g t h e r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d t h e i r v i o l a t i o n o f t h e law ( 4 ) . 
A t f i r s t , m a g i s t r a t e s p e r m i t t e d such s t a t e m e n t s , o f t e n c o u n t e r -
i n g w i t h t h e i r own v i e w s , b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y o n l y w r i t t e n s t a t e -
ments m e x p l a n a t i o n were a c c e p t e d . 
(1) The Government may have been m i n d f u l i n i t i a l l y , m p a r t , 
o f t h e d e c i s i o n t a k e n a t t h e second a n t i - p a s s c o n f e r e n c e 
on 23 June 1946, m Johannesburg, t o o r g a n i z e a mass 
campaign a g a i n s t t h e pass l a w s w i t h i n t h r e e months. 
(2) D a t e d 1879 
(3) No. 27, 1914. 
( k ) "The absence o f p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s d e p r i v e s us o f t h e most 
p o w e r f u l means o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e d r e s s . To p r e s e r v e 
o u r s e l v e s , t o u p h o l d t h e d i g n i t y and honour o f t h e I n d i a n 
n a t i o n , we have been f o r c e d t o a dopt u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
methods", M. D. Naidoo, J o i n t S e c r e t a r y N.I.C., 1 J u l y 
1946, Leader, 6 J u l y 1946. 
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The f i r s t r e s i s t e r s t o be a r r e s t e d were charged under 
t h e R i o t o u s A s semblies A c t f o r f a i l i n g t o d i s p e r s e , f o l l o w i n g 
t h e i s s u e o f an o r d e r b a n n i n g p u b l i c g a t h e r i n g s a t t h e Gale 
S t r e e t s i t e ( l ) . When t h e i r case came t o c o u r t t h e l e a d e r s 
and t h o s e who had a l r e a d y been a r r e s t e d more t h a n once a t t h e 
Gale S t r e e t s i t e were sentenced, under t h e R i o t o u s A s s e m b l i e s 
A c t and a d d i t i o n a l l y t h e Trespass A c t , t o between k weeks and 
6-J months m p r i s o n ( 2 ) , w i t h t h e o p t i o n o f a f i n e . F or t h e 
r e m a i n d e r , t h e o r i g i n a l charge under t h e R i o t o u s A s s e m b l i e s 
A c t was dropped and t h e y were c o n v i c t e d o f s i m p l e t r e s p a s s > f o r 
w h i c h t h e y were f i n e d £5 w i t h o u t t h e o p t i o n o f i m p r i s o n m e n t (3)« 
I n a l l subsequent cases i n v o l v i n g t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h e Gale 
S t r e e t s i t e , f i r s t t i m e o f f e n d e r s were c o n v i c t e d s o l e l y f o r 
c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e Trespass A c t . From m i d - J u l y 1 9 ^ t h e y 
were g i v e n t h e o p t i o n o f i m p r i s o n m e n t t o a f i n e , t h e n o r m a l 
sentence b e i n g 1 month's i m p r i s o n m e n t o r a £3 f i n e . I n l i n e 
w i t h t h e r e s i s t a n c e c o u n c i l ' s p o l i c y , most went t o p r i s o n , 
t h i s was c o n s i d e r e d i m p o r t a n t t o t h e image and a p p e a l o f 
t h e campaign as w e l l as b e i n g an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a p a s s i v e 
r e s i s t e r ' s e x p e r i e n c e . 
Those who t o o k p a r t m r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e I m m i g r a t i o n 
R e g u l a t i o n A c t g e n e r a l l y r e c e i v e d much h e a v i e r sentences t h a n 
t h e Gale S t r e e t r e s i s t e r s (k), f i r s t o f f e n d e r s b e i n g s e n t t o 
p r i s o n f o r 1 - 2 months and second o f f e n d e r s r e c e i v i n g 3 month 
t e r m s . I n a t l e a s t one case, a second o f f e n d e r (5) had t o 
d ) S e c t i o n 1(4) A c t 27, 191^. The i n i t i a l o r d e r a p p l i e d f o r 
1 week. 
(2) Dr N a i c k e r r e c e i v e d t h e h e a v i e s t sentence o f 6% months, 
h a v i n g a l r e a d y been a r r e s t e d 3 t i m e s , he s e r v e d 5 months. Dr Dadoo 
was sentenced t o 3 months and s e r v e d t h e f u l l p e r i o d . B o t h r e -
c e i v e d f u r t h e r 6 month sentences m F e b r u a r y 1 9 ^ under t h e 
I m m i g r a t i o n R e g u l a t i o n A c t . 
(3) There i s no r e c o r d o f p r o p e r t y b e i n g e s t r e a t e d m terms o f A c t 31: 
1917, as a r e s u l t o f non-payment o f f i n e s , y e t t h e p r e s s r e p o r t e d 
t h a t t h o s e c o n v i c t e d d i d n o t i n t e n d t o pay. Leader, 6 J u l y 19^-
(^f) An e x c e p t i o n was M a n i l a l Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi's son, who l e d 
t h r e e groups o f r e s i s t e r s a c r o s s t h e T r a n s v a a l / N a t a l b o r d e r . He 
was a r r e s t e d and charged on o n l y one o c c a s i o n , b u t n e ver sentenced. 
I n d i a n O p i n i o n , 16, 23,30 A p r i l -]9h8. 
(5) P. C h e t t y . Leader, 17 A p r i l 1 9 ^ . 
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serve o n e - t h i r d o f h i s sentence m s o l i t a r y c o n f i n e m e n t and 
was g i v e n a s p a r e d i e t t w i c e each week. Youths were sen-
te n c e d t o w h i p p i n g . D r s Dadoo and N a i c k e r , who were charged 
m F e b r u a r y 1 9 ^ w i t h " a i d i n g and a b e t t i n g A s i a t i c s t o e n t e r 
t h e T r a n s v a a l w i t h o u t p e r m i t s " , r e c e i v e d t h e maximum sentence 
o f 6 months i m p r i s o n m e n t , w i t h o u t t h e o p t i o n o f a f i n e ( l ) . 
I n p r i s o n , t h e p a s s i v e r e s i s t e r s , men and women, were 
s i n g l e d o u t f o r h a r s h t r e a t m e n t . W h i l s t t h i s was n o t o f f i -
c i a l " p o l i c y " , i t was c l e a r l y condoned ( 2 ) . 
There i s l i t t l e t o suggest t h a t g o v e r n m e n t a l and w h i t e 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n m South A f r i c a , t o any degree, d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
between t h e programme o f n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e and t h e o t h e r 
p r i n c i p a l a s p e c t o f t h e campaign, i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n ( 3 ) ) 
and t h e t a c t i c o f n o n - v i o l e n c e appears t o have a t t r a c t e d o n l y 
o c c a s i o n a l , g e n e r a l l y s u p e r f i c i a l comment, such as t h a t o f a 
c o r r e s p o n d e n t m t h e N a t a l W i t n e s s who w r o t e , "no B a r l i a m e n t a r y 
Government c o u l d t o l e r a t e p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e by Gandhi's 
'Passive R e s i s t a n c e ' w h i c h i s l a w l e s s n e s s and r e b e l l i o n under 
a n o t h e r name" (k). A t t h e t i m e o f t h e r e n e w a l o f r e s i s t a n c e 
m 1 9 ^ Die T r a n s v a l e r d e s c r i b e d t h e campaign as a , " r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
r e b e l l i o n " , c l a i m i n g t h a t , " t h e I n d i a n s s h o u l d be p u n i s h e d l i k e 
r e b e l s and n o t g i v e n a chance t o become m a r t y r s " ( 5 ) • And t h e 
N a t a l Mercury, on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , sought t o r i d i c u l e t h e 
r e s i s t e r s , as f o r example, when t h e p o l i c e d e c l i n e d t o a r r e s t 
r e s i s t e r s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e 19V7 UNGA " ( t h e y ' j s a t w i t h an 
(1) P a s s i v e R e s i s t e r , 5 March 19^-
(2) The Leader, 2h August 19^6, p u b l i s h e d N.I.C. a l l e g a t i o n s 
a b out p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s f o r p a s s i v e r e s i s t e r s and t h e 
recommendations o f Mr J. S u l l i v a n , MP f o r t h e i r improvement. 
(3) The response o f t h e w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n t o t h e campaign as a 
whole i s assessed m Chapter V, r e f e r e n c e i s made m t h e 
p r e s e n t c h a p t e r o n l y t o t h e r e a c t i o n t o t h e i n t e r n a l cam-
p a i g n o f " p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e " . 
( k ) N a t a l W i t n e s s , 23 August 19^+6. 
(5) D i e T r a n s v a l e r , 5 F e b r u a r y 1 9 ^ m P r e s s D i g e s t , 6 F e b r u a r y 
endurance w h i c h t h e Spartans m i g h t have e n v i e d n i g h t a f t e r 
n i g h t ... a s k i n g o n l y t o be t a k e n t o t h e c o m p a r a t i v e warmth 
o f a p r i s o n c e l l ... such i s t h e u n k i n d f a t e o f t h o s e who 
would s a c r i f i c e themselves on t h e a l t a r o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
c o n v i c t i o n s " ( l ) . Even Forum, t h e weekly l i b e r a l paper, 
w h i c h m i g h t have been ex p e c t e d t o comment s p e c i f i c a l l y on 
t h e n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e a s p e c t s o f t h e 1946-8 campaign 
f a i l e d t o do so m any d e p t h . The programme o f n o n - v i o l e n t 
r e s i s t a n c e may, o f co u r s e , have p r o v o k e d c o n s i d e r a b l e un-
r e c o r d e d d i s c u s s i o n between w h i t e i n t e l l e c t u a l s , o t h e r t h a n 
those d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d w i t h , o r on t h e f r i n g e s o f t h e 
campaign, b u t i f i t d i d , t h e r e i s l i t t l e t o show f o r 
i t ( 2 ) . 
The f a i l u r e o f n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e t o e x c i t e t h e 
sympathy o f t h e w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n was u n d e r l i n e d by t h e 
i n c i d e n t s w h i c h o c c u r r e d a t Gale S t r e e t m 1946 and s h o r t l y 
b e f o r e t h e 1948 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n when groups o f young 
w h i t e s , male and fe m a l e , a s s a u l t e d r e s i s t e r s and r a n s a c k e d t h e 
t e n t s e r e c t e d on t h e s i t e . M i c h a e l S c o t t d e s c r i b e d one such 
a t t a c k , w h i c h he w i t n e s s e d , by a group o f Europeans, "Suddenly 
a w h i s t l e b l e w and w i t h s h o u t s and c a t c a l l s t h e whole forma-
t i o n charged and b o r e down on t h e l i t t l e g roup o f r e s i s t e r s 
who were s t a n d i n g back t o back. W i t h t h e i r f i s t s t h e y 
s t r u c k t h e I n d i a n s m t h e f a c e and about t h e body. No one 
r e t a l i a t e d b u t some t r i e d t o duck and ward o f f t h e blows 
b e f o r e f a l l i n g down. On t h e ground t h e y were k i c k e d ..." ( 3 ) . 
Zaynap A s v a t , one o f those a t t h e s i t e , a t t h e t i m e , commented 
"We propose t o w i n them over and t o make them see t h e j u s t i c e 
(1) N a t a l Mercury, 27 November 1947- The paper d i d , however 
p o i n t o u t t o i t s r e a d e r s t h a t p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e had "a 
deep r e l i g i o u s and p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e A s i a t i c s 
( t h o u g h i t ) "appears so p a t e n t l y p u r p o s e l e s s t o t h e 
European mind". 20 June 1946. 
( 2 ) The oc c a s i o n a l j o u r n a l a r t i c l e e x c e p t e d . 
(3) M. S c o t t , A Time t o Speak, p 136. S i m i l a r r e p o r t s 
appeared m t h e N a t a l Mercury, 18 June 1946. 
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o f o u r cause by o u r s u f f e r i n g and s a c r i f i c e ... d ) . The 
response t o t h e s e s e n t i m e n t s m 19^6-8 was one o f t o t a l 
i n d i f f e r e n c e , n o t o n l y from t h e a s s a i l a n t s b u t w h i t e 
o p i n i o n as a whole. 
( i ; Leader, 22 June 19^6. 
1 6 7 
CHAPTER V RESISTANCE AND REACTION THE INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSION ( 1 ) 
I n d i a n s m South A f r i c a were accustomed t o l o o k t o 
I n d i a f o r s u p p o r t i n t h e i r e f f o r t s t o improve t h e i r c o n d i -
t i o n s , b u t , f o l l o w i n g t h e Cape Town Agreement m 1927 when 
f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e South A f r i c a n Government f o r m a l l y 
a c c e p t e d t h a t I n d i a n s w o u ld f o r m an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e 
c o u n t r y ' s permanent p o p u l a t i o n ( 2 ) , South A f r i c a n I n d i a n 
l e a d e r s p l a c e d g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on a c h i e v i n g i n t e r n a l s o l u -
t i o n s . 19^6 marks a f u r t h e r t u r n i n g p o i n t , f o r , m t h e 
a f t e r m a t h o f t h e second w o r l d war, South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s 
p e r c e i v e d new o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o secure an improvement m t h e i r 
d e t e r i o r a t i n g s t a t u s by a p p e a l i n g f o r s u p p o r t a b road, a c c u s i n g 
t h e South A f r i c a n Government o f f a i l i n g t o honour i t s i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o them s e t o u t m t h e Cape Town 
Agreement. 
To p r e s s t h e i r case t h e y s e n t d e l e g a t i o n s abroad, t o 
I n d i a and o c c a s i o n a l l y e l s e w h e r e , a t f a i r l y f r e q u e n t i n t e r v a l s 
f r o m e a r l y 19^6. The c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e l e g a t i o n s was t h e 
s u b j e c t o f e n d l e s s c o n t r o v e r s y between t h e m i l i t a n t s and 
c o n s e r v a t i v e s w h i c h r e s u l t e d m t h e d e s p a t c h o f s e p a r a t e groups, 
sometimes s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ( 3 ) - The I n d i a n Government r e c e i v e d 
(1) The i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n i s examined h e r e o n l y m o u t -
l i n e , as an a d j u n c t t o t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , i t i s t h e 
s u b j e c t o f o t h e r s t u d i e s , f o r example, B. P a c h a i , "The 
Emergence o f t h e Q u e s t i o n o f t h e South A f r i c a n I n d i a n as 
an I n t e r n a t i o n a l I s s u e 186O-1961". ( U n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. 
t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y o f N a t a l . ) 
( 2 ) The Cape Town Agreement, o f w h i c h I n d i a and South A f r i c a 
were t h e c o - s i g n a t o r i e s , a l s o c o n t a i n e d an u n d e r t a k i n g t o 
improve I n d i a n e d u c a t i o n a l and s o c i a l f a c i l i t i e s m South 
A f r i c a ( t h e s o - c a l l e d " u p l i f t m e n t c l a u s e s " ) . I n r e t u r n , 
t h e I n d i a n Government agreed t o a scheme o f v o l u n t a r y 
r e p a t r i a t i o n f o r South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s . 
(3) Separate d e l e g a t i o n s were s e n t t o t h e 19A-6 UNGA and 
a p p a r e n t l y r e f u s e d t o have any c o n t a c t w i t h one a n o t h e r , 
Leader, 30 November 19^6. 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f b o t h e l e m e n t s , b u t t h e i r t i e s were 
p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h t h e m i l i t a n t s . D r s. Dadoo and N a i c k e r , 
s p e n t o v e r two months m I n d i a m 19^7 c o n s u l t i n g w i t h h m d u 
and muslim l e a d e r s , s e e k i n g t o cement t h e i r l i n k s w i t h b o t h d ) . 
The i m p a c t o f t h e d e l e g a t i o n s i s n o t always easy t o assess 
and t h e r e p o r t s o f t h e i r achievements m t h e South A f r i c a n 
I n d i a n p r e s s were i n e v i t a b l y s e l e c t i v e . B u t t h e S.A.I.C. 
d e l e g a t i o n w h i c h v i s i t e d I n d i a from March - May 19^6 and w h i c h 
was l e d by S. Rustomjee, t h e o n l y member o f t h e group m whom 
t h e m i l i t a n t s had any c o n f i d e n c e , was a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y i n s t r u -
m e n t a l m t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e I n d i a n Government t o sever t r a d e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h South A f r i c a (2) as a r e p r i s a l f o r t h e Un i o n 
Government's r e f u s a l t o agree t o a r o u n d t a b l e c o n f e r e n c e (3)» 
I t i s e q u a l l y p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e r e were d i s c u s s i o n s a b o u t r a i s i n g 
t h e t r e a t m e n t o f South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 
t h o u g h i t i s n o t c l e a r from p r e c i s e l y whom t h e p r o p o s a l came. 
Rustomjee's r e q u e s t t h a t t h e I n d i a n Government s h o u l d 
w i t h d r a w i t s H i g h Commissioner m South A f r i c a met w i t h t h e 
agreement o f Nehru (.k)y t h e d e c i s i o n was announced f o l l o w i n g 
t h e passage o f t h e Land Tenure A c t ( 5 ) . I n t h e heady atmos-
phere m I n d i a b e f o r e independence, news o f t h e t r e a t m e n t o f 
(1) Dr Dadoo s t r e s s e d how i m p o r t a n t he c o n s i d e r e d i t was t o 
o b t a i n t h e b a c k i n g o f b o t h muslim and h m d u l e a d e r s m 
I n d i a m an e f f o r t t o f o r e s t a l l a r i f t amongst South 
A f r i c a n I n d i a n s on r e l i g i o u s grounds, w h i c h c o u l d have 
s e r i o u s l y undermined t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e m i l i t a n t s t o 
c r e a t e a broad-based p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . I n t e r v i e w , 2 2 May 1969. 
(2) The d e c i s i o n was announced on 12 March 19^+6, b u t d i d n o t have 
t h e f o r c e o f law u n t i l r e g u l a t i o n s were p u b l i s h e d m an 
E x t r a o r d i n a r y G a z e t t e , d a t e d 17 J u l y 19^6. The p r i n c i p a l 
element m t h e t r a d e was t h e e x p o r t by I n d i a o f j u t e bags 
f o r g r a m s t o r a g e . Dr Dadoo was s u b s e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d 
(Leader, k October 19^7) as a d v o c a t i n g a w o r l d b o y c o t t o f 
South A f r i c a n goods, b u t t h i s p r o p o s a l was n o t p u r s u e d 
d u r i n g t h e campaign. On i t s emergence as a s e p a r a t e S t a t e 
P a k i s t a n p l a c e d a ban on t r a d e w i t h South A f r i c a , i b i d . , 
6 March 19^8-
(3) P 1 3 0 
(4-J A t f i r s t , however, V i c e r o y W a v e l l r e f u s e d t o a g r e e . P a c h a i , 
o p . c i t . , pp 408-9. 
(5) The d e c i s i o n t o r e c a l l H i g h Commissioner Desmuck was made p u b l i c 
m South A f r i c a on 11 June 19^-6. The H i g h Commission o f f i c e 
r e mained open t h r o u g h o u t t h e campaign m t h e charge o f a 
j u n i o r o f f i c i a l . 
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I n d i a n s m South A f r i c a appears t o have e x c i t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e 
i n t e r e s t and p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s were r e a d y t o t a k e up a cause 
w h i c h w o u l d c a s t I n d i a m a f a v o u r a b l e l i g h t a broad, as a 
champion o f t h e oppressed. 
Less t h a n 6 months a f t e r t h e p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e campaign 
had begun and o n l y 9 months s i n c e Rustomjee's d e l e g a t i o n had 
made t h e f i r s t approaches t o t h e I n d i a n Government t h e p l i g h t 
o f I n d i a n s m South A f r i c a was under d i s c u s s i o n a t t h e U n i t e d 
N a t i o n s . For a s m a l l m i n o r i t y , w i t h few r i g h t s o r r e s o u r c e s , 
l i v i n g m a c o u n t r y whose l e a d e r was one o f t h e l e a d i n g a r c h i -
t e c t s o f t h e UN C h a r t e r , t h i s was a r e m a r k a b l e achievement, 
p a r t l y t h e r e s u l t o f f o r t u i t o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b u t a l s o a con-
sequence o f t h e s k i l l o f t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e 
campaign m d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p l i g h t o f t h e i r p e o p l e 
t h r o u g h t h e s p e c t a c l e o f a c t u a l p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e and by t h e 
despatch o f d e l e g a t i o n s and s k i l f u l use o f p u b l i c i t y m a t e r i a l . 
The debates b e f o r e t h e UN p o l i t i c a l committee and m 
p l e n a r y s e s s i o n on "The Treatment o f I n d i a n s S e t t l e d m t h e 
T e r r i t o r y o f t h e Union o f South A f r i c a " d ) saw t h e development 
o f two p r i n c i p a l l i n e s o f argument, t h e f i r s t , l e g a l i s t i c , 
advanced m p a r t i c u l a r by t h e South A f r i c a n s , who c l a i m e d t h a t 
t h e m a t t e r was one f o r domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n , and t h e second, 
h u m a n i t a r i a n , espoused by I n d i a . There was l i t t l e sympathy 
f o r South A f r i c a ' s defence o f i t s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e I n d i a n popu-
l a t i o n and n e i t h e r Smuts n o r t h e South A f r i c a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o 
t h e UN, H e a t o n - N i c h o l l s , c o u l d p r o v i d e an e f f e c t i v e c o u n t e r t o 
( 1 ) J o i n t Committee o f t h e 1st and 6 t h Committees' Summary 
r e c o r d o f m e e t i n g s 21-JO November, 1946, and O f f i c i a l 
Record o f t h e 2nd p a r t o f t h e 1st s e s s i o n o f t h e UN G e n e r a l 
Assembly 23 October - 16 December 1946, (50-51st m e e t i n g s 
pp 1006-1061). B o t h t h e I n d i a n and South A f r i c a n Govern-
ments s u b m i t t e d d e t a i l e d background memoranda, p u b l i s h e d 
as annexures 1(a) and 1 ( b ) t o t h e r e c o r d o f t h e J o i n t 
Committee. 
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t h e f o r m i d a b l e I n d i a n d e l e g a t e , Mrs Lakshmi P a n d i t . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e outcome f o r t h e South A f r i c a n Government 
was worse t h a n e x p e c t e d . I n t h e p o l i t i c a l committee i t s 
r e s o l u t i o n p r o p o s i n g t h a t t h e m a t t e r be p u t t o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
C o u r t o f J u s t i c e f o r a r u l i n g as t o whether o r n o t i t was a 
domestic c o n c e r n , and t h e r e f o r e s u b j e c t t o A r t i c l e 2(7) o f t h e 
UN C h a r t e r , was r e j e c t e d m f a v o u r o f a Franco-Mexican r e s o l u -
t i o n . T h i s s t a t e d t h a t because o f t h e t r e a t m e n t o f I n d i a n s m 
South A f r i c a f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between two member S t a t e s had 
been i m p a i r e d and t h a t u n l e s s a s a t i s f a c t o r y s e t t l e m e n t was 
rea c h e d a f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n m r e l a t i o n s was p r o b a b l e . 
I t u r g e d t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t o f South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s s h o u l d 
be m c o n f o r m i t y " w i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e 
Agreements c o n c l u d e d between t h e two Governments d ) and t h e 
r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C h a r t e r " and r e q u e s t e d I n d i a and South 
A f r i c a t o r e p o r t t o t h e n e x t s e s s i o n o f t h e UNGA t h e measures 
adopt e d t o a c h i e v e t h e s e ends ( 2 ) . The v o t i n g was 2k m f a v o u r , 
19 a g a i n s t , w i t h 6 a b s t e n t i o n s . B e f o r e t h e p l e n a r y s e s s i o n , 
South A f r i c a ' s m o t i o n was a g a i n d e f e a t e d and,on t h i s o c c a s i o n , 
t h e Franco-Mexican r e s o l u t i o n was passed w i t h more t h a n t h e 
r e q u i r e d t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y w i t h 32 v o t e s m f a v o u r , 15 
a g a i n s t and 7 a b s t e n t i o n s ( 3 ) . 
F o l l o w i n g t h e debate, Nehru w r o t e t o Smuts s i g n i f y i n g h i s 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o h o l d d i s c u s s i o n s t o implement t h e r e s o l u t i o n , 
b u t Smuts c o u l d n o t a c c e p t t h e I n d i a n p r o p o s a l s , c o r r e s -
pondence between t h e two men d u r i n g 19^7 c o n s t i t u t e d l i t t l e 
(1) The U n i o n Government d i d n o t a c c e p t t h a t t h e Cape Town 
Agreement o f 1927 and t h e subsequent Statement o f 1932 
c o n s t i t u t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements. 
( 2 ) Summary Record o f M e e t i n g o f t h e J o i n t Committee, o p . c i t . , 
r*-\ ^ e x u r e 1f"- Jhe South A f r i c a n r e s o l u t i o n i s . a t c A n n g x u r e , 1d (3; The Government was e q u a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l m t h e SoTrtn west 
A f r i c a debate, t h e UNGA r e g e c t m g i t s r e q u e s t f o r annexa-
t i o n , i n s t e a d p r o p o s i n g t h a t South West A f r i c a became a 
UN T r u s t T e r r i t o r y . 
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mare t h a n " s e t - p i e c e s " designed t o s h i f t t h e onus t o t h e 
r e c i p i e n t ( l ) . There was never any s e r i o u s l i k e l i h o o d o f 
t a l k s t a k i n g p l a c e on t h e terras each p r o p o s e d . 
The debate on t h e t r e a t m e n t o f I n d i a n s m South A f r i c a 
a t t h e 19^7 s e s s i o n o f t h e UNGA t o o k p l a c e a g a i n s t t h e 
background o f w i d e s p r e a d b l o o d s h e d m t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t , 
f o l l o w i n g i t s p a r t i t i o n a t independence t h e p r e v i o u s month. 
W h i l s t t h e d i s c u s s i o n a g a i n f o c u s e d w o r l d a t t e n t i o n on South 
A f r i c a ' s r a c i a l p o l i c i e s t h e r e was l i t t l e new t o be added 
t o t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r ' s debate and t h e f e r v o u r and commitment, 
so e v i d e n t m 19^6, was l e s s a p p a r e n t . The r e s o l u t i o n p r o -
posed by I n d i a f a i l e d t o secure t h e t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y i t 
r e q u i r e d f o r a d o p t i o n by t h e UNGA. I t expressed r e g r e t a t 
South A f r i c a ' s r e f u s a l t o implement t h e 19^6 r e s o l u t i o n , r e -
a f f i r m e d t h e 19^ +6 r e s o l u t i o n and c a l l e d f o r a c o n f e r e n c e 
between t h e I n d i a n and South A f r i c a n Governments who were t o 
r e p o r t what t h e y had a c h i e v e d t o t h e 1 9 ^ UNGA ( 2 ) . No 
s u b s t i t u t e r e s o l u t i o n was passed and t h e s t a t u s o f t h e I9h6 
r e s o l u t i o n was th r o w n i n t o d o u b t . The I n d i a n r e s o l u t i o n d i d 
o b t a i n a s i m p l e m a j o r i t y (3) and Mrs P a n d i t c l a i m e d t h e r e s u l t 
as a "moral v i c t o r y " b u t i t was a bl o w t o I n d i a n s e l f -
esteem and m o r a l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y m South A f r i c a . 
The f a c t r emained t h a t t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n 
i n South A f r i c a , as a r e s u l t o f t h e t a c t i c s t h e y had adopte d m 
response t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e A s i a t i c Land Tenure A c t , had 
s e t m m o t i o n t h e p r o c e s s o f i s o l a t i n g South A f r i c a i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , 
(1) The correspondence was p u b l i s h e d m t h e p r e s s . Leader, 
7 June 19^7, 25 August 19V?. 
(2) O f f i c i a l Records o f t h e 2nd Sess i o n o f t h e General 
Assembly, 16 September - 19 November 19^-7, P 623. 
(3) I n t h e p l e n a r y s e s s i o n t h e v o t i n g was 3 1 - 1 9 - 6 . 
( k ) Statement t o A. I . Meer, J o i n t S e c r e t a r y N.I.C 
P a s s i v e R e s i s t e r , 11 December 19^7• 
p u t t i n g t h e Government on t h e d e f e n s i v e and m a p o s i t i o n 
where i t f e l t o b l i g e d t o e x p l a i n and j u s t i f y i t s i n t e r n a l 
p o l i c i e s even though i t c l a i m e d t h e s e were n o t t h e l e g i t i -
mate co n c e r n o f f o r e i g n governments. The r e a c t i o n w i t h i n 
South A f r i c a t o t h i s new s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , where even i t s 
c l o s e s t a l l i e s had n o t spoken o u t m s u p p o r t o f t h e 
Government's p o l i c i e s , was mixed. 
The Government, m ']9k6, p r e s s e d by t h e N a t i o n a l P a r t y 
and i t s own e l e c t o r a t e , as w e l l as f r o m abroad, had l i t t l e 
room f o r manoeuvre and t o o k no new i n i t i a t i v e , h o p i n g , 
presumably, t h a t i n t e r e s t a t home and a b r o a d m t h e "South 
A f r i c a n I n d i a n q u e s t i o n " w o uld soon s u b s i d e . I t r e a f f i r m e d 
i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o implement t h e A s i a t i c A c t ( l ) and sought 
t o m i n i m i s e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f what had happened a t t h e U n i t e d 
N a t i o n s . Smuts declared^"we f o u n d u n b e l i e v a b l e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
about r a c e and c o l o u r c o n d i t i o n s and t h e i r h a n d l i n g m South 
A f r i c a ... The i n f l a m m a b l e i s s u e s o f r a c e and c o l o u r swept o v e r 
t h e ... Assembly m a mood o f e m o t i o n , f a n n e d by m i s c h i e v o u s 
propaganda" ( 2 ) . When t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a t t h e UN (3) came up 
f o r debate m t h e House o f Assembly m January - F e b r u a r y 19^7 ? 
Smuts ar g u e d t h a t t h e Government would " s t i c k t o i t s guns" ( 4 ) , 
b u t he was n e v e r t h e l e s s c l e a r l y t a k e n aback by t h e e v e n t s a t t h e 
UN and a d m i t t e d , "The p a s t f o u r months have been some o f t h e 
most d i f f i c u l t m my l i f e t i m e " ( 3 ) - He summarised t h e o f f i c i a l 
p o s i t i o n by s a y i n g , "We do n o t want p e o p l e m South A f r i c a t o 
go and make a p p e a l s t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . I f t h e y want t o make 
any a p p e a l l e t them do so m South A f r i c a ... we a r e now g i v i n g 
(1) For example, m a s t a t e m e n t made by t h e M i n i s t e r o f t h e 
I n t e r i o r , p u b l i s h e d m t h e N a t a l Mercury, 27 December 19^6. 
(2) Speech t o t h e Nation,18 December"19^6. i b i d . , 21 December 1 
(3) B o t h on t h e t r e a t m e n t o f I n d i a n s and on South West A f r i c a 
p 1 70 
( k ) Assembly Debates, V o l 59, C o l 10922. 
(5) i b i d - , C o l 10911. 
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them p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s . They a r e g i v e n a say m t h e P a r l i a m e n t 
o f t h e C o u n t r y and t h e r e i s no need f o r them t o go e l s e w h e r e " d ) . 
Smuts w o u l d n e i t h e r meet t h e demands o f t h e N a t i o n a l P a r t y , 
made m t h e debate m P a r l i a m e n t , f o r t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n o f I n d i a n s 
m South A f r i c a and t h e r e p e a l o f Chapter I I o f t h e A s i a t i c A c t , 
n o r t h o s e o f South A f r i c a n I n d i a n l e a d e r s f o r t h e r e p e a l o f t h e 
A c t m i t s e n t i r e t y . The Government d i d acknowledge t h a t , 
"one t h i n g t h a t must be done i s t o implement t h e p r o m i s e s t h a t 
have been made t o p r o v i d e t h e I n d i a n s w i t h t h e a m e n i t i e s t o 
w h i c h t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d " (2) b u t t h i s and o t h e r a p p a r e n t l y con-
c i l i a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s ( 3 ) , were p r o b a b l y i n t e n d e d p r i m a r i l y as 
a g e s t u r e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r a t h e r t h a n l o c a l I n d i a n o p i n i o n . 
The same c o u l d be s a i d , t o a degree, a b o u t t h e Government's 
a c t i o n , e a r l y m 1947, m p r e s s i n g ahead w i t h p r o p o s a l s t o e s t a b -
l i s h an I n d i a n N a t i o n a l A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l (4) and t o make p r o -
v i s i o n f o r I n d i a n s m N a t a l t o be g i v e n t h e m u n i c i p a l f r a n c h i s e (5)» 
They may have had t h e a d d i t i o n a l purpose o f e n c o u r a g i n g s p l i t s 
w i t h i n t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n between t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s and m i l i -
t a n t s . I n p r a c t i c e , n e i t h e r element would a c c e p t t h e A d v i s o r y 
C o u n c i l (6) and t h e proposed m u n i c i p a l f r a n c h i s e f o r I n d i a n s 
was d e c i s i v e l y r e j e c t e d by t h e e l e c t o r a t e o f N a t a l m a r e f e r e n -
dum h e l d on 28 F e b r u a r y 1946 (7) t o t h e accompaniment o f an 
(1) i b i d - , C o l 10922. 
(2) op. c i t . N a t a l Mercury, 27 December 1946. 
(3) Smuts,m a speech m P r e t o r i a on 20 December 1946 a d m i t t e d t h a t 
t h e r e were c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f South A f r i c a ' s t r e a t m e n t o f i t s 
b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h he c o u l d n o t d e f e n d (and w h i c h by i m p l i -
c a t i o n s h o u l d be changed) and he s a i d , "There i s t o o much o f 
t h e tendency m South A f r i c a t o l o o k a t a man's s k i n and judge 
him on t h a t N a t a l W i t n e s s , 21 December 1946. 
(4) Announced by Smuts m t h e Assembly on 5 F e b r u a r y 1947- I t i s 
c u r i o u s t h a t Smuts s h o u l d have propo s e d such a c o u n c i l when 
t h e r e was a l r e a d y p r o v i s i o n f o r I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m 
P a r l i a m e n t under A c t 28, 1946. 
(5) T h i s had been mooted by Hofmeyr d u r i n g t h e 2nd Reading o f t h e 
A s i a t i c Land Tenure B i l l . Assembly Debates,27 March 1946,Col 4434. 
(6) The c o n s e r v a t i v e s d i d , however, e s t a b l i s h such a body o f t h e i r 
own. Leader, 31 May 1947. 
(7) The v o t e r s , a l l w h i t e , were asked t o say "yes" o r "no" t o t h e p r o -
posed m u n i c i p a l f r a n c h i s e . I n Durban t h e p r o p o s a l was r e j e c t e d 
by 15066 v o t e s t o 1639 m a 37% p o l l . S i m i l a r m a j o r i t i e s were 
r e c o r d e d e l s e w h e r e , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e p e r c e n t a g e p o l l . N a t a l 
Mercury, 1 March 1947-
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o u t b u r s t o f a n t i - I n d i a n s e n t i m e n t s . The p r o p o s a l was t a k e n 
no f u r t h e r . 
The Government made no a t t e m p t m t h e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e 
UN debates t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t w i t h t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e p a s s i v e 
r e s i s t a n c e campaign. I n i t s v i e w t h e y were a group o f ex-
t r e m i s t s whose i n t e r e s t s l a y o u t s i d e South A f r i c a and who ex-
p l o i t e d t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n ^ o r t h e i r own i d e o l o g i c a l ends. 
I t s u b j e c t e d them t o h a r r a s s m e n t as o p p o r t u n i t i e s a r o s e ( l ) . 
The Government c o n f i n e d i t s d i s c u s s i o n s on p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s a f f e c t i n g t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n t o t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s , 
m d o i n g so e n c o u r a g i n g f r i c t i o n between t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s 
and m i l i t a n t s . There were p r e l i m i n a r y c o n t a c t s , m October 
19^6, a p p a r e n t l y a t t h e Government's i n s t i g a t i o n ( 2 ) , between 
i t s e l f and t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n v e n i n g 
a m e e t i n g between t h e I n d i a n and South A f r i c a n Governments ( 3 ) 
t o d i s c u s s t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n m South A f r i c a . 
N o t h i n g came o f t h e c o n t a c t s b u t t h e y were w i d e l y i n t e r p r e t e d 
amongst South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s as a p l o y by t h e South A f r i c a n 
Government t o secure t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e "South A f r i c a n I n d i a n 
q u e s t i o n " f r o m t h e a m b i t o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , o r a t l e a s t 
t o d e f l e c t c r i t i c i s m t h e r e o f South A f r i c a ' s p o l i c i e s , w i t h o u t 
making any p r i o r c o n c e s s i o n s ( k ) . 
S u s p i c i o n was e q u a l l y w i d e s p r e a d a t t h e news m May 19^ +7 
t h a t Smuts had r e c e i v e d a d e l e g a t i o n o f t h e newly formed 
(1) B o t h Drs Dadoo and N a i c k e r were r e f u s e d p a s s p o r t s f o r 
t r a v e l t o I n d i a m F e b r u a r y 19V7, N a t a l Mercury, 12 F e b r u a r y 
19^7, though t h e Government s u b s e q u e n t l y r e l e n t e d . 
(2) Leader, 12 October 19^6. 
(3) There i s some d i s p u t e as t o whether i t was p r o p o s e d t h a t 
t h e m e e t i n g s h o u l d be i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r between South 
A f r i c a n I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t h e Union Government. 
Leader, 5 October I9^f6. 
( k ) P a s s i v e R e s i s t e r , 7 October 19^+6, N a t a l Mercury, 30 September 
19^6, I n d i a n O p i n i o n , h October 1 9 ^ , Leader, 5 October 19^ 4-6-
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c o n s e r v a t i v e N a t a l I n d i a n O r g a n i z a t i o n O ) , whose members 
opposed t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e campaign. 
Though t h e N.I.O. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e x p r e s s e d o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e 
A s i a t i c A c t and t o t h e proposed I n d i a n A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l t h e 
v e r y e x i s t e n c e o f t h e N . I 0 and i t s p o l i c i e s was h e l p f u l t o 
Smuts who made e x t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e N.I.O and i t s 
v i e w s m a l e t t e r t o Nehru m June 19^7 ( 2 ) , m an endeavour 
t o undermine b o t h t h e s t a n d i n g o f m i l i t a n t I n d i a n l e a d e r s m 
N a t a l and t h e l i n e t a k e n by t h e I n d i a n Government t o w a r d s 
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h South A f r i c a . I n r e t u r n t h e N.I.O r e c e i v e d 
no more t h a n vague u n d e r t a k i n g s t o l o o k i n t o t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s . 
F o l l o w i n g t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n t o s e cure 
a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y f o r i t s r e s o l u t i o n a t t h e 19^7 UNGA, 
Smuts a g a i n h e l d a m e e t i n g w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e N.I.O. 
t h e embryonic T r a n s v a a l I n d i a n O r g a n i z a t i o n ( T . I . O . ) , and 
members o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e Cape I n d i a n Congress ( C . I . C . ) , a t 
w h i c h he i s u n d e r s t o o d t o have agreed m p r i n c i p l e t h a t a 
r o u n d t a b l e c o n f e r e n c e s h o u l d be h e l d between t h e I n d i a n , 
P a k i s t a n and South A f r i c a n Governments, w i t h o u t p r e - c o n d i t i o n s ( 3 ) • 
I n s t e a d o f p u t t i n g h i s v i e w s on r e c o r d m a f o r m a l communication 
t o I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , Smuts and t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s a g r e e d t h a t 
(1) See P127_ • Communists and members o f any o t h e r p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n were p r e v e n t e d by i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n f r o m 
j o i n i n g . (A f o r m e r I n d i a n A g e n t - G e n e r a l m South A f r i c a , 
S i r Raza A l l s a i d t h e N.I.O. "seemed t o be t h e r e s u l t 
o f an u n h o l y a l l i a n c e between b i g I n d i a n money and a 
r e s o u r c e f u l Prime M i n i s t e r who knew how t o e x t r i c a t e 
h i m s e l f m a t i g h t c o r n e r " . Leader, 31 May 19^ +7-' 
(2) 18 June 19^7- i b i d . , 23 August 19^7- The N . I . O . , f o r 
example, f a v o u r e d t h e immediate u n c o n d i t i o n a l r e t u r n o f 
t h e I n d i a n H i g h Commissioner t o South A f r i c a , p r e c i s e l y 
what Smuts ad v o c a t e d . 
(3) Smuts' e x a c t p o s i t i o n i s n o t known, t h e o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n 
came fr o m t h e d e l e g a t i o n i t s e l f . Leader, 7 F e b r u a r y 1 9 ^ 
and 20 March 1 9 ^ . 
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the l a t t e r would send a delegation to the sub-continent, to 
urge the governments of I n d i a and Pakistan to welcome the 
(Smuts') assurances and to take such steps as are p o s s i b l e 
f o r the h o l d i n g o f a round t a b l e conference ..." d ) . I n 
the view o f the PRC leaders Smuts was simply preparing h i s 
ground f o r the next General Assembly a t which he wished t o 
be able t o put the onus on the I n d i a n and Pakistan Govern-
ments f o r the f a i l u r e t o hold inter-governmental t a l k s ( 2 ) . 
But the general e l e c t i o n intervened before the d e l e g a t i o n 
could set out, l e a v i n g i t w i t h o u t a mandate ( 3 ) . 
Amongst the White p o p u l a t i o n there was a general lack 
of sympathy f o r the Indians m South A f r i c a (4) and t h i s 
was manifest i n the p e r i o d immediately before and during 
the 19^-6-8 campaign by, f o r example, the views expressed m 
Parliament during the discussions o f the A s i a t i c Act ( 5 ) 5 
the attacks on the passive r e s i s t e r s a t Gale S t r e e t ( 6 ) , the 
r e s u l t o f the N a t a l referendum on the proposed I n d i a n 
d ) Statement by P. R. Pather, N.I.O o f f i c i a l t o the Leader, 
i b i d . , 10 A p r i l 1948. 
(2) J. N. Singh, Secretary Transvaal PRC, Leader,20 March 
1948. The Leader which a t the time was committed to 
n e i t h e r the conservative nor m i l i t a n t cause was equally 
suspicious of Smuts' motives and c r i t i c a l o f the con-
se r v a t i v e s ' r o l e . I t d i d not escape n o t i c e t h a t m a 
message t o an N.I.O. conference m March 1948 Smuts t o l d 
the delegates t h a t he hoped "as South A f r i c a n s we can 
s e t t l e our own d i f f i c u l t i e s m a s p i r i t o f mutual 
discussion". i b i d . , 20 March 1948. 
(3) The N a t i o n a l Party government was prepared to h o l d t a l k s 
w i t h I n d i a and Pakistan but only to f u r t h e r the objec-
t i v e s o f the 1927/1932 agreements (which i t saw p r i m a r i l y 
as the r e p a t r i a t i o n o f the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n from South 
A f r i c a t o the sub-continent). L e t t e r (n.d.) from Dr Malan 
to N.I.O., Leader, 31 J u l y 1948. 
(4) A study of r a c i a l t o l e r a n c e / i n t o l e r a n c e thresholds of the 
p e r i o d 1934-1944 showed t h a t white South A f r i c a n s , English 
and Afrikaans speaking, reserved t h e i r highest i n t o l e r a n c e 
r a t i n g s f o r the Indians of a l l South A f r i c a n r a c i a l groups. 
E. Hellmann, Handbook of Race Relations m South A f r i c a , 
p 694. 
(5) pt> 1 2 2 - 12 3 
(6) p 1 6 5 
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municipal f r a n c h i s e ( l ) , the boycott o f I n d i a n t r a d e r s (2 ) 
and m the correspondence and e d i t o r i a l columns o f the 
Afrikaans and E n g l i s h language press. 
The e f f o r t s of South A f r i c a n Indians to draw a t t e n t i o n , 
a t home and abroad t o t h e i r p l i g h t , provoked discussion of 
the "In d i a n question" but only r a r e l y was there any sugges-
t i o n of a w i l l i n g n e s s to re-examine e x i s t i n g p r e j u d i c e s and 
even where there was i t was not always evident t h a t i t con-
s t i t u t e d more than a vague statement of i n t e n t i o n m response 
to an immediate c r i s i s . I n December \9k6 the Cape Times 
commented e d i t o r i a l l y , "South A f r i c a has reaped what genera-
t i o n s of r e a c t i o n and l l l i b e r a l i s m have sown ... The d e c i -
sion of the UNO i s a challenge t o complacency. There must 
be a new deal f o r the non-European . There must be evolved 
a cl e a r sighted, dynamic p o l i c y designed t o f i t the non-
European i n t o the p a t t e r n o f our n a t u r a l l i f e " ( 3 ) . And 
The Friend remarked, a t the same time, "The country from the 
government downwards must-re-examine i t s conscience ... 
whatever South A f r i c a can do i t must do t o s a t i s f y the 
opinion of a t l e a s t those nations whose standards are no 
worse than ours" (k). 
Much more commonly, the campaign and i t s leaders provoked 
an i n t r a n s i g e n t response, expressed m extreme but not un-
t y p i c a l language by a correspondent m the Na t a l Mercury (5) 
who wrote, "The simple, honest, I n d i a n c i t i z e n ... i s being 
l e d to d i s a s t e r by the un-Indian, un-South A f r i c a n communists, 
serving the cause of r e v o l u t i o n a r y chaos, as w e l l as by the 
I n d i a n p r o f i t e e r who has to hide h i s i l l - g o t t e n gams m ever 
i n c r e a s i n g land purchase. UNO has degenerated i n t o a 
( 1 ) pp 17 3 - 1 7 4 
(2) pp 17 8 - 1 7 9 
(3) Reprinted m the Forum, 21 December 19^6. 
(k) Friend, 10 December I9^f6. 
(5) 18 December 19^6. 
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shop window to s e l l Russian communism to the g u l l i b l e of t h i s 
world" The p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t o dismiss the campaign, and to 
argue t h a t the m a j o r i t y of South A f r i c a n Indians were content 
w i t h t h e i r l o t enjoying much b e t t e r c o n d i t i o n s than m s t r i f e 
t o r n I n d i a d ) could not disguise an u n d e r l y i n g anxiety as to 
i t s wider i m p l i c a t i o n s both w i t h i n South A f r i c a , m encouraging 
A f r i c a n s t o r e v o l t , and abroad (2) I t ; was a fear which the 
N a t i o n a l and Labour P a r t i e s e x p l o i t e d m thenr e l e c t o r a l 
i n t e r e s t s , t h e i r " s o l u t i o n " was the r e p a t r i a t i o n of the 
I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n (3) 
Tne most widespread concerted a c t i o n taken against Indians 
m South A f r i c a which could be a t t r i b u t e d t o the campaign was 
the boycott o f I n d i a n stores m the Transvaal which began m 
January 19^7, l a s t i n g f o r about 6 months. According t o Forum (k) 
the boycott was conceived by a group o f farmers, who were United 
Party supporters, as a gesture of r e t a l i a t i o n f o r the expected 
loss of g r a i n r e s u l t i n g from the I n d i a n trade embargo which 
produced a temporary severe shortage o f g r a m bags ( the 
j u t e from which they were made came l a r g e l y from the sub continents 
The boycott movement gamed widespread support and ^00 delegates 
attended an " I n d i a n Boycott Congress" m March, s e t t i n g up the 
South A f r i c a n P r o t e c t i o n Movement. Not only d i d i t advocate 
a t o t a l boycott of I n d i a n scores but appears to have favoured 
a ban on the issue o f f u r t h e r t r a d i n g l i c e n c e s t o Indians and 
(1) Natal Mercury, 29 June 19^6. 
(2) A correspondent w r i t i n g m the N a t a l Mercury, 3 December 
19^6, on the proceedings a t the UN commented, "(-chis i s ) 
uhe f i r s t brush m the campaign of Black and Coloured 
against White. IT: threatens a tremendous clash between 
i d e o l o g i e s , between White standards of l i v i n g and govern-
ment and m i l l i o n s of i g n o r a n t and se'ni-barbaric peoples, 
mostly pagan ... " 
(3) Dr Malan t o l d the House of Assembly, 21 January 19^7, "The 
s o l u t i o n o f the I n d i a n problem i s t o t r a n s f e r the I n d i a n 
community m South A f r i c a to I n d i a or elsewhere. Such 
t r a n s f e r s of p o p u l a t i o n are n o t h i n g out o f the o r d i n a r y " 
N a t a l Mercury, 22 February 19^7-
C+) 22 March 19^7-
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the r e p a t r x a t i o n of the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n d ) The boycott 
was pursued w i t h considerable v i g o u r , p a r t i c u l a r l y m the 
Western Transvaal where anyone - black or white - who sought 
to patronise I n d i a n stores faced i n t i m i d a t i o n and a s s a u l t ( 2 ) . 
The t r a d e r s , i s o l a t e d and v u l n e r a b l e , received support n e i t h e r 
from the p o l i c e nor the government, which was slow to condemn 
the boycott (3) 
Support f o r the Indians m t h e i r campaign to secure 
change m the Government's p o l i c i e s <as not, however, e n t i r e l y 
absent m South A f r i c a . Amongst the white p o p u l a t i o n there 
"/as a small m i n o r i t y comprising l i b e r a l s and communists, who to 
a v a r y i n g degree, e i t h e r as i n d i v i d u a l s or as members of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , sympathized w i t h the demands of the PRC leaders, 
but the number o f whites prepared openly to i d e n t i f y w i t h the 
p i s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e campaign was mimscule. Nevertheless t h e i r 
presence was important (k). 
The programme of passive r e s i s t a n c e a t t r a c t e d only a 
handful o f A f r i c a n p a r t i c i p a n t s . Iz was never intended t h a t 
i t should be otherwise but the r e a l importance o f the campaign, 
m terms o f the A f r i c a n response, was t h a t L t helped t o 
create a climate favourable t o co-operation between A f r i c a n 
and I n d i a n leaders. 'Tnroughout the campaign ANC leaders 
attended and addressed p u b l i c meetings c a l l e d by the p r o v i n c i a l 
PEC1s and I n d i a n congresses and expressed t h e i r support f o r 
the campaign and the PRC leaders ( 5 ) - I t was during tne cam-
paign, f)jx 9 March 19V7, t h a t the "Three Doctors' Pact" was 
(1) Passive Resister, 28 March 19^7, Forum, 22 March 19^7• 
(2) Leader, 5 A p r i l 19^7, I n k u l u l e k o , 1s t E d i t i o n A p r i l 19^7-
(3) Smuts d i d n o t speak out c l e a r l y against the b o y c o t t u n t i l 
s h o r t l y before the UWGA reconvened m September 19^7-
Passive Resister, k September 19^7-
(k) This was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f Michael Scott who played a 
prominent p a r t m the campaign a t l e a s t m i t s i n i t i a l 
stages. 
(5) I n r e t u r n ^ the PRC leaders, f o r example, voiced t h e i r support 
f o r the A f r i c a n mmeworkers s t r i k e m 1 9 ^ , Dr Dadoo was 
charged w i t h i n c i tement as a r e s u l t o f l i s campaigning. 
Leader, 7 September 1 9 ^ • 
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signed between Dadoo, Naicker and Xuma s e t t i n g out a programme 
of co-operation ( l ) designed to co-ordinate t h e i r e f f o r t s to 
secure an end t o r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n m South A f r i c a . And 
m March 19^ +8 PRC and ANC leaders co-operated to form the 
"Votes f o r A l l Movement" which culminated m the meeting of a 
m u l t i - r a c i a l "Peoples' Assembly" and the d e c l a r a t i o n o f a 
Peoples' Charter (2) A f r i c a n and I n d i a n suspicions of one 
another s t i l l remained, as was manifest m the v i o l e n t con-
f r o n t a t i o n between them m Durban m 19^ +9 (3) but the seeds 
of co-operation between t h e i r leaders, sown m 19^7, had 
already begun to bear f r u i t . 
(1) The t e x t was published m I n k u l u l e k o , 2nd. e d i t i o n 19^7-
(2) Passive Resister, 19 March &25 May 19^8. "The Votes f o r A l l 
Movement" developed f romtlfeaibryoni c "Votes f o r I n d i a n 
People" campaign. 
(3 ) Tnere i s a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the r i o t and the sub-
sequent e f f o r t s o f A f r i c a n and I n d i a n leaders t o e s t a b l i s h 
a measure of co-operation between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
communities by Mary B enson, South A f r i c a The Struggle 
f o r a B i r t h r i g h t , pp 123-126. 
CHAPTER VT AN ASSESSMENT 
At the end of the passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign m 
June 1948, Michael Scott wrote, "There can be no doubt t h a t 
the s p i r i t shown by the passive r e s i s t e r s and t h e i r t e n a c i t y 
of purpose during the two years m which some 2,000 or more 
have been sent t o p r i s o n has had a profound e f f e c t on world 
op i n i o n though South A f r i c a n o p i n i o n i s s t i l l nardened against 
any compromise whatever" ( 1 ) . 
Neither the leaders of the PRC nor the Government were 
i n t e r e s t e d m compromise, except on t h e i r own narrowly defined 
terms c o n s t i t u t i n g a " s e l l - o u t ! ' m the o p i n i o n of the other. 
More sharply and immediately than m 1906-14, the 1946-8 cam-
paign s i g n a l l e d a c o n f r o n t a t i o n about fundamentals m which 
there was no serious i n c l i n a t i o n t o compromise m a meaningful 
sense of the word and v i r t u a l l y no room m which to do so. 
The campaign ended m stalemate w i t h n e i t h e r side the "winner" 
or " l o s e r " of what was a p r e l i m i n a r y round. 
The campaign d i d not achieve the repeal of the A s i a t i c 
Land Tenure and I n d i a n Representation Act though i t impeded 
i t s implementation, nor d i d i t r e s u l t m the a l l e v i a t i o n of 
the numerous other d i s a b i l i t i e s s u f f e r e d by the I n d i a n popula 
t i o n . I n the aftermath of the 1946 UN debate, M i n i s t e r s had 
r e f e r r e d t o the need to provide Indians w i t h "the amenities 
to which they were e n t i t l e d " (2) and subsequently the N.I.C. 
held discussions w i t h Durban C i t y Council (3) and the 
Ad m i n i s t r a t o r of Nat a l (4) about ways of improving I n d i a n 
housing and education f a c i l i t i e s , but these were i s o l a t e d 
developments, apt to founder, and they have t o be o f f s e t 
(1) Passive Resister, 16 J u l y 1948. 
(2) P 1 7 3 
(3) Leader, 20 December 1947-
(4) i b i d . , 7 February 1948. 
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against an u n r e m i t t i n g upward t r e n d of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and 
harrassment to which the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the A s i a t i c Act 
c o n t r i b u t e d . Indians were prosecuted under the Act from 
mid-19^7 m the Transvaal d ) I n N a t a l the Government 
stayed i t s hand, p r e f e r r i n g no charges under the Act. The 
PRC claimed t h i s as a v i c t o r y f o r the passive r e s i s t a n c e 
campaign ( 2 ) , however, the Government's dec i s i o n deprived 
r e s i s t e r s of t h e i r intended t a r g e t , w i t h o u t givxng them any 
grounds to b e l i e v e t h a t the ±and tenure r e s t r i c t i o n s m the 
Act would be dropped as a r e s u l t of t h e i r campaign. The 
Government was c r i t i c i z e d by the e l e c t o r a t e f o r i t s acquies-
cent approach, but b e l i e v e d i t could bide i t s time w a i t i n g f o r 
the collapse of the campaign and decline m i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t . 
South A f r i c a 's treatment a t the United Nations d i s -
tressed and angered Smuts but he was n e i t h e r disposed nor able 
as a r e s u l t of the proceedings to make s i g n i f i c a n t concessions 
to South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s , l e a s t of a l l around a t a b l e w i t h 
Nehru. Though Smuts and Nehru took p r e l i m i n a r y soundings 
of one another there i s no reason to suppose t h a t Smuts had 
any i n t e n t i o n o f h o l d i n g substantive t a l k s w i t h the I n d i a n 
Government and he p i t c h e d h i s terms ac c o r d i n g l y . The PRC 
argued t h a t as a r e s u l t of i t s endeavours (and not those of 
the conservatives) the Union government showed a change o f 
heart f o l l o w i n g the 19^7 UNGA, f o r the f i r s t time s i g n i f y i n g 
i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o h o l d inter-governmental t a i k s ( 3 ) , but 
subsequent events (k) suggest t h a t the "change" was more 
apparent than r e a l . 
White o p i n i o n , as Scott suggests, remained stubbornly 
opposed to what i t perceived I n d i a n s o c i a l , economic and 
(1) i b i d . , 19 J u l y 19V7-
(2) Passive Resister, 8 January 1 9 ^ . 
(3) Leader, 18 December 19^7> Passive Resister, 18 December 
19^7-
(k) pp 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 
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p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s t o be. Neither the programme of non-
v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e nor the upsurge m c r i t i c i s m s of South 
A f r i c a ' s r a c i a l p o l i c i e s abroad had the e f f e c t of persuading 
the white p o p u l a t i o n a t large to re-assess, m a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
way, i t s a t t i t u d e s toward the I n d i a n s . Instead, the m a j o r i t y 
confined t h e i r response to the campaign to denegratmg i t and 
i t s leaders, sometimes r e s o r t i n g t o extreme language and ac-
t i o n s , suggesting an u n d e r l y i n g a n x i e t y and lack o f confidence. 
Party p o l i t i c s played an important p a r t m t h i s response, N a t i o n a l 
Party p o l i t i c i a n s being p a r t i c u l a r l y a c t i v e m fanning emotions 
about the campaign, as a means of encouraging e l e c t o r a l 
support d ) W h i l s t the m a j o r i t y remained i n t r a n s i g e n t , t h e i r 
i n t o l e r a n c e o f Indians probably i n t e n s i f i e d by the campaign, 
there was a small m i n o r i t y of whites, who may broadly be 
described as " l i b e r a l s " , f o r whom i t was a pressing reminder 
t h a t South A f r i c a ' s r a c i a l p o l i c i e s were becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y 
outmoded and unworkable ( 2 ) , but t h i s group lacked cohesion 
and, some might argue, commitment. The few whites who d i d 
p a r t i c i p a t e m the campaign were subject t o scorn and r i d i c u l e 
from f e l l o w whites. 
The Leader commented s h o r t l y before the campaign began, 
"We have to consider our resources and our own powers. I t i s 
no use g e t t i n g s t a r t e d w i t h o u t a n t i c i p a t i n g some degree of 
success. No one f i g h t s to lose ... " (3 ) The preceding 
paragraphs suggest t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s d i d lose and t h a t 
the PRC should have heeded more c l o s e l y what the Leader had 
to say, but the campaign was by no means the f a i l u r e i t f i r s t 
appears to be and i t may be argued t h a t i t v i n d i c a t e d the 
p o l i c y of the m i l i t a n t s m "throwing c a u t i o n t o the wind" and 
r e j e c t i n g the approach, t y p i f i e d by the Leader e d i t o r i a l , 
( 1 ) Dr Dadoo doubted t h a t the campaign a f f e c t e d v o t i n g m the 
general e l e c t i o n but the " I n d i a n question" f e a t u r e d f a i r l y 
prominently and i t i s conceivable t h a t the p o l i c y of 
r e p a t r i a t i o n advocated by the N a t i o n a l Party c o n t r i b u t e d 
to i t s v i c t o r y . I n t e r v i e w , P P M „ v i q ^ q 
(2) Forum, 6 J u l y ^^hG. 1 1 9 9 ' 
(3) E d i t o r i a l , 8 June 19^-6. 
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which had dominated South A f r i c a n I n d i a n p o l i t i c s f o r 
decades. 
Scott's claim t h a t the programme of passive r e s i s t a n c e 
had "a profound e f f e c t " on world o p i n i o n may be an exaggeration 
but as a r e s u l t of the e f f o r t s o f South A f r i c a n I n d i a n leaders, 
the predicament of the country's non-whites a t t r a c t e d world-wide 
a t t e n t i o n and sympathy, as never before, p u t t i n g the South 
A f r i c a n Government on the defensive and s e t t i n g m t r a m i t s 
progressive i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n . W h i l s t t h i s brought 
no m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s to blacks m South A f r i c a , q u i t e the 
cont r a r y , the knowledge t h a t the country's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s had 
become the subject of widespread c r i t i c i s m abroad, which was l i k e -
l y to continue and to grow m s t r e n g t h , o f f e r e d a boost t o t h e i r 
morale ( l ) and an added i n c e n t i v e f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
The achievement of the campaign as a c a t a l y s t t o p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y and co-operation was summed up by Joshi m March 1948 
when he commented "They ( A f r i c a n s ) have begun to r e a l i z e t h a t 
i f a handful of Indians could challenge a powerful government 
supported by European c o l o n i a l powers, they, numbering 40 times 
as l a r g e , could, i f w e l l organized, not only shake the very 
s t r u c t u r e of ( s i c ) colour bar but pave the way to e q u a l i t y 
and emancipation. The (campaign) has ... i n s p i r e d under-
standing and g o o d w i l l among the non-European peoples and a 
common u n i t e d f r o n t has been forged by common i n d i g n i t i e s and 
s u f f e r i n g s " ( 2 ) . Joshi's language may be i n f l a t e d but m 
essence what he says i s supportable. The PRC's leaders recog-
n i z e d i t was of prime importance t o the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n , i f 
they were t o secure an improvement m t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s and a 
l a s t i n g f u t u r e m South A f r i c a , to work m concert p a r t i c u l a r l y 
w i t h A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , as w e l l as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of coloured and white r a d i c a l o p i n i o n . The campaign o f f e r e d 
d ) The r e s u l t of the 1946 UNGA may have generated f a l s e optimism 
though the lack of m a t e r i a l progress m the f o l l o w i n g year 
should have provided a c o r r e c t i v e . 
(2) Passive Resister, 23 A p r i l 1948. 
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an o p p o r t u n i t y t o demonstrate to the ANC and others the 
seriousness of purpose of South A f r i c a n Indians and t h e i r 
p o t e n t i a l value as a l l i e s . I t served t o emphasize the 
common goals which A f r i c a n s and Indians shared and provided a 
framework and focus f o r i n i t i a l co-operation, which was to 
be of l a s t i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e . For i t may be argued t h a t the 
campaign marked the beginning o f the a l l i a n c e of the A f r i c a n and 
I n d i a n Congresses and Coloured and white r a d i c a l s ( l ) which 
was subsequently to play a c e n t r a l r o l e m m o b i l i z i n g o p p o s i t i o n 
a t home and abroad t o the Government's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . PRC 
leaders, m preparing the ground f o r such co-operation, were 
c a r e f u l throughout the campaign to cast i t m the broadest 
possible context as a p a r t o f a world-wide s t r u g g l e f o r 
democratic r i g h t s and not simply as an i s o l a t e d movement to 
p r o t e s t against the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s u f f e r e d by South A f r i c a n 
I n d i a n s . F i n a l l y , the campaign o f f e r e d a p r a c t i c a l example 
to the ANC of t a c t i c s i t might i t s e l f adopt m the f u t u r e . 
To be saccessful m winning the agreement of the ANC 
to co-operate m opposing r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and to secure 
s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l backing, as they wished, the PRC leaders 
needed t o be able to demonstrate t h a t they represented a s i g n i -
f i c a n t body of South A f r i c a n I n d i a n o p i n i o n which they could 
m o b i l i z e m an effectLve manner and which was prepared t o 
demonstrate the seriousness o f i t s commitment to oppose the 
Government's r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . Seen m t h i s context the cam-
paign represented a tremendous gamble f o r Drs Dadoo and Naicker 
and t h e i r immediate colleagues who were s t i l l m the process 
during the campaign of securing c o n t r o l o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
p r o v i n c i a l congresses and the S.A.I.C. At the ou t s e t , they 
faced two p r i n c i p a l and r e l a t e d challenges m b u i l d i n g up 
d ) This i s not to suggest t h a t p r e v i o u s l y there had been 
no co-operation. C l e a r l y there had, but not on the same 
scale nor w i t h a comparable l a s t i n g impact. 
popular support f o r the campaign, the lack o f resources, 
human and f i n a n c i a l , immediately a t bheir d i s p o s a l and the 
presence of a Government, l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and employers, a l l 
representiag white i n t e r e s t s , implacably opposed t o the cam-
paign and capable of i n t i m i d a t i n g would-be supporters and 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . W h i l s t the Government d i d not d e t a i n PRC 
leaders en masse, as subsequently became the p r a c t i c e , nor, 
m general, d i d i t prevent t h e i r freedom of movement or of 
a c t i o n , they worked under tne t h r e a t of such p o s s i b i l i t i e s and 
were l i a b l e to harrassment a t any time d ) . I n the face of 
these problems the leaders were quick to show t h e i r organiza-
t i o n a l a b i l i t y and t o prove the p o p u l a r i t y o f the campaign, 
m the process e s t a b l i s h i n g themselves as the e f f e c t i v e leader 
of the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n . I n co n t r a s t to the conservatives, 
the ne*j coagress leaders a c t i v e l y sought and succeeded m ob-
t a i n i n g the backing of Indians from a l l walks of l i f e , m 
p a r t i c u l a r drawing support from urban workers whon the con-
se r v a t i v e s had l a r g e l y ignored. Many were p r e v i o u s l y l a c k i n g 
m any p o l i t i c a l experience. I n the space of two years not 
only had between one and two per cent of the a d u l t I n d i a n popu 
l a t L o n taken p a r t m the programme of no n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e 
and had been imprisoned f o r doing so, some as a consequence 
l o s i n g t h e i r jobs, but many more Indians had shown support f o r 
the campaign by r a i s i n g funds and gene r a l l y h e l p i n g w i t h i t s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as w e l l as by a t t e n d i n g p u b l i c meetings c a l l e d 
by the PRC's or Congresses. As a mark of the growth m 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , m N a t a l new Congress branches were esta-
b l i s h e d and membership rose from a few hundred to about 35)000 
Even f o r those whose experience of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y proved 
to be short l i v e d , the impact of the campaign was u n l i k e l y to 
be e n t i r e l y erased. 
( l ) For example, PRC/Congress o f f i c e s and the hones of PRC 
o f f i c i a l s , were subject t o p o l i c e r a i d s d uring the 
campaign. 
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But could the PEC leaders have achieved more than they 
d i d m the circumstances 9 They were not s e r i o u s l y c r i t i c i z e d 
f o r f a i l i n g t o secure the repeal o f the A s i a t i c Act or an 
immediate improvement of the general treatment o f the I n d i a n 
p o p u l a t i o n , nor was any major o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d , so f a r as i s 
known, by a s i g n i f i c a n t body of I n d i a n o p i n i o n t o closer 
p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h A f r i c a n s (1) such as the PEC advocated. 
They were however c r i t i c i z e d by the Leader newspaper f o r 
"unduly fanning the embers" (2 ) o f discord between themselves 
and the conservatives t o the detriment of the I n d i a n popula-
t i o n ' s common goals, f o r unnecessarily p r o l o n g i n g the cam-
paign, f o l l o w i n g the 19M5 UNGA session ( 3 ) , and ge n e r a l l y 
f o r d i s p l a y i n g a lack of realism (k). The f i r s t o f these 
c r i t i c i s m s was p o t e n t i a l l y the most important m terms of 
l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the campaign. C e r t a i n l y the PEC 
leadership indulged m a good deal of extreme language towards 
the conservatives and entered i n t o c o s t l y and time consuming 
l i t i g a t i o n w i t h them, sometimes seemingly p r i m a r i l y t o s e t t l e 
personal scores, but there were fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s o f 
approach oetween them on p o l i c y issues. I f they had co-operated, 
and i t may be argued t h a t both sides were equally responsible 
f o r t h e i r general f a i l u r e to do so, i t would probably have made 
r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e to the l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n m 
the campaign. The conservatives lacked popular support and 
i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r membership of PRC's would have 
r e s u l t e d m many of t h e i r supporters, mostly t r a d e r s , volun-
t e e r i n g t o r e s i s t ( 5 ) . I f i t had been p o s s i b l e , which seems 
h i g h l y u n l i k e l y , f o r there t o have been a meaningful a l l i a n c e 
(1) This d i d not apply m the reverse d i r e c t i o n , o p p o s i t i o n 
coming mostly from young ANC m i l i t a n t s . 
(2) Leader, 12 October 19^ +6 
(3) i b i d , 1 Feoruary 19^ +7-
(k) i b i d . , 15 March 19V7, 21 June 19^7-
(5) The conservatives placed much emphasis m t h e i r p u b l i c 
statements on the communist a f f i l i a t i o n s o f PRC leaders 
but i t seems u n l i k e l y t h i s deterred many people from m 
some way a s s o c i a t i n g themselves w i t h the campaign. I t 
c e r t a i n l y d i d not deter M a n i l a l Gandhi, a staunch a n t i -
conmunist and h i s example( p1^2 f t n t 2) may have encour aged 
others. 
1 8 8 
between conservative and m i l i t a n t leaders, the p r i n c i p a l 
advantage might have been to l i m i t the Government's opportu-
n i t i e s t o p o r t r a y the campaign and i t s leaders as being un-
representative, or to p l a y - o f f one element against the other, 
but the Government would s t i l l have found ways to t r y t o 
undermine the campaign. 
I n c r i t i c i z i n g the PEC f o r d i s p l a y i n g a lack of r e a l i s m , 
the Leader was r e f e r r i n g to the perxod a f t e r the 1946 UNGA 
when p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the campaign had sharply d e c l i n e d . 
I n the Leader's view the members of the N a t a l PRC concerned 
themselves unduly w i t h c e r t a i n domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a f f a i r s , which were not p r i o r i t i e s f o r the Indian p o p u l a t i o n , 
w h i l s t f a i l i n g t o take " p o s i t i v e " a c t i o n by l o b b y i n g the 
government and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s on more pressing day to day 
problems (1). P a r t i c u l a r l y during 1947 the focus of the 
campaign d i d become r a t h e r b l u r r e d and there were times 
when very l i t t l e appears to have happened except f o r the 
issuing)f hotly-worded press statements and the passing of 
wide-ranging r e s o l u t i o n s m support of diverse causes un-
connected w i t h the campaign, except m a very general sense. 
I n 1948 some of the leaders o f the campaign were h e a v i l y en-
gaged f o r a p e r i o d m the "Votes f o r A l l " movement. I t i s 
p ossible t h a t i f the PRC leaders had devoted themselves more 
smgle-mmdedly to the development of passive r e s i s t a n c e m 
1947/8 a higher l e v e l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n would have been 
achieved, but i t i s u n l i k e l y t o have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher, 
l a r g e l y because of e x t e r n a l considerations, m p a r t i c u l a r the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a l k s on the f u t u r e treatment of Indians bet-
ween the South A f r i c a n and Indianqovernments. The 
leadership might, however, have been more assiduous atfchat 
(1) PRC leaders d i d on occasions take up day t o day problems 
w i t h l o c a l and p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s (P ^ 8 l ) 5 but i t was 
p r e c i s e l y because such approaches, on t h e i r own, had consis-
t e n t l y f a i l e d t o b r i n g about an improvement m the conditions 
under which In d i a n s l i v e d t h a t more m i l i t a n t means had been 
adopted. 
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time m co n s o l i d a t i n g the Congress o r g a n i z a t i o n m 
an e f f o r t to ensure t h a t they had a reasonably strong network 
at t h e i r disposal f o r f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
I n the l a s t / el§ioirt;?Ls of the campaign, f o l l o w i n g the 19^6 
session of the UNGA,only approximately 500 acts of res i s t a n c e 
occurred, compared w i t h 1500 m i t s f i r s t 6 months. There 
were no very compelling reasons t o prolong the campaign ( 1 ) , 
e s s e n t i a l l y i t became a h o l d i n g operation which could be 
expanded f a i r l y r a p i d l y i f t here were pressing reasons t o do 
so, such as the resumption of the debate a t the 19^7 session 
of the UNGA on the treatment of South A f r i c a n I n d i a n s . And 
w h i l s t the campaign continued, even a t a very low ebb, i t 
provided a focus f o r a c t i v i t y and i t symbolised the co n t i n u i n g 
determination of the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n not to accept m a 
supine fashion the p r o v i s i o n s of the A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act. 
The c o n t i n u a t i o n of the campaign seems p r i n c i p a l l y t o have 
been opposed oy the conservatives, but the problem which they 
were unable s a t i s f a c t o r i l y t o answer was what to put m i t s 
place t o maintain a focus f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The PRC 
leaders were faced w i t h a d i f f i c u l t t a c t i c a l problem m 
deciding when and how t o conclude the campaign, t o which the 
general e l e c t i o n provided an unexpected answer. 
The t a c t i c a l means a t the disposal of the leaders of the 
campaign appear very l i m i t e d as compared w i t h those a v a i l a b l e 
to the Government. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l means were v i r t u a l l y absent 
and the r e s o r t of e a r l i e r generations of congress leaders t o 
p e t i t i o n s and i n t e r v i e w s had proved l a r g e l y f r u i t l e s s . Nor 
d i d the PRC leadership have the means (or i n c l i n a t i o n ) t o 
press t h e i r claims by f o r c e of arms, any form of v i o l e n t 
a c t i v i t y t h a t they could have mounted would have played i n t o 
the Government's hands and would have been e n t i r e l y counter-
p r o d u c t i v e . I n conventional terms the I n d i a n m i n o r i t y was 
( l ) Y. Dadoo i n t e r v i e w , 22 May 196 9-
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at a severe disadvantage m t r y i n g t o nount any s o r t of 
meaningful o p p o s i t i o n t o the Government. But, as the events 
of 19^6-8 revealed, they i«rere not as he l p l e s s as at f i r s t 
appeared and the Government might have imagined. The combina-
t i o n of the programme of non-violent r e s i s t a n c e and appeals 
to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community ( r a t h e r than to the Government) 
proved a potent f o r c e m the hands of the PRC lead e r s h i p , f o r 
w h i l s t i t d i d not r e s u l t m any improvement m the m a t e r i a l 
l o t of black South A f r i c a n s i t provided the basis f o r a new 
and c r u c i a l phase of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by blacks m South 
A f r i c a against the Government 
and i t set m motion p a r a l l e l 
a c t i v i t y abroad t o b r i n g pressure t o bear on the South A f r i c a n 
Government t o mend i t s ways. The campaign and the means i t 
employed proved w e l l matched t o the times and t h i s was c r u c i a l 
to i t s impact. 
The question remains as t o what was achieved s p e c i f i c a l l y 
by the use o f the t a c t i c o f non-violent r e s i s t a n c e against the 
law. F i r s t and foremost i t provided a means of i n v o l v i n g , 
f o r the f i r s t time, a broad-spectrum of the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n 
m sustained combined p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , e i t h e r by d i r e c t l y 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g m acts of non-violent r e s i s t a n c e or by t a k i n g 
p a r t m the campaign m some other way. Once int r o d u c e d t o 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y through tne campaign i t *vas the PRC's hope 
t h a t they would p a r t i c i p a t e m the I n d i a n congresses on a 
permanent b a s i s , strengthening those o r g a n i z a t i o n s m prepara-
t i o n f o r f u t u r e campaigns. No other t a c t i c a v a i l a b l e t o the 
Indians could have provided them w i t h such a p o s i t i v e means 
of demonstrating t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and t h e i r commitment 
to change and i t had the v i r t u e of not being s o l e l y depend-
ent f o r e f f e c t on l a r g e numbers, however b e n e f i c i a l they were 
f o r p u b l i c i t y . The campaign served as a reminder t o the 
In d i a n p o p u l a t i o n and t o A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l leaders of the 
considerable p o t e n t i a l t h a t non-violent r e s i s t a n c e h e l d as a 
means of developing p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
1 91 
The element o f s a c r i f i c e i n v o l v e d m an act of r e s i s t a n c e , 
as contrasted, f o r example, w i t h s i g n i n g a p e t i t i o n was of 
considerable s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the campaign f o r , apart from i t s 
impact on the morale of the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n , i t a t t r a c t e d 
a t t e n t i o n from A f r i c a n and other non-Indian p o l i t i c a l leaders 
m South A f r i c a and from abroad. 
Ashwin Choudree, a N a t a l Congress leader, claimed m 
July 1946 t h a t the programme of passive r e s i s t a n c e " i s already 
awakening bhe conscience of Europeans" (1) but w i t h r a r e 
exceptions i t s i n g u l a r l y f a i l e d t o do t h i s and bhe campaign 
may indeed have c o n t r i b u t e d t o a f u r t h e r hardening of t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e s toward the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n . I f the Indians 
could not immediately win the hearts of Europeans nor could 
they m o b i l i z e themselves m s u f f i c i e n t numbers to pressure 
the Government and white opinion g e n e r a l l y t o b r i n g about an 
improvement m t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s . But f o r the most p a r t the 
leaders of the PRC never expected t h a t they would secure 
fundamental change overnight, t h e i r best expectations f o r 
the campaign were t h a t i t would l a y the foundations. 
(1) Leader, 13 J u l y 1946. 
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ANNEX A LAND TENURE 
LEGISLATION DISCRIMINATING AGAINST ASIANS 1885 - 19^5 
TRANSVAAL 
Between 1885 and 19^0 Asians m the Transvaal progressively 
l o s t the freedom (de 3ure and de facto) to own land and to l i v e 
and trade where they wished, though the impact of the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s had t i l l then been somewhat blunted by the con-
donation of existing Asian fixed property holdings whether or 
not acquired s t r i c t l y within the l e t t e r of the law. 
The South African Republic, by Law 3 of 1885, forbade "persons 
belonging to any of the native races of Asia" from owning fixe d 
property m the lepublic except m specially set aside areas 
("bazaars or locations") where the Government could direct Asians 
to l i v e . The Law was not retroactive, nor did i t contain any 
punitive provisions and was widely disregarded (1 ) 
I n I898 the Transvaal Government passed a further act (2) 
intended to r e s t r i c t coloured (including Asian) occupation and 
holding of land m proclaimed gold mining areas on the Rand. 
This was succeeded m 1908 by the more important and wide\rangmg 
Transvaal Precious and Base Metals Act (The Gold Law) (3 ) of 
which sections 130 and 131 are the kernel. Section 130 stipulated 
that m proclaimed areas (k) no holder of a r i g h t to a stand (5) 
m terms of the Act was allowed to permit a "coloured" person, 
other than his bona fi d e servant,to reside on or occupy ground 
held under such r i g h t . The following Section prohibited "coloureds" 
(other than servants or employees of whites) from residing on 
proclaimed land m the Witwatersrand mining d i s t r i c t s 
except m bazaars and locations permitted by the mining 
(1) See p 16 and Report of Asiatic Land Laws Commission UG 16, 
1939, Sec I I , paras 2 1 f f . 
(2) Act 15, 1898. 
(3) Act 35, 1908. I t interacts with the Townships Act 3^, 1908. 
(k) Which constituted the greater part of the urban areas of the Rand. 
(5) Such a holder could only be a European. 
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Commissioner. The r e s t r i c t i o n s were not to apply to 
"coloureds" already occupying premises on proclaimed land 
at the commencement of the Act. 
The Transvaal Asiatics Land and Trading (Amending) Act 
1919 (1) was intended to close certain loopholes m lew 3 i 1885, 
by p r o h i b i t i n g the owning of fixed property by "coloureds" 
through l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y companies m which non-whites had 
a "co n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t " anywhere xn the Transvaal except i n 
areas set aside by the Government. Fixed property acquired 
by such companies p r i o r to May 1919 was exempt. At the same 
time, the Act, i n implementation of the 191^ f Gandhi-Smuts 
agreement, gave recognition to the vested r i g h t s of B r i t i s h 
Indians who on 1 May 1919 were trading on proclaimed ground 
to which Sections 130 and 131 of the Gold Law applied. 
I n response to continuing white anti-Indian a g i t a t i o n , the 
Government i n 1920 appointed the Asiatic Inquiry Commission 
under Mr Justice Lange. I t recommended that Law 3, 1885, 
and Act 37i 1919, should be retained but that no compulsory 
segregation of Asians should be enforced ( 2 ) . I n 192^, 1925 
and 1926 r a c i a l l y discriminatory Union-wide b i l l s were i n t r o -
duced to r e s t r i c t "coloured" r e s i d e n t i a l and trading r i g h t s i n 
urban areas but they did not become law. The r e p a t r i a t i o n 
provisions of the Indo-South African Cape Town Agreement of 
1927 (3) may have temporarily lessened the c a l l s from whites 
for further r e s t r i c t i o n s on Asian land tenure r i g h t s but i n 
1930 a Parliamentary Select Committee was established, i n t e r a l i a , 
to consider how effective had been the p r o h i b i t i o n on the owner-
ship of property i n the Transvaal by Asians through companies 
i n which they held a co n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t . 
(1) Act 37,1919- This Law provided the framework for much of the sub-
sequent inter-war period l e g i s l a t i o n r e s t r i c t i n g "coloured" land 
holding and occupation i n the Transvaal. 
(2 ) Report of the Asiatic Inquiry Commission, TJG h - 1921, para 226. 
(3) E.Pahad, "The Round Table Conference between the Govt, of India 
and the Govt, of South Africa which led to the Cape Town Agreement 
of February 1927"• (Unpublished seminar paper, University of 
Sussex,1969)• A further conference was held m 1932-
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The Committee's Report (1) led to the introduction and 
passage of the Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act of 1932 (2) 
which made i l l e g a l , as from May 1930, the holding of fixe d 
property m the Province by a nominee on behalf of an Asian 
or Asian Company. I t also tightened up the d e f i n i t i o n of 
"co n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t " m companies to close a loophole m 
the 1919 Asiatic Land Act. I n addition, the Act contained 
provisions to regularize the position of Asians residing on 
or occupying proclaimed land from which they were technically 
excluded by Sections 130 and 131 of the Gold Law. They were 
required m terms of the Act to furnish d e t a i l s of t h e i r 
occupancy to the Minister of the I n t e r i o r m return for the 
r i g h t to re t am t h e i r land holding t i l l the end of A p r i l 
1935 ( 3 ) - This allowed time for the Government to set up a 
Commission (^f) to examine the extent and nature of "coloured" 
occupation of proclaimed mining areas and make recommendations 
to the Minister for the exemption of certain areas occupied 
by "coloureds" from the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Gold Law (5)-
The Feetham Commission issued a series of reports (6) 
making detailed suggestions for the withdrawal of stands from 
the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Gold Law. Feetham's p r i n c i p a l 
innovation was to recommend that m certain circumstances 
"Coloureds" should be allowed freehold r i g h t s of property on 
(1) S.C.7, 1930. 
(2) 35, 1932. 
(3) This date was progressively put back by Act 351 1935, Act 32, 
1937, Act 28, 1939, Act 28, 19^1 and Act 35, 19^3-
(k) The Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act Commission, appointed 
under Government notice 132^, k October 1932. Chairman 
Mr Justice Feetham. 
(5) The power of exemption was introduced m Act 25, 1932 (Sec.2(3) 
amending Sec 131 of Act 35, 1908). 
(6) Part I (General observations and background) and Part I I 
(Johannesburg) of the Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act 
Commission Report published together m 193^ + (UG 7)are of 
pri n c i p a l i n t e r e s t , Parts I I I - V I I , issued between 1935 
and 1937, examine "coloured" land holding m other towns on 
the Rand, and Part V I I I miscellaneous matters. The f i r s t 
exemptions of land as recommended by Feetham were not approved 
by Parliament t i l l 19^1• 
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stands ( i n proclaimed areas) covered by exemption c e r t i f i c a t e s 
issued under Section 131A of the Gold Law- This suggestion 
was incorporated i n the Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Amendment 
Act of 1936 The Commission noted, "During the period 
of nearly 2k years (since the introduction of the 1908 Gold 
Law) no effective steps had been taken to enforce the Gold Law 
prohibitions against occupation by Asiatics ... of the land 
referred to i n Sections 130 and 131 and so f a r as Johannesburg 
was concerned no action had been taken to provide accommodation 
for these sections of the population m areas l e g a l l y open to 
t h e i r occupation ... meanwhile the issue to Asiatic traders 
of Government licences authorizing them to trade on land m 
prohibited areas had been continued and the number of 
Asiatics ... m occupation of premises situate m such areas 
had greatly increased" ( 2 ) . 
I n 1938, to meet continuing disquiet amongst the elec-
torate, the Asiatic Land Laws Commission was set up "to enquire 
in t o and report whether and i f so to what extent the l e t t e r and 
s p i r i t of any law r e s t r i c t i n g or p r o h i b i t i n g the ownership, use 
or occupation by Asiatics of land i s being evaded and to make 
recommendations xn regard thereto" ( 3 ) - The Murray Commission 
did not concern i t s e l f with proclaimed areas - the subject of 
Mr Justice Feetham's enquxry. Wxth the exception of techni-
c a l l y i l l e g a l property acquisition by Asian companies (through 
nominees) i n the Transvaal between 1930 and 1932 (k) Murray 
found l i t t l e evidence of contravention of land tenure laws by 
(1) Act 30, 1936. 
(2) Feetham Commission, Part 1 Chp.IV,para 11(7) -
(3) Report of the Asiatic Land Laws Commission - UG 16, 1939-
Chairman Mr Justice Murray. The Commission was set 
up following the Report of a Select Committee (S.C. 11, 
1937). 
(k) Such property acquisition had only been made i l l e g a l 
retrospectively by Act 35, 1932. 
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Asians. He did, however, note the "widespread" evasion of 
the s p i r i t of land tenure laws on property holding by "the 
expedient of discrimination between A and B classes of shares ... 
whereby an Asiatic secures a p r e f e r e n t i a l r i g h t to the c a p i t a l 
p r o f i t s of the company while exercising de facto control as a 
creditor" ( l ) . The Commission proposed the tightening up of 
the provisions of Act 371 19195 m respect of companies, and 
recommended that the r e s t r i c t i o n s m Act 35, 1932, on the 
ownership of property through (white) nominees be no longer 
retrospective t i l l 1930 (2). I t rejected c a l l s from Transvaal 
Indians for the t o t a l repeal of statutory r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
Asian occupation and ownership of land. 
The conservative Transvaal Indian leader, A. I . Kajee, 
volunteered an assurance to the Minister of the I n t e r i o r m 
Smuts' recently appointed Government that he and his support-
ers would do what they could to dissuade members of t h e i r 
community from purchasing property m predominantly European 
areas (3)- I n spite of t h i s the Government proceeded with 
the Asiatics (Transvaal Land and Trading) Act, 1939 (4), a 
holding measure to peg both Asian occupation of land and trad-
ing for two years from June 1939- With the outbreak of war, 
substantive l e g i s l a t i o n was delayed, not being introduced t i l l 
19^6 (5) . 
NATAL 
During the 19*jO's, the focus of attention turned to 
Natal - m part i c u l a r Durban, the home of approximately 
(1) Murray Commission, op. c i t . , Sec VI ( 7 ) . 
(2 ) i b i d . , para 156. 
(3) C. Kondapi, Indians Overseas, p 256, G. H. Calpm, 
Indians m South Africa, p 130. 
( k ) Act 28, 1939-
(5) The provisions of Act 28, 1939, were extended by Act 28, 
19 Vl (Asiatic (Transvaal Land and Trading) Amendment Act) 
and Act 351 19^3 (Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal 
and Natal)Restriction Act). 
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two-thirds of South Africa's Asian population. I n Natal ( 1 ) , 
t i l l 1941, statutory r e s t r i c t i o n s on Asian land tenure were con-
fined to the Durban Borough Lands Alienation Ordinance 14 of 
1922 and the Natal Borough and Township Lands Ordinance 5 of 
1923. The l a t t e r gave wide powers to l o c a l councils to i n -
sert Asian exclusion clauses m sales of unalienated lands. 
The r i g h t was widely used, e f f e c t i v e l y l i m i t i n g the acquisi-
t i o n of properties by Asians to pre-existing alienated areas. 
The Lands Alienation Ordinance was used to eject Asians from 
land which they occupied ( 2 ) . 
I n May 1940, a Commission was set up under Mr Justice 
Broome to enquire, "whether and, i f so, to what extent, Indians 
have, since 1 January 1927, commenced occupation of or acquired 
sites for trading or for r e s i d e n t i a l purposes m predominantly 
European areas m the Province of Natal and the Transvaal ... 
(excluding proclaimed land m the Transvaal) ... and the reasons 
for such occupation and acquisition" ( 3 ) - Like previous 
commissions examining Asian land holdings, the Indian Penetration 
Commission produced l i t t l e evidence to j u s t i f y European agita-
t i o n for further r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Asian population. I n the 
Transvaal the Commission traced 339 cases of what was termed 
"penetration" of European areas concluding that t h i s did "not 
disclose a s i t u a t i o n which can by any stretch of imagination 
be described as c r i t i c a l " . I n Natal, where the Commission 
reported 700 instances, i t said "the position does not appear 
to be serious" (4). I t found that Indians who had acquired 
property m European areas generally did so for investment 
purposes, rather than residence (5)» there being few comparable 
(1) Excluding the Northern D i s t r i c t s - formerly a part of the 
South African Republic -/Transvaal Asian land r e g i s t r a t i o n 
continued to apply. where 
(2 ) Indians Q y ? r > 257-
(3) Report Ox the Indian Penetration Commission, UG 39 - 1941. 
The Commission was established by Govt, notice 841, 1940. 
(4) i b i d . , paras 193 and 290. 
(5) For example,m Natal, 491 of the "penetration" cases cited 
by Broome related to ownership but not occupation of property. 
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alternative openings withi n the Country for Indian c a p i t a l . 
Where Indians had moved i n t o predominantly white areas Broome 
said i t could often be a t t r i b u t e d to a desire for better 
l i v i n g or trading conditions, which,he pointed out, was a per-
f e c t l y natural motive not peculiar to Indians. I n some 
instances Indians had acquired property m already declining 
European areas, but the Report f i r m l y rejected that m such 
cases the Indians had i n i t i a t e d the process of decay by taking 
property m the areas concerned. I m p l i c i t l y , the commissioners 
blamed lo c a l councils for bringing on themselves the supposed 
problem of Indian acquisition of property m white areas. " In 
Durban the predominantly Indian areas are closely s e t t l e d . 
Many of them lack the ordinary c i v i c amenities ... I n most 
Natal towns the predominantly Indian areas are located m the 
less desirable quarters, often m proximity to native areas ... 
I t would be surprising i f the acceptance of Western standards (1) 
did not impel Indians to leave such l o c a l i t i e s wherever 
opportunity offered" ( 2 ) . 
I n Durban, m 19^> a j o i n t committee (the Lawrence Committee) 
of members of the Natal Indian Association and the City Council 
was established, i n t e r a l i a , to r e s t r i c t by voluntary means 
i n t e r - r a c i a l transfer of property from Europeans to Indians 
I t was dissolved m 19^2 having achieved very l i t t l e ( 3 ) - I t s 
European members favoured the Commit bee being given statutory 
powers to prevent i n t e r - r a c i a l property transfers. 
Following allegations from Durban City Council that the 
i n f l u x of Indians i n t o predominantly white areas of the City 
(1 ) As envisaged for South African Indians m the "upliftment" 
clauses of the 192? Cape Town Agreement. The recognition 
under t l u s Agreemenb of the pernanence of South Africa's 
Indian population may have contributed nargxnally bo t h e i r 
readiness to invest m property. 
(2) i b i d . , para 333T 
(3) The Committee was succeeded i n 19^3 by the Asiatic A f f a i r s 
Advisory Board, a j o i n t European-Indian Body, though t h i s 
had rather different; functions. 
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had increased since the period examined by bhe f i r s t Broone 
Commission ( l ) , the Government re-appointed Justice Broome 
to mvestigabe bhe extent to which Indians and predominantly 
Indian Companies had between JO September 19^ 40 and February 19^3 
acquired sites m Durban municipality areas which m January 1927 
bhe previous Commission had found to be mainly European ( 2 ) . 
Broone's terms of reference were narrowly defined, for his 
enquiry concerned only the old Borough of Durban (approximately 
13 square miles),, and he was not empowered to examine bhe reasons 
for any acquisition of property. The Report played i n t o the 
hands of anti-Indian extremists m Natal. I t found that I T . 
19^2 195 sites m predominantly white areas had been acquired 
by Indians, compared to a previous maximum of 78 ( i n 1939)1 
reported by the f i r s b Broone Commission. Acquisition m the 
f i r s b Lwo months of 19^3 indicated a continumg upward trend ( 3 ) -
Broome accepted that the majority of tne sites renamed m 
European occupation Both the Natal Indian Congress (N.I.C.) 
m evidence to the Commission and Kondapi (k) suggest the 
proportion of European occupied sites v/as much higher than Broome 
implied, possibly as many as 5 i n every 6 of the newly acquired 
sites retaining European tenants. Indians s b i l l only owned 
k% of the land m the old Borough of Durban tnough forming 
23% of i t s population. And though Indian acquisition was 
r e l a t i v e l y sizeable m the early 19^+0's as Prof. Burrows 
commenbed^ "tne s t r a i n of penetration has nob been a l l on one 
side, for example, the European suburb of Durban North was 
formerly occupied mainly by Indians" (5 )« I n informal 
observation Broome again suggested, as m his previous report, 
thaT; Indians had invested i n immovable property because of 
the absence of acceptable alternatives, at the same time 
(1) January 1927 - 30 September 1 9 ^ . 
(2) Report of the 2nd Indian Penetration (Durban) Commission, 
UG 21 - 19^3- The Commission was established m February 
19^3 t>y Government notice 327, 19V5-
(3) i b i d . , para 16. 
Indxaas. Qvftr£reag,p 2 6 ? -
(5) Indian L i f e and Labjar m Natal, p 55-
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noting that "Indians may be anxious to pass through the door 
while i t i s s t i l l a j a r " ( l ) . 
Within a month of the completion of Mr Justice Brooke's 
Report Parliament acted, passing the Trading and Occupation of 
Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act ( 2 ) , an interim 
measure, i n t e r a l i a , preventing the i n t e r - r a c i a l transfer of 
land for acquisition or occupation i n Durban ( 3 ) . The Act 
could be extended to other parts of Natal. I t was b i t t e r l y 
c u t i c i z e d by Natal Indians and the Indian Government (k). 
At the same time i t did not sati s f y r n i l i t a n t l y anti-Indian white 
public opinion ( 5 ) -
As a gesture to the Indians, the Union Government announced 
m the establishment of the t h i r d Commission to be headed 
by Mr Justice Broone. I t was to inquire i n t o "matters a f f e c t -
ing tne Indian population of Natal", with p a r t i c u l a r reference 
to t h e i r housing and health needs, c i v i c status, education, 
rel i g i o u s and recreational f a c i l i t i e s . The Commission ^as 
required to make recommendations for the implementation of the 
u p l i f t clauses of the 1927 Cape To\m Agreement and for the 
general "well being" of Natal's Indian popu]at:on ( 6 ) . The 
Commission had three European and two Indian members, but the 
l a t t e r withdrew m December 19^. An interim report was 
piodaced, c r i t i c a l of the hardening attitudes of both Europeans 
and Indians. I t suggested "the only way out of the present 
impasse l i e s m the direction of ... an exchange of views 
between the Government of the Union and the Government of India" 
conducted through personal conversations to be held m South 
(1) 2nd Broome Commission Report, op.cit., para 27-
(2) Act 35, 19^3- One of the "Pegging Acts'.' Referred to above pl96 
(3) The Act was retroactive m Durban to 22 March 19^3- I n Natal, 
unlike the Transvaal, the Act did not impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
the issue of addjtional trading licences to the Indian popula-
t i o n , but administrative provisions m Natal rendered such a 
move unnecessary. 
(4) Indiana Ovftraeaa, pp 268-9. 
(5 ) Indians m S.AfriCja^^ 
(6) Interim Report of the Commission of Enquiry in t o matters a f f e c t i n g 
TEe_Indian Population of the Province of Natal. UG 22 19^6. The 
Commission was established under Government notices h2G and 633 of 19M+. 
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Africa ( 1 ) . I t urged a "new s t a r t " m relati o n s and recommended 
the introduction of loaded franchise for Natal Indians. 
Negotiations took place m 19^1- Detween the Union Government 
and the Natal Indian Congress which resulted m the Pretoria 
Agreement. I t s terms are the subject of some dispute but i t 
provided for the replacement of the "Pegging" Act oy a Provincial 
Ordinance to control occupation of dwellings by licence. 
Kondapi comments^"The s p i r i t behind the Agreement was that Indians 
would agree to voluntary segregation m Durban,., without any 
prejudice to t h e i r inherent r i g h t to ownership and occupation 
of pioperty throughout the rest of Natal " ( 2 ) . The segregation 
envisaged applied only to residence and not acquisition. Public 
opinion was scarely prepared for the Pretoria Agreement, strong 
opposition being voiced both by Europeans and tne increasingly 
vociferous elements m the Natal and Transvaal Indian population (3)» 
The Ordinance introduced m the Natal Legislature m furtherance 
of the Pretoria Agreement rfas d r a s t i c a l l y altered by a Select 
Committee which, contrary to the Agreement, proposed extending 
the Ordinance to provide for control of the acquisition as well 
as the occupation of r e s i d e n t i a l property. I t was also to apply 
throughout Natal and not j u s t to Durban. The Provincial Council 
approved the Residential Property Regulation Ordinance. At the 
same time i t passed two other Ordinances - the Housing Board 
Ordinance and the Provincial and Local Authorities Expropriation 
Ordinance, both of t h i c h were intended to f a c i l i t a t e the 
segregation of Indians. The Ordinances, which were m breach 
of the Pretoria Agreement were declared u l t r a vires of the 
powers of the Provincial Council. The House of Assembly 
subsequently passed the nominally non-racial Housing (Emergency 
Powers) Act 19^5 (^)- This enabled the Natal Provincial 
(1) i b i d . , para 7^ -
(2 ) op. c i t . , p 269. 
(3 ) For a b r i e f account see Indians m S Ajyi c.a. p1;A - 2 1 ^ . 
(4) Act 4 5, 1945 
Council to reintroduce a Housing Board Ordinance, which i t 
did i n September 1945• Under i t , subject to M i n i s t e r i a l 
consent, the Board could appropriate land and, xn s e l l i n g or 
l e t t i n g land, could xmpose condxtions r e s t r i c t i n g i t s owner-
ship or occupation to people of a pa r t i c u l a r "class". 
ANNEX B 
MEMBERS OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE COUNCILS 1946-1948 
(a) Joint Passive Resistance Council 
(b) 
Dr Y. M. Dadoo ) 
Dr M. Naicker ) Joint Chairmen G. 
Mr A. I . Meer (Natal) 
Mr M P. Naicker (Natal) 
Mr M. D. Naidoo (Natal) 
Mr Debi Singh (Natal) 
Mr Y A. Cachalia (Transvaal) 
Mr I . C. Meer (Transvaal) 
Mr H. A. Naidoo (Transvaal) 
Mr S. Rustomjee (Transvaal) 
Mr N. Si t a (Transvaal) 
Mr N. Thandray (Transvaal) 
Natal Passive Resistance Council 
Dr G. M. Naicker (Chairman) 
Dr B. Cnetty 
Mr A. Choudree 
Dr (Mrs) K Goonara 
Mr A. I . Meer 
Mr M. P. Naicker 
Mr M. D. Naidoo 
Mr R. A. P i l l a y 
Mr S. V. Reddy 
Mr Debi Singh 
Mr G. Singh 
Mr J. N. Singh 
Mr P. Singh 
Mr S. Singh 
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(c) Transvaal Passive Resistance Council 
Dr Y. M. Dadoo (Chairman) 
Mr Y. A. Cachalia 
Mr M. A. Dmath 
Mr I . C. Meer 
Mr D. Mistry 
Mr H. A. Naidoo 
Mr T. N. Naidoo 
Dr V. Patel 
Mr S. Rustomjee 
Mr N. Sita 
Mr N. Thandray 
Mr L. F. Williams 
(d) Cape Passive Resistance Council 
Mr S. P i l l a y (Chairman) 
Note (a) Comprehensive information about PRC member-
ship i s not available the foregoing l i s t s 
are based on newspaper reports and interviews. 
(b) There were substantial changes m membership 
during the Campaign. 
2 0 5 
PART I I I THE DEFIANCE OF UNJUST LAWS CAMPAIGN 1952 
CHAPTER I BACKGROUND 
The defiance campaign was neither an isolated incident 
with i n the World or South African p o l i t i c a l systems White (1) 
minority rule was being challenged m Asia and m certain parts 
of Africa. The sense of a common an t i c o l o n i a l straggle was 
reinforced by j o i n t meetings, for example, post war Pan» 
African Congresses, which were attended by African National 
Congress (ANC) o f f i c i a l s . Defiance leaders could draw i n -
spiration from those countries where indigenous p o l i t i c a l 
leaders had already secured independence or, at least, increasing 
l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the p o l i t i c a l system. The democratic, 
non-racial aims of Congress Leaders were m harmony with the 
upsurge of l i b e r a l expression m many countries during and 
aft e r the Second World War, which rendered the r a c i a l p olicies 
of the Union Government increasingly anachronistic. This 
development was epitomized at the United Nations, where South 
Africa, previously a respected member of the international 
community, faced widespread and growing c r i t i c i s m of i t s dis-
criminatory practices and mores. 
South Africa m the post war period experienced consider-
able p o l i t i c a l unrest, increasing non-European m i l i t a n t opposi-
t i o n to the status quo (2), p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 19^ 48, was 
paralleled by extensive white extra-Parliamentary a c t i v i t y . \attempted 
The\ removal of Cape Coloureds from the common r o l l franchise, 
by a simple majority of Parliament, m v i o l a t i o n of the con-
s t i t u t i o n a l l y required procedure for a l t e r a t i o n of an entrenched 
(1) The following terms are used for d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l groups. 
"African", "Asian", "Indian", "Coloured", "European" and 
"white". At the time of the catrpaign, "European" and "non-
European" were more commonly applied than "white" or "non-
white". The omnibus term "blacks" i s also used here, refer-
mg to a l l non-white groups, but i t was not a contemporary expression. 
(2) Manifest for example m the 19*4-6 mmeworker's s t r i k e and the passive 
resistance campaign of 19*4-6-19*48. 
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clause, provided the p r i n c i p a l specific focus f o r white 
opposition during 1951 and 1952 ( l ) . The National Party's 
disregard for the constitution and the courts provoked the Leader 
of the o f f i c i a l opposition to threaten that his party would begin 
a programme of c i v i l disobedience (2) The degree of European 
disaffection was demonstrated by the rapid growth of the Torch 
Commando which was formed m A p r i l 19511 and at i t s zenith at the 
end of 1952 had nearly 250,000 members ( 3 ) - I t s manifesto l i m i t e d 
the Organization to const i t u t i o n a l means m opposing the Separate 
Representation of Voter's B i l l and seeking the removal of the 
Government, but t h i s was not always reflected m speeches at mass 
meetings (h). The more radical Springbok Legion expressed support m 
June 1952 for a national stoppage of work ( 5 ) . Subsequently i t 
declared i t s support for the defiance campaign ( 6 ) . 
I n Natal, p o l i t i c a l uncertainty was re f l e c t e d m renewed 
discussion about the possible secession of the Province (7 ) and 
the c a l l by the Provincial Council for a new national convention 
to re-draft the Union Constitution ( 8 ) . 
The threat to personal l i b e r t y , and to press freedom m the 
Suppression of Communism Act i n t e n s i f i e d white h o s t i l i t y 
11) Tne Government introduced the High Court of Parliament B i l l m 1952 
as a device to circumvent the declaration by the courts that the 
Separate Representation of Voters Act was n u l l and void, but the 
coloureds were not f i n a l l y removed from the Common Voters' Roll 
t i l l 1956, following a series of dubious l e g i s l a t i v e manoeuvres. 
(2) 0. Strauss to Natal Provincial Congress of the United Party. 
Evening Post, 23 September 1952. 
(3) G. Carter, The P o l i t i c s of Inequality, p 302 f f . 
ik) See, for example, a speech by the Chairman of the Eastern Cape Torch 
Commando, Middleburgh, Evening Post, 21 June 1952. 
(5) Clarion, 12 June 1952. 
(6) People's World, 30 October 1952. 
(7) Evening Post, 6 June 1952, P o l i t i c s of Inequality, p 319 f f . 
(8) This was f i r s t proposed by the "Defenders of the Constitution" - a 
Natal based group associated with the Torch Commando. Eastern 
Promnce Herald, 5 June 1952. 
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to the Government. Trade union organizations held numerous 
protest meetings, and some threatened s t r i k e action ( 1 ) . Ad 
hoc m i l i t a n t groups were formed to protect democratic r i g h t s ( 2 ) . 
United Party followers and t h e i r a l l i e s cast themselves m the 
role of "defenders of freedom", but f a i l e d to recognise the 
v a l i d i t y of demands by non-whites for f u l l democratic r i g h t s . 
Very few whites who participated m the Torch Commando and 
other anti-government, extra-Parliamentary organizations were 
prepared to co-operate with other races but the a c t i v i t i e s of 
such groups, during the early 1950's, emphasized the strength 
of feeling amongst whites against the National Party regime. 
Defiance Leaders did not require t h i s additional pretext or 
encouragement to r e s i s t discriminatory laws, but the pressure 
on the p o l i t i c a l system from white extra-Parliamentary a c t i v i t y 
enhanced the p o t e n t i a l impact of organized non-European opposi-
t i o n to Government p o l i c i e s . 
There were many grounds for discontent amongst the black 
population (3) and channels for expressing i t , almost invariably 
i n e f f e c t i v e . 
There was a country-wide shortage of 
housing for urban non-whites. I n a study m 1950 of the l i f e 
and labour of the urban African worker m Durban (4) i t was 
estimated "Barracks" and Compounds housed less than t h i r t y per 
cent of Durban's African population. Large numbers daily came 
(1) Guardian, 1 May 1952. Trade union p o l i t i c s were m a state 
of turmoil at t h i s time, provoked largely by National Party 
moves to prevent the growth of a non-racial trade union move-
ment. H. J. 8c R. E. Simons, Class and Colour m South Africa, 
1850-1950, pp 594-8. 
(2) The Personal Lib e r t i e s Defence Committee and Freedom of the 
Press Committees are examples. 
(3) South African Outlook, m i t s issue of A p r i l 1952 and m succeeding 
editions, published a series of a r t i c l e s contrasting white and non-
white conditions. The Guardian, Drum and E. Goli also carried 
reports. Various published analyses of academic research on as-
pects of the non-white environment are referred to below. 
(4) Department of Economics, University of Natal, The African 
Factory Worker, p 9-
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t o work from the squatters' homes m Durban's "Black B e l t " , 
and from outside the C i t y . I n a survey of 260 workers, the 
average r e n t f o r shack accommodation was 21/jd per month ( l ) . 
I n Johannesburg, which contained the most extensive slum 
areas, the Native A f f a i r s Department c a l c u l a t e d t h a t a t the 
end of 1951 there was a s h o r t f a l l of 50)000 houses f o r 
A f r i c a n s ( 2 ) , and y e t m the p e r i o d J u l y 19^f8 t o December 1951 
the C i t y Council signed no new c o n t r a c t s f o r A f r i c a n housing (3) -
Squatters were subject t o frequent harrassment from the C i t y 
Council (k)• The growth of slums and the i n c r e a s i n g density 
of the urban A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n , m Johannesburg, East London 
and elsewhere,was evidence of a d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n ( 5 ) -
This t r e n d was equally apparent amongst the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n 
m Durban ( 6 ) . An estimated s h o r t f a l l of 20,000 houses f o r 
Coloured people m Cape Town m November 1952 (7) i n d i c a t e d 
the u n s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n d i t i o n s m which many l i v e d . By com-
parison, housing problems f o r Europeans were i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
The s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the housing s i t u a t i o n f o r non-
whites were considerable, i t was a major f a c t o r preventing 
the growth of s t a b l e urban f a m i l y l i f e and an encouragement to 
a n t i - s o c i a l h a b i t s . Considerable f r u s t r a t i o n 
a t these c o n d i t i o n s was engendered amongst urban workers and 
i t was increased by the growing t h r e a t they faced of being 
f o r c i b l y removed from c e n t r a l areas where they had t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
(1) i b i d . , p 10. 
(2) Eastern Province Herald, 18 June 1952. 
(3) The Guardian, 6 December 1951- Statement from a deputation 
l e d by the Bishop o f Johannesburg t o the C i t y Council. 
(k) Their a t t i t u d e i s r e f l e c t e d m the r e p l y t o a question about 
the f a t e o f a group of squatters the Council sought t o e v i c t 
from waste land, "We are l e a v i n g t h a t t o the Magistrate t o 
decide". Eastern Province Herald, k November 1952. Perhaps 
the s quatters were expected to s w e l l the ranks of the "Bush 
Dwellers" described by D. H. Reader, The Black Man's P o r t i o n , 
p 120. The Prevention of I l l e g a l Squatting Act, 52, 1951, 
strengthened the hand of municipal c o u n c i l s . 
(5) See Xhosa m Town sprnpq fnr- example,The Black Man's Portion,pp 10^122. 
(6) This i s shown m The Durban Housing Survey, N a t a l Regional Survey, 
A d d i t i o n a l Report No.2, p 288. 
(7) Report o f the C i t y Engineer, Advance, 13 November 1952. Housing 
was also r e q u i r e d f o r an a d d i t i o n a l 7,000 A f r i c a n f a m i l i e s and 
17,500 s i n g l e A f r i c a n men. But even i f the houses had been b u i l t , 
hC$> of the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n m the C i t y could not have a f f o r d e d 
to pay the r e q u i r e d r e n t a l . 
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l i v e d t o d i s t a n t dormitory settlements ( 1 ) . But the p o t e n t i a l 
force o f t h i s discontent was tempered by the all-consuming 
requirement o f s u r v i v a l . 
S o c i a l Services m non-white areas were g e n e r a l l y w o e f u l l y 
inadequate and r a r e l y corresponded t o f a c i l i t i e s f o r Europeans. 
I n 1951 i 17)700 h o s p i t a l beds were provided f o r the l a t t e r , but 
only 27-800 f o r the e n t i r e non-white p o p u l a t i o n ( o f the 570 
h o s p i t a l s m the Union, 2j8 were simply f o r whites, and only 
138 were s o l e l y f o r non-Europeans ( 2 ) . Unequal h e a l t h f a c i -
l i t i e s had a bearing on the c o n t r a s t i n g m o r t a l i t y r a t e s as 
between blacks and whites. D. H. Reader, f o r example, found 
t h a t m a sample of 306 i n f a n t s l i v i n g m "wood and i r o n " or 
Municipal housing m East London m 19531 there was an average 
m o r t a l i t y r a t e o f 392 per thousand (3)* This contrasted w i t h 
J>h per thousand f o r whites ( k ) . 
Advances were being made m the p r o v i s i o n o f c e r t a i n 
services f o r non-whites, p a r t i c u l a r l y , m the f i e l d o f 
education, but per c a p i t a expenditure f o r non-European p u p i l s 
remained much lower than f o r whites ( 5 ) , and the standard of 
school b u i l d i n g s and equipment i n f e r i o r . Secondary and 
higher education f a c i l i t i e s f o r blacks were gr o s s l y inadequate, 
and the prospect of segregated U n i v e r s i t i e s , and f o r A f r i c a n s , 
the p o l i c i e s formulated by the Native Education Commission (6) 
provided f u r t h e r grounds f o r d i s c o n t e n t . 
(1) I n October 1951 Johannesburg C i t y Council accepted respon-
s i b i l i t y f o r removing A f r i c a n s from Sophia^Town, Newclare, 
Martmdale and Vrededorp (the Western Areas). The Guardian, 
11 October 1951-
(2) O f f i c i a l Year Book of the "Union of South A f r i c a 1952-3, 
pp 181-2. 
(3) Black Man's P o r t i o n , p 157-
(k) Year Book, o p . c i t . , p 1133-
(5) I n 19^9, £50 per annum f o r whites, £17 f o r Coloureds and 
Asians, £7 f o r A f r i c a n s . Survey o f Race Relations m 
South A f r i c a 1951-2, p ^ Q 
(6) i b i d . , pp if7 - i+S, and Survey of Race Relations 
1949-50, p 68. 
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Incomes, m general, were meagre and inadequate even 
f o r the spartan existence accepted by the m a j o r i t y of non-
whites ( 1 ) . I n 19M5 the Dunlop Factory m Durban o f f e r e d a 
minimum salary f o r A f r i c a n workers of s i x pounds per month, 
although between e i g h t and eleven pounds appears to have been 
a more t y p i c a l sum ( 2 ) . This was above the norm and, f o r 
example, even m the p e r i o d 1951-2, u n s k i l l e d r a i l w a y employees 
earned only £5 . l 6 s (3) - Yet a medical examination of a 50% 
sample of thej workers, who were amongst the h e a l t h i e s t m 
Durban, revealed n o t a s i n g l e case which could be passed as 
completely f i t , most men s u f f e r i n g from a form o f m a l n u t r i t i o n ( k ) . 
I n p a r t , t h i s could be a t t r i b u t e d to a la c k of n u t r i t i o n educa-
t i o n , but f a r more s i g n i f i c a n t l y the demands of r e n t s , t r a n s p o r t , 
taxes, and e s s e n t i a l personal and f a m i l y commitments 
c l e a r l y exceeded the capacity of incomes received!?)) Although 
r e g u l a r o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s were not published r e v e a l i n g the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f A f r i c a n wages to the r i s i n g cost o f l i v i n g , 
f o r example, m the p e r i o d of 1 9 ^ - 9 u n t i l 1952-3i the weekly 
salary o f non-white r a i l w a y labourers rose from 28/6 t o 29/- (6) 
an increase o f approximately 1.8%; whereas the average r e t a i l 
(1) The c o n t r a s t between white and non-white incomes was consider-
able, see Year Book, op. c i t . , pp 309-18. 
(2) This i n c l u d e d overtime. A f r i c a n Factory Worker, pp 10-11. 
(3) Year Book, o p . c i t . , p 316. 
(k) A f r i c a n Factory Worker, pp 6-7-
(5) Rents f o r A f r i c a n s g e n e r a l l y v a r i e d between 10/- and £2 per month, 
and were r i s i n g considerably. Amongst Dunlop f a c t o r y workers the 
average t r a n s p o r t cost was approximately 7 / - per month. A f r i c a n 
Factory Worker,p 10. A study m Orlando revealed an average sum 
of 10/- per month. Race Relations, v o l 18(2), 1951, p 100. 
Taxes f o r a male worker could be as hig h as £3.10.0. per annum. 
Year Book, o p . c i t . , pp 502-3- I n the Durban Factory Workers 
Survey, o p . c i t . , p 13, s i n g l e men spent an average of £6.12.0. 
per month on food, f a m i l y men £9.5-0. C l e a r l y there were other 
expenses. 
A survey by the Soc i a l Science Department,Cape Town U n i v e r s i t y , 
c a l c u l a t e d the minimum income l e v e l r e q u i r e d by a f a m i l y of f i v e 
m Cape Town m November 1951 > to be £212 per annum. At t h i s l e v e l 
50% of the non-white p o p u l a t i o n and 6% o f Europeans l i v e d below the 
poverty datum l e v e l . Cape Argus,21 J u l y 1952. See also e d i t i o n 
f o r 2k J u l y 1952. The r e s u l t of a survey m 19^ +6 by the U n i v e r s i t y 
of Natal m the Province reveals a s i m i l a r percentage be low the 
poverty datum l e v e l , Race Relations J o u r n a l , v o l 1 ^ ( 1 ) , 19^7, p2. 
(6) Year Book, o p . c i t . , p 316. 
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p r i c e s m p r i n c i p a l urban areas during t h i s time rose by 
38$ Average weekly wage r a t e s f o r whites m the same 
urban areas increased k6% m the p e r i o d ( 2 ) . I t was c l e a r l y 
d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h a reserve of c a p i t a l f o r periods of 
unemployment, disablement and r e t i r e m e n t (3) and black employees' 
groups could not r e a d i l y pressure employers f o r improved 
b e n e f i t s ( k ) . One reason f o r t h i s , was widespread unemploy-
ment, a problem which was exacerbated by job r e s e r v a t i o n . 
Again, r e g u l a r s t a t i s t i c s were not issued f o r A f r i c a n unem-
ployment but m January 1953) Dr Ei s e l e n , Secretary f o r Native 
A f f a i r s , estimated there were 25,000 A f r i c a n workseekers m 
Johannesburg ( 5 ) . I n Durban, m 19^f6, the average monthly 
number o f A f r i c a n workseekers was 9,000 ( 6 ) . With the increas-
i n g enforcement of i n f l u x c o n t r o l , the compulsory use of labour 
bureaux, and the d e p o r t a t i o n of A f r i c a n unemployed urban r e s i -
dents, t h e i r numbers may have declined, but i f so the problem 
t r a n s f e r r e d i t s e l f to the reserves, and l e f t the employer m 
an ever more commanding p o s i t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n f o r urban 
A f r i c a n women was no less d i f f i c u l t than f o r men. D.H. Reader 
noted, "Where a woman i s on her own ... i l l e g a l means are the 
(1) i b i d . , p 33O. 
(2) i b i d . , p 3O8. 
(3) The Unemployment Insurance Ammendment Act No. *f 1, debarred a l l 
migrant workers and others earning l e s s than £182 per annum 
from assistance under the Act. Disablement and pension grants 
were pai d on a d e c l i n i n g scale r e s p e c t i v e l y t o Coloureds, Asians 
and A f r i c a n s , but were t o t a l l y inadequate as the sole means of 
l i v e l i h o o d . A f r i c a n s t e m p o r a r i l y d isabled received no b e n e f i t s 
f o r the f i r s t seven and sometimes fou r t e e n days of i n j u r y , f o r 
other races the p e r i o d was only three days. Year Book, op. c i t . , p 2 8 6 
See also pp 223-^. 
(k) A f r i c a n Trade Unions were not recognized as n e g o t i a t i n g bodies and 
A f r i c a n s were not pe r m i t t e d to s t r i k e under War Measure 1^ -5 of 
19^2 which remained m force u n t i l 1953- Non-whites who d i d 
r e s o r t to i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n were l i a b l e t o harrassment from the 
p o l i c e , d i s m i s s a l and, m the case of A f r i c a n s , d e p o r t a t i o n 
from the town where they were working. 
(5) Statement a t a meeting of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Local Councils and the 
Native A f f a i r s Department. D a i l y Dispatch, 13 January 1953-
(6) A f r i c a n Factory Worker, p 5- These f i g u r e s are inadequate m t h a t 
they do not re v e a l f o r how long i n d i v i d u a l s were unemployed, but 
r e p o r t s from Johannesburg (Eastern Province Herald, 30 J u l y 1952) 
and Port E l i z a b e t h ( i b i d . , 3 0 October 1952) suggest unemployment 
was a growing problem, a t l e a s t i n those centres. 
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easiest i f not the only ones o f making a s u f f i c i e n t independent 
income upon which to l i v e ( 1 ) . Only m white farming areas 
was there a constant shortage o f labour, but wages were very 
low, and a t l e a s t m c e r t a i n d i s t r i c t s , c o n d i t i o n s extremely 
poor ( 2 ) . 
The p r o p o r t i o n of Asians and Coloureds unemployed, m 
Durban and Johannesburg was m a t e r i a l l y lower than f o r A f r i c a n s 
i n these centres (3 ) , but I n d i a n employees o f 
white c o n t r o l l e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s were l i a b l e to replacement by 
Afr i c a n s and Coloureds i f , f o r example, they p a r t i c i p a t e d m 
r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Asian and Coloured wages were 
higher than f o r A f r i c a n s , but were not comparable w i t h white 
incomes, and s a l a r y i n c r e a s e s , c e r t a i n l y f o r the In d i a n s , 
were not commensurate w i t h the mounting cost o f l i v i n g ( 4 ) . 
P o l i c e r a i d s and subsequent prosecutions f o r t e c h n i c a l , 
r a t h e r than c r i m i n a l offences, under r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
laws, were an i n t e g r a l p a r t of urban A f r i c a n l i f e and obvious 
source o f f r u s t r a t i o n and bewilderment. I n 1952, from the 
t o t a l o f 868,000 A f r i c a n a d u l t s convicted of a l l types o f 
offences, 264,000 were sentenced f o r contravening "Native 
Supervision and c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n s , 169,000 f o r offences 
(1) Black Man's P o r t i o n , p 67. 
(2) Drum, 13 March 1952, depicted c o n d i t i o n s m Bethal, the 
most n o t o r i o u s of the farming d i s t r i c t s . 
(3) Unemployment f i g u r e s f o r Asians and Coloureds Year 
Book, 1950-51, P 276, and 1952-53, P 274. 
(4) H. Burrows, I n d i a n L i f e and Labour m N a t a l , p 3 1 , 
c a l c u l a t e d t h a t from 1946 t o 1951, the average earning 
o f Indians m employment m Nata l rose from £137 t o 
£179 per annum. I n the same p e r i o d the R e t a i l P r i c e 
Index m the two p r i n c i p a l centres o f I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n 
m the Province rose 38$. Year Book, 1952-53, p 330. 
2 1 3 
under r a c i a l l i q u o r _ L a w s (1 ) , and 28,000 were c o n v i c t e d 
f o r breach of labour r e g u l a t i o n s , many of which were d i s -
c r i m i n a t o r y ( 2 ) . S t a t i s t i c s f o r p r e v i o u s y e a r s a r e not a l -
ways comparable, but the t o t a l number of a l l non-white con-
v i c t i o n s r ose from 799,300 m 1947 to 1,007,000 m 1952, and 
the corresponding t o t a l s f o r pass and c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n s 
were 153,000 and 266,985 (3 ) - Many more A f r i c a n s and 
other non-whites had brushes with the p o l i c e and some were 
a r r e s t e d but not charged or c o n v i c t e d . 
The achievement of h i g h e d u c a t i o n a l s t a t u s by non-whites 
could earn some r e l i e f from the h a r d s h i p s considered above, 
but i t a l s o encouraged a d d i t i o n a l f r u s t r a t i o n and d i s c o n t e n t C+). 
As a r e s u l t of the job r e s e r v a t i o n p o l i c y many h i g h l y s k i l l e d 
non-Europeans were underemployed (5) and even where t h i s was 
not so, g e n e r a l l y r e c e i v e d lower s a l a r i e s than s i m i l a r l y q u a l i -
f i e d w hites m comparable .posts, and d i d not have a c c e s s to 
equal f a c i l i t i e s . Outside the sphere of employment, they were 
/ 'white" o f t e n debarred f r o m / c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s . Under 
N a t i o n a l Party r u l e the few r e s i d u a l s p o i l s a v a i l a b l e t o h i g h l y 
educated non-whites were r a p i d l y eroded ( 6 ) , i n c r e a s i n g 
(1) The t o t a l may be h i g h e r , f o r a f u r t h e r 57,000 A f r i c a n s were 
co n v i c t e d f o r l i q u o r and drug o f f e n c e s some of which may 
have a p p l i e d only to a p a r t i c u l a r r a c e . Year Book, 1952-53, 
pp These f i g u r e s r e v e a l t h a t a t l e a s t 52% of con-
v i c t i o n s f o r A f r i c a n a d u l t s i n v o l v e d v i o l a t i o n s o l e l y of 
r a c i a l laws. 
(2) Year Book, 19^9-50, pp V32 and ^35 -6 , Year Book, 1952-53, P kk5 
(3) Year Book, 19^9-50, pp ^32 and ^35 -6 , Year Book, 1952-53, P hk5 
(4) See E. Mphelele, The A f r i c a n Image, pp56-66 , B. Modisane, 
Blame Me or H i s t o r y . I should a d d i t i o n a l l y acknowledge the 
t e l l i n g account of A. Hutchinson. I n t e r v i e w , 31 January 1970. 
(5) See, f o r example, The F r i e n d , 30 October 1952. 
(6) For example, under the N a t i v e s ( a b o l i t i o n of P a s s e s and 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n of Documents) Act, 67, 1952, Cape A f r i c a n 
Voters were no longer exempt from c a r r y i n g p a s s e s . Through-
out the country the r i g h t of educated non-Europeans to 
enter "White" U n i v e r s i t i e s was threatened. 
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dxsaffectxon, and encouraging co-operation between them and 
w i t h other socxal groups, xn j o i n t o p p o s i t i o n t o the s t a t u s 
quo. 
Af r i c a n s m the Reserves d i d not experience a l l o f the 
i n i q u i t i e s commonplace m urban areas, but the i n c r e a s i n g 
shortage of a v a i l a b l e land ( l ) , i t s d i m i n i s h i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y 
and the Government's f r e q u e n t l y i n s e n s i t i v e and a r b i t r a r y 
c o r r e c t i v e s (2) encouraged the spread of di s c o n t e n t . 
The defiance campaign, l i k e i t s predecessors m 1906-lif 
and 19^-^+3, was a r e a c t i o n both t o the general f a b r i c o f 
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r e f l e c t e d m the dxsabxlxtxes outlxned 
m the preceding paragraphs and t o s p e c i f i c newly introduced 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y r a c i a l r u l e s and practxces ( 3 ) . The Natxonal 
Party v i c t o r y i n the general e l e c t i o n of May 19^ +8 on the 
p l a t f o r m o f ap a r t h e i d (k) l e d to the e a r l y i n t r o d u c t i o n of a 
new and fa r - r e a c h i n g programme o f r a c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n . 
I n t e r i m , piecemeal laws and proclamations (5) were r a p i d l y 
replaced by d e f i n i t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n . I n the 1950 session of 
Parliament, the 'Government secured the passage o f the 
(1) The A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n has access to le s s than 13% of 
South A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y . 
(2) A p a r t i c u l a r source of anger m the Reserves was the compulsory 
and i n c r e a s i n g l y severe c u l l i n g o f herds m s p e c i f i c areas, to 
prevent the continued over-grazing of land and i n h i b i t s o i l 
erosion. See the r e a c t i o n m the Nqutu D i s t r i c t o f Northern 
N a t a l , The Guardian, 6 March 1952, 13 March 1952 and subsequently. 
C a t t l e c u l l i n g became an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f comprehensive "Bet t e r -
ment Schemes" introduced m 19^9-
(3) An exceptxon xn 1952 was the xnclusxon as one of the t a r g e t s 
of the campaxgn the non-racxal, but anti-democratic Suppression 
of Communism Act. 
(^f) E a r l y statements of N a t i o n a l Party r a c i a l p o l i c i e s include 
Dr Verwoerd's speech to the Native Representative Council, 5 
December 1950 and the N a t i o n a l Party statement reproduced m 
the N a t a l Mercury, 29 and 30 March 19*^8. 
(5) For example, makxng more r e s t r x c t x v e e l e c t o r a l r e g x s t r a t i o n 
procedures f o r Coloureds ( E l e c t o r a l Laws Amendment Act 50,19^+8), 
i n t r o d u c i n g f u r t h e r property r e s t r i c t i o n s on Asians ( A s i a t i c 
Land Tenure Amendment Act 53, 19^9) and suspending the A f r i c a n 
A r t i s a n s ' t r a i n i n g scheme. 
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Population R e g i s t r a t i o n B i l l ( l ) intended t o achieve the 
concise demarcation o f the p o p u l a t i o n t o r a c i a l groups. 
I n t h i s instance, as w i t h other subsequent r a c i a l l y d i v i s i v e 
measures, non-white leaders and some Europeans condemned the 
p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g the B i l l , and expressed f e a r s of the 
probable p r a c t i c a l consequences, but the Government was imper-
vious t o such c r i t i c i s m . During the same session, the Govern-
ment introduced the Group Areas B i l l (2) as the "Kernel" 
of i t s programme (3)• The Group Areas l e g i s l a t i o n replaced 
the A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act ( i f ) . Temporary u n c e r t a i n t y a t 
p r e c i s e l y when and where and m what degree the Group Areas 
Act would be imposed was removed t y the promulgation of the 
Group Areas Amendment Act i n 1952 (5)« 
The Native Laws Amendment Act (6) and the Natives 
( a b o l i t i o n of Passes and c o - o r d i n a t i o n of Documents) Act (7 ) , 
which were forced through Parliament, under a severe g u i l l o t i n e , 
xn 1952 made f u r t h e r p r o v i s i o n f o r the p h y s i c a l separation of 
the races. Both m a t e r i a l l y reduced A f r i c a n r i g h t s and were, 
p o t e n t i a l l y , a major a d d i t i o n a l source o f d i s c o n t e n t which 
Congress Leaders could e x p l o i t . The Native Laws Act prevented 
the growth of permanent and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e urban A f r i c a n 
(1) Act 30, 1950. 
(2) Act i f1 , 1950. K. Kirkwood, The Group Areas Act, provides a 
d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s . See also the Guardian, 3° November 1950. 
(3) Dr D. Malan- House of Assembly 31 May 1950. Rand D a i l y M a i l , 
1 June 1950. Dr Donges claimed i t was a measure of " p o s i t i v e 
a p a r t h e i d " which would provide t r a i n i n g i n "Local S e l f 
Government" f o r Groups otherwise deprived o f the o p p o r t u n i t y . 
(if) Act 28, 1946. 
(5) No 65, 1952. 
(6) Act 54, 1952. An e a r l i e r Act of the same t i t l e , Act 56, 
1949, e s t a b l i s h e d labour bureaux f o r A f r i c a n s . From 
November 1952 the M i n i s t e r of Native A f f a i r s could compel 
Local Councils t o set up labour bureaux. These formed 
an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the i n f l u x c o n t r o l system. Evening 
Post, 7 November 1952. 
(7) Act 67, 1952. 
2 1 6 
communities ( 1 ) . I t became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t f o r 
wives and c h i l d r e n t o l i v e m the towns ( 2 ) . For the f i r s t 
time A f r i c a n women throughout the Union were compelled t o 
seek a permit i f they wished t o remain m an urban area f o r 
more than 72 hours (3)• Workseekers were severely r e s t r i c -
ted m the p e r i o d during which they might remain m a p a r t i c u -
l a r urban area, and i f t h i s was exceeded, were l i a b l e to 
de p o r t a t i o n (4 )• This penalty which could be imposed f o r 
other offences as w e l l acted as a strong d i s i n c e n t i v e t o 
d e l i b e r a t e and open r e j e c t i o n o f the law by urban blacks. 
The " A b o l i t i o n of Passes" Act, despite the claims of 
Dr Verwoerd t o the contrary (5 ) , imposed new r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on many A f r i c a n s . A l l women were r e q u i r e d t o have a pass 
book which had t o be c a r r i e d a t a l l times ( 6 ) . Other 
p r e v i o u s l y exempt groups were r e q u i r e d to h o l d s p e c i a l permits 
and t o appear a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s before a Native 
Commissioner ( 7 ) -
The Government showed equal determination to enforce the 
t o t a l separation of whites and non-whites m the conduct of 
(1) The p r o v i s i o n s governing which A f r i c a n s were e l i g i b l e f o r 
permanent residence m Urban Areas, i n v i t e d e x p l o i t a t i o n 
of employees by employers. 
(2) As a r e s u l t of the i n f l u x c o n t r o l measures P. Mayer, 
Townsmen or Countrymen, p 60, r e f e r s t o the considerable 
animosity t h i s provoked m East London. 
(3) The same p r o v i s i o n a p p l i e d t o men. 
(4) I n c e r t a i n circumstances t o work colonies and farm p r i s o n s . 
According to the O f f i c i a l Year Book, 1952-3, p 452, farm 
work was a "congenial" occupation f o r non-white p r i s o n e r s . 
(5) "This B i l l adds no new burden, but only seeks t o remove 
some of the e x i s t i n g ones .. i t gives a great deal o f 
r e l i e f t o the Natives g e n e r a l l y " , Dr. Verwoerd, House 
of Assembly, 25 June 1952. 
(6) The Natives Urban Areas Consolidation Act No^25, 1945, 
r e q u i r e d A f r i c a n Women t o have a c e r t i f i c a t e , / f o r example, 
to enter proclaimed areas. This Law, which contains 
numerous clauses r e s t r i c t i n g freedom of a c t i o n ^ o f f e r s 
evidence of the f i r m foundation provided by e a r l i e r 
Governments f o r the N a t i o n a l Party's p o l i c i e s . 
(7) I n a d d i t i o n these persons were not fr e e from i n f l u x 
c o n t r o l or the operation o f the Labour Bureaux. 
(*but only i n c e r t a i n circumstances) 
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p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . The N a t i o n a l Party's p o l i c y statement 
on Race Relations m 19^8 ( l ) paved the way f o r the i n t r o d u c -
t i o n o f the Separate Representation of Voters B i l l (2) and 
the Bantu A u t h o r i t i e s B i l l ( 3 ) . The proposal to remove 
Coloured v o t e r s from the common e l e c t o r a l r o l l provoked 
widespread o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n and outside South A f r i c a ( k ) . 
The i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Native's Representative Council (5) 
and the i n a b i l i t y of the white "Native Representatives" m 
Parliament to p r o t e c t A f r i c a n i n t e r e s t s o f f e r e d c l e a r evidence 
to the Coloured p o p u l a t i o n of what they stood to lose through 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Act. The Government's proposals 
f o r A f r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n m p u b l i c a f f a i r s , i n c o r p o r a t e d m 
the Bantu A u t h o r i t i e s Act, represented a f a r more r a d i c a l 
development of the Apartheid p o l i c y , and were t o t a l l y a t 
variance w i t h the i n c r e a s i n g l y i n s i s t e n t demands of the 
A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Congress. The Act provided f o r the c r e a t i o n 
of t r i b a l , r e g i o n a l and t e r r i t o r i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s m the 
Reserves. They were t o have very l i m i t e d powers and were 
almost e n t i r e l y dependent on the f i n a n c i a l assistance and 
law enforcement machinery of c e n t r a l Government. 
By 1952, the N a t i o n a l Party's t w i n pronged p o l i c y to 
separate the races (6) and minimize non-white freedom of 
a c t i o n , except along c l o s e l y determined paths, remained 
(1) N a t a l Mercury, 29 and 30 March 1 9 ^ . 
(2) Act ^6 , 1951. 
(3) Act 68 ,1951 . This a p p l i e d only to Reserve Areas, but m 1952 
the Government announced the Urban Bantu A u t h o r i t i e s B i l l to 
provide communal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r A f r i c a n town d w e l l e r s . 
For a c r i t i q u e see the Guardian, 6 March 1952. 
(k) Much of the white o p p o s i t i o n to the proposal stemmed not out o f 
sympathy f o r the l o s s of r i g h t s s u f f e r e d by the Coloureds but from 
a concern a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e of r e p e a l i n g an en-
trenched clause m the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
(5) Abolished by Act 68, 1951. 
(6) The foregoing a n a l y s i s i s s e l e c t i v e , no reference i s made f o r 
example to the Immorality Acts of 19^9 and 1950-
2 1 8 
l a r g e l y unexecuted and m many respects i l l - d e f m e d ( l ) . 
Nevertheless, the prospect of the Laws already announced, the 
t h r e a t o f f u t u r e l e g i s l a t i o n , f o r example, to give force to 
the recommendations of the Commission on Native Education (2) 
and the I n d u s t r i a l L e g i s l a t i o n Commission ( j ) , together w i t h the 
impact of an i n c r e a s i n g number of orders and r e g u l a t i o n s r e s t r i c t i n g 
or preventing contact between races, m p u b l i c places ( 4 ) , combined 
to provide an a d d i t i o n a l and unequivocal challenge (5) t o black 
p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s and the i d e a l s they espoused when they were 
already under severe pressure by 1948. 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n of o p p o s i t i o n to the Government, severely 
hampered by 1948, was rendered i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
as a r e s u l t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Suppression of Communism Act (6 ) , 
but there were f a c t o r s f a v o u r i n g the emergence of widespread m i l i t a n t 
r e s i s t a n c e ! grounds f o r popular discontent, already strong m 1948, 
had increased sharply between then and 1952 and the d e t e r i o r a t i o n 
showed no signs of h a l t i n g . The banning of the Communist Party (7) 
and the common t h r e a t p a r t i c u l a r l y to r a d i c a l groups encouraged the 
a s s o c i a t i o n of the members of a t l e a s t some o f these movements 
( 1) For example, the Commission on the Socio-Economic Development 
01 -one Ke&erves was announced onxy on d./ uctoDer xy?o and was 
s t i l l gatnermg evidence during -che defiance campaign, although 
i t was c l e a r t h a t the model envisaged by J u s t i c e Fagan was t o t a l l y 
unacceptable to the Government. 
(2) U.G. 53, 1951. 
(3) U.G. 62, 1951. 
(4) These measures which r e g u l a r l y a f f e c t e d a l l urban non-whites, 
m p r a c t i c e , became the p r i n c i p a l b u t t of the Defiance Campaign. 
(5) I n c o n t r a s t to the United Party's Trusteeship P o l i c y . 
(6) Act 44, 1950, amended by Act 50, 19511 and subsequent l e g i s l a t i o n . 
(7) I t s d i s s o l u t i o n was announced on 20 June 1950, t o avoid prosecution 
under the Suppression of Communism Act which came i n t o e f f e c t on 
17 July 1950. 
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f o r e a r l y and concerted o p p o s i t i o n t o the dominant system. 
By 1950 both of the p r i n c i p a l non-white p o l i t i c a l bodies were 
c o n t r o l l e d by h i g h l y a r t i c u l a t e and determined r a d i c a l s , w e l l 
q u a l i f i e d t o mo b i l i s e popular support d ) f o r a campaign of 
m i l i t a n t a c t i o n . To achieve mass a c t i v e support the leader-
ship had t o formulate and put i n t o p r a c t i c e a c r e d i b l e and 
u l t i m a t e l y c l e a r l y advantageous a l t e r n a t i v e to acquiescence m 
the s t a t u s quo. I n 19^3 the then ANC lea d e r s h i p , under 
Dr Xuma, i t s President-General, drew up a B i l l o f Rights (2) 
which was adopted by the ANC's annual conference m December 19^3-
The B i l l demanded "the r e p e a l of any and a l l laws as w e l l as 
the abandonment o f any p o l i c y and a l l p r a c t i c e s t h a t d i s c r i m i -
nate against the A f r i c a n m any way whatsoever on the basis 
of race, creed or colour m the Union of South A f r i c a " . But 
i t was not accompanied by any statement of how the r i g h t s 
should be achieved. 
The formation of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) m 19¥f (3) 
marked a c r u c i a l step towards the adoption 
by the parent ANC of r e l a t i v e l y m i l i t a n t p o l i c i e s (k). The 
"Basic P o l i c y o f Congress Youth League" Document (5) issued m 
(1) One of the few p o t e n t i a l advantages possessed by the black 
p o p u l a t i o n v i s a v i s the Government was i t s numerical 
s u p e r i o r i t y . 
(2) For the t e x t see T. Kar i s and G. M. Carter, From P r o t e s t t o 
Challenge: A Documentary H i s t o r y o f A f r i c a n P o l i t i c s m 
South A f r i c a 1882-1964, v o l 2, pp 217-222. The B i l l was a 
response t o the 19^-1 Anglo-US A t l a n t i c Charter, endorsed by 
Smuts. 
(3) A. P. Mda, Anton Lembede (d i e d 19^7), O l i v e r Tambo and 
David Bopape played a leading r o l e a t i t s i n c e p t i o n . Lembede 
who exercised p a r t i c u l a r i n f l u e n c e over the t h i n k i n g of the 
ANCYL was a strong advocate o f the r a c i a l l y exclusive 
"Garveyite" stream of A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m . 
(4) The development of the ANCYL i s considered by K a r i s and Carter 
pp 98-107. For a d e t a i l e d study o f the growth of r a d i c a l i s m 
m the ANC see P. Walshe, "The A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Congress of 
South A f r i c a : Aspects of Ideology and Organization 1912-1951" 
(D.Phil Thesis, Oxford 1967). Published m shortened form under 
the t i t l e The Rise of A f r i c a n Nationalism m South A f r i c a . 
(5 ) For t e x t see, P r o t e s t to Challenge, v o l 2, pp 323 -331• I t 
was preceded by the 1 9 H ANCYL Manifesto. 
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1948, had as i t s cornerstone "the creed of A f r i c a n Nationalism", 
described as, "the m i l i t a n t outlook of an oppressed people 
seeking a s o l i d basis f o r waging a long, b i t t e r and u n r e l e n t i n g 
s t r u g g l e f c z ^ i t s , n a t i o n a l freedom" ( 1 ) . A. P. Mda, by 1948 
Chairman of the Youth League, claimed only A f r i c a n Nationalism 
could "give the black masses the se l f - c o n f i d e n c e and dynamism 
to make a successful s t r u g g l e " ( 2 ) . Yet the Basic P o l i c y 
Document, w h i l s t representing a major advance m Congress t h i n k -
i n g d i d not t a c k l e the c e n t r a l problem of t a c t i c s . Moreover, 
i t represented only the viewpoint o f the Youth League, a t 
l e a s t t i l l 1949 when r a d i c a l s , i n c l u d i n g prominent members of 
the ANCYL,achieved a m a j o r i t y p o s i t i o n on the parent ANC n a t i o n a l 
executive (3)- The need"for an o u t l i n e s t r a t e g y f o r securing 
the goals put forward m the B i l l o f Rights and the Basic P o l i c y 
Document was f i n a l l y met m December 1949 a t the ANC's annual 
conference which approved a "Programme of A c t i o n " ( 4 ) . The 
Programme's authors (5) hoped by means of b o y c o t t s , c i v i l 
disobedience (6) and s t r i k e s both ^° develop mass 
support, r a i s i n g the p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the A f r i c a n 
p o p u l a t i o n , and on the other t o challenge the e x i s t i n g order 
m South A f r i c a . W h i l s t t h i s "composite" approach won wide-
spread support m Congress, the "Hamba Kahle" ("moderate") 
Congress leadership had r e s e r v a t i o n s . Xuma, f o r example, 
continued to b e l i e v e Congress should f i r s t increase i t s 
membership and improve i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n before embarking on 
a campaign o f mass a c t i o n (7) - Nevertheless the c o n t i n u a l l y 
(1) Annex to Basic P o l i c y Document, i b i d . , p 328. See also 
G. Carter, A f r i c a n Concepts o f Nationalism m South A f r i c a . 
(2) P r o t e s t t o Challenge, v o l 2, p 103. 
(3) The r a d i c a l component on the executive grew m numbers from the 
e a r l y 1940's and p r i o r t o 1949 ( and a f t e r ) i n c l u d e d David 
Bopape, Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks and Edwin Mofutsanya. 
(4) For the t e x t see P r o t e s t to Challenge, v o l 2, pp 337~9-
(5) The f i n a l d r a f t appears to have derived from v a r i o u s sources. 
i b i d . , pp 103-4. A.P. Mda was one o f the p r i n c i p a l authors. 
(6) According t o Prof. Z.K. Matthews the "immediate i n s p i r a t i o n " f o r the 
d e c i s i o n t o undertake c i v i l disobedience was the 1946 I n d i a n 
passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign, P r o t e s t t o Challenge, v o l 2, p 103. 
(7) Xuma was replaced as ANC Chairman m December 1949 by Dr J.S.Moroka, 
who had the support o f the ANCYL since, u n l i k e Xuma, he professed 
acceptance o f the Programme m i t s e n t i r e t y . 
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d e t e r i o r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r A f r i c a n s , and i n c r e a s i n g l y 
r a d i c a l demands f o r a c t i o n expressed a t post-war annual 
meetings o f Congress ( l ) favoured the r a p i d and widespread 
acceptance w i t h i n the ANC of the proposals m the Programme 
of A c t i o n . Having secured a p l a t f o r m and mouthpiece f o r t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s , the Congress m i l i t a n t s could begin to win the support 
of A f r i c a n s outside the Organization s e t t i n g m motion the 
process of e s t a b l i s h i n g the ANC as the pre-eminent channel f o r 
the expression of A f r i c a n o p i n i o n (2) and the dominant f o r c e 
f o r n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n . 
Developments m "black n a t i o n a l i s m " d u r i n g the IS'to's 
r e f l e c t e d m the Basic P o l i c y Document, the Programme of A c t i o n 
and the assumption to power m the A f r i c a n and I n d i a n Congresses 
of m i l i t a n t s , who shared an equal determination t o replace the 
e x i s t i n g dominant set of r u l e s , and by s i m i l a r means, brought 
nearer the prospect of nation-wide r a d i c a l o p p o s i t i o n t o the 
Government's p o l i c i e s . 
But prospects f o r co-operation m a co-ordinated campaign 
of r e s i s t a n c e amongst the groups who advocated the t o t a l 
replacement of South A f r i c a ' s e x i s t i n g r a c i a l l y based economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l systems d i d not look very promising a t 
l e a s t t i l l the end of the decade. Elements, f o r example, o f 
the "Hamba Kahle" leadership m the ANC and members of the 
ANCYL were h o s t i l e to such an a l l i a n c e . There were, however, 
i n c r e a s i n g l y evident t a c t i c a l and p r e s e n t a t i o n a l advantages m 
co-operation, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o l l o w i n g the assumption to power 
of the N a t i o n a l Party. 
(1) The growth of A f r i c a n r a d i c a l i s m was d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d 
t o the increase of the urban A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n , p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n m p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s and trade unions, 
and i n c r e a s i n g l y harsh c o n d i t i o n s . 
(2) This development was f a c i l i t a t e d by the lack of leaders 
and p o l i c i e s of comparable standard and p o t e n t i a l m other 
A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
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With the death m 1947 of Anton Lembede the "Ggfveyite" 
stream of A f r i c a n Nationalism m the ANCYL l o s t impetus. I n 
1948, the Youth League, m the appendix t o i t s Basic P o l i c y 
Document, f o r m a l l y r e j e c t e d the "Gaveyite" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m 
favour of a more moderate, e s s e n t i a l l y n o n - r a c i a l approach 
and agreed t h a t " N a t i o n a l Organizations of the A f r i c a n ^ Indians 
and Coloureds may co-operate on common issues" ( 1 ) . 
M i l i t a n t I n d i a n leaders were e s p e c i a l l y i n t e n t to 
e s t a b l i s h c l o s e r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r O r g a n i z a t i o n s and the 
ANC as the p r i n c i p a l African p o l i t i c a l body ( 2 ) , r e c o g n i z i n g 
j o i n t a c t i o n o f f e r e d the only p r a c t i c a l means f o r them t o 
secure fundamental and l a s t i n g improvement m t h e i r s t a t u s . 
Relations between the two Congresses, the most important 
elements m the p u t a t i v e r a d i c a l a l l i a n c e , were strengthened 
by the 1946-1948 passive re s i s t a n c e campaign, the impact of 
the A f r i c a n - I n d i a n r i o t s m Durban m 1949 (3)? personal con-
t a c t s ( 4 ) , t h e i r broadly and i n c r e a s i n g l y compatible b e l i e f s 
and p o l i c i e s and the acceptance by the I n d i a n leadership o f 
a subordinate s t a t u s m the a l l i a n c e (5) -
Members of the South A f r i c a n Communist Party (CPSA) were 
a c t i v e m f o s t e r i n g co-operation between members of r a d i c a l 
(1 ) For the t e x t of the appendix to the Basic P o l i c y Document 
see Protest to Challenge, v o l 2, pp 326-331-
(2) I n the immediate post-war years no A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n had a membership of more than a few thousand 
but the ANC was the most a c t i v e and widespread. I n d i a n 
leaders wished t o co-operate w i t h the ANC even when i t was 
c o n t r o l l e d by n o n - m i l i t a n t s . See, f o r example, the "Three 
Doctors Pact" of 1947 (p 179 ) . 
(3) For an account, see K. Kirkwood,The Durban R i o t s and A f t e r 
and M. Benson, The Struggle f o r a B i r t h r i g h t , pp 123-4. 
(4) These were p a r t i c u l a r l y important m Johannesburg,where, a t l e a s t , 
from 1950 i n d i v i d u a l members of the Congresses" n a t i o n a l executives 
r e s i d e n t there maintained close contact through i n f o r m a l d i s -
cussions. Plans f o r the defiance campaign were f i r s t considered 
m t h i s way. Y. Dadoo i n t e r v i e w , 8 February 1969- There was also 
" c o n s t a n t " l i a i s o n between A f r i c a n and I n d i a n r a d i c a l s m Natal 
from 1950, M. P. Naicker i n t e r v i e w , 4 December 1969-
(5) Although; p a r t i c u l a r l y as ANC membership grew equal I n d i a n represen-
t a t i o n on j o i n t d e c i s i o n making bodies became i n c r e a s i n g l y out o f 
l i n e with the r e s p e c t i v e numerical s t r e n g t h s of the two O r g a n i z a t i o n s . 
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o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n i t i a t i n g j o i n t conventions and campaigns. 
And w i t h increased contact between ANCYL leaders and supporters 
of marxist b e l i e f s ( f o r example on Congress committees), the 
i t s e l f d e clined. However, members of the ANCYL and others 
m the ANC were deeply c r i t i c a l when, a t the i n s t i g a t i o n o f 
the CPSA, "freedom day" demonstrations were organized f o r 
1 May 1950, the date set aside by the ANC leaders t o i n i t i a t e 
the Programme of A t i o n w i t h a one day n a t i o n a l stoppage of 
work. 
The k i l l i n g by the p o l i c e of 18 p a r t i c i p a n t s m "freedom 
day" demonstrations and the i n j u r i n g of 38 o t h e r s , had a 
c a t l a r t i c e f f e c t , i nducing ANC leaders to co-operate w i t h 
leaders of the CPSA, I n d i a n Congress and the A f r i c a n Peoples 
Organization (APO) m org a n i z i n g a day of p r o t e s t and mourning 
on 26 June 1950 ( l ) . As Walshe notes (2) i t was not an 
outstanding success but, once begun the process of c o n s u l t a t i o n 
between the leaders continued, a l b e i t a t f i r s t , very i n t e r -
m i t t e n t l y and w i t h h e s i t a t i o n . The d i s s o l u t i o n o f the CPSA 
m June 1950, m a sense, made easier the process o f co-operation, 
since there was, t h e r e a f t e r , no longer a meaningful a l t e r n a t i v e 
t o the ANC t o head a r a d i c a l a l l i a n c e , thus h e l p i n g the ANC to 
achieve a pre-eminent p o s i t i o n and, a d d i t i o n a l l y , perhaps 
lessening tension w i t h i n i t . 
I n January 1951 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of var i o u s p o l i t i c a l 
a s s o c i a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the ANC and South A f r i c a n I n d i a n 
Congress (SAIC) formed the Franchise A c t i o n Committee ( l a t e r c o u n c i l ) 
(FAC) t o demand the vote f o r a l l South A f r i c a n s on an equal basis 
(1) For basic d e t a i l s o f these events see H.J. & R.E. Simons, 
Class and Colour m South A f r i c a 1850-1950, pp 60^-5, 
P. Walshe, The Rise of A f r i c a n Nationalism, pp 3^6-7. 
(2) op. c i t . , p 367-
CPSA and m 
BBS memDers 
former's h o s t i l i t y towards some cases t o Marxism 
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and d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r non-Europeans m Parliament ( 1 ) . 
Then m June 1951 the ANC n a t i o n a l executive i n v i t e d the 
members of the FAC and SAIC executive c o u n c i l s t o a j o i n t 
conference t o consider t a k i n g a stand against the " r i s i n g 
t i d e of n a t i o n a l oppression" (2) and to discuss "methods of 
d i r e c t a c t i o n " ( 3 ) . The meeting took place on 29 J u l y 1951 (k) • 
The decision was taken there " t o form a c o u n c i l t o co-ordinate 
the e f f o r t s of the N a t i o n a l organizations of the A f r i c a n , 
I n d i a n and Coloured people m ... an .. immediate mass cam-
paign f o r the repeal of ( c e r t a i n ) oppressive laws" (5)-
This development r e f l e c t s the r a p i d progress m co-operation 
amongst black r a d i c a l groups p a r t i c u l a r l y from May 1950 and 
was a measure of the re-alignment which had occurred. 
(1) The Guardian 18 January 1951- This newspaper c a r r i e d 
extensive r e p o r t s of the Council's a c t i v i t i e s t i l l mid-
1952 when the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s bona f i d e s were i n c r e a s i n g l y 
c a l l e d i n t o question by A f r i c a n and I n d i a n Congress 
leaders. The FAC was e s s e n t i a l l y a Coloured Cape-based 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g l y under T r o t s k y i t e i n f l u e n c e . 
(2) Report of the ANC n a t i o n a l executive committee 1951i c i t e d 
by P. Walshe, o p . c i t . , p k02. 
(3) O f f i c i a l Record of the preparatory hearing m 3egma vs 
W. M. S i s u l u and 19 others on charges of contravening 
the Suppression of Communism Act, 31 August 1952. 
(k) I t was preceded by i n f o r m a l contacts between I n d i a n and 
A f r i c a n leaders, most notably Walter Sisulu and Dr Yusuf 
Dadoo. The proposals f o r a r e s i s t a n c e campaign were 
f i r s t presented to the ANC n a t i o n a l executive by a sub-
committee, "The Council of A c t i o n " , set up t o implement 
the Programme of A c t i o n . 
(S) Regma vs S i s u l u , 31 August 1952. The laws m question 
are set out a t p 2 25 
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CHAPTER I I . THE AIMS, PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE 
DEFIANCE OF UNJUST LAWS CAMPAIGN 
"The t a r g e t of the campaign ( i s ) u n j u s t , oppressive laws ... 
the course we have chosen i s the only way open to us of showing 
our o p p o s i t i o n t o laws which have no moral basis ... our hope 
i s t h a t white people w i l l look i n t o our grievances, take us 
s e r i o u s l y . The Defiance Campaign i s a p o l i t i c a l demonstration 
against d i s c r i m i n a t o r y laws ... the s t r u g g l e i s not d i r e c t e d 
against any race or n a t i o n a l group but against the u n j u s t laws 
which keep i n p e r p e t u a l s u b j e c t i o n and misery vast sections 
of the p o p u l a t i o n " ( 1 ) . 
The campaign had several purposes. I t s s t a t e d aim was 
to secure the repeal of the Bantu A u t h o r i t i e s Act, the Group 
Areas Act, the Voters Representation Act, the Suppression of 
Communism Act, Pass Laws (2 ) , Stock L i m i t a t i o n Controls (3) 
and p e t t y a p a r t h e i d r e g u l a t i o n s (k), these being the laws and 
r e g u l a t i o n s which black p o l i t i c a l leaders agreed most serious-
l y repressed and threatened t h e i r people and which, a t the 
same time, appeared capable of being challenged by means the 
leaders were prepared and able to use. I n p r a c t i c e , as 
L u t u l i shows, the leaders conceived of the campaign as a demon-
s t r a t i o n of discontent and were under few i l l u s i o n s of i t s 
probable coercive e f f e c t on the white p o p u l a t i o n . 
(1) A L u t h u l i . Let My People Go, pp 105 and 110. 
(2) Pass requirements derived from v a r i o u s laws and r e g u l a t i o n s 
extending back t o a t l e a s t 1760 i n c l u d i n g the Natives Adminis-
t r a t i o n Act (1927), successive Native (Urban Areas) Acts, 
from 1923-19^5, and, m 1952, i n the Natives ( A b o l i t i o n o f 
Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act. There were also 
municipal r e g u l a t i o n s . For d e t a i l s of the other laws which 
were the subject of the campaign, see pp 214-218 above. 
(3) The Stock Regulations were set out m Proclamation 116 of 19*4-9-
(k) General a p a r t h e i d r e g u l a t i o n s were not in c l u d e d xn the l x s t of 
laws drawn up a t the J o i n t ANC-SAIC-FAC meeting on 29 July 
1951, but see p 2 2 7 
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The campaign had a c r u c i a l i n t e r n a l f u n c t i o n t o f u l f i l l , 
t o develop mass p o l i t i c a l consciousness amongst the blacks, 
to secure a c t i v e popular support, on a scale p r e v i o u s l y not 
a t t a i n e d by the ANC, t o strengthen the Congress o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
and improve the l e v e l of co-operation amongst the c o n s t i t u e n t 
elements of the Congress a l l i a n c e . These i n t e r n a l goals 
were co n s i s t e n t w i t h the Programme of A c t i o n ( 1 ) . F i n a l l y , 
the Campaign provided a t e s t of a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g y of 
a c t i o n , p o s s i b l y o f f e r i n g t a c t i c a l g u i d e l i n e s f o r the f u t u r e . 
The choice of the term "defiance" campaign was d e l i b e r a t e . 
Congress m 1952 was f i r m l y committed to n o n - v i o l e n t a c t i o n 
but as the Programme o f Ac t i o n made c l e a r the ANC was set on 
a m i l i t a n t path aimed a t fundamental change m South A f r i c a n 
society (2 ) , t h i s a p p l i e d equally t o the I n d i a n congresses. 
The term "defiance" of u n j u s t laws campaign was thus adopted 
to s i g n i f y the new s p i r i t of m i l i t a n c y . 
Preparations f o r the Campaign 
I n i t i a l p r eparations f o r the proposed campaign were 
undertaken by the J o i n t Planning Council of the A f r i c a n and 
I n d i a n Congresses (3) which had been e s t a b l i s h e d to co-ordinate 
the e f f o r t s of the groups i n t e n d i n g t o p a r t i c i p a t e m the cam-
paign. The Council lacked precise terms of reference and had 
no a u t h o r i t y t o extend the scope of the proposed defiance. 
I t was Transvaal based, comprising Yusuf Dadoo, Yusuf Cachalia, 
(1) P 2 2 0 
(2) Congress a c t i v i t i e s of the e a r l y 1950's m p a r t i c u l a r 
the defiance campaign mark the a c t i v e resumption of the 
long dormant " l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e " and m a sense mark 
the t a k i n g up o f the threads l e f t o f f by Bambata m 
1906. 
(3) For i t s o r i g i n s see p 2 24 above. The Franchise A c t i o n 
Council was n e i t h e r a n a t i o n a l nor a permanent body and 
f o r these and other reasons was not i n v i t e d t o s i t on the 
Planning Council. 
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J. B. Marks and Walter S i s u l u w i t h James Moroka as i t s nominal 
head. The Council reported to the ANC annual conference m 
December 1951* The r e p o r t (1) o f f e r e d a conceptual framework 
f o r the campaign and may be l i k e n e d t o a p r e - e l e c t i o n p a r t y 
manifesto, expressing the u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e of the movement, 
i t s immediate o v e r t aims and the means by which these should 
be achieved ( 2 ) . I t d i d not c o n s t i t u t e a d e t a i l e d plan o f 
a c t i o n . 
With the exception of the Pass Laws, the t a r g e t s selected 
f o r o p p o s i t i o n a t the J o i n t Conference of the N a t i o n a l Executives 
d i d not provide a f e a s i b l e basis f o r the planned mass non-
co-operation - a t l e a s t m the immediate f u t u r e . This probably 
accounts f o r the Council's suggestion t h a t I n d i a n and Coloured 
a c t i v i s t s , who were not subject t o pass laws, should defy 
"general a p a r t h e i d segregation". I n a d d i t i o n , the Population 
R e g i s t r a t i o n Act (3) was put forward as an eventual t a r g e t f o r 
r e s i s t a n c e , though i t d i d not become so. The r u r a l sector 
was accorded comparatively l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n m the Report, 
the authors were more concerned to m o b i l i z e urban support. 
Their proposals f o r o p p o s i t i o n to stock l i m i t a t i o n and c a t t l e 
c u l l i n g m betterment areas added no t h i n g of substance to the 
J u l y 1951 d e c l a r a t i o n o f the ANC and SAIC executive c o u n c i l s . 
The r e g u l a t i o n s were, m any event, implemented piecemeal 
and, hence, o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r r e s i s t a n c e were l i m i t e d ( k ) . 
(1) The t e x t of the J o i n t Planning Council Report i s a t 
Annex A below. 
(2) See, f o r example, paragraph 7 o f the Report o u t l i n i n g 
"the fundamental p r i n c i p l e which i s the k e r n e l of our 
s t r u g g l e f o r freedom". 
(3) Act 30, 1950. 
(k) A p o i n t stressed by M. B. Yengwa, i n t e r v i e w 16 May 1970. 
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The Report envisaged the campaign beginning e i t h e r on 
6 A p r i l 1952, the Van R lebeck Tercentenary,of 2fc June 1952, 
the anniversary of the N a t i o n a l day of p r o t e s t m 1952 ( l ) . 
I t was t o have three stages, the f i r s t i n v o l v i n g r e s i s t a n c e 
by experienced cadres m the mam urban centres, the second 
seeing a l i m i t e d broadening of the s t r u g g l e and the t h i r d , 
country-wide mass a c t i o n . There was no attempt t o suggest 
a t i m e t a b l e . 
The Report s t a t e d , " w i t h regard t o the form of s t r u g g l e 
best s u i t e d to our c o n d i t i o n s we have been constrained t o bear 
m mind the p o l i t i c a l and economic set up of our country ... 
the economic s t a t u s of the ... non-white people and the l e v e l 
of o r g a n i z a t i o n of the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t o r y movements". I t 
proposed two t a c t i c s as the p r i n c i p a l means of prosecuting 
the defiance campaign, non-co-operation w i t h u n j u s t laws 
and i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n ( 2 ) . The Report recommended t h a t 
i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n be confined p r i m a r i l y to the t h i r d and f i n a l 
stage of countrywide mass r e s i s t a n c e . I t was not a f i r s t 
p r i o r i t y and hence was no"t given d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n m 
the Report. But the authors argued, " i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n i s 
second to none, the best and most important weapon m the 
s t r u g g l e ... f o r the r e p e a l of the u n j u s t laws ..." The 
Council made no s p e c i f i c recommendation t h a t the campaign 
should be confined t o n o n - v i o l e n t means, although t h i s was 
i m p l i c i t . Arguably, since the document was intended 
p r i m a r i l y f o r i n t e r n a l consumption i t may have been considered 
superfluous to re-emphasise the Congresses' t r a d i t i o n a l 
( 1) p 2 2 3 
(2) The l e t t e r s w r i t t e n by the Congresses to the Prime 
M i n i s t e r demanding the r e p e a l of s p e c i f i e d laws by 
February 1952 and the use o f the boycott "weapon" 
during the Van Riebeck c e l e b r a t i o n s m A p r i l , f a l l 
outside the mainstream of the campaign, though the 
former, as m the campaign of 1906-191^, was probably 
considered a t the time to be an e s s e n t i a l precursor. 
attachment t o non-violence, but i t i s a s u r p r i s i n g ommission (1 
Kuper argued "the choice of passive r e s i s t a n c e as a form of 
str u g g l e appears to have been governed by considerations of 
expediency r a t h e r than by the e t h i c o f Satyagraha" ( 2 ) . This 
i s so, but there was a f i r m commitment. 
I n general, the Report o f f e r e d few d e t a i l e d proposals 
f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f the campaign, but the 
intended r o l e o f the J o i n t Planning (and D i r e c t i n g ) Council 
was accorded close a t t e n t i o n as was t h a t of the sub-national 
c o u n c i l s , to be appointed by the j o i n t Executives of the 
Congresses to organize volunteer corps of r e s i s t e r s . The 
members of the e x i s t i n g planning c o u n c i l intended, i t would 
seem, to r e t a i n a dec i s i v e c o n t r o l over the d i r e c t i o n of the 
campaign w h i l s t r e c o g n i s i n g the nominal supremacy of the f u l l 
n a t i o n a l executives of the ANC and SAIC. There was no 
attempt m the Report t o define the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s o f the 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of c o u n c i l s , nor, t o consider m any depth 
the i n t e r a c t i o n of the e n t i r e proposed d e c i s i o n - t a k i n g 
network. I n p a r t , t h i s may have been due to the r e c o g n i t i o n 
t h a t the d i f f e r e n t circumstances of each Province and the 
f a c t o r s of distance and l i m i t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l resources 
made i n e v i t a b l e a considerable degree of l o c a l autonomy and 
v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n the basic framework of the campaign. But 
the authors of the Report appear t o have favoured a consider-
able measure of c e n t r a l c o n t r o l from the nationa] and p r o v i n -
c i a l headquarters. The Council members claimed " w i t h some 
confidence" t h a t t h e i r proposals f o r f i n a n c i n g the campaign 
would meet requirements, but no attempt was made to give 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l form t o the " m i l l i o n s h i l l i n g d r i v e " , f o r 
(1) The adoption of n o n - v i o l e n t resistance f o r the Campaign 
was c e r t a i n l y discussed at? meetings to approve the 
Report - see, f o r example, Lutuli's testimony. O f f i c i a l 
Record of the South A f r i c a n Treason T r i a l (1956-1961), 
Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n m i c r o f i l m copy, P116V5-
(2) L. Kuper, Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a , p 103. 
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example, by suggesting the s e t t i n g up of s p e c i a l fund r a i s i n g 
committees. Nevertheless, i t was proposed t h a t the sum be 
c o l l e c t e d by March 1952. The o u t l i n e nature of the P'lamung 
c o u n c i l document i s also emphasised by the absence o f recommen-
dations f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n of propaganda,despite i t s impor-
tance m non-violent r e s i s t a n c e campaigns,and tne lack of a 
p r o v i s i o n a l programme f o r the p e r i o d from December 1951 to 
the beginning of defiance. 
The process of securing approval f o r the p r o v i s i o n s of the 
Report and a m p l i f y i n g i t s proposals extended f r o i i November 1951 
t i l l approximately the end of March 1952. P r i o r t o i t s sub-
m i t t a l a t the annual ANC conference, the d r a f t was taken by 
Marks, S i s u l u , Dadoo and Cachalia to Moroka a t Thaba'Nchu f o r 
h i s s i gnature. Although chairman o f the 3 o m t p lannmg 
r o u n c i l , h i s r o l e was nomnal ( 1 ) . Dadoo sai d that Moroka 
agreed t o the document very r e a d i l y "never h i m s e l f expecting 
to s u f f e r , having so many A f r i k a n e r f r i e n d s " . Subsequently 
the plan was submitted to Professor Matthews, president of the 
Cape ANC, and p o s s i b l y to other members of the Cape executive. 
According t o Dadoo, i t met w i t h general approval t h e r e , 
though suggestions were put forward f o r i n c o r p o r a t i n g l o c a l 
sources of grievance m the campaign. This idea was taken 
up elsewhere ( 2 ) . When and whether the N a t a l A f r i c a n and 
I n d i a n executives were consulted about the Planning Document 
remains unclear. Dr Dadoo, m an i n t e r v i e w (3) was unsure 
whether members of the Council d i d v i s i t N a t a l before the annual 
ANC conference, but i n d i c a t i o n s from L u t u l i (k) and Yengwa (5) 
s t r o n g l y suggest t h a t the N a t a l leaders d i d not receive d e t a i l s 
of the Report a t l e a s t u n t i l very s h o r t l y before the ANC n a t i o n a l 
conference. Mary Benson (6) contends the plans were sent m 
(1) Y. Dadoo, f o r example, made t h i s c l e a r - i n t e r v i e w , 8 
February 1969. 
(2) For example, m Natal* i n t e r v i e w , M.P.Naicker, k December 1969. 
(3) op. c i t . 
(k) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, p 107. 
^5) I n t e r v i e w , 16 May 1970. 
(6) M. Benson, The Struggle f o r a B i r t h r i g h t , p 138. 
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e r r o r t o Champion, who had ceased to be president of the 
N a t i o n a l ANC m June 1951- I f t h i s i s t r u e i t leaves un-
explained why tne Na t a l I n d i a n Congress d i d not receive a 
copy of the document or communicate i t s contents to t h e i r 
opposite numbers m the ANC w i t h whom they are said t o nave 
had good contact ( 1 ) . Whatever the'answer,it o f f e r s an 
example of the very o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weakness which t i e defiance 
campaign was intended to pat r i g h t . 
The process of i n f o r m i n g congress o f f i c i a l s of the 
p r o / i s i o n s of the Report and securing i t s formal acceptance 
was advanced through delegate conferences of the ANC, the SAIC 
and the Franchise A c t i o n Council ( 2 ) . There i s a dearth of 
i n f o r m a t i o n about the Conferences, but there was overwhelming 
support on each occasion m favour of o r g a n i z i n g a r e s i s t a n c e 
campaign on the l i n e s proposed by the J o i n t Council. A 
r e p o r t m Sgark (3) on the ANC conference a t Bloemfontem 
noted t h a t , "nobody from extreme l e f t to the conservatives 
argued against mass a c t i o n . The debate centred around d e t a i l s 
of o r g a n i z a t i o n and not on the fundamental need f o r a c t i o n " . 
Howe^ v e r i the t i m i n g of the Campaign provoked debase a t the 
ANC conference.-r_/Manilal Gandhi, who attended, noted the 
fundamental d i v i s i o n between "the e x t r e m i s t s " ( i n t o whose Hands 
he f e l t the Congress a l l i a n c e was f a l l i n g ) and the "sober 
leaders" who expressed support f o r mass a c t i o n , but f e l t t h a t 
an e a r l y i n i t i a t i v e would be " s u i c i d a l " . Such people, he 
s a i d , were branded as " d e f e a t i s t s and appeasers" (k). The 
Conference decreed t h a t branches snould h o l d mass demonstra-
t i o n s on 6 A p r i l " t o p r o t e s t against ^00 years o f oppression" 
as a prelude to a wider campaign, the t i m i n g of which was t o 
M. Naicker, M. Yengwa, i n t e r v i e w s , o p . c i t . 
(2) I n December 1951, January and March 1952, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
(3) 29 February 1952, Spark was a f o r t n i g h t l y newsheet produced 
from 1952-3 by the Transvaal A f r i c a n and I n d i a n Youth 
Leagues. According t o Spark i t was the ANC Youth League 
t h a t proposed the r e s o l u t i o n f o r mass a c t i o n a t Bloemfontem. 
(^) I n d i a n Opinion, 11 January 1952. M. Gandhi was the e d i t o r . 
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be f i x e d l a t e r ( 1 ) . Whether t h i s two stage approach was only-
formulated during the conference, m tne face o f those u r g i n g 
caution, or whether the authors o f the planning c o u n c i l r e p o r t 
were already prepared f o r t h i s i s unclear, but the l a t t e r seems 
more probable. Popular support f o r the planning c o u n c i l ' s 
proposals could be guaged t o some exte n t , from p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
on 6 A p r i l , and f u t u r e a c t i o n programmed ac c o r d i n g l y . More-
over, the Government was thus deprived of 6 months n o t i c e of 
the s t a r t i n g date f o r the campaign. The Conference i n s t r u c t e d 
t h a t p r o v i n c i a l Congresses should organize conferences from 1 1 - 1 ^ 
A p r i l t o receive branch r e p o r t s on l o c a l p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the 
proposed campaign and to issue f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s from the 
Nati o n a l Executive. These meetings were t o be followed by a 
conference of the ANC n a t i o n a l executive on A p r i l 26/27-
The SAIC conference accepted the p l a n n i n g c o u n c i l r e p o r t 
and i n s t r u c t e d the incoming Executive t o work out a d e t a i l e d 
programme o f a c t i o n w i t h the ANC to be ready f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n 
a t p r o v i n c i a l congresses immediately a f t e r 6 A p r i l . Having 
received comments from these congresses the SAIC executive was 
to consult w i t h the ANC ( 2 ) . The FAC, a t a conference attended 
by over 90 delegates, who claimed t o represent 63,000 supporters, 
gave unanimous approval to the Report and i n s t r u c t e d t h a t 
machinery be set up immediately to implement the Plan (3)* 
Dadoo and Si s u l u addressed the meeting. The delegate confer-
ences were complemented by l o c a l meetings, p r o v i n c i a l conferences 
of branch delegates and i n f o r m a l contacts a t and between a l l 
l e v e l s . 
(1) At a meeting t o be he l d on 26/27 A p r i l . L e t t e r from S i s u l u 
to the J o i n t Hon. Sec. SAIC, 8 January 1952. Regma vs 
Sisu l u and 19 o t h e r s , pp 292-3. 
(2) L e t t e r from Y. A. Cachalia t o Sisulu, 5 February 1952. Regma vs 
Si s u l u , pp 316-8. 
(3) Guardian, 20 March 1952. Coloured a c t i v i s t s , through the FAC, 
played a major r o l e m organ i z i n g and executing the boycott 
o f the Van Riebeck c e l e b r a t i o n s . 
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During the f i r s t quarter of 1952 members o f the J o i n t 
planning c o u n c i l toured "che provinces to discuss f u r t h e r w i t h 
p r o v i n c i a l leaders plans f o r the campaign and t o m o b i l i z e popu-
l a r backing both m established centres of congress support 
and elsewhere. S i s u l u , f o r example, h e l d a number of mass 
meetings m N a t a l , i n c l u d i n g a t Nqutu where the Government 
was meeting r e s i s t a n c e t o a stock l i m i t a t i o n exercise ( 1 ) . 
Meetings to b u i l d up support were h e l d under j o i n t ANC/TIC sponsor-
ship m many centres m the Transvaal (2) and there are r e p o r t s , 
o f s i m i l a r gatherings m both the Western and Eastern Cape ( 3 ) . 
I n the Orange Free State there appears to have been l i t t l e such 
a c t i v i t y , though Spark r e p o r t s a meeting m Ladybrand sa i d to 
have been attended by 2,000 people ik) and there w i l l have 
been meetings m Bloemfontem and p o s s i b l y -at Ficksburg and 
Bethlehem where tnere were ANC branches (5) - Mass meetings, 
organized by the A f r i c a n and I n d i a n Congiesses i n c l u d i n g 
t h e i r youth wings, j o i n t l y or separately, played a major r o l e 
throughout the campaign - to secure v o l u n t e e r s , t o f u r t h e r the 
process of p o l i t i c a l education and to develop support f o r the 
Congress a l l i a n c e ( 6 ) . 
The p r o v i n c i a l congresses m A p r i l a f f o r d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y 
to inform grass r o o t s a c t i v i s t s about the forthcoming campaign, 
i 
t o encourage c o - o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and t o strengthen 
t h e i r r e solve, i n t e r a l i a , by emphasizing t h a t they were not 
s t r u g g l i n g m i s o l a t i o n but as a p a r t of a province and n a t i o n -
wide movement which was gaming i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n and 
backing. Representatives of 25 branches are s a i d to have 
(1) Guardian, 6 March 1952 and 3 A p r i l 1952. The map at p 2 71 
p l o t s recorded meetings m a l l provinces. 
(2) See, f o r example, r e p o r t s m unnamed ANC-TIC l e a f l e t 
r e f e r r e d t o m Bantu World, 5 A p r i l 1952. 
(3) Sources, (a) Guardian,2k January 1952 (Worcester,where there was 
a l o c a l p lanning c o u n c i l of the type envisaged oy the N a t i o n a l 
Planning C o u n c i l ) , ( b ) A.Sachs, interview, 1 0 November 1969, 
(c) Eastern Province Herald, 31 March 1952. 
(k) Spark, 11 A p r i l 1952. 
(5) A. L u t u l i , L e t My People Go,p 121. Such centres of discontent as the 
mining centre o f Odendaalsrus appear not t o have been approached. 
(6) For a s p e c i f i c example of such a meeting - w i t h d e t a i l s of the a l l -
important songs - see L.Kuper,Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a 
pp12-19- Prayers were u s u a l l y s a i d t o o . 
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attended the Transvaal meeting, discussing l o c a l support f o r 
demonstrations on the Van Riebeck Tercentenary and the s t a t e 
of p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the main campaign ( 1 ) . The Cape p r o v i n c i a l 
congress held m Port E l i z a b e t h and attended by 55 delegates 
representing the 8 sub-regions of the p r o v i n c i a l Congress, 
reported t o the n a t i o n a l headquarters t h a t the Cape was ready 
to play i t s p a r t m the campaign when the word was given and 
t h a t a l a r g e number of volunteers had already been e n r o l l e d ( 2 ) . 
Early m 1952, the ANC scarcely e x i s t e d m N a t a l outside Durban, 
and even there i t was f a r from strong, so t h a t the n o t i o n of 
a province-wide delegate conference was premature ( 3 ) . A 
p u b l i c meeting was h e l d by the "Natal branch of the ANC" on 23 
March a t which a r e s o l u t i o n was passed supporting the d e c i s i o n 
t o embark on a r e s i s t a n c e campaign,"subject to conforming to 
l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s " (k)• But t h i s was c l e a r l y not the forum f o r 
a d e t a i l e d discussion o f Natal's r o l e m the campaign. Tnere 
i s no record of a p r o v i n c i a l ANC congress m A p r i l m "the Free 
State. 
The SAIC executive was under i n s t r u c t i o n s t o present a 
d e t a i l e d plan of a c t i o n to i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p r o v i n c i a l organiza-
t i o n s s h o r t l y a f t e r A p r i l 6 but there i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h i s 
was c a r r i e d out. The I n d i a n leaders may have d e l i b e r a t e l y 
h e l d back l e a v i n g the i n i t i a t i v e to the ANC. The only delegate 
conference h e l d a f t e r A p r i l 6 by tne I n d i a n s , before the cam-
paign began,was m the Transvaal on 11 May, s h o r t l y a f t e r a 
(1) D. W. Bopape i n t e r v i e w e d m the Guardian, 17 A p r i l 1952. 
(2) Guardian, 2h A p r i l 1952. This was not Joe Matthews' 
r e c o l l e c t i o n ( i n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970) and was probably 
not taken too s e r i o u s l y a t the time by the n a t i o n a l leadership. 
The claim was presumably intended p r i m a r i l y as a c a t a l y s t 
to the uncommited. 
(3) The d i v i s i o n m the N a t a l ANC between "progiessives" and 
" r e a c t i o n a r i e s " which had f i n a l l y provoked Champion's depart-
ure m 1951 continued t o provoke t e n s i o n . 
(h) Guardian, 27 March 1952. 
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meeting of the SAIC executive. The plan n i n g c o u n c i l r e p o r t 
was o u t l i n e d and unanimously approved, but there i s no h i n t 
of an a d d i t i o n a l l y comprehensive plan o f a c t i o n being d i s -
cussed ( 1 ) . The meeting i s u n l i k e l y to have been s i g n i f i -
cant o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y . The mam branches o f the Transvaal 
I n d i a n Congress were m or near Johannesburg and i n f o r m a t i o n 
and i n s t r u c t i o n s could be t r a n s m i t t e d on an i n f o r m a l net 
wit h o u t w a i t i n g f o r a p r o v i n c i a l congress,almost c e r t a i n t o 
be i n f i l t r a t e d by the Government s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . 
The ANC and SAIC n a t i o n a l executives met s i n g l y , then m 
j o i n t session to complete preparations f o r r e s i s t a n c e . The 
ANC n a t i o n a l executive (2) meeting on A p r i l 27i received 
r e p o r t s from p r o v i n c i a l executives of prepara t i o n s f o r r e s i s -
tance which, i t claimed, i n d i c a t e d "a wide acceptance of the 
campaign by the A f r i c a n people botn m the r u r a l and urban 
areas" (j?)- The Executive, a f f i r m i n g i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the o v e r a l l p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n of the campaign, a t l e a s t f o r 
A f r i c a n p a r t i c i p a n t s , resolved t h a t an ANC N a t i o n a l Volunteers 
Council should be i n s t i t u t e d t o be responsible f o r the " t a c t i c a l 
aspects of tne campaign" (k)• A t a r g e t was set t o e n r o l l 
10,000 volunteers by June 26, the date f i n a l l y chosen f o r the 
beginning of the campaign. Moroka c a l l e d f o r an i n t e n s i f i -
c a t i o n of the " M i l l i o n S h i l l i n g d r i v e " and proposed a j o i n t 
meeting of the ANC and SAIC executives t o be held m Johannesburg 
towards the end o f May. Further c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the matters 
discussed a t the ANC n a t i o n a l executive meeting was l e f t to Vke. 
(1) I n d i a n Opinion, 16 May 1952, Leader, 16 May 1952. The 
miniscule Cape I n d i a n Assembly he l d a s i m i l a r r a t i f y i n g 
meeting. Guardian, 20 March 1952. Such meetings, together 
w i t h t h a t of the N a t a l ANC on 25 March, belong t o the 
immediate post Bloemfontem "approval" phase, r a t h e r than 
the l a t e r "planning" p e r i o d . 
(2) Membership m 1952 i n c l u d e d , J.Moroka, W.Sisulu, Prof. Z.K.Matthews 
(absent), N.Mandela, J.B.Marks, M.Kotane ( t i l l banned), D.Tloome, 
A . L u t u l i , Dr J.Njong'e, Rev. J.Calata, Rev. J.Skomolo and D.Mji, 
W.Conco, O.Tambo, M.Yengwa, Others, attended on a co-opted basis 
(3) ANC statement c a r r i e d m Guardian, 1 May 1952. 
(k) Treason T r i a l Record, pp 59V5 
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working committee ( 1 ) . This met on 2 May and proposed t h a t 
the J o i n t Executives should convene m Port E l i z a b e t h on 
31 May ( 2 ) . The working committee decided there should be a 
committee o f seven ( l a t e r c a l l e d the N a t i o n a l A c t i o n Council 
(NAC) ) repres e n t i n g the ANC and SAIC " t o prosecute the plan 
of a c t i o n " . E f f e c t i v e l y . i t was to be a re-embodiment of 
the fcmt planning c o u n c i l . The Committee also proposed 
t h a t the N a t i o n a l Volunteer Council should be a j o i n t body 
of 6, w i t n 3 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from each Congress (3 ) - A n a t i o n a l 
v o l u n t e e r - m - c h i e f and p r o v i n c i a l counterparts were t o be 
appointed. I t i s unclear how d e t a i l e d were the Committee's 
proposals, f o r example, on the f u n c t i o n s and r e l a t i v e respon-
s i b i l i t i e s of the NAC and volunteers' c o u n c i l s , nor do we know 
i f they were put t o a formal meeting of the f u l l ANC executive 
or what c o n s u l t a t i o n s were h e l d w i t h the Indians (who were 
given equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the NAC and volunteers' c o u n c i l ) . 
The proposals put forward by the ANC executive and i t s 
working committee were f o r m a l l y approved a t a meeting of the 
SAIC executive on k May. The SAIC executive l a i d : down as a 
p r e - c o n d i t i o n t h a t I n d i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the campaign be 
subject t o SAIC c o n t r o l vested i n those members of the execu-
t i v e on the NAC. Their ANC counterparts appear t o have had 
no such formal u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y ( k ) . The committee of the 
FAC met a t about the same time, r e s o l v i n g f u l l co-operation 
w i t h the Congresses m the defiance campaign (5)» 
H ) I n 1952 the working committee included Moroka ( n o m i n a l 9 ) , 
probably S i s u l u and Marks, and l a t t e r l y , i t seems, Mandela 
and Tloome, the l a s t two being r e f e r r e d to as members of 
the "ANC S e c r e t a r i a t " m Bantu World, 15 November 1952. 
(2) The FAC was not i n v i t e d on the grounds i t remained a 
r e g i o n a l r a t h e r than n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
(3) Resolutions of Working Committee. Treason T r i a l Record, pp 59^-5-
As i s o f t e n the case w i t h such s e l e c t i v e sources, only c e r t a i n 
decisions are given. 
(k) Minutes of meetings. Treason T r i a l Record, p 595-
(5) Guardian, 8 May 1952. 
The f i n a l stage m the formal planning preparations f o r 
the campaign comprised a j o i n t assembly of the A f r i c a n and 
I n d i a n Congress n a t i o n a l executi ves m Port E l i z a b e t h on 
May 31 . At t h i s , the n a t i o n a l a c t i o n c o u n c i l and n a t i o n a l 
volunteer corps c o - o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l were f o r m a l l y i n s t i t u t e d 
and June 26 agreed as the date f o r beginning the mam t h r u s t 
of the campaign ( 1 ) . The N a t a l leadership recommended a delay 
of several months as there was no prospect of t h e i r mounting 
resistance m the Province by June. As a compromise i t was 
agreed Na t a l should j o i n m the campaign when i t was ready ( 2 ) . 
The conference also approved, a f t e r some h e s i t a t i o n ( 3 ) 5 the 
proposal t h a t Bopape, Dadoo, Kotane, Marks and Ngwevela, a l l 
of whom had r e c e n t l y been ordered by the Government to r e s i g n 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e congress o f f i c e s (k), should make what would 
be t e c h n i c a l l y the f i r s t a c ts of defiance by v i o l a t i n g t h e i r 
banning orders. The Conference m a symbolic r e j e c t i o n of 
the Government's a p a r t h e i d p o l i c i e s brought together f o r the 
f i r s t time between 30 and kO leading p r o v i n c i a l and n a t i o n a l 
f i g u r e s of both the A f r i c a n and I n d i a n Congresses. Previously, 
w i t h the notable exception o f meetings of the J o i n t planning 
c o u n c i l , the two Congresses had tended to convene separate 
meetings of t h e i r o f f i c i a l s and supporters t o discuss prepara-
t i o n s f o r the campaign though p a r t i c u l a r l y a t p u b l i c gatherings 
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the other Congress would f r e q u e n t l y be 
present. The Conference demonstrated the n a t i o n a l base of 
the forthcoming campaign. I t also emphasized i t s imminence 
and gave an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p u b l i c i t y . 
The formal processes o u t l i n e d above m the planning of the 
campaign wrere complimented throughout by i n f o r m a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s 
amongst Congress o f f i c i a l s . These i n f o r m a l exchanges were 
(1) Treason T r i a l Record, p 596. 
(2) M. Yengwa, i n t e r v i e w , 1b May 1970. 
(3) i b i d . 
(k) I n May 1952 m terras of the Suppression of Communism Act. 
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probably the p r i n c i p a l source of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e s , 
proposals subsequently being r a t i f i e d a t formal meetings. 
The circumstances of the Congresses made personal i n f o r m a l 
l i n k s e s p e c i a l l y important ( 1 ) . The problems o f convening 
commit bee meetings, p a r t i c u l a r l y of people p o s s i b l y l i v i n g 
hundreds of miles apart and of members of d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l 
groups were considerable. Not only were there l e g a l r e s t r i c -
t i o n s t o be faced but also l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the lack of 
resources a t the Congresses' d i s p o s a l . They d i d not have the 
means to e s t a b l i s h an extensive e f f i c i e n t bureaucracy s t a f f e d 
w i t h f u l l time o f f i c i a l s who could meet a t w i l l . Even a t 
the l o c a l l e v e l formal committee meetings presented d i f f i c u l t i e s 
not l e a s t because most a c t i v i s t s m a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r Congress 
commitments had jobs t o go t o . There are evident l i m i t a t i o n s 
on the use of ad hoc l i n k s , but they were c o n s i s t e n t l y lmpor-
t a n t f o r the Congress a l l i a n c e i n \ d e f i a n c e campaign I t i s 
an aspect which F e i t underestimates, basing h i s c r i t i c i s m s of 
the ANC o r g a n i z a t i o n much too h e a v i l y on i t s formal s t r u c t u r e s ( 2 ) . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , because of the very nature of such i n f o r m a l 
contacts and the time which has elapsed since the campaign, 
the o p p o r t u n i t y no longer e x i s t s to b u i l d up a comprehensive 
study of these l i n k s . We know, f o r example, t h a t there was 
a great deal of i n f o r m a l contact between Congress leaders m 
Johannesburg d u r i n g the planning stages but not p r e c i s e l y what 
was agreed m these circumstances and a t whose i n i t i a t i v e . 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p a t t e r n evolved by June 1952 was 
c e r t a i n l y an advance on the planning c o u n c i l ' s b l u e p r i n t , but 
much remained to be done. Except m Johannesburg and p o s s i b l y 
(1) Matthews i n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970 c i t e d a s p e c i f i c 
example: namely the importance of N. Mandela's and W. Sisulu's 
v i s i t s t o the Eastern Cape, during the campaign, f o r the 
maintenance of l i n k s between t h a t area and the n a t i o n a l 
headquarters. Both were Xhosa speakers. 
(2) E. F e i t . A f r i c a n Opposition m South A f r i c a . The 
F a i l u r e of Passive Resistance. P a r t i c u l a r l y Chap. 3-
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Port E l i z a b e t h , there was scarcely any o r g a n i z a t i o n a l basis 
f o r a sustained campaign. Both f o r t a c t i c a l and resource 
reasons the leadership, m l i n e w i t h the Programme of A c t i o n , 
began the campaign rfith a very makeshift o r g a n i z a t i o n , b u i l d i n g 
i t up as best i t could and as appropriate, as and when defiance 
gathered momentum. The consequent r i s k s f o r a campaign 
r e l y i n g on sustained mass support and n o n - v i o l e n t a c t i o n needed 
no emphasis, but there were some advantages t o be load from 
the f l e x i b l e open ended approach 
The Organization of the Campaign m P r a c t i c e 
(a) N a t i o n a l Level - The Main Congress Organizations. 
Tlie defiance o r g a n i z a t i o n throughout the country was under 
the formal aegis of the n a t i o n a l a c t i o n c o u n c i l , comprising 
h ANC and 3 SAIC re p r e s e n t a t i v e s nominated by and drawn from 
t n e i r r e s p e c t i v e executives ( 1 ) . Most members were from the 
Johannesburg area where the Council met monthly and sometimes 
le s s o f t e n . I f the campaign had been h i g h l y c e n t r a l i s e d the 
NAC would have been i t s nerve centre, i n s t e a d i t appears t o 
have been a " t a l k i n g shop" p r o v i d i n g a necessary j o i n t forum 
f o r discussions about the general s t a t e and d i r e c t i o n of the 
campaign. I t seems to have taken few decisions of r e a l import (2) 
and to have exercised l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l c o n t r o l . The ANC 
n a t i o n a l e x e c u t i v e , w i t h i t s working committee, and the i n d i v i d u a l 
leaders o f the SAIC would seem to have exercised much more 
a u t h o r i t y . The ANC executive, u n l i k e i t s I n d i a n counterpart, 
met f a i r l y f r e q u e n t l y during the campaign, discussing defiance 
matters and i s s u i n g occasional statements about i t (3)- But 
(1) I t comprised J.Moroka,W.Sisulu,N.Mandela,Y.Cachalia and, p o s s i b l y 
I.A.Cachalia and D.Tloome. Co-opted p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s a t t e n d -
i n g on an ad hoc basis. 
(2) I t did,however, announce an extension of the scope of the campaign 
(KingWilliamstown Mercury,25 October 1952,and was responsible f o r 
agreeing t o white p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( I n d i a n Opinion,5 December 1952). 
Occasionally i t issued documents, one f o r c i r c u l a t i o n a t the UN -
Advance, 13 November 1952. 
(3) For example,directing branches throughout the country t o i n t e n s i f y 
the campaign. Peoples World, 28 August 1952. 
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the importance of i n f o r m a l contacts amongst leading f i g u r e s 
i n the campaign nust again be stressed. I n Johannesburg, 
the SAIC and the ANC had t h e i r o f f i c e s m the same b u i l d i n g (1) 
ensuring close contact amongst those working there- The 
growing number o f Canning orders on Congress leaders musb 
also have encouraged i n f o r m a l contacts, p a r t i c u l a r l y m 
the i n t e r i m periods before new o f f i c e r s were elected ( 2 ) . 
The n a t i o n a l volunteers c o - o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l appears 
never to have met (3) but there was a n a t i o n a l volunteer m 
c h i e f - Nelson Mandela - and a deputy - I - A . Cachalia. 
Whether the o f f i c e counted f o r much i s d o u b t f u l , both men, 
l i k e most of t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l counterparts, having other more 
demanding r o l e s t o f i l l . Mandela, m a d d i t i o n t o t r a v e l l i n g 
m the Transvaal, d i d v i s i t the Eastern Cape and N a t a l d u r i n g 
bhe Campaign, g i v i n g him the o p p o r t u n i t y to urge people to 
volunteer, and t o keep a watching b r i e f on the s e l e c t i o n o f 
would-be r e s i s t e r s . 
The number of occasions r e q u i r i n g formal contact between 
the n a t i o n a l and sub-national defiance u n i t s was l i m i t e d , 
much of the interchange necessary could be conducted through 
a c t i v i s t s o p e r a t i n g a t more than one l e v e l (4) and froTi v i s i t s 
by l e a d i n g n a t i o n a l f i g u r e s to the p r o v i n c e s ( 5 ) . The 
(1) The ANC had been forced t o leave t h e i r own b u i l d i n g and 
was given rooms m the SAIC o f f i c e s . P. Joseph, I n t e r v i e w , 
15 May 1970. 
(2) Each move by Government against non-white p o l i t i c a l groups 
encouraged the adoption of l e s s o v e r t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s . 
(3) According, f o r example, to M. B. Yengwa, Natal's v o l u n t e e r m 
c h i e f . I n t e r v i e w , 1b May 1970. 
(4) For: example, Dr Njongwe was on the ANC N a t i o n a l executive, 
he was, m a d d i t i o n , a c t i n g p r e s i d e n t and substantive 
t r e a s u r e r o f the Cape ANC and an o f f i c i a l o f the New B r i g h t o n 
Congress branch. 
(5) Take, f o r example, the "brokers", W. S i s u l u and N. Mandela. 
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extensive flow of w r i t t e n m a t e r i a l was e f f e c t i v e l y precluded 
by the absence of a separate a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machine a t the 
n a t i o n a l l e v e l and the l i m i t e d manpower and f i n a n c i a l resources 
a v a i l a b l e a t a l l l e v e l s o f the defiance o r g a n i z a t i o n . The 
precise r e l a t i o n s h i p of the n a t i o n a l headquarters w i t h the 
p r o v i n c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o ns v a r i e d . Links were c l o s e s t m the 
Transvaal where the n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s so 
overlapped as to be almost one. There w a s / r a i r l y h i g h l e v e l °^ 
contact w i t h N a t a l and the Eastern Cape, but the element of 
c e n t r a l d i r e c t i o n was n e c e s s a r i l y reduced. Relations w i t h 
the Orange Free State and the Western Cape were more spasmodic. 
(b) P r o v i n c i a l Level 
Tile d r i v i n g force m the o r g a n i z a t i o n of defiance came 
from sub-national u n i t s responsible f o r the day t o day manage-
ment of the Campaign. Considerable r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s are 
apparent - notably between, on the one hand the Transvaal and 
Natal and,on the other, the Eastern Cape. I n the Transvaal 
and N a t a l the Congresses, m accordance w i t h the Planning 
Report, es t a b l i s h e d p r o v i n c i a l a c t i o n coancilsfwh^ch^ became the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l lynch p i n s f o r defiance m those areas ( 1 ) . 
They comprised an approximately equal number of re p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
from the A f r i c a n and I n d i a n p r o v i n c i a l Congress executives ( 2 ) , 
(1) Confirmed by Y. Dadoo & M. P. Naicker, i n t e r v i e w s 8 February 
1969, k December""1~9o*9, r e s p e c t i v e l y . References t o the N a t a l 
and Transvaal PAC's are based on the foregoing i n t e r v i e w s and 
others w i t h M.Yengwa,l6 May 1970, and B.Joseph (1969-1970), I n 
the Transvaal a j o i n t c o - o r d i n a t i n g committee - the forerunner of 
the P r o v i n c i a l A c t i o n Council*" had operated a t l e a s t since March. 
Guardian, 13 March 1952. 
(2) I n Nata] the c o u n c i l had 10 or 11 members, w i t h L u t u l i as c h a i r -
man and M.Naicker and M.Yengwa as j o i n t s e c r e t a r i e s . P. Siraelane, 
S.Mtolo, F.Dhlammi, Dr. Naicker, I.C.Meer and J.N.Singh were also 
members. Composition o f the Transvaal c o u n c i l has not been 
traced but i s l i k e l y t o have included p r o v i n c i a l p r e s i d e n t s and 
s e c r e t a r i e s , the p r o v i n c i a l volunteer m c h i e f and h i s deputy and 
youth league r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . The c o u n c i l ' s newsheet Flash 
i n d i c a t e s there was also a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Coloured P o l i t i c a l 
A c t i o n Committee. Flash, 9 J u l y 1952, Regma vs S i s u l u , p 179. 
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and a t the h e i g h t o f r e s i s t a n c e met almost d a i l y . The 
Councils were responsible f o r working out precise d e t a i l s 
of l o c a l r e s i s t a n c e e f f o r t s , f o r arranging p u b l i c meetings 
to keep people informed about the Campaign and t o encourage 
support, f o r p u b l i c i t y and fund r a i s i n g , f o r welfare a c t i v i -
t i e s and f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h the n a t i o n a l a c t i o n c o u n c i l . 
I n N atal the a c t i o n c o u n c i l had a t i t s d i s p o s a l two f u l l time 
paid o f f i c i a l s - M. Naicker and M. Yengua, as w e l l as several 
others who gave t h e i r services v i r t u a l l y f u l l time on a 
v o l u n t a r y b a s i s . I n both Provinces the Councils could c a l l 
f o r the assistance of congress branch o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( 1 ) , youth 
and womens groups w i t h i n or a l l i e d t o the Congresses and from 
the trade unions and churches. To avoid t o t a l d i s r u p t i o n o f 
t h e i r e f f o r t s some a t l e a s t of the members of the p r o v i n c i a l 
a c t i o n c o u n c i l s were i n s t r u c t e d not t o defy. This d i d not 
remove the t h r e a t of banning orders - but when these were im-
posed those concerned could and d i d s t i l l work behind the 
scenes. I n both N a t a l and the Transvaal the i n d i v i d u a l 
Congress executives or t h e i r working committees continued to 
meet separately, i n t e r a l i a to discuss defiance matters ( 2 ) . 
Marupeng Seperepere, the Transvaal volunteer m chief, and 
his_ deputy,A. E. P a t e l , r e c r u i t e d v o l u n t e e r s both a t meetings 
and on a house t o house basis, sometimes w i t h the assistance 
of youth league members. Their a u t h o r i t y may have been n 
l i m i t e d by the presence m Johannesburg of the N a t i o n a l 
Volunteers m Chief, Mandela and Cachalia (3)- But i t i s 
(1) I n n e i t h e r province d i d i n d i v i d u a l Congress branches have 
a u t h o r i t y t o take independent r e s i s t a n c e i n i t i a t i v e s . 
See p 246 below. 
(2) For example, see the meeting o f the N.I.C. executive's 
working committee reported m the Leader, 29 August 1952. 
(3) For example, Duma Nokwe, youth leader m Orlando, was m 
d i r e c t contact w i t h Mandela about volunteer matters. 
A. Hutchinson, I n t e r v i e w , July 1970. Hutchinson, was one 
of a group m Orlando who canvassed f o r v o l u n t e e r s , but he 
sa i d he never had any contact w i t h Seperepere. 
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probable t h a t Seperepere and P a t e l s c r u t i n i z e d a t l e a s t some 
of the volunteers' a p p l i c a t i o n forms ( 1 ) . They may also 
have conducted i n t e r v i e w s , as was f o r m a l l y r e q u i r e d , before 
accepting v o l u n t e e r s (2) and w i l l have been responsible f o r 
seeing t h a t volunteers took the oath of obedience (3)- Some 
of the v o l u n t e e r s received t r a i n i n g - the e a r l i e s t v o l u n t e e r s 
being the most thoroughly d r i l l e d - w i t h p a r t i c u l a r emphasis 
apparently being l a i d on the need f o r d i s c i p l i n e and non-
violence (k). The welfare o f r e s i s t e r s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s -
an important c o n s i d e r a t i o n m the campaign - was a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of the v o l u n t e e r s m c h i e f . But i t i s evident m the Transvaal 
t h a t the work was done_by others, n o t a b l y the aged R. Naidoo 
and youth from both Congresses ( 5 ) . 
The N a t a l volunteer m c h i e f , M. B. Yengwa, and h i s 
deputy, H. Deadoth, were a c t i v e l y engaged m the p r i n c i p a l 
tasks o u t l i n e d above, i n c l u d i n g welfare work. They operated 
(1) Their use was c l e a r l y i n t e r m i t t e n t . Hutchinson, i n t e r v i e w , 
" o p . c i t . According t o Mandela and I . A. Cachalia, people 
were asked t h e i r name, address, p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f , a t t i t u d e 
to non-violence, educational and r e l i g i o u s background and 
employment d e t a i l s . Treason T r i a l Record, pp 15072 and 15782. 
(2) Almost a l l were.m the Transvaal, M. Mandela, i b i d . 
(3) According t o a p o l i c e informer, the pledge was as f o l l o w s : 
" I the undersigned volunteer of the N a t i o n a l Volunteer 
Corps, m f u l l a p p r e c i a t i o n of the consequence t h a t the 
p o s i t i o n e n t a i l s , do hereby solemnly pledge and b i n d myself 
t o serve my country and my people g e n e r a l l y m accordance 
w i t h the p o l i c y , programme and d i c t a t e s of congress, t o 
the best of my a b i l i t y and m p a r t i c u l a r do hereby pledge 
myself to p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y m the campaign f o r the 
defiance of u n j u s t laws I s h a l l obey the orders of 
my leaders under whom I s h a l l be placed and s t r i c t l y abide 
by the r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s of the N a t i o n a l Volunteers 
Corps formed from time t o time. I t s h a l l be my duty t o 
keep myself p h y s i c a l l y and mentally and morally f i t " . 
Refima vs S i s u l u , p 128. A s i m i l a r v e r s i o n i s found m 
The C l a r i o n , 26 June 1952. 
(k) Treason T r i a l Record, p 15782. 
(5) P- Joseph, i n t e r v i e w , k December 1969 
through a volunteer c o - o r d i n a t i n g committee which was, 
e f f e c t i v e l y , a working group of the p r o v i n c i a l a c t i o n 
c o u n c i l , though i t s members were not drawn e x c l u s i v e l y from 
t h a t body. Yengwa p r e f e r r e d approaches t o be made t o people 
whom the committee judged as s u i t a b l e defiance m a t e r i a l , but 
others were c e r t a i n l y accepted a f t e r screening ( 1 ) . Given 
the l i m i t e d number of p a r t i c i p a n t s and the s i n g l e centre f o r 
resis t a n c e m the Province i t was pos s i b l e f o r Yengwa and h i s 
a s s i s t a n t s t o undertake closer s u p e r v i s i o n of volunteers and 
r e c r u i t s than was f e a s i b l e e i t h e r m the Transvaal or the 
Eastern Cape. At the same time, the task of m o b i l i z i n g 
a c t i v e support m a Province f o r the most p a r t devoid o f 
congress i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s was c l e a r l y formidable. 
Very l i t t l e i s known about the p r o v i n c i a l defiance o r g a n i -
z a t i o n m the Orange Free State. As m the Eastern Cape, i t 
was e n t i r e l y under the c o n t r o l of the ANC, presumably being 
supervised by members of the Executive r e s i d e n t m or near 
Bloemfontem where the p r i n c i p a l acts of defiance took place. 
Mr S. Mokoena was the p r o v i n c i a l v o l u n t e e r - m - c h i e f . 
The Cape defiance o r g a n i z a t i o n d i f f e r e d markedly from 
i t s counterparts m the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and 
Nata l since i t lacked t i g h t c e n t r a l p r o v i n c i a l c o n t r o l . I n 
a d d i t i o n , u n l i k e m the Transvaal and N a t a l , the campaign m 
the Cape, notably m the Eastern Region, was confined almost 
e n t i r e l y t o ' t h e A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n and t h i s a f f e c t e d the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p a t t e r n . Owing t o disparate c o n d i t i o n s , 
distance and p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d ANC o r g a n i z a t i o n a l boun-
da r i e s , r e s i s t a n c e m the Western and Eastern Cape was conduc-
ted separately, though there were contacts through occasional 
province-wide Congress meetings and i n f o r m a l l i n k s . Radical 
I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y m the Province was v i r t u a l l y non-
e x i s t e n t , except m Cape Town where the Cape I n d i a n Assembly 
(1) M. B. Yengwa, i n t e r v i e w , 16 May 1970. 
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functioned i n t e r m i t t e n t l y . Coloured p a r t i c i p a t i o n was l i m i t e d 
to the Western Cape, where a j o i n t c o - o r d i n a t i n g c o u n c i l was 
established of the ANC, FAC and Cape I n d i a n Assembly ( 1 ) . I t s 
r o l e appears t o have been very l i m i t e d , n e i t h e r of the l a t t e r 
bodies making a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o r e s i s t a n c e . The 
bulk of defiance a c t i v i t y m Cape Town was organized by the 
r e g i o n a l ANC executive m conjunction w i t h i n d i v i d u a l branches. 
Elsewhere m the Western r e g i o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , m p r a c t i c e , 
lay a t the l o c a l l e v e l ( 2 ) . I n the Eastern Cape, there was 
no v i a b l e Coloured or I n d i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h which the ANC 
could have es t a b l i s h e d a workable j o i n t a c t i o n c o u n c i l even i f 
they had had the w i l l t o do so ( 3 ) . No f o r m a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
a c t i o n c o u n c i l was i n s t i t u t e d but members of the p r o v i n c i a l 
ANC executive l i v i n g m the Eegion (k) used t o meet about once 
a week, and a s e c r e t a r i a t , sometimes c a l l e d the working 
committee (5)) drawn from executive members based m Port 
E l i z a b e t h , met d a i l y t o plan and discuss r e s i s t a n c e m the 
areas w i t h which they were a c t i v e l y concerned. The working 
committee was the only source of reasonably comprehensive 
up t o date i n f o r m a t i o n about; r e s i s t a n c e a c t i v i t i e s m the 
Region. This could be passed through Mandela and S i s u l u to 
defiance headquarters, but as Joe Matthews admitted, m some 
centres "we d i d n ' t know what was going on". 
I n the Ciskei and elsewhere m the Eastern Cape i n f o r m a l , 
o f t e n unannounced v i s i t s helped t o ensure the campaign was 
conducted w i t h i n the broad terms o f Congress p o l i c y . But 
(1) This Council may w e l l have been formed p r i o r t o the 
Tercentenary b o y c o t t . 
(2) Examined belowpp 248 , 2 75 
(3) J« Matthews, i n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970, saw as one of 
the reasons f o r the success of the campaign m the Eastern 
Cape i t s e n t i r e l y A f r i c a n composition. I am g r e a t l y 
indebted t o him f o r i n f o r m a t i o n about defiance m the 
Eastern Cape. 
(k) ' I n t e r a l i a , a c t i v e membership consisted of Dr J. Njongwe, 
Dr R. Bokwe, E. M a t j i , J. Matthews, A. Gwentshe, Rev. W. Tshume, 
Rev. J. Calata and S. Simpe. 
(5) This may be the body r e f e r r e d t o as the "Volunteers Board" 
m the Eastern Province Herald, 26 June 1952. 
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much of the d e t a i l e d planning and mounting of r e s i s t a n c e , 
other than a t Port E l i z a b e t h and Uitenhage, appears to have 
been m the hands of m d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y run l o c a l semi-
autonomous u n i t s (l)» 
There was a volunteer m c h i e f f o r the Cape - A l c o t t 
Gwentshe - and he d i d o c c a s i o n a l l y address meetings m t h i s 
capacity but was f a r more h e a v i l y engaged m the task o f 
d i r e c t i n g r esistance i n East London. I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t 
he would have been much concerned w i t h the mmutae of e n r o l -
ment forms and screening exercises. 
(c) Local Level 
There was close contact between n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l 
Congress leaders and the grass r o o t s , both m urban and r u r a l 
d i s t r i c t s ( 2 ) . I n some a r e a s , l o c a l branches and i n f o r m a l 
groups of supporters f u r t h e r e d the development o f the campaign, 
h e l p i n g the Congresses t o achieve some of t h e i r i n t e r n a l goals. 
But i t was only m the Cape t h a t branches made an impact on 
any scale on the o r g a n i z a t i o n and de c i s i o n making of the 
defiance campaign. I n the Transvaal and Na t a l i t was never 
intended t h a t i n d i v i d u a l branches should take i n i t i a t i v e s to 
defy the law, p a r t l y because i t was feared t h i s could lead t o 
a f a i l u r e m d i s c i p l i n e w i t h d i s a s t r o u s consequences f o r the 
campaign (3)- Also, the Congresses' o r g a n i z a t i o n m the two 
provinces, outside the Johannesburg area and Durban, r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
was g e n e r a l l y very weak. I n Natal.both the ANC and N.I.C. 
were recovering from a p e r i o d of schism (k) which had l e f t t h e i r 
(1) This p a t t e r n may have i n f l u e n c e d N.Mandela m f o r m u l a t i n g 
the "M" plan. 
(2) At p 27 1 i s a map recording a l l known p o i n t s where p u b l i c 
or other meetings were held, addressed by p r o v i n c i a l or n a t i o n a l 
congress o f f i c i a l s , on the defiance campaign. 
(3) P. Joseph, i n t e r v i e w , 15 May 1970. 
(k) I t was not completely over - f o r example the N.I.C. branch m 
Pie t e r m a r i t z b u r g was s p l i t m 1952 between a " T r o t s k y i t e " element 
and an "orthodox" group, the former winning c o n t r o l . M. Naicker, 
i n t e r v i e w , k December 1969. 
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organizations m di s a r r a y - The Transvaal I n d i a n Congress 
r e l i e d h e a v i l y on an i n f o r m a l web of c o n t a c t s , r a t h e r than 
branches,outside Johannesburg, p a r t l y t o minimise the t h r e a t 
of persecution o f members of i s o l a t e d I n d i a n communities whose 
s e c u r i t y of tenure was always a t r i s k . W i t h i n the Transvaal 
ANC the only branch which was probably allowed t o exercise 
any r e a l degree of freedom of a c t i o n was t h a t a t B e t h a l under 
the d i s t i n c t i v e and energetic leadership o f Gert Sibande. The 
cautious approach of Congress leaders m N a t a l and the 
Transvaal to l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e m the Campaign contrasted sharply 
w i t h t h a t of Eastern Cape leaders. Resistance occurred m 
at l e a s t 14 towns or d i s t r i c t s m the Region, some over 150 
miles from Port E l i z a b e t h . And nearly 6,000 people are record-
ed as defying m the Eastern Cape, compared w i t h under 1,500 
i n the Transvaal. Njongwe seized the o p p o r t u n i t y o f the 
Campaign f o r a determined e f f o r t t o develop the ANC 's grass 
r o o t s backing. ANC members m Port E l i z a b e t h and East London 
r e t u r n i n g to the r a r a l areas, a t the end of t h e i r c o n t r a c t s , 
or f o r shorter p e r i o d s , were r e c r u i t e d t o s e t up Congress 
branches m t h e i r l o c a l areas ( 1 ) . These people were given 
basic i n s t r u c t i o n on the s e t t i n g up and running of a branch 
but then l e f t very much to t h e i r own devices t o b u i l d up s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t , l a r g e l y autonomous u n i t s . The r e s u l t was the 
emergence of a number of h i g h l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c "Dranches" m 
the Ciskei and elsewhere m the r u r a l Eastern Cape which had 
a r o l e t o play m p r o v i d i n g batches of r e s i s t e r s t o p a r t i c i p a t e 
m the Campaign m p r o v i n c i a l towns. Previously e s t a b l i s h e d 
branches m the country towns also enjoyed a considerable 
measure of autonomy, as d i d the Congress o r g a n i z a t i o n m East 
London which was run by A l c o t t Gwentshe, whom Matbhews l i k e n e d 
to an American " c i t y p o l i t i c a l boss". Whatever the r i s k s 
i n h e r e n t m t h i s d i v e r s i t y m o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r a n o n - v i o l e n t 
resistance campaign i t d i d permit a f a r higher l e v e l of 
(1) Whether or not they were successful m t h i s aim could w e l l 
depend on tne a t t i t u d e of the l o c a l t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r . 
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n and p o l i t i c i z a t i o n than would have been possible 
i f a more r i g i d c e n t r a l i z e d , system had e x i s t e d The develop-
ment of a broad based grass r o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n had a p o t e n t i a l 
long-term s i g n i f i c a n c e ( l ) . 
I n the Western Cape l o c a l autonomy was confined to the 
few centres outside Capetown where r e s i s t a n c e occurred. The 
most notable example was a t Worcester, the only town to have 
a l o c a l j o i n t a c t i o n c o u n c i l (2) v i r t u a l l y as envisaged i n the 
planning c o u n c i l r e p o r t . I t comprised A f r i c a n and Coloured 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 
(d) Tne Role of associated o r g a n i z a t i o n s m the 
running o f the Campaign 
I n the mam centres of defiance the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the 
campaign was a combined operation r e l y i n g not only on the 
support of a c t i v i s t s i n v o l v e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h the "parent" 
Congresses but also those more h e a v i l y engaged w i t h the Youth 
and Women's Leagues and, to a l i m i t e d e x t e n t , other a s s o c i a t i o n s 
outside the ambit o f the Congresses. To a greater or lesser 
degree, depending on the o r g a n i z a t i o n and l o c a l i t y , the resources 
o f these groups were put a t the d i s p o s a l of the main defiance 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . Generally they had l i t t l e autonomy m defiance 
matters, but t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y d e t r a c t from t h e i r im-
portance m the running of the campaign. 
The Transvaal Youth Leagues ( 3 ) 1 as d i s t i n c t bodies, were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a c t i v e , n o t a b l y m Johannesburg where t h e i r 
(1) I t seems reasonable t h a t the development o f l a r g e l y s e l f running 
branches and the experience gained from them were f a c t o r s r e l e -
vant t o the p a r t i c u l a r r e s i l i e n c e of Eastern Cape resistance t o 
the Government m subsequent years. 
(2) Called the Worcester United A c t i o n Committee, i t was m e x i s -
tence c e r t a i n l y by January 1952. 
(3) The A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Youth League and the Transvaal I n d i a n 
Youth Congress. 
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o r g a n i z a t i ons were mobilized t o help w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a t 
campaign headquarters, to c i r c u l a t e defiance propaganda, to 
drum up funds, t o help d i s t r i b u t e w e lfare supplies t o f a m i l i e s 
of imprisoned r e s i s t e r s , and to encourage people to volunteer 
and t o associate w i t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Congresses. They pro-
duced newsheets ( 1 ) , h e l d p o l i t i c a l education classes and 
organized p r o v i n c i a l and l o c a l meetings a l l of which could 
f u r t h e r the progress of the campaign ( 2 ) . I n the other 
f r o v m c e s during the campaign A f r i c a n and I n d i a n youth 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s seem to have played scarcely any r o l e , as d i s -
t i n c t u n i t s , t h e i r members, in s t e a d , c o n t r i b u t i n g on an i n d i v i -
dual basis (3)- One notable exception i s East London where 
members of the ANC Youth League appear to have dominated the 
resistance o r g a n i z a t i o n . But m the Eastern Cape and N a t a l 
m 1952 the d i v i s i o n between the leadership of the parent 
Congresses and the Youth Leagues i s h a r d l y a very meaningful 
one. 
There i s a dearth of d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about the 
a c t i v i t i e s , during the campaign, of the ANC Women's leagues, 
and other women's associ a t i o n s which may have played an impor-
t a n t r o l e m the m o b i l i z a t i o n of v o l u n t e e r s , and m securing 
finance and welfare supplies. There were many women r e s i s t e r s 
Out of a sample group m the Eastern Cape of 2,529 r e s i s t e r s , 
1,067 were female, a s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s of k88 r e s i s t e r s m the 
Transvaal showed t h a t 173 were female. But, no women held 
p o s i t i o n s a t the n a t i o n a l l e v e l m the ANC or SAIC du r i n g the 
campaign and they were under-represented 
(.1) fc>ee, m p a r t i c u l a r , Spark, r e f e r r e d t o above, p2 31 f t . 3 
and A f r i c a n Lodestar, The ANCYL p u b l i c a t i o n . 
(2) Most of the foregoing i s drawn from i n t e r v i e w s w i t h P. Joseph, 
November 1969-May 1970. He was a prominent member of the 
TIYC m 1952. 
(3) This ^s supported by i n t e r v i e w s w i t h J . Matthews, 29 Jauauary 
1970, M. Naicker, k December 1969, M Yengwa, 1b May 1970, 
and A. Sachs, 10 November, 1969. 
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on provincial Congress committees. The ANC Women's league 
was active m the Eastern Cape and Transvaal. At the annual 
conference of the Transvaal ANC Women's League m November 1952 
i t was resolved to r e c r u i t 3^000 women volunteers (1) which 
at l e a s t indicates an intended organizational function and i t 
i s reasonable to assume they had already played a part m 
mobilizing the wromen who had r e s i s t e d by t h i s stage. I n the 
Eastern Cape, wives of Congress leaders played an important 
role m persuading women to r e s i s t (2) as did the wives of 
Indian Leaders. Indian women do nob appear to have had 
their own Congress organizations m 1952, some participating, 
instead, m the committees of the mam Congress bodies (3) 
Informal personal l i n k s w i l l have been important m organizing 
women for defiance. These l i n k s may have been considerably 
f a c i l i t a t e d by the existence of womens associations outside 
the Congress orbit, m p a r t i c u l a r church groups (k). Women 
*rere also prominent m certain trade unions and t h i s net may 
(1) Advance, k December 1952. Bantu World, 22 November 1952 
and 29 November 1952. The President of the Transvaal 
Women's ANC m 1952 was Ida Mtwana. 
(2) Mrs. Njongwe, for example, he r s e l f led an a l l female batch 
into defiance. Clarion,31 July 1952. She may have been 
President of the ANC Women's League m the Cape. The 
Vice President appears to have been Mrs. Dyantyi. Imvo, 
2 August 1952. Over 1,000 African women assembled m 
Port Elizabeth on the eve of the defiance campaign to pray 
for the volunteers. Eastern Province Herald, 26 June 1952. 
Whether i t was organized by the ANC Women's League i s unclear. 
(3) For example, Miss Z. Asvat (Mrs. K a z i ) , Cmterview 10 November 1970], 
who was a vice chairman of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress. 
Other women a c t i v i s t s m the Indian Congresses m the early 
1950's included Mrs. A. Pahad, Mrs. A. Cachalia (Transvaal) 
and Mrs. F. Meer and Mrs. F. Seedat (Natal). Interviews, 
Mr and Mrs. Joseph, 15 May 1970, and M. Naicker, k December 1969 
(k) For example, the Mothers Union of Loyal African Women 
referred to by M. Benson, "The Struggle for a Birthrig h t " , 
p H £ . 
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have been exploited ( 1 ) . There may have been other womens' 
organizations which a s s i s t e d at l e a s t i n d i r e c t l y , m the 
campaign but evidence i s quite lacking m the sources available ( 2 ) . 
The role of the trade unions and church groups m the 
organization of the campaign deserves amplification. Many 
unionists were active m the campaign, but, generally, m 
the i r individual capacities. However, the Coloured Trade Union 
P o l i t i c a l Action Committee based m Johannesburg and under the 
control of James P h i l l i p s was responsible for mobilizing the 
few Coloured r e s i s t e r s m the Transvaal ( 3 ) , but th e i r deploy-
ment remained the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Congress a l l i a n c e . 
The unions - notably the t e x t i l e and food canning workers - played 
an important role m organizing defiance m Worcester m the 
Western Cape (^f), but there are few other examples which can 
be cited. I n the view of Joe Matthews the unions gained far 
more from the Congresses during 1952 through the l a t t e r ' s en-
couragement for people to 30111 the unions than the Congresses 
benefited from union assistance m mobilizing support for the 
Campaign. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y m the Eastern Cape, the churches appear to 
have played a role m mobilizing support for the campaign. 
An example i s the African Inter-Denominational Minister's 
Federation whose President, the Rev. J . A. Calata, was a 
member of the Cape ANC executive. I n August 1952, at a 
conference, i t unanimously agreed to lin k with the ANC m 
"the struggle for African Freedom" (5)» Whether the African 
(1) The Eastern Cape defiance a c t i v i s t L i l l i a n Ngoyi was a member of 
the Garment Workers Union and i s l i k e l y to have used her contacts 
within that body to encourage other women to defy. 
(2) Did, for example, the National Council of African Women, Imvo, 
17 May 1952, play any p a r t 9 
(3^ T P h i l l i p s , Interview, 11 July 1970. 
(k) See the reference to Worcester, p 24 8 above. 
(5) People's World, k September 1952. The importance of r e l i g i o n 
to the campaign m the Eastern Cape i s stressed m an e d i t o r i a l 
m Imvo, 11 October 1952 
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s e p a r a t i s t churches played a r o l e m the campaign i s q u i t e 
unclear. Kuper (1) t h i n k s not, but f u r t h e r study i s needed 
to be sure of t h i s . 
F i n a l l y , reference should be made to the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
r o l e m the campaign of t r a d i t i o n a l leaders, notably m r u r a l 
areas m the Eastern Cape and, secondly, of the Franchise 
A c t i o n Council which was of marginal importance m org a n i z i n g 
defiance m the Western Cape ( 2 ) . The few whites who took 
p a r t d i d so on a personal basis and they d i d not f u l f i l l any 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s of note ( 3 ) . 
(e) Finance and Propaganda o r g a n i z a t i o n m the Campaign 
Both are i l l u s t r a t i v e m va r y i n g degrees of the ad hoc, non-
s p e c i a l i z e d nature of the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the campaign. 
Wh i l s t the authors of the planning c o u n c i l r e p o r t recognized, 
" i t i s apparent t h a t the pLan.of a c t i o n ... cannot be put i n t o 
e f f e c t without the necessary funds t o back i t " and t o t h i s end 
proposed a " m i l l i o n s h i l l i n g d r i v e " they d i d not t h i n k i t 
worthwhile t o suggest s e t t i n g up s p e c i a l i s e d fund r a i s i n g groups. 
The lack o f coherent o r g a n i z a t i o n was a reason f o r the f a i l u r e 
of the appeal though there were other f a c t o r s ( 4 ) . And w h i l s t 
(1) Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a , p 1^9- M. Naicker, 
i n t e r v i e w , k December 1969, b e l i e v e d t h a t the d i s s i d e n t 
churches d i d p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e m e f f o r t s t o drum 
up support amongst A f r i c a n s m N a t a l . 
(2 ) I t s main o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f o r t m 1952 was d i r e c t e d t o 
the boycott of the Tercentenary c e l e b r a t i o n s . 
(3) The Transvaal Congress of Democrats (COD) was not formed t i l l 
a f t e r a meeting a t the end of November 1952 c a l l e d by the ANC 
n a t i o n a l executive (not the J o i n t Council) f o r i n v i t e d white 
sympathisers. The South A f r i c a n COD was created m 1953-
(k) J. Matthews, i n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970, s a i d m the Eastern 
Cape A f r i c a n s were deterred from c o n t r i b u t i n g by the " o r i e n t a l " 
appearance o f the stamps given as r e c e i p t s - having doubbs 
about the u l t i m a t e d e s t i n a t i o n of the funds. 
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the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the campaign's finances were haphazard 
i t i s d o u b t f u l whether t h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t impediment to 
the progress of r e s i s t a n c e . 
Both Congresses r e t a i n e d separate accounts d u r i n g the 
campaign, though m the Transvaal and Natal there was fi n a n -
c i a l co-operation a n l i t i s r eported t h a t a j o i n t fund " f o r 
v i c t i m s of N a t i o n a l i s t ition" was e s t a b l i s h e d m June 
1952, by the ANC, SAIC, the Transvaal c o u n c i l of non-European 
trade unions and the Transvaal Peace Council ( 1 ) . Methods 
of r a i s i n g funds for* the finance v a r i e d considerably Some 
money - no records have been traced of how much - rccrued 
from t h e " m i l l i o n S h i l l i n g d r i v e " , but t h i s scheme never secured 
widespread enthusiasm and support. The ANC c o l l e c t e d money 
from annual dues, some of which w i l l have been used f o r campaign 
expenses. Special l o c a l fund r a i s i n g d r i v e s were probably tne 
mam source of income f o r the campaign. I n Port E l i z a b e t h , 
f o r example, Rooert M a t j i arranged f o r s h o r t - l i v e d slogan 
c a r r y i n g l a p e l badges t o be sold a t mass meetings, apparently 
considerably augmenting Congress funds ( 2 ) . S i g n i f i c a n t sums 
wex-e also obtained m the Region from s o c i a l events organized 
by wonren a c t i v i s t s , through-house to house campaigns and a t 
f a c t o r i e s . The same a p p l i e d m other Regions. I n tne 
Transvaal and N a t a l , t r a d e r s and merchants were an important 
source of campaign funds. Their support was s o l i c i t e d by 
members of the I n d i a n Congresses e i t h e r o p e r a t i n g alone, or 
m the company of an ANC o f f i c i a l C3). M. B. Yengwa (k) 
(1) C l a r i o n , 26 June 1952. 
(2) J- Matthews, op. c i t . C o l l e c t i o n s were also taken a t meetings. 
(3) P. Joseph, i n t e r v i e w , k December 1969. I . Dmaat, i n t e r v i e w , 
h December 196*91 claimed the r i c h merchants showed a much 
greater reluctance to c o n t r i b u t e than poorer t r a d e r s . 
(k) I n t e r v i e w , 16 May 1970. 
2 5 4 
believed that m Natal churches also helped to r a i s e money 
for the campaign and t h i s may also have happened elsewhere. 
Groups overseas played a marginal role m organizing funds 
for the defiance movement. Congress o f f i c i a l s interviewed 
cast doubts as to whether any g i f t s were actually received 
from abroad during the campaign ( 1 ) . 
Where violence i s employed i _ i a p o l i t i c a l campaign i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t even m "controlled" s o c i e t i e s to prevent at l e a s t 
some d e t a i l s reaching a f a i r l y wide spectram of the popula-
tion, whether or not that idea was prominent m the minds of 
the participants. I n a non-violent campaign, unless the 
scale i s very large, Governments can deploy a variety of 
devices to see that acts of defiance a t t r a c t little public 
attention. Yet, p a r t i c u l a r l y m situations were tne acts of 
defiance ire not themselves expected to r e c t i f y the situation, 
extensive, and where possible favourable, p u b l i c i t y can be of 
major importance m securing i n t e r n a l and external goals. 
The Congress a l l i a n c e "let the challenge m a variety of ways, 
out did not, vfith one known uinor exception, e s t j o l i s h 
s p e c i a l i s t propaganda organs l i c k i n g the resources to do 
so. The use of the spoken word was of overriding imporcance 
m seeking to popularize the campaign, notably through mass 
meetings of which many were held throughout the country ( 2 ) . 
Occasional pamphlets and statements were published under the 
imprint of the national action council (3) and at the very 
end of the campaign the Council assumed formal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for the weekly paper Spark, which t i l l then had been produced 
by the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress A c t i v i s t , R. H. Desai, 
' 1 
(1) One report m the Peoples World, 30 October 1952, r e f e r s 
to a g i f t of #900 said to have been sent by the U. S. 
Council of African a f f a i r s as i t s f i r s t contribution to 
the National Assistance Fund for "victims of the struggle 
against unjust laws". 
(2) Meetings m r u r a l areas, where there were many i l l i t e r a t e s , 
assumed a spec i a l importance for the communication of ideas 
about the Campaign. 
(3) I n November 1952 the NAC submitted to the UN for circula tion 
a pamphlet e n t i t l e d The D i s a b i l i t i e s of the non-white Peoples 
of South Africa . 
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m conjunction with ANC Youth League o f f i c i a l s . The 
national action council lacked i t s own apparatus for the dissemi-
nation of the information. I t r e l i e d m the Transvaal on a 
group of a c t i v i s t s resident m or around Johannesburg, most 
of whom were members of the Congress youth organizations. 
This same group helped zo produce the l e a f l e t s and broadsheets 
issued by the Transvaal provincial action council (1) as well 
as Spark and the ANC Youth League's African Lodestar, but 
there i s no evidence that they constituted a formal publica-
tions sub-committee, such as i s said (2) to have existed m 
Natal. There, as m the Transvaal, there seems to have 
been no lack of young people prepared to help distribute 
c i r c u l a r s and newsheets about the campaign. I n the Eastern 
Cape, Congress appears to have paid l i t t l e attention to 
producing written material, placing i t s r eliance on the spoken 
word. 
Congress leaders m the p r i n c i p a l areas of defiance met 
with some success m putting over t h e i r views through i n t e r -
views m the "white" press, but they had minimal control over 
the character of such reports. This was equally true of 
external publicity, to which they gave comparatively l i t t l e 
attention, as compared with the passive resistance campaign 
of 1946-8. But there was one independent newspaper organiza-
tion, run by Brian Bunting, a member of the banned South A f r i c a 
Communist Party, which consistently supported the defiance 
campaign giving i t extensive favourable p u b l i c i t y . The 
Guardian, and i t s successor newspapers, the Clarion, the 
People's World and the Advance (3) had a c i r c u l a t i o n m 1952 
(1) Including Flash. 
(2) M. Yengwa, interview, 16 May 1970. 
(3) Guardian t i l l May 1952 (banned). Clarion, May - August 
1952. People's World, August - November 1952 ( r e f u s a l 
of r e g i s t r a t i o n ) , f o r remainder of defiance campaign 
appeared as Advance. 
of 3 0 - 3 5 i 0 0 0.primarily on the RandNin the Cape Town area, 
approximately 80% of the readership being A f r i c a n ( 1 ) . 
E d i t o r i a l l y , i t was q u i t e independent of the Congresses, 
although most of i t s r e p o r t e r s were Congress a c t i v i s t s and 
i t received some f i n a n c i a l support from Congress members. 
The paper, under i t s successive guises, was an i n v a l u a b l e 
propaganda weapon m the hands of Congress, making i t 
l a r g e l y unnecessary f o r the a l l i a n c e , even i f i t had had the 
resources, to attempt to p u b l i s h a r e g u l a r campaign paper on 
the l i n e s of the Passive Resister. The campaign received 
favourable p u b l i c i t y m a number o f other South A f r i c a n 
papers, such as Imvo Zabantsundu, E. G o l i , and I . Langa Lase 
N a t a l , but these o u t l e t s , though h e l p f u l , were much le s s 
s i g n i f i c a n t and not as u n f a i l i n g l y r e l i a b l e as Bunting's papers 
nor were they a p a r t of the campaign's propaganda o r g a n i z a t i o n 
m the way t h a t de f a c t o , the Guardian and i t s successors were. 
The campaign's o r g a n i z a t i o n a l network, the very a n t i t h e s i s 
of a uniform, f o r m a l l y s t r u c t u r e d bureaucratic machine, d i v i d e d 
i n t o c l e a r cut h i e r a r c h i e s and supported by s p e c i a l i s t u n i t s , 
was s u r p r i s i n g l y e f f e c t i v e against considerable e x t e r n a l odds 
m m o b i l i z i n g support f o r the defiance o f u n j u s t laws campaign, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y m the Transvaal and Eastern Cape. Far from 
being i s o l a t e d u n i t s , the numerous groups responsible f o r 
o r g a n i z i n g the campaign were l i n k e d - a d m i t t e d l y l o o s e l y m 
the Eastern Cape - by a complex and wide ranging web of formal 
and i n f o r m a l contacts, the f o c a l p o i n t o f which was Johannesbur 
The p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n which emerged, l a r g e l y spontaneously m 
the Eastern Cape, though c o n t a i n i n g many weaknesses, held the 
key t o the possible f u t u r e p a t t e r n of r e s i s t a n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
m South A f r i c a . 
(1) BBunting, i n t e r v i e w , 27 January 1970. 
CHAPTER I I I ' LEADERS AND PARTICIPANTS 
The d i v e r s i t y i n age, background and b e l i e f of the 
defiance leadership i s r e f l e c t e d m the rank and f i l e p a r t i c i -
pants and gives an i n s i g h t i n t o the broad base of support which 
the Campaign enjoyed 
The leadership were u n i t e d m bheir espousal of democratic 
i d e a l s , which underlay the campaign and were the basis f o r 
i t s l e g i t i m a t i o n ( 1 ) . The ANC (and the I n d i a n Congress) had 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y h e l d to such i d e a l s , expressing them w i t h i n -
creasing vigour m the 13h0's through, f o r example, the B i l l 
of Rights (2) and the ANCYL Basic P o l i c y document ( 3 ) . 
A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m m i t s "moderate" form (k) was e n t i r e l y 
compatible w i t h the democratic i d e a l . W h i l s t i t was an ex-
pression of the parainoimtcy of the i n t e r e s t s of the A f r i c a n 
people m South A f r i c a there was an acceptance of the perma-
nent s t a t u s (5) of other races m a f u t u r e m a j o r i t y c o n t r o l l e d 
State. The degree of attachment, amongst ANC leaders, to 
the concept of "non-racialism" v a r i e d but i t was a co n s t a n t l y 
r e c u r r i n g theme m the speeches of defiance leaders (6) and 
the campaign i t s e l f o f f e r e d proof of t h e i r conmitment m t h i s 
respect. 
Walshe suggests the ideology jxid terminology of the 
class s t r u g g l e was a faqbor of "some importance" (7) m 
(1) See, f o r example, Report of the J o i n t Planning Council, 
paragraph 7- Annex A. 
(2) p 2 1 9 
(3) P 2 1 9 
(k) p 2 2 2 
(5) The precise nature of the envisaged s t a t u s must be r e l a t e d 
to ANC demands f o r a n o n - r a c i a l democratic South A f r i c a 
m which the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n would have an overwhelming 
m a j o r i t y . 
(6) See, f o r example, e x t r a c t s o f speeches by lead i n g ANC and 
SAIC o f f i c i a l s c i t e d m the record o f Regma vs S i s u l u . 
The pledge a t paragraph 7 o f the Planning Council Report 
i s noteworthy. Annex A. 
(7) P. Walshe, "The A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Congress of South A f r i c a " , 
(D.Phil t h e s i s ) , p 631 
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ensuring t h a t the ANC continued i t s long e s t a b l i s h e d b e l i e f 
m a n o n - r a c i a l s o c i e t y m the face of the "Garveyite" stream 
of A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m . I n the Transvaal, m p a r t i c u l a r , 
some of the most prominent f i g u r e s m the A f r i c a n and I n d i a n 
Congresses held marxist b e l i e f s ( 1 ) , but not to the exclusion 
of other streams of thought. Marxist b e l i e f s a f f e c t e d the 
language and emphasis o f t h e i r speeches and w r i t i n g s ( 2 ) , 
t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the process of l i b e r a t i o n and con-
cepts of a f u t u r e South A f r i c a n State under m a j o r i t y r u l e , 
but the "Marxists" were not p r i n c i p a l l y concerned, p a r t i c u -
l a r l y d u ring a r e s i s t a n c e campaign t o wage an i n t e r n a l i d e o l o -
g i c a l b a t t l e against other Congress leaders t o e s t a b l i s h 
marxism as the sole or dominant d o c t r i n e shaping the l i b e r a -
t i o n "movement" ( 3 ) . From 1950, the Suppression of 
Communism Act a f f o r d e d a d d i t i o n a l grounds f o r ^ a u t i o n 
A c o n t r a s t i n g , and more s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e m the 
defiance campaign, e s p e c i a l l y m the Eastern Cape, was 
C h r i s t i a n i t y U) The m a j o r i t y of senior A f r i c a n defiance 
leaders probably h e l d C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s and p r i e s t s were w e l l 
represented m t h e i r ranks ( 5 ^ . Congress leaders f r e q u e n t l y 
(1) Y. Dadoo, M. Kotane, J. B. Marks. These and other 
"Marxists" were g e n e r a l l y long standing members of t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e Congresses. Kotane f o r example, j o i n e d the 
ANC m 1927. 
(2) And m t h i s respect may have i n f l u e n c e d the o p i n i o n of 
t h e i r audiences f o r example m f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
(3) According t o J. Matthews ( i n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970) 
m the Eastern Cape, where there were few "marxists" m 
the ANC hie r a r c h y m 1952, there was a dispute, e s s e n t i a l l y 
on i d e o l o g i c a l grounds, between 3 ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) ex CPSA 
members of the ANC leadership and Dr N^ongwe, President 
of the Cape ANC. But such tension does not appear t o 
have been commonplace du r i n g the Campaign. 
(k) But there were Congress a c t i v i s t s , f o r example,^J. ^g^w^ela^ 
Chairman Cape Western Regional Committee, ANC, H* 0 ' w e r e 
Marxist and C h r i s t i a n . 
(5) There were, f o r example, two p r i e s t s on the Cape ANC 
Executive, Rev. J. Calata and Rev. W. Tshume. Others 
were a c t i v e a t the branch l e v e l - Rev. L. S. Soga President 
Queenstown ANC. 
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used b i b l i c a l references (1) and the ANC's senior chaplain, 
Rev. J. Skomolo, described the process of l i b e r a t i o n as a 
holy war m which a l l C h r i s t i a n s had a duty t o p a r t i c i p a t e m 
op p o s i t i o n " t o the i n j u s t i c e s of the oppressor" ( 2 ) . The 
ANC's adherence to n o n - r a c i a l and no n - v i o l e n t i d e a l s and 
p r a c t i c e s may m p a r t have derived from the C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s 
o f i t s leaders and rank and f i l e members. 
Gandhi remained a f i g u r e and example of some i n f l u e n c e ( 3 ) -
Dr. Njongwe remarked, "With the h i s t o r i c a l example o f Gandhi 
before us, we turned t o Passive Resistance l a r g e l y because 
i t secured r e s u l t s w i t h o u t c r e a t i n g b i t t e r n e s s between the 
contenders" (k). But no A f r i c a n and very few I n d i a n leaders 
acknowledged a d o c t r i n a i r e attachment to satyagraha,and most, 
i n s t e a d , accepted a more f l e x i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h non-
v i o l e n c e , akin t o t h a t of Nehru and the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress (5)> 
The n o n - v i o l e n t methods adopted by re s i s t a n c e leaders m 1952 
also r e f l e c t e d t h e i r c o n t i n u i n g b e l i e f both m the r u l e o f 
law, and m humanitarian i d e a l s ( 6 ) . 
(1) " I f we were I s r a e l i t e s we would have trekked out of Egypt" ... 
M. Seperepere, 22 June 1952. Hegina vs S i s u l u , p 131-
(2) Da^ly Representative (Queenstown), 29 J u l y 1952. 
(3) Although i t i s not c l e a r whether h i s works or those of 
any other exponent of non-violence were read widely, 
amongst the Defiance l e a d e r s h i p . But L u t u l i e v i d e n t l y 
r e f e r r e d t o the works o f Gandhi, Leb My People Go, 
fa c i n g p 129. 
(k) Speech t o the Supreme Court. Advance, 9 A p r i l 1953-
Some I n d i a n leaders may have also been i n f l u e n c e d towards 
no n - v i o l e n t p r a c t i c e s by Hindu and other n o n - c h r i s t i a n 
creeds. 
(5) For a statement of Nehru's a t t i t u d e see Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Autobiography, p 8^, taken m the context of the r e s t of 
the work. A p a r a l l e l between the stance o f the SAIC 
and INC i s o f f e r e d by I . A. Cachalia, Treason T r i a l , p 15057-
(6) C e r t a i n of the defiance leaders, i n c l u d i n g Chief L u t u l i , 
could be described as humanists. 
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A f r i c a n leaders' keen awareness of t r i b a l h i s t o r y (1 ) 
and mythology was used, w i t h e f f e c t , t o r a i s e morale and 
encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n notably m the Eastern Cape (2) 
where most of the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n had common t r a d i t i o n s and 
defiance was confined to a s i n g l e race. The h i s t o r y of the 
str u g g l e s and achievements of other groups, i n c l u d i n g those 
of the people of I n d i a ( 3 ) , blacks m the United States ( i f ) 
and the A f r i k a n e r V O I K (5) o f f e r e d an a d d i t i o n a l source of 
i n s p i r a t i o n , but w i t h the possible exception of the f i r s t o f 
these were of marginal importance m determining the charac-
t e r of the campaign. 
The d i v e r s i t y o f b e l i e f s w i t h i n and between defiance 
leaders ensured t h a t the campaign did: not become narrowly 
d o c t r i n a i r e and t h i s encouraged f l e x i b i l i t y m approach. 
The presence of c o n f l i c t i n g b e l i e f s prevented the formula-
t i o n o f a s i n g l e all-embracing i d e o l o g i c a l nodel or framework, 
but t h i s was not of momentous importance m 1952 and there 
was s u f f i c i e n t common ground amongst the leadership t o give 
the campaign purpose and d i r e c t i o n . 
The ANC leadership m 1952 comprised a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e 
number of h i g h l y educated p r o f e s s i o n a l men, m r e l a t i o n to 
the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n as a whole. I n the Eastern Cape, 
prominent examples i n c l u d e Drs. BoKwe and Njongwe, Professor 
Matthews and h i s son and the Rev. Calata ( 6 ) . I n the 
(1) L u t u l i , f o r example, made a " s p i r i t e d defence of the 
Shaka", Times, 21 J u l y 1967. (Obituary of A l b e r t L u t u l i L 
Dr S. Molema, Treasurer-General of the ANC dur i n g the defiance 
campaign, wrote several a r t i c l e s about t r a d i t i o n a l leaders 
and s o c i e t y . 
(2) I t s importance there was stressed by J. Matthews, i n t e r v i e w , 
29- January 1970. 
(3) See N. Mandela, Treason T r i a l , p 15847. 
(k) P. Walshe, "The A f n can N a t i o n a l Congress o f Soath A f r i c a " , 
(D. P h i l t h e s i s ) , pp 574-6. 
(5) Dr. S. Molema, "A H i s t o r i c a l P a r a l l e l and Warning, Bantu 
World, 11 and l 3 October 1952. 
(6) The Bok^e ,Matthews and Calata f a m i l i e s enjoyed a c e r t a i n standing 
m the Eastern Cape tfhich may have encouraged others to p a r t i c i p a t e 
m Congress a c t i v i t i e s . 
Transvaal J. B. Marks and W. Bopape were former teachers, 
N. Mandela, a lawyer, W. Nkomo, a doctor, and D. M j i , the 
youth leader, was a u n i v e r s i t y student.. This bias may have 
been l e s s marked m N a t a l , but amongst the P r o v i n c i a l Execu-
t i v e was a doctor (W. Conco), a t r a i n e e lawyer ( M. B. Yengwa) 
and a former teacher (A. L u t u l i ) . There Mere organizers who 
had had very l i t t l e formal education, such as R. Ma~cji, the 
Eastern Cape a c t i v i s t , G. B. S i t h o l e , o f the Nat a l Executive, 
who was a h e r D a l i s t , and Moses Kotane, b u t , a t l e a s t a t the 
n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , almost a l l , i f not a l l , o f the 
leaders were l i t e r a t e . Even a t the branch l e v e l m the urban 
areas i t i s probable there was a c l e a r m a j o r i t y of leaders 
v/i bh some formal education, though t h i s was not the case m 
some o f the r u r a l d i s t r i c t s , n o t a b l y m the Eastern Cape. 
Presumably, i t L S because of the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e represen-
t a t i o n of educated people, many o f whon had hi g h occupational 
s t a t u s , t h a t F e i t argues, " i t i s the A f r i c a n bourgeois u s u a l l y 
the i n t e l l e c t u a l who seeks t o provide leadersmp m A f r i c a n 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , such as the ANC. But whatever h i s s i n c e r i t y 
and hi,s capacity f o r leader ship he i s separated from the A f r i c a n 
masses by the very achievement t h a t gives him e l i t e s t a t u s " ( 1 ) . 
The term "bourgeois" (2) provides a thoroughly u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 
image of the m a j o r i t y of l e a d i n g Congress o f f i c i a l s . I t i s 
n ot c l e a r p r e c i s e l y t o whom F e i t was r e f e r r i n g m arguing 
t h a t the leadership was separated from the masses or e x a c t l y 
how he conceived the d i v i d e . I t may be argued t h a t Moroka 
held h i m s e l f a l o o f m 1952,as d i d some of t h e ' b i d guard", 
who continued to h o l d o f f i c e s a t branch l e v e l . But F e i t 
adduces no convincing evidence t o show t h a t t h i s c r i t i c i s m 
could j u s t i f i a b l y be l e v e l l e d a t the key members o f the defiance 
le a d e r s h i p , such as Mandela, S i s u l u , Marks and Njongwe. To 
(1 ) E. F e i t , A f r i c a n Opposition_in South A f r i c a ' The f a i l u r e 
of Passive Resistance, p 26. 
(2 ) The Oxford D i c t i o n a r y ^ a p p l i e s the term bourgeois to 
"those addicted to comfort and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , Humdrum". 
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suggest thab they were separated from the general populace 
by v i r t u e of t h e i r s o c i a l s t a t u s ignores, f o r example, Sisulu's 
experience as a f a c t o r y and mine worker, Marks' 20 years as 
a trade union m i l i t a n t and Njongwe's successful 
e f f o r t s a t m o b i l i z i n g a wide cross s e c t i o n o f A f r i c a n s m the 
Eastern Cape i n c l u d i n g amongst the"Red'people. 
I t i s scarcely unusual f o r the leadership of p o l i t i c a l 
organisations t o contain a higher p r o p o r t i o n of w e l l educated 
people, some w i t h h i g h l e v e l jobs, than i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
the p o p u l a t i o n as a whole I F e i t appears t o have m i s i n t e r p r e t e d 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the occupational and educational s t a t u s of 
many of the ANC leaders. I n South A f r i c a , p r e v a i l i n g economic 
and s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n s , the background of many o f the Congress 
leaders and the very p l a t f o r m on which they had r i s e n t o power 
encouraged close contact w i t h A f r i c a n workers m urban and t o 
some extent r u r a l areas. To see the Congress leadership 
as a whole, m 1952, as an i s o l a t e d c l i q u e i s an i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n open to the strongest doubts. 
More s u r p r i s i n g than the prominent r o l e of p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
m the ANC leadership during the defiance campaign was the 
almost t o t a l absence, a t the n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l s , 
of women. Nearly h a l f of the r e s i s t e r s m the Eastern Cape 
and perhaps a t h i r d m the Transvaal were female. But the 
ANC Women's League, of which the Transvaal s e c t i o n was p a r t i c u -
l a r l y a c t i v e during the Campaign, was presumably m r e g u l a r 
i n f o r m a l contact w i t h the c e n t r a l defiance leadership m 
Johannesburg. I n a d d i t i o n , a number of wives o f leaders 
m both the ANC and SAIC played a prominent r o l e m the Campaign 
wi t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y h o l d i n g formal o f f i c e m Congress ( l ) . 
There may have been some l i n g e r i n g t r a d i t i o n a l reluctance to 
appoint women to senior Congress p o s i t i o n s , but i f so no 
evidence has been found. 
CD For example, Mrs. Njongwe, Mrs. Cachalia and Mrs. Meer. 
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Women were underpresented m the I n d i a n Congress leadership, 
and so were members of the w e a l t h i e s t , the poorest and the 
l e a s t educated groups regardless of t h e i r sex, but the I n d i a n 
leadership was chosen w i t h some care to r e f l e c t the p r i n c i p a l 
elements m the p o p u l a t i o n ( l ) . 
I n f o r m a t i o n about the rank and f i l e p a r t i c i p a n t s m the 
defiance campaign i s sketchy. I n 1952 and s h o r t l y afterwards, 
serious study could have provided d e t a i l e d answers to ques-
t i o n s to which now, a t l e s t , there can be t e n t a t i v e conclu-
sions drawn from inadequate and c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n : Why 
d i d people p a r t i c i p a t e ? What d i d they t h i n k of n o n - v i o l e n t 
re s i s t a n c e and of the l i k e l y outcome of the campaign? How 
many p a r t i c i p a t e d and who were they? What p r o p o r t i o n were 
migrant workers, how many were l i t e r a t e , what percentage were 
new r e c r u i t s t o Congress, what was there age s t r u c t u r e and 
r a t i o o f the sexes and races? How d i d these f a c t o r s vary 
between the Regions 9 
The f i r s t questions are perhaps the hardest t o answer, 
m.any d e t a i l , m the absence of f i e l d s t u d i e s . People 
appear to have been motivated to r e s i s t both by general con-
s i d e r a t i o n s such as a desire f o r "freedom" and an end t o 
" e x p l o i t a t i o n " , " h u m i l i a t i o n " and "oppression" (2) and by 
s p e c i f i c l o c a l grievances ( f o r example, i n f l u x c o n t r o l , 
the i m p o s i t i o n of curfew and r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y land 
tenure p r o v i s i o n s ) . 
For some the sense of discontent and i n j u s t i c e had i t s 
o r i g i n s m the seizure of the lands and dismemberment o f the 
(1) The Ind i a n s , given t h e i r small numbers, needed t o make 
s p e c i a l e f f o r t s t o prevent the growth of too many s p l m t e r 
groups. I n Natal, where the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n was very 
d i v i d e d , the N.I.C. m the e a r l y 1950 's were a t pains t o 
form a very broad based executive. M. Naicker, i n t e r v i e w , 
h December 1969-
(2) These are terms which appear and reappear m r e p o r t s of 
rank and f i l e a t t i t u d e s recorded m the contemporary press. 
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kingdoms of t h e i r ancestors by white s e t t l e r s ( 1 ) , and was 
exacerbated by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t w h i l s t they faced a con-
t i n u i n g d i m u n i t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s , people m some other 
p a r t s of the world were winning an. increased measure of s e l f -
determination ( 2 ) . What perhaps surprised many whites m 
1952 was the number of people prepared to act on t h e i r f e e l -
i n g of d i s c o n t e n t . 
The metnod of defiance employed does not appear to have 
occasioned a great deal of comment. The precise form of 
n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e employed c l e a r l y a t t r a c t e d support, m 
a way t h a t , f o r example, the boycott had f a i l e d t o do. Given 
the circumstances of the m a j o r i t y of the p a r t i c i p a n t s (a sub-
j e c t considered below), i t would have been inconceivable f o r 
them a t t h a t time t o have adopted a s t r a t e g y of organized, 
sustained v i o l e n c e . Aside from the t a c t i c a l problems, the 
use of violence would not have accorded w i t h what was probably 
a general wish to counter the Government's p o l i c i e s and prac-
t i c e s m a " c i v i l i z e d " i f m i l i t a n t manner. To have done 
otherwise m 1952 would m any event almost c e r t a i n l y have 
played i n t o the Government's hands. 
P a r t i c i p a n t s and supporters hopes f o r the campaign 
probably v a r i e d from month to month, from optimism t h a t i t 
might secure fundamental and favourable changes a t l o c a l and 
n a t i o n a l l e v e l s t o a more cautious hope t h a t the campaign 
would a t l e a s t succeed m demonstrating the widespread and 
deep f e e l i n g of d iscontent amongst the black p o p u l a t i o n and 
t h e i r determination to a c t m defence of t h e i r r i g h t s as 
human beings 
(1) The sense of h i s t o r y and the need to "avenge" f o r the 
defeats of the eighteenth and n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s 
apply m p a r t i c u l a r to the Eastern Cape. 
(2) The Guardian and i t s successors and, f o r example, the 
Bantu World, w i t h predominantly A f r i c a n readerships, 
contained i n f o r m a t i o n on these developments. 
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Accurate s t a t i s t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n about the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
i s as inadequate as the m a t e r i a l on the m o t i v a t i o n of 
r e s i s t e r s Tables I and I I set out such i n f o r m a t i o n as i s 
a v a i l a b l e from press sources 
TABLE I 
ACTS OF DEFIANCE BY PROVINCE AND RACE 
TOTAL AFRICANS INDIANS COLOUREDS EUROPEANS 
Eastern 
Cape (a) 527^ 527^ -
Transvaal 1 ¥ ^ 1326 (b) 100 (b) 12 8 
Western Cape 386 362 (c) - 20 ( c ) if 
N a t a l 283 200 (d) 83 (d) 
Orange Free 
State 150 150 
N a t i o n a l 7312 183 32 12 
(a) Acts of defiance m the Eastern and Western Cape are 
recorded separately since the ANC m the Cape was d i v i d e d 
on t h i s b a s i s . 
(b) Estimate based on a sample of 965 r a c i a l l y d e f i n a b l e . 
(c ) Estimate based on a sample of 2^2 r a c i a l l y d e f i n a b l e . 
(d) Estimate based on a sample of 85 r a c i a l l y d e f i n a b l e . 
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TABLE I I 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE - BY TOWN 
EASTERN CAPE TOTAL TRANSVAAL TOTAL 
Port E l i z a b e t h ( l ) 1951 Johannesburg k99 
East London 1073 Germiston 259 
Uitenhague (2 ) 600 Boksburg 132 
Peddie (3) 583 Brakpan 96 
Grahamstown 33k P r e t o r i a 92 
F t . Beaufort 132 Vereenigmg 79 
Queenstown 129 Springs 76 
Kirkwood 110 Krugersdorp Gh 
KingWilliarastown 98 Roodepoort 55 
Port A l f r e d 8 if Benoni 52 
Adelaide 66 Bethai 31 
Cradock 55 Witbank 11 
A l i c e 37 
J a n s e n v i l l e 22 
E. CAPE TOTAL. 5274 TRANSVAAL TOTAL 
WESTERN CAPE TOTAL NATAL TOTAL 
Cape Town 125 Durban (k) 283 
Worcester 100 
Stellenbosch 61 
Kimberley kk ORANGE FREE STATE TOTAL 
Mafeking 20 
Paarl 20 Bloemfontem 150 
Ceres 16 
W. CAPE TOTAL- 386 
(1) According t o a r e p o r t m Race Relations News, Vo l . 
14 ( 9 ) 5 1952 more acts o f defiance took place m 
I t o r t E l i z a b e t h than shown m t h i s t a b l e , but e v i -
dence i s c o n f l i c t i n g . There were probably about 
2000 acts of defiance m the c i t y . 
(2) Figure put m excess of 600 by the Eastern Province 
Herald, 15 October, 1952 ,but no t o t a l was given. 
(3) Figure put m excess of 600 by D a i l y Dispatch, 
21 October 1952, but no t o t a l was given. 
ik) This number would be higher i f s e veral batches 
r e f e r r e d t o i n the press could be q u a n t i f i e d . 
2 6 7 
The n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l t o t a l s of defiance m the 
foregoing t a b l e s may f a l l s hort of the a c t u a l f i g u r e s , but 
the f o l l o w i n g t o t a l s - submitted m the S e c r e t a r i a l Report 
to the 21st Congress of the SAIC (195^) and r e f e r r e d to by 
Kuper (1) may e r r m the other d i r e c t i o n : 
TABLE I I I 
TOTALS OF RESISTERS ( l ) 
Eastern Cape 5719 
Transvaal 1911 
Western Cape k23 
N a t a l 2k6 
Orange Free State 258 
N a t i o n a l T o t a l - 8557 
(1) There are a number of reasons why the t o t a l s m Tables 
I and I I I should d i f f e r . For example, i t i s arguable 
what p r e c i s e l y constiLuted an act of defiance. I t seems 
q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t the f i g u r e s m Table I I I may i n c l u d e a 
number of i n c i d e n t s , one of which i n v o l v e d over 100 
people, m which a r r e s t s were made f o r c r e a t i n g a p u b l i c 
nuisance outside courts d u r i n g the t r i a l s of defiance 
leaders or p a r t i c i p a n t s . Such cases are not i n c l u d e d 
in Tables I and I I though they w i l l have been associated 
m the minds of black and white South A f r i c a n s w i t h the 
campaign. Such was the nature of defiance m the 
Eastern Cape t h a t even a t the time, according t o Matthews 
( i n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970) the leadership was n o t 
c l e a r how many acts of defiance had occurred. The t o t a l 
f o r the Eastern Cape given m Table I I I may i n c l u d e 
cases o f breach of stock r e g u l a t i o n s , a t best l o o s e l y 
associated w i t h the defiance campaign. Acts of defiance 
m the Transvaal were b e t t e r documented and the t o t a l 
given by the SAIC f o r these and the Free State are almost 
c e r t a i n l y i n f l a t e d . By c o n t r a s t , the Natal t o t a l prob-
ably underestimated the Province's r o l e m the Campaign. 
(1) Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a , p 123* 
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At b e s t , the t a b l e s o f f e r g e n e r a l p o i n t e r s , f o r example, 
d e t a i l i n g the nation-wide b a s i s of the campaign and i t s 
m u l t i - r a c i a l support w h i l s t a t the same time i n d i c a t i n g the 
numerical dominance of E a s t e r n Cape r e s i s t e r s and the over-
whelming m a j o r i t y ( n e a r l y 97%) of A f r i c a n p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
They a l s o r e v e a l the patchy nature, m geographical terms, 
of r e s i s t a n c e . 
A d u l t s of a l l ages took p a r t m r e s i s t a n c e w i t h those m 
t h e i r t w e n t i e s and t h i r t i e s predominating. Many, perhaps 
the majority, were C h r i s t i a n s , t h i s a p plying p a r t i c u l a r l y to 
the E a s t e r n Cape rfhere the C h r i s t i a n i n f l u e n c e on the 
campaign was most marked. Ab l e a s t 75% of the a c t s of de f i a n c e 
took p l a c e m major urban c e n t r e s where the m a j o r i t y of r e s i s -
t e r s were l i t e r a t e s drawn from the ranks of a r t i s a n s , c l e r k s 
and analagous p r o f e s s i o n s , a good many had trade union back-
grounds. Some people w i t h minimal or no education d i d take 
p a r t , p a r t i c u l a r l y m the E a s t e r n Cape. However, m ge n e r a l , 
few of the poorest urban manual l a b o u r e r s seem to have p a r t i -
c i p a t e d . A number of unemployed workseekers took p a r t , but 
they do not appear to have comprised a major element ( l ) . 
At the other extreme the w e a l t h i e s t d i d not p a r t i -
c i p a t e d i r e c t l y . But there was no corresponding d e a r t h of 
the most h i g h l y educated, p r o f e s s i o n a l s and studen t s being 
g e n e r a l l y w e l l represented, o f t e n a s o f f i c e h o l d e r s r a t h e r 
than m the rank and f i l e . Women played a major r o l e m the 
Campaign m a l l of the r e g i o n s . Of the 2529 E a s t e r n Cape 
(1) A Queenstown M a g i s t r a t e , commented on l e a r n i n g t h a t 
two-thirds of a group of d e f i e r s were unemployed, 
"That g i v e s me an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t you a r e a l o t of l o a f e r s 
who do nothing to earn a l i v i n g " . D a i l y R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , 
8 September 1952. On a wide s c a l e such comments could 
serve to damage the image of the Campaign and i t s l e a d e r s 
would not have wished to give such hostages to fo r t u n e . At 
the same time, many b l a c k s were unemployed and the Campaign 
l e a d e r s h i p had no reason t o t a l l y to exclude them from 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a c t s of r e s i s t a n c e . 
r e s x s t e r s whose sex i s recorded 1067 were female, m the 
T r a n s v a a l out of 488 recorded i n d i v i d u a l s 173 were female. 
There may have been a tendency m the p r e s s to make a po i n t 
of mentioning r e s i s t a n c e by women. But even so i t seems 
reasonable to p o s i t t h a t 25% of the d e f i e r s may have been 
women. The m a j o r i t y were almost c e r t a i n l y housewives, 
perhaps self-employed, f o r i n s t a n c e , a s laundry women or 
p o s s i b l y m domestic s e r v i c e , and s i n g l e women, probably 
w i t h l i t t l e formal education, some of them working m f a c t o r -
i e s . A few of the women p a r t i c i p a n t s , n o t a b l y the wives of 
c e r t a i n congress l e a d e r s , were n u r s e s or s o c i a l workers. 
Regional v a r i a t i o n s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t . The most obvious 
i s the d i s p a r i t y m numbers and m r a c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n shown 
m the t a b l e s on the preceding pages. There a r e o t h e r s too. 
Matthews pointed out (1 ) t h a t students and t e a c h e r s were not 
prominent m the E a s t e r n Cape campaign, y e t , s t u d e n t s , m 
p a r t i c u l a r played an important r o l e m support of d e f i a n c e 
m the T r a n s v a a l . Very few migrant workers took p a r t m 
r e s i s t a n c e m the T r a n s v a a l . By c o n t r a s t , m the E a s t e r n Cape 
many of those who r e s i s t e d m the urban and r u r a l a r e a s were, 
or had been, migrant workers. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s probably 
r e f l e c t e d m the e d u c a t i o n a l l e v e l of the r e s i s t e r s m the 
two r e g i o n s , t h a t m the T r a n s v a a l being higher, a d i s p a r i t y 
i n c r e a s e d by the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the r u r a l populace, m the 
E a s t e r n Cape u n l i k e m the T r a n s v a a l , w i t h the exception of 
B e t h a l . The peasantry, i n c l u d i n g s u b s i s t e n c e farmers and 
farm l a b o u r e r s , who r e s i s t e d m the E a s t e r n Cape have no 
p a r a l l e l elsewhere m the campaign ( 2 ) . Some of the r u r a l 
based r e s i s t e r s had been educated a t m i s s i o n s c h o o l s , but 
(1) I n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970. 
(2) With the exception of Gert Sibande's group a t B e t h a l . 
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"Red People" (Xhosa's who, i n s p i t e of t h e i r c o n t a c t s w i t h 
Europeans, r e t a i n e d t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s , d e s p i s i n g t h e i r 
C h r i s t i a n i z e d , "educated" former co-tribesmen) a l s o p a r t i c i -
pated, both m the r u r a l a r e a s and the c i t i e s ( l ) . 
There are v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the r e g i o n a l 
v a r i a t i o n . The d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n a l p a t t e r n of urban 
c e n t r e s a f f e c t e d the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s i s t a n c e w i t h i n eacn 
Province (2) and i n f l u e n c e d the degree of c e n t r a l p r o v i n c i a l 
c o n t r o l by the Congresses. I n the T r a n s v a a l m 1952 the 
ten most populous towns were w i t h i n a 35 m i l e r a d i u s of 
Johannesburg and i t was t h e r e t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l the r e s i s -
tance m the Province took p l a c e . By c o n t r a s t , the two 
p r i n c i p a l c e n t r e s of population and d e f i a n c e m the E a s t e r n 
Cape, Port Elizabeth-TJitenhage and E a s t London are approximate-
l y 150 m i l e s a p a r t by road. Next to these m s i z e , Queenstown, 
Grahamstown and other major c e n t r e s were 50-150 m i l e s from 
e i t h e r of the two major f o c i . The p a t t e r n and n a t u r e of 
A f r i c a n r u r a l s e t t l e m e n t was a l s o of some r e l e v a n c e m 
e x p l a i n i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s i s t a n c e . Although i t could 
never be an easy t a s k f o r r e s i s t a n c e l e a d e r s to m o b i l i z e r u r a l 
based de f i a n c e (3) the l e a s t d i f f i c u l t a r e a s m terms of 
T—• « — • r~i ' " • 
j 
(1) As P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, p 81, note s , i t was 
remarkable t h a t both the " m i s s i o n " and "Red People" p a r t i -
c i p a t e d m the d e f i a n c e campaign. The p r e c i s e nature of 
co-operation between the two "groups" during the campaign 
i s not c l e a r , nor i s the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of t h e i r p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n . But m a r e f e r e n c e to r e s i s t a n c e m the r u r a l 
Peddie d i s t r i c t , where n e a r l y 650 d e f i e d , the E a s t London 
D a i l y D i s p a t c h of 28 October 1952, commented, "Though the 
m a j o r i t y of r e s i s t e r s have been of the semi-educated c l a s s , 
r ed-blanket n a t i v e s have supported the campaign whole-
_ heartedly'.' 
(2 ) See map of r e s i s t a n c e c e n t r e s , p271 
(3 ) Under the Native A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act 1927 meetings of over 
10 people r e q u i r e d the approval of a Government o f f i c i a l 
and the l o c a l C h i e f . 
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a c c e s s i b i l i t y from major urban centres were the densely 
populated reserves and adjacent lands of the Eastern Cape 
and Natal. This factor was c r u c i a l to the outbreak of 
resistance m the C i s k e i , though of course i t does not ex-
plain the absence of Transkei participation (1) nor the 
patchy nature of resistance m the C i s k e i . I n the Western 
Cape, Orange Free State and the Southern Transvaal there 
were v i r t u a l l y no reserve lands and Africans were scattered 
as tenant farmers or labourers on white owned farms where i t 
was d i f f i c u l t to mount p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The reserves to 
the north of Pretoria, were distant from Johannesburg, communi-
cations were poor and subject to control, the density of 
population was generally low and they had l i t t l e or no tradi 
tion of "modern" p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
Regional differences m the r a c i a l composition of the 
population influenced the pattern of defiance. Absence of 
Coloured participation helps to explain the limited support 
for defiance m the towns of the Western Cape where the 
Coloured population frequently exceeded the African. The 
only other major centre where Africans were outnumbered was 
Durban where Asians predominated but t h i s only i n d i r e c t l y 
accounts for the l e v e l of resistance there. 
The urban/rural d i v i s i o n of the African population reveals 
interesting regional variations. At the time of the 1951 
census of the three and a half million Africans m the Transvaal, 
one million l i v e d on the Rand and another 26^,000 m urban 
centres with a population of more than 10,000. By contrast, 
m the Eastern Cape 1,600,000 Africans l i v e d m the non-urban 
( l ) The ANC was, however, active m the Transkei - see for 
instance references m the Daily Dispatch, 1 August 1952-
I n r u r a l Natal resistance did occur immediately before 
and during the Campaign but was only loosely associated 
with i t . 
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Transkei and Ciskei and only 163 ,000 m towns. I n Natal, 
out of an African population of 1 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 , only 185 ,000 l i v e d 
m urban centres, 1^7,000 Q f these being m Durban. Tne 
distribution of resistance m 1952 showed the distorting effect 
factors, such as tight Government controls and h i s t o r i c a l 
considerations had on the relationship between the growth of 
urbanisation and r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( l ) . 
Tue pre-eminent role o f f i c i a l l y accorded to the ANC ±n the 
campmc: may have affected the l e v e l of Indian participation and 
may have had a marginal effect on the t o t a l number of participants 
m Natal and the Transvaal. During the 19^6-8 resistance campaign 2000 
Indians defied the law m Durban, but m 1952 l e s s than 100 r e s i s t e d there. 
Indian and African Congress leaders were aware of the potential 
disadvantages of minority group prominence m the campaign ( 2 ) 
and, m any event, the Indian population may have been reluctant to 
become involved m an African dominated campaign, at l e a s t m the 
early stages (3) There were increasingly strong economic deterrents 
to Indian p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Indian traders were subject to constant 
harassment and l o c a l councils continued t h e i r practice of revoking 
trading licences for Indians. Indians employed by whites may have 
been deterred from r e s i s t i n g by the outcome of the 1950 general 
s t r i k e m which Indian participants had suffered more severely than 
their African counterparts m los s of employment. Indian workers 
faced the constant threat of replacement by Africans and some may 
have been reludant to jeopardise t h e i r livelihood by taking part 
m the defiance campaign when they could detect no 
11) I f , however, urbanization i s interpreted very broadly to cover 
contact, however b r i e f , with urban l i f e then the distortion m 
the Eastern Cape i s l e s s marked. 
( 2 ) Thema's"National minded Bloc" based part of the i r c r i t i c i s m of 
the defiance campaign on allegations i t was dominated by Indians 
and other minorities and t h i s was occasionally put forward as an 
argument for the lack of African p a r t i c i p a t i o n m Natal. See for 
example l e t t e r from F. Makolsa writing from 3ululand m E. Goli, 
31 August 1952 . 
( 3 ) Tins i s the import of I . A. Cachalia's statement, Treason T r i a l , 
p 1 5 1 3 ^ . 
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concession from the Government m the face of the 19^6 
resistance campaign or the s t r i k e s of 1950 and 1951- The 19^9 
m t e r - r a c i a l r i o t s m Durban d ) and organized and t a c i t 
Indian opposition to the campaign, for example, by the Trots-
kyite Anti-Segregation Council m Pietermaritzburg, may have 
also acted as a deterrent to Indian p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
The general absence of Coloured pa r t i c i p a t i o n m the cam-
paign ( 2 ) materially affected the pattern and scale of r e s i s -
tance p a r t i c u l a r l y m the Cape ( 3 ) . Coloured people, though 
threatened with the abolition of thei r right to the common 
r o l l franchise and a loss of status from the Group Areas and 
Population Registration Acts s t i l l had what James P h i l l i p s (k) 
described as a "Second c l a s s immunity". They did not, for 
example, require passes and could move about r e l a t i v e l y freely 
Some s t i l l harboured the feeling that i f they were law-abiding 
they would eventually be accepted as equals by the whites, where-
as i f they participated m the African dominated l i b e r a t i o n 
movement they could not hope to receive better treatment from 
the whites. The Coloured population did not see the campaign 
as relevant to thei r cause. Possibly i f the Group Areas 
Act, the Separate Representation Act and the Population Regis-
tration Act had been rigorously imposed at the outset of the 
campaign Coloured participation would have been greater. 
African-Coloured r e l a t i o n s were generally not close ( 5 ) and 
progress towards greater p o l i t i c a l co-operation through the 
African Peoples Organization and the Franchise Action Council 
( 1 ) An anti-Indian n o t occurred m Benoni m July 1952 but does 
not seem to have had wide repercussions. Eastern Province 
Herald, 7 July 1952-
( 2 ) Several of the Congress leaders were of mixed blood, for 
example, Sisulu, but they were i d e n t i f i e d as Africans rather 
than Coloureds. 
( 3 ) There were 5^ )000 Coloureds m Port Elizabeth/Oitenhage/ 
East London. Over 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 l i v e d m the mam centres of 
the Western Cape. 
(if) Interview, 11 July 1970 . 
( 5 ) Coloured-African r i o t s occurred m East London m November 
1952 when certain jobs were redesignated "Coloured" instead 
of "African". Cape Argus, 22 November 1 9 5 2 . 
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had not advanced very f a r . The Coloured population had a 
long history of i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n which helped to thwart mean-
ingful co-operation m the defiance campaign. Supporters of 
the Non-European Unity Movement were p a r t i c u l a r l y active m 
persuading the Coloured population not to participate m the 
mam body of the defiance campaign from June 1952 . Not more 
than hO Coloureds r e s i s t e d , the p r i n c i p a l centre of thei r 
a c t i v i t y being Worcester where there was a well established 
tradition of African-Coloured trade union co-operation. 
Widespread white participation was not contemplated nor 
would i t have been forthcoming, but there was some difference 
of approach amongst defiance leaders towards white involve-
ment , notably between the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape. 
In tne l a t t e r the campaign enjoyed white support and co-
operation ( 1 ) , but no encouragement was given to whites to 
participate l o c a l l y , while,m the Transvaal, a number of 
whites defied, and some 200 attended a s o l i d a r i t y meeting 
called by tne national action committee ( 2 ) . There may have 
been a national policy that white resistance should be confined 
to the Transvaal and Western Cape. The presence m both areas 
of other non-African r e s i s t e r s may have made easier the accep-
tance by the l o c a l resistance organizations of white a c t i v i s t s . 
But there were no white r e s i s t e r s m Natal, m part, perhaps, 
the r e s u l t of the preoccupations of the l o c a l leadership with 
more pressing organizational matters. I n the Eastern Cape, 
some African leaders appear to have been firmly against white 
participation m resistance ( 3 ) . 
Varying standards of organization and leadership within 
the Congresses m the different regions contributed to the 
( 1 ) Joe Matthews, interview, 29 January 1970 , referred, for 
example, to the backing of Mr Sutherland of the Evening Post, 
and to the sympathetic co-operabion of David Lamg, Officer 
Commanding Port Elizabeth Citizens Force at the time of 
November r i o t s . 
( 2 ) Advance, 27 November 1952 . 
( 3 ) J . Matthews, op. c i t . 
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pattern of resistance, though the r e l a t i o n i s not an easy 
one to e s t a b l i s h . I t can be argued that m a l l the 
Provinces the lack of a r e a l l y extensive grass roots Congress 
organization and the very limited d i r e c t i o n a l and communications 
resources available hindered the development of the campaign. 
This i s evident m Natal where the ANC was m disarray follow-
ing a protracted f a c t i o n a l dispute. To some extent the 
" f a i l u r e " of resistance m the Orange Free State can be a t t r i -
buted to the absence of an e f f e c t i v e Congress organization 
outside Bloemfontem. But with a s i m i l a r l y unpromising 
organizational base, the Eastern Cape ANC achieved a l e v e l of 
defiance four times greater than the much better established 
Transvaal Congresses. Whilst, therefore, cognizance must be 
taken of the factor of the varying l e v e l s of organizational 
preparedness m explaining the pattern of resistance ( 1 ) i t 
was not necessarily a decisive determinant. 
The separate though related issue of the quality and 
t a c t i c a l preferences, of the top p r o v i n c i a l leadership i s 
perhaps more important. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the Eastern Cape 
leaders stand out for their resourcefulness and energy, without 
which the campaign, as a whole would have been a shadow of i t -
s e l f . Whilst there were certain h i s t o r i c a l factors favouring 
resistance m the Eastern Cape, even so, without a leadership 
capable of seizing the opportunity the scale, and possibly 
the nature of resistance there, would have been very different. 
The Eastern Cape executive's control of r u r a l resistance was 
admittedly spasmodic, but not absent. The defiance was not 
anarchic and there was, for example, some central p r o v i n c i a l 
control on the timing of resistance e f f o r t s ( 2 ) . The policy 
adopted by the Eastern Cape leadership m encouraging l o c a l 
( 1 ) I n the early weeks of the campaign Njongwe limited defiance 
to the centres m the region where Congress was best organized, 
namely Port Elizabeth, East London, Grahamstown and Uitenhague. 
Evening Post, 23 August 1952-
( 2 ) f t n t d ) 
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resistance i n i t i a t i v e s was c r i t i c i z e d by other Congress leaders, 
because of the considerable r i s k s of violence associated with the 
rapid b u i l d up of the campaign i n the Eastern Cape ( 1 ) . Congress 
leaders were also active i n r u r a l Natal during the campaign, but 
the leadership f e l t that they had i n s u f f i c i e n t time to organize 
r u r a l resistance with what they considered an adequate degree of 
central control ( 2 ) . I n general, t h e i r approach to the campaign 
/ that of 
was much more cautious than/their counterparts i n the 
Eastern Cape. I f the campaign had lasted longer, resistance m 
Natal might have spread ( 3 ) - Less easy to explain m positive terms 
i s the stpmd of Dr Moroka m the Free State. Kuper records 
( 4 ) that Morcka declared i t was "deliberate policy" not to prosecute 
the campaign vigorously m the Free State, but pre c i s e l y why t h i s 
should have been so i s unclear. 
I n certain instances l o c a l Congress leaders, notably m the 
Eastern Cape and at Bethal influenced the pattern of resistance. 
I t has been noted ( 5 ) how small i n absolute numbers and i n 
proportion to the whole populace of the region was the urban Eastern 
Cape population compared to that i n the Transvaal. Nevertheless 
more people defied i n the Eastern Cape. One explanation 
for t h i s i s the different c u l t u r a l / h i s t o r i c a l background 
1 ! — J 
( 1 ) J Matthews, interview, 29 January 1 9 7 0 . 
( 2 ) M. Yengwa, interview , 16 May 1 9 7 0 . A different approach was 
taken by an Eastern Cape ANC spokesman, reported xn the Evenxng 
Post of 25 July 1952 , namely that i f the ANC did not organize people 
i n the r u r a l areas there could be spontaneous and by implication, 
violent disturbances. 
( 3 ) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, p 108 , claims that at the end of 
1952 he had been touring r u r a l areas preparing the inhabitants 
for the spread of the campaign. Much e a r l i e r i n the year, 
resistance, loosely associated with the aims of the campaign, had 
begun xn the Nqutu d i s t r i c t of Zululand against stock l i m i t a t i o n 
and control regulations. 
(k) Passive Resistance i n South Afrxca, p 1 2 2 . 
( 5 ) PP 272 -273-
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of the African population m the two regions. The presence 
on the Hand of members of a l l the p r i n c i p a l ethnic and l i n -
g u i s t i c groups l i v i n g m South Africa and many from outside i t s 
borders ( 1 ) contrasts sharply with the position m the Eastern 
Cape where m the mam centres Africans are almost e n t i r e l y 
Xhosa speaking, coming from withm the Eastern Cape, an area 
which has been thei r home for generations ( 2 ) . Whilst there 
was a fundamental division of l i f e s t y l e amongst the Xhosa 
between the so-called "Red" and "School" people, resistance 
leaders m the Province were able to c a l l on the common Xhosa 
identity, traditions and experiences to encourage p a r t i c i p a -
tion m the Campaign ( 3 ) - Africans m the Eastern Cape, especially 
m the C i s k e i , had^a long history of association with the "modern" 
p o l i t i c a l sphere (k)• This i s demonstrated by t h e i r involve-
ment, notably from the 1870's, m the procedures for electing 
members of Parliament ( 5 ) - The Fengu, who comprised the f i r s t 
Cape African voters, form a major element of the population of 
the Peddie D i s t r i c t which was an important centre of resistance 
during 1952 and by far the most s i g n i f i c a n t area of r u r a l opposi-
tion. Certain other centres m the Ciskei were also prominent 
i n the Campaign. To e l e c t o r a l experience may be added the 
( 1 ) I n 19k6 there were over 500,000 a l i e n Africans registered 
m South Africa, the majority l i v i n g on the Rand. Report 
of the UN Commission on the Racial Situation m S. A f r i c a 
(1953) , P ^3-
( 2 ) Admittedly, the Fengu had only entered the Eastern Cape 
afte r the 1820's. 
( 3 ) Stressed by J . Matthews, interview, 27 January 1970. See 
also I . A. Cachaliate testimony,, Treason T r i a l , p 15139-
However, according to Matthews, i t was t h i s very t r a d i t i o n 
which acted as a deterrent to Eastern Cape defiance leaders 
involving students m the campaign. 
(k) S. Trapido, "African D i v i s i o n a l P o l i t i c s m the Cape Colony, 
l88 i f -1910" , Journal of African History, Vol 9 ( 1 ) , 1968, and 
"African P a r t i c i p a t i o n m Cape P o l i t i c s " (unpublished seminar 
paper, I n s t i t u t e of Commonwealth Studies, London, 29 February 1 9 6 7 ) . 
( 5 ) This t r a d i t i o n continued t i l l 1960. There were never more than 
1 6 , 5 0 0 Africans on the Cape Common R o l l , but many others were 
exposed to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s through the l o c a l MP's and l a t e r , 
the Native Representatives. 
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tradition of participation xn Vigilance Associations, the 
I n d u s t r i a l and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), the ANC and 
other p o l i t i c a l groupings. The extent and continuity of 
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n from these sources should not be exaggerated, 
nor should i t s implications for resistance i n the Eastern 
Cape m 1952 ( 1 ) . But xn assessing why the campaign achieved 
the l e v e l of participation i t did there, the deep rooted p o l i -
t i c a l culture of the Xhosa/Fengu peoples cannot be ignored ( 2 ) . By 
the same token xn the Transvaal the contribution of the Communist 
Party and the ANC to the p o l x t i c i z a t i o n of the African popula-
tion may have had a bearing on l e v e l s of resistance i n 1952 
but they did not compare with the experience of both the r u r a l 
and urban based Eastern Cape Africans which derived from the 
Cape " l i b e r a l " traditions of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries ( 3 ) « 
Mrs Ballmger, the Eastern Cape Native Representative, 
argued i n 1952 the reason for the predominance of the Eastern 
Cape i n the defiance campaign was that i t had once had a t r a d i -
tion of "freedom" unknown elsewhere i n the Country (k). The 
l a s t vestiges of t h e i r "privileged" position had been steadil y 
eroded away by the National Party Government, but a few remained. 
For example, i n Port Elizabeth, the centre which recorded the 
highest number of defiers i n 1952 , there was no i n f l u x control 
at the outset of the campaign, nor were Africans subject to 
curfew regulations. In general, there appears to have been 
l e s s r e s t r i c t i o n on non-white p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y xn the Eastern 
( 1 ) Take, for example, the absence of resistance, though not 
of Congress a c t i v i t y , m the Transkei m 1 9 5 2 . 
( 2 ) I t would be interesting to know, i n t h i s context, how 
many Eastern Cape participants xn the defiance campaign 
were following a famxly tradxtxon of xnvolvement xn non-
t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . 
( 3 ) For a b r i e f assessment of the Cape " l i b e r a l " t r a d i t i o n , see 
P. Lewsen, "The Cape L i b e r a l Tradxtion - Myth or R e a l i t y 9 " . 
Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern 
Africa, Vol 1 , Instxtue of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1970 . 
(k) Daily Representative (Queenstown), 23 October 1 9 5 2 . 
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Cape than i n the urban and r u r a l d i s t r i c t s of other parts of the 
Countryfi). But the rights which the Cape Africans could s t i l l 
exercise m 1952 were not comparable with those enjoyed by the 
Coloured population and there was no corresponding reason for 
holding back from defiance of the law. Rather, as Mrs Ballmger 
indicated, the Cape African predicament was such as p o s i t i v e l y 
to encourage resistance ( 2 ) . 
The foregoing would appear to represent the major factors 
influencing regional variations m the defiance campaign, but 
lack of information precludes an assessment of such other elements 
as the role of t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s m furthering or hindering the 
campaign m pa r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t i e s ( 3 ) 1 the influence of churches 
and the varying impact of African groups opposed to the Campaign (^). 
(1) Take, for example, the contrast with the mining townships 
of the Rand. 
(2) Arguments that the defiance campaign accelerated the 
disappearance of the l a s t vestiges of Cape African " p r i v i l e g e s " 
carry l i t t l e weight, as the die was already cast. 
(.3) This may, for example, have been a factor m the Transkei's 
non-defiance. According to the United Nations Report of 
the Ra c i a l Situation m South Africa 1953 > P 1 0 9 , the Zulu 
Paramount and"some 200 of the Zulu Chiefs" allegedly opposed 
the campaign on the grounds that the Indians were using 
the Africans as a p o l i t i c a l pawn, but there i s no basis for 
assessing the r e l i a b i l i t y of t h i s information. M. Yengwa, 
interview, 16 May 1970, argued r e l a t i o n s between the Zulu 
chieftaincy and the ANC wer* "very fr i e n d l y " and that 
whilst the Chiefs ( L u t u l i excepted) generally did not i n -
volve themselves m the campaign most, including the then 
Paramount chief, were sympathetic. 
(k) For example, the A l l A f r i c a Convention (AAC) appears to 
have had an at l e a s t temporary adverse effect on defiance 
r e c r u i t i n g m Queenstown, (Daily Representative report, 
19 July 1952). The non European Unity Movement which 
drew support from Eastern Cape teachers' groups may 
have deterred them from parti c i p a t i n g . 
Regional differences should not be allowed to mask the 
degree of unity and co-ordination amongst those who participated, 
nationwide, m the defiance campaign, the achievement speaks 
for the quality of Congress leadership. 
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CHAPTER IV RESISTANCE 
The defiance Leadership sought to demonstrate to the 
Government and White South Africans as a whole the plight and 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of the black population by organizing breaches 
of certain undemocratic and r a c i a l l y d i v i s i v e laws ( 1 ) . 
Other methods employed included the p e t i t i o n , the boycott and 
s t r i k e s . I n addition, external "pressures" were placed on 
the Government, for example, at the United Nations, though not 
generally at the s p e c i f i c behest of the campaign leadership. 
The degree to which Congress leaders, at the outset, intended 
the campaign simply to demonstrate d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , as opposed 
to persuade or coax the Government to reform i s a matter already 
considered ( 2 ) . 
I n a move reminiscent of the Gandhian era and mdicatiA/e 
of the open and restrained nature of the defiance campaign, 
protest memoranda were sent to the Prime Minister by both the 
ANC and SAIC early m 1952 ( 3 ) . The memoranda outlined the 
grievances of the black population, pointing out (with some 
force and not a l i t t l e desperation), "for our part, we have 
endeavoured over the l a s t kO years to bring about conditions 
for genuine progress and true democracy". I t warned that i f 
the laws specified m the Joint Planning Council document (k) 
were not repealed by 29 February demrtnstrations and meetings 
would be held on the tercentenary of Van Riebeck's landing 
(6 A p r i l 1952) "as a prelude to the implementation of the plan 
( 1 ) Detailed, p 2 25 
( 2 ) p 2 2 5 
( 3 ) The ANC memorandum i s dated 21 January. The SAIC l e t t e r 
of 20 February, was written after the ANC-Government 
exchange of correspondence. I t i s curious that the 
ANC-SAIC did not send a j o i n t l e t t e r from the Planning 
Council. The Government did not reply. For the texts, 
see L. Kuper, Passive Resistance m Soath Africa, p 2 3 3 - 2 5 6 . 
(if) See Annex A. 
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for the defiance of unjust laws". On receipt of the Government's 
unhelpful reply d ) the ANC wrote again to the Prime Minister 
informing him that under the circumstances "The African people 
are l e f t with no alternative but to embark upon the campaign 
(of mass a c t i o n ) " ( 2 ) . The memoranda represented a formal 
statement to the Government of the aims, nature and rationale 
of the proposed campaign and the wider freedom "movement". 
By f a i l i n g to comply with the demands, which were coached m 
moderate tones, i f far reaching i n implication, the Government 
could be said to be strengthening the Congress' moral position 
m opting, as a consequence, to defy the law and ultimately to 
adopt extra-constitutional means, of a more r a d i c a l nature. 
The exchange of memoranda served to underline the divergent 
sets of rules guiding the actions of the two sides and high-
lighted their preparedness for confrontation. 
As a consequence of the Campaign the r a c i a l situation m 
South A f r i c a was raised at the 1952 session of the United Nations, 
for which the national action council produced a memorandum c i r -
culated to a l l delegations ( 3 ) - Various l e t t e r s were also 
written by Congress to private enquirers and sympathizers from 
abroad outlining i t s standpoints (k), but these external aspects 
of the campaign were of minor importance, though having a use-
f u l p u b l i c i t y value. 
In the l i g h t of the Government's response to i t s memoranda 
the ANC urith the SAIC and the Franchise Action Council organized 
a boycott by the i r followers, of the Van Riebeck celebrations. 
( 1 ) Dated 29 January. I t was signed by Mr W. W. Aucamp, the 
Prime Minister's Private Secretary. The implication of t h i s 
response i s considered m Chapter 5-
( 2 ) Dated 11 February. 
( 3 ) p 25^ f t n t 3-
(k) For example, W. Sisulu to Greater New York Negro Labour 
Council. 30 August 1952 Regina v Sisulu. 
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I t was quite successful, especially m the Cape, but i t i s 
possible not many non-whites would have attended the celebra-
tions whether or not the boycott had been organized. The 
boycott did not prevent the celebrations going ahead. The 
Guardian ( 1 ) commented,"The F e s t i v a l boycott was a success, 
but at the same time i t has revealed the shortcomings of the 
whole boycott philosophy ... by i t s e l f the boycott w i l l remain 
a s t e r i l e , i n e f f e c t i v e form of protest, pre c i s e l y because i t 
cannot mobilize tne masses of the people for struggle ..." 
The demonstrations organized by the Congresses and FAC, 
attended by some 1 0 , 0 0 0 m Cape Town and s i m i l a r numbers m 
Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg, to coincide with the tercen-
tenary celebrations had more impact. 
During the defiance of unjust laws Indian schoolchildren 
twice boycotted cla s s e s ( 2 ) m support of the campaign and i t s 
leadership but the weapon was not used m the mam stream of 
the defiance campaign. 
The j o i n t planning council's proposal ( 3 ) for the use of 
i n d u s t r i a l action m the campaign, primarily i f i t should es-
calate beyond the f i r s t stage, but, also, under certain circum-
stances from the outset (k) was implemented m only one instance, 
of any significance. I t was s t r i c t l y outside the campaign, 
but inextricably bound up with i t . An apparently spontaneous 
r i o t occurred m New Brighton, Port Elizabetn m October 1952 ; 
i t was followed by others elsewhere ( 5 ) - The Eastern Cape 
defiance leadership c a l l e d a s t r i k e shortly a f t e r the Port 
Elizabeth r i o t m protest at the City Council's reaction m 
proposing a ban on non-religious meetings and the imposition 
( 1 ) 10 A p r i l 1952 . 
( 2 ) On 26 June and 26 August (bhe date on which began the preparatory 
Court examination of W. Sisulu and 19 other Congress leaders 
under the Suppression of Communism Act. 
( 3 ) See p a r t i c u l a r l y Section 13 of i t s Report (Appendix . 6 . ) . 
(k) The wording of section 13 suggests that Congress was divided 
on t h i s matter. 
( 5 ) Pp 298- 299, 3 1 0 - 311 
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of a curfew. The o r i g i n a l intention was for the s t r i k e to be 
of ind e f i n i t e duration and to apply throughout the Eastern Gape, 
the leadership subsequently r e s t r i c t e d i t to one day and the 
s t r i k e was confined to Port Elizabeth. 
The Eastern Province Herald found that "only about one 
tenth of the African Workers m Port Elizabeth reported for 
duty" ( l ) , some Coloureds participated as w e l l . Before the 
s t r i k e began the City Council made minor concessions, but 
r e p r i s a l s were taken against some of the s t r i k e r s ( 2 ) , under-
l i n i n g the problem of u t i l i z i n g the s t r i k e as a weapon, even 
on quite a wide scale, when unemployment i s high, the workers 
do not nave strong unions and do not occupy v i t a l s k i l l e d 
posts. 
The p r i n c i p a l t a c t i c employed m the defiance campaign 
was that of non-violent breach of specified r a c i a l l y and 
p o l i t i c a l l y discriminating laws. Three of the proposed 
targets, the Bantu Autnorities Act, the Voter's Representation 
Act and the Group Areas Act had hardly been implemented at the 
outset of defiance and offered few opportunities for resistance. 
Nor did the Suppression of Communism Act provide a suitable 
mass defiance target. Messrs Dadoo, Kotane, Marks, Ngwevela, 
Bopape and Bhoola deliberately defied bannirg orders under the 
- Suppression of Communism Act early m June as a '/curtain-raiser" 
to the campaign (3)« Other leaders were charged under the Act ( k ) , 
but i t was not m the i n t e r e s t s of the leadership, intent on 
building up mass participation,for which t h e i r presence was 
required, p o s i t i v e l y to i n v i t e conviction under t h i s Act. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Eastern Province Herald, 11 November 1952. 
p 316 
The j a i l sentences received were subsequently set aside or 
suspended, p 30 7 
Banning orders were imposed on 52 Eastern Cape leaders m 
November (Eastern Province Herald, 8 November 1952), S i s u l a 
and 19 others *iece t r i e d under the Act m August. 
( i f ) 
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I n theteircumstances, Pass laws and aparthexd regulations 
(the l a t t e r o r i g i n a l l y being singled out for resistance by 
Coloured and Indian participants) became the p r i n c i p a l foci of 
a c t i v i t y (Tables IV and V). L u t u l i commented, "The main force 
of the Defiance Campaign was directed against the National Motto 
of white South A f r i c a , EUROPEANS ONLY" ( 1 ) . The mam targets 
were railways and post o f f i c e s where defiers deliberately made 
use of f a c i l i t i e s reserved for races other than their own, thereby 
signifying t h e i r r e j e c t i o n of the discriminatory practice involved. 
I n practice, there were fewer acts of defiance against apartheid laws 
than against pass regulations, except m Natal and the Free State. 
The disparity m to t a l s would have been much greater i f i t were 
not for Port Elizabeth where v i r t u a l l y a l l the 2000 acts of 
defiance that took place were against apartheid regulations ( 2 ) . 
Port Elizabeth was one of the very few centres m the Country which 
had not imposed curfew r e s t r i c t i o n s on Africans ( 3 ) . Where pass laws 
were the subject of defiance i t was the general practice to breach 
curfew regulations (k) by f a i l i n g to carry a night pass. "Location" 
regulations imposed by l o c a l councils which r e s t r i c t e d entry to 
residents and those with permits provided a further target for 
resistance, notably m the Transvaal, where "location" r e s t r i c t i o n s 
were p a r t i c u l a r l y severe. 
(1) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, p 1 0 6 . 
(.2) Some of the acts of defiance m practice turned out not to be 
i l l e g a l , see pp 306 _ 307 . 
( 3 ) An "anomaly" r e c t i f i e d a f t e r the October r i o t s , p 3 ° 9 -
(k) Local Councils could ask th^Government to issue an order 
imposing a curfew on Africans m th e i r d i s t r i c t m terms of 
Government Proclamation 6 8 , gazetted 27 A p r i l 19^+5- Almost 
a l l councils, including m the Cape, had made use of t h i s 
provision. 
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The practice of concentrating resistance against curfew 
and location regulations was m harmony with the wish of the 
campaign leaders to avoid (wherever possible) provoking r a c i a l 
f r i c t i o n tfith the white population. For the same reason, 
vio l a t i o n of apartheid regulations generally occurred when the 
f a c i l i t i e s were being l i t t l e used (1"). Kuper (2) sees t h i s 
approach as springing from the continuing influence of 
Satyagraha on the Congresses, but q u i t e as much i t was a prag-
matic decision. F i n a l l y , curfew,location and railway regula-
tion v i o l a t i o n s could take place at almost any time of the day, 
which i s of some advantage to part-time organizations such as 
the Congresses. 
In the r u r a l areas, v i r t u a l l y a l l the acts of defiance 
recorded m Table V rela t e to breaches of curfew. Dipping 
and other stock regulations were also violated ( 3 ) but i t i s 
not clear how closely, i f at a l l , some of the acts of r e s i s -
tance were associated with the defiance campaign. The ANC was 
active i n the Ciskei and Zululand, where widespread opposition 
to stock regulations took place m 1952,but viola t i o n s of the 
provisions began some months Defore the defiance campaign. 
On occasions, m urban and r u r a l areas, defiers were 
charged with offences additional to or different from that 
which had been thei r intention, or at l e a s t p r i n c i p a l intention. 
Subsidiary charges included creating a public disturbance, 
forming an i l l e g a l procession, having no service contract, and 
not being m possesion of a reference (pass) book. 
Generally, acts of defiance were preceded by public meetings 
organized by Congress to heighten the impact on Congress members 
(1) And often at places which were l i t t l e frequented by 
whites at any time - such as New Brighton railway station. 
(2) Passive Resistance m South Africa, p 126. 
( 3 ) Eastern Province Herald, 1^ October 1952. 
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and sympathizers. Prayers and songs formed a v i t a l element m 
the proceedings ( 1 ) . Government or l o c a l p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s (and 
the press) were f r e q u e n t l y informed, m advance, of acts o f r e s i s -
tance, p a r t l y bo t r y zo ensure the defiance should not pass un-
n o t i c e d (since much of the purpose would then have been l o s t ) and 
also m an attempt to avoid p o t e n t i a l l y harmful r a c i a l or other 
i n c i d e n t s ( 2 ) . Except perhaps from a s t r i c t Gandhian p o i n t of 
view there was l i t t l e to be gained (and much to be l o s t m terms 
of morale) from v i o l a t i n g a law, y e t being ignored. At the 
worst under such circumstances (and they were not uncommon dur i n g 
the defiance campaign) the d e f i e r s could r e t u r n f o r another attempt, 
perhaps against a d i f f e r e n t r e g u l a t i o n , and, w h i l s t a w a i t i n g a r r e s t , 
d i s t r i b u t e l e a f l e t s i n support of t h e i r cause. 
TABLE IV 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE - OFFENCES COMMITTED (5) BY PROVINCE 
WYTAT CURFEW JLREACH APARTHEID LOCATIONS. m 
JXi&k (Night Passes) REGULATIONS ILLEGAL ENTRY ^kSk-
Eastern Cape 527^ 3258 2010 - 6 > 
Transvaal 1¥*6 515 317 577(k) 3?(5) 
Western Crpe 386 Gk 2h7 20 55 
N a t a l 283 121 162 
Orange Free 1 5 0 1 2 0 1 ? 
State 13 
N a t i o n a l 7539 ^ 7 8 2753 597 111 
(1) A d e s c r i p t i o n of one of these meetings (though prayers are absent 
m t h i s case) i s given by Kuper, o p . c i t . , pp12-21l 
(2) Even so, there were instances where whites confronted r e s i s t e r s 
despite the presence of the p o l i c e . 
(3) The t o t a l s r e l a t e only t o the p r i n c i p a l offences f o r which i n d i v i d u a l 
r e s i s t e r s were charged. 
(k) Included here are P a t r i c k Duncan's group of r e s i s t e r s some of whom 
were sentenced under the i n t e r i m proclamation of 28 November 1952, 
P 
(5) This includes 31 d e f i e r s a t Bethai who d e l i b e r a t e l y formed an 
1 llegalpoc e ssion. 
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TABLE V 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE - OFFENCES COMMITTED' BY TOWNS 
TOTAL ALL CURFEW APARTHEID LOCATIONS' 
OFFENCES BREACH REGULATIONS ILLEGAL ENTRY MISC. 
EASTERN CAPE 
Port E l i z a b e t h 1951 - 1950 - 1 
East London 1073 1071 - - 2 
Uitenhague 600 565 35 - -
Peddie 583 583 - - -
Grahamstown 33^ 317 17 - -
F t . Beaufort 132 132 - - -
Queenstown 129 127 - - 2 
Kirkwood 110 110 - - -
King 
Williamstown 98 89 8 - 1 
P ort A l f r e d 8k 8k - - -
Adelaide 66 66 - - -
Cradock 55 55 - - -
A l i c e 37 37 - - -
J a n s e n v i l l e 22 22 - - -
T o t a l 
Eastern Cape 5274 3258 2010 0 6 
TRANSVAAL 
Johanne sburg ^99 220 273 - 6 
Germiston 259 ko - 219 -
Boksburg 132 29 103 -
Brakpan 96 51 - k5 -
P r e t o r i a 92 51 ko 1 -
Vereemgmg 79 15 k 5o -
Springs 76 60 - 16 -
Krugersdorp Gk 9 - 55 -
Roodepoort 55 - - 55 -
cont. 
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TABLE V - cont. 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE - OFFENCES COMMITTED BY TOWN 
TOTAL ALL CURFEW APARTHEID LOCATIONS• 
OFFENCES BREACH REGULATIONS ILLEGAL ENTRY MISC. 
TRANSVAAL - cont. 
Benom 52 29 - 23 -
Bethal 31 - - - 31 
Wxtbank 11 11 - - -
T o t a l 
Transvaal 1V*6 515 317 577 3/ 
WESTERN CAPE 
Cape Town 125 - 125 - -
Worcester 100 - 100 - -
Stel1enbosm 61 - 6 - 55 
Kimberley kk - - -
Mafekmg 20 20 - - -
Paarl 20 - - 20 -
Ceres 16 - 16 - -
T o t a l 
Western Cape 386 247 20 55 
NATAL 
Durban 283 121 1b2 
J 
-
2 M I 1^^^TATE 
Bloemfontem 150 120 17 - 13 
NATIONAL 
TOTALS 7539 ¥)78 2753 597 111 
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A r r e s t was never r e s i s t e d , nor, u s u a l l y , d i d those 
detained refuse bo co-operate w i t h the p o l i c e , p r i s o n and 
court o f f i c i a l s m the exercise of t h e i r l e g a l duty ( l ) . 
Many batches of r e s i s t e r s pleaded "not g u i l b y " , adding to 
the congestion m bhe c o u r t s , but the reasons f o r pleading 
" g u i l t y 1 ' o r "not g u i l t y " are not always c l e a r , there being no 
set p a t t e r n I t was however tne p r a c t i c e t o plead "not 
g u i l t y " and t o be defended m cou r t , i f necessary l o d g i n g an 
appeal against sentence, m cases where d e f i e r s were charged 
w i t h committing a more serious offence than t h a t f o r which 
they had i n t e n t i o n a l l y r e s i s t e d . A number o f cases, f o r example, 
were brought against d e f i e r s under the Riotous Assemblies Act 
on counts of in c i t e m e n t . The defiance leadership also con-
t e s t e d several " t e s t " cases of which t h a t o f Regma vs. Lusu 
a t t r a c t e d most a t t e n t i o n ( 2 ) . I n cases where r e s i s t e r s 
pleaded "not g u i l t y " and e s p e c i a l l y m those where counsel 
were b r i e f e d , prospects f o r p u b l i c i t y and a t t e n t i o n were 
g r e a t l y enhanced and t h i s must have been a s i g n i f i c a n t , i f not 
the p r i n c i p a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , m many instances ( j ) . 
Those who were convicted normally went to j a i l i f allowed 
to do so r a t h e r than accepting the o p t i o n of -a f i n e . The a c t 
of imprisonment had both an i n t e r n a l f u n c t i o n (morale boosting) 
and an e x t e r n a l r o l e (encouraging respect, sympathy and p u b l i c i t y 
f o r the campaign m and outside the Union and b r i n g i n g added 
inconvenience t o the Government). Imprisonment represented 
the climax of a r e s i s t e r ' s involvement, symbolizing h i s deter-
mination of purpose and preparedness t o s a c r i f i c e . According 
(1) There are instances where r e s i s t e r s refused t o give t h e i r 
addresses and names ( j u s t r e p l y i n g " A f r i c a n " f o r the l a t t e r ) . 
See, f o r example, a case a t F o r t Beaufort, Eastern Province 
Herald, 15 October 1952. 
(2) p 306 
(3) A number of d e f i e r s succeeded m making " p o l i t i c a l " speeches 
m support of the campaign du r i n g proceedings against them m 
the Courts, f o r example, M. P. Naicker ( t e x t published m 
Peoples World, 11 September 1952) and S. Mokoena ( f o r t e x t 
see Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a , p 129). 
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t o M. P. Naxcker (1) r e s i s t e r s emerged' from j a i l "ennobled" 
by t h e i r experience, o f f e r i n g an i n s p i r a t i o n to oth e r s . I t 
was an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f the mystique of non - v i o l e n t r e s i s -
tance. As an outward symbol of t h e i r new s t a t u s , p r i s o n 
"graduates" were sometimes presented w i t h badges a t p u b l i c 
meetings ( 2 ) . I n p r i s o n , the d e f i e r s were p e r s i s t e n t m 
demanding t h a t they should be f a i r l y .treated. They maintained 
h i g h standards o f d i s c i p l i n e and t h e i r presence i s said,some-
times, to have boosted the morale of other p r i s o n e r s ( 3 ) . 
The i n t e n s i t y of res i s t a n c e v a r i e d markedly during the campaign 
which l a s t e d from 26 June 1952 t i l l February 1953i s h o r t l y before 
the i m p o s i t i o n of new p u n i t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n , and the climax of 
the general e l e c t i o n campaign. 
TABLE VI 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE - BY PERIOD AND LOCALITY (PROVINCIAL) 
26 6.52* 25-7.52 23.8.52 21.9 52 20 .10 . 18.11.52 
TOTAL to 
24.7-52 
to 
22.BT52 
t o 
20 9.52 
t o 
19-10 52 
t o 
17-11. 
t o 
Eastern 
Cape 5274 377 1912 165^ 1047 222 62 
Transvaal 1W5 173 232 436 271 134 200 
Western 
Cape 386 52 39 201 70 20 4 
N a t a l 283 - - 54 99 89 41 
Orange 
Fz-ee State 150 - - - 130 20 -
NATIONAL 
TOTAL 7539 602 2183 2345 1617 435 307 
* except f o r the l a s t phase the d i v i s i o n s are of 30 days 
(1) I n t e r v i e w , 4 December 1969. 
(2) Evening Post, 28 October 1952. N. Mandela presided. 
(3 ) P. Joseph, i n t e r v i e w , 17 December 1969. 
TABLE V I I 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE - BY PERIOD (SAIC ANALYSIS) 
Jul y 
August 
June 1952 1'+6 
1504 
November/February 
October 
September 
2015 
2258 
2354 
280 
4528 of the 7539 cases recorded m Table V I , 60% of the 
t o t a l , were m the second and t h i r d months of the campaign 
(25 J u l y - 20 September). The l a s t three weeks m August 
was the mosb a c t i v e phase, n a t i o n a l l y . I n the month preceding 
the outbreak of v i o l e n c e a t New Bri g h t o n , on 1<3 October, r e s i s -
tance was already waning, most n o t i c e a b l y m the Eastern Cape 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the s p e c i a l case of Peddie i s excepted), but 
also m the mam centres o f the Transvaal and Western Cape. 
The s t a t i s t i c a l breakdown given m the S e c r e t a r i a l Report 
prepared f o r the 1954 SAIC Conference and r e f e r r e d to by 
Kuper (1) show a constant upward t r e n d t i l l the r i o t s . 
I n the absence of d e t a i l e d supporting evidence, such as 
i s a v a i l a b l e f o r the f i g u r e s m Table V I , the accuracy of the 
SAIC's monthly a n a l y s i s i s open to doubt. I t i s noteworthy 
t h a t Kuper comments, " I t i s , of course, conceivable t h a t the 
campaign had reached i t s peak p r i o r to the r i o t s , and was, m 
any event, m process of d e c l i n e " ( 2 ) . 
(1) 
(2) 
Passive Resistance i n South A f r i c a , p 124. 
I b i d , p 140. 
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The Campaign began s h a k i l y I n the f i r s t month defiance 
took place s o l e l y m the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal, a t a 
t o b a l o f s i x centres. Few people were ready to defy a t the 
outs e t , p a r t l y because of the Congress' o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e f i -
c i e n c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y outside the Transvaal, and, because 
there was a reluctance to be amongst the f i r s t to a c t , n ot 
l e a s t because i t was unclear p r e c i s e l y what the p e n a l t i e s 
would be and how widespread the campaign vvould become 
The z e n i t h of the campaign, m the l a t t e r h a l f o f the 
second month, and m the t h i r d , coincided w i t h the spread of 
defiance beyond the nam centres o f po p u l a t i o n . Nominally, the 
f i r s t stage of defiance, as l a i d down m'the j o i n t p lanning 
c o u n c i l r e p o r t , may have only given way t o the second m 
OctoDer, but i t i s c l e a r from Table V I I I t h a t the spread of 
resis t a n c e took place e a r l i e r , m l i n e w i t h a c a l l from the 
ANC n a t i o n a l executive (1) and wi t h o u t a w a i t i n g formal approval 
of the n a t i o n a l a c t i o n committee I n some centres, as the 
ta b l e shows, i t was s h o r t l i v e d . 
TABLE V T I I 
RECORDED ACTS OF DEFIANCE BY PERIOD AND LOCALITY (TOWNS) 
26.6.52 25.7.52 23.8.52 21 9-52 20.10.52 13.11.52 
TOTAL t o to to to t o to 
2^.7-52 22 3,52 20.9.52 19-10.52, 17-11 52 22.2.53 
1951 203 792 790 89 77 
1073 12*f 7 ^ 133 52 16 
600 50 100 350 100 
Port 
E l i z a b e t h 
East 
London 
U i t e n -
hague 
Peddie 583 - - _ 583 
Grahams-
town 3 ^ ' 272 62 
F o r t 
Beaufort 132 - - 77 55 
(1) On 23 and 2k August. Peoples World, 28 August 1952-
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TABLE V I I I - cont. 
26.6 .52 25.7 .52 23 .8 .52 21 .9 .52 20 .10 52 18.11.52 
TOTAL to to t o t o t o to 
2^.7 .52 22 .8 .52 20.9 .52 19.10.52 17 .11.52 22.2.53 
Queens-
town 129 - - 77 36 16 -
Kxrkwood 110 - - - 110 - -
Kxng 
Wxllxams- 98 _ 44 53 1 
town 
Port 
A l f r e d - - 84 - - -
Adelaxde 66 - - - - 20 46 
Cradock 55 - - - - 4o 15 
Alxce 37 - - 37 - - -
Jansen-
v x l l e 22 - 22 - -
TOTAL 
Eastern 5274 377 1912 1654 10^7 222. 62 
Cape 
Joiiannes-
burg 499 106 65 55 - 125 
Germxston 259 - - 86 31 34 58 
Boksburg 132 53 - 67 12 - -
Brakpan 96 - 3^ + 11 51 - -
Pretorxa 92 - 17 2h 8 1 
Vereenxg-
xng 79 - - - 68 11 -
Sprxngs 76 - - 51 9 - 16 
Krugers-
dorp 6^ 1<4 - 50 - - -
Eoodepoort 55 - 33 22 - - -
Benonx 52 - - 42 10 - -
Bethal 31 - - - - 31 -
Wxtbank 11 - - - 11 -
TOTAL 
Transvaal l ¥ f 6 173 232 436 271 134 200 
29 6 
TABLE V I I I - cont. 
26.6 .52 25 7-52 23.8 .52 21 9.52 20.10 52 18.11.52 
TOTAL to to to t o t o to 
24-7-52 22.8 .52 20.9 .52 19.10.52 17.11. 52 22.2.53 
Cape Town 125 _ 27 74 _ 20 4 
Worcester 100 52 12 36 - - -
S t e l l e n -
bosch 61 - - 55 6 - -
Kimberley 44 - - - 44 - -
Maf ekmg 20 - - - 20 - -
Paar l 20 - - 20 - - -
Ceres 16 - - 16 - - -
TOTAL 
Western 386 52 39 201 70 20 4 
Cape 
Durban(4) 283 - - 54 99 89 41 
Bloemfon-
texn _ 150 - - - 130 20 -
NATIONAL 
TOTALS 7539 602 2183 2345 1617 485 307 
( l ) (2) (3) (4) see corresponding footnotes m Table I I f o r 
an explanation. 
Folloitfing a Cabinet meeting on 14 August, a t 
winch the defiance campaign was discussed, Moroka, S i s u l u , Marks, 
Dadoo, Cachalia, Mandela and 14 other Congress leaders were a r r e s t -
ed on charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. Kuper 
comments,"Certainly, the a r r e s t of the leaders must have c o n t r i b u t e d 
to the decline of the Campaign" (1) I n the long run t h i s may have 
been so, but the short term e f f e c t was the very reverse. I t 
helped t o b r i n g about a climax of resi s t a n c e a c t i v i t y immediately 
( l ) Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a , p 145« 
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before the s t a r t o f the preparatory examination on 26 August. 
S i m i l a r l y , m Port E l i z a b e t h , immediately f o l l o w i n g the a r r e s t 
of Njongwe and other Eastern Cape leaders, 330 acts of defiance 
were recorded on one day (12 September) ( 1 ) . The high f i g u r e 
f o r the Peddie d i s t r i c t a t the end of the f o u r t h month must be 
p a r t l y r e l a t e d to the t r i a l there of two l e a d i n g ANC a c t i v i s t s 
on charges of inc i t e m e n t ( 2 ) . Such responses represented a 
popular challenge to the Government and gave some temporary 
substance to Njongwe's comment that the a r r e s t of leaders was 
no impediment as " i n d i v i d u a l s do not count" m the campaign. 
The negative impact of leadership c u l l i n g was lessened m the 
Sisulu and Njongwe cases because the defendants were allow 
out of 3 a i l a f t e r being charged and they remained p o l i t i c a l l y 
a c t i v e ( 3 ) -
Why then d i d r e s i s t a n c e decline p r i o r to the r i o t s , t a k i n g 
the f i g u r e s for the Country as a whole, regardless, f o r example, 
of e f f o r t s m the Transvaal, probably spearheaded by the SAIC, 
to i n t e n s i f y defiance m the days leading up to the meeting of 
the UN Assembly (14 October)? I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t i f i t had 
not been f o r the r i o t s the campaign might have gathered 
s t r e n g t h a f t e r a temporary l u l l , which could have been a t t r i -
buted t o an e s s e n t i a l l y v o l u n t a r y d e c i s i o n by the defiance 
leadership to take stock and decide where the campaign was 
heading. Bat, i f so, evidence i s l a c k i n g . More l i k e l y , trie 
downturn i n d i c a t e d some doubts on the p a r t of the rank and f i l e , 
and may be the lead e r s h i p , about what more the campaign could 
achieve. I n p a r t , a t l e a s t , such doubts may have r e s u l t e d 
(1 ) I t i s very u n l i k e l y t h i s was a coincidence. The quick m o b i l i z a -
t i o n o f d e f i e r s on t h i s occasion i s noteworthy, suggesting 
Congress was n o t always as i n e p t as some would make out, nor 
t o t a l l y l a c k i n g m able second rank leaders. 
(2 ) 300 people r e s i s t e d on the eve of the t r i a l . Evening Post, 
20 October 1952. 
(3 ) Both Dr Njongwe and N. Mandela, f o r example, addressed the 
Na t a l ANC AGM a t the end of October/early November. I t was 
only a f t e r the New Brig h t o n r i o t t h a t 52 Eastern Cape ANC 
leaders were prevented from a t t e n d i n g p u b l i c gatherings, even 
t h i s d i d not put them e n t i r e l y out o f a c t i o n . 
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from Government i n t i m i d a t i o n , manifest m the b r i n g i n g m of 
p o l i c e reinforcements t o the Eastern Cape, m t h r e a t e n i n g 
Government speeches, and m i n c r e a s i n g l y s t i f f sentences meted 
out t o d e f i e r s . Purely l o c a l f a c t o r s may have also c o n t r i -
buted t o the downturn m a c t i v i t y . A number of centres may 
have exhausted t h e i r o r i g i n a l volunteer resources and f o r a 
v a r i e t y of reasons f a i l e d to a t t r a c t replacements. I n East 
London ne a r l y 900 people r e s i s t e d m the space of a few days 
a t the end of J u l y , but only kOO more p a r t i c i p a t e d there m the 
whole of the r e s t of the campaign, i n p a r t a r e f l e c t i o n o f the 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c leadership of A l c o t t Gwentshe. I n the Eastern 
Cape, occasional references suggest t h a t the p l a n t i n g season, 
which was under way before the r i o t s began, could have had some 
impact on resistance l e v e l s ( 1 ) . 
The r i o t s t h a t occurred a t New B r i g h t o n , Denver, Kimberley, 
Grahamstown and East London between 18 October (2) and 
9 November hastened the end of the campaign on a n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 
I t should be stressed t h a t these outbreaks, which warrant study 
o f t h e i r own, cannot j u s t i f i a b l y be a t t r i b u t e d d i r e c t l y or i n -
d i r e c t l y to the defiance leadership which reacted s t r o n g l y 
against the violence winch occurred ( 3 ) - Six whites were mur-
dered and others i n j u r e d during the r i o t s and a t l e a s t 30 A f r i c a n s 
were k i l l e d by the p o l i c e , who overreacted, as was widely recog-
n i z e d by whites a t zhe time (k). There can now be no d e f i n i t i v e 
explanation of the r i o t s , but the impact on the campaign was 
c l e a r . I n the Eastern Cape, Matthews sai d "the h e a r t went out 
o f the Campaign" (5)> t h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f Port 
(1 ) D a i l y Dispatch, 2 October 1952. 
(2 ) The very day the UN was considering whether to debate South 
A f r i c a ' s r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . 
(3 ) See, f o r example, the statement of the ANC f o l l o w i n g the 
New Brighton r i o t . Eastern Province Herald, 20 October, 
1952. 
(k) Who, f o r example, commented on the ase o f guns when te a r gas 
would have been adequate. 
(5 ) J- Matthews, i n t e r v i e w , 29 January, 1970. He was t a l k i n g m the 
immediate term and t h i s need not c o n f l i c t w i t h L u t u l i ' s l a t e r 
assessment ( p 3 3 3 , f t n t 3 0 
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E l i z a b e t h and East London. Mayer records the s p i r i t of 
d e j e c t i o n present m the townships of East London a t the time ( l ) . 
There, defiance ceased a b r u p t l y , m Port E l i z a b e t h i t l i n g e r e d 
on, on a much reduced scale. Elsewhere m the Province and m 
the r e s t of the country the short term impact i s l e s s c l e a r . 
For example, defiance a t Adelaide and Cradock only began a f t e r 
the r i o t a t New B r i g h t o n and continued w e l l i n t o November. But 
a t Grahamstown defiance had ceased over a month before the f i r s t 
r i o t . I n the Transvaal, where only one r i o t occurred - a t 
Denver, Johannesburg - r e s u l t i n g m the death of 3 Africans, k i l l e d 
by the p o l i c e , there appears to have been a temporary h a l t to 
defiance m Johannesburg and i t s environs, but r e s i s t a n c e sub-
sequently r e v i v e d . Violence was so commonplace on the Reef 
t h a t the impact o f the disturbances may have been much l e s s than 
m the r e l a t i v e l y peaceful Eastern Cape. I n N a t a l and the 
Orange Free State, where resistance began l a t e , f o r " o p e r a t i o n a l 
reasons", and m the Western Cape, none of which were d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t e d by the r i o t s , t h e campaign continued, the l a s t a c t of 
defiance o c c u r r i n g m N a t a l , on 22 February 1953 ( 2 ) . 
But the immediate impact of the r i o t s on the campaign i s only 
one aspect. The disturbances became associated m the minds 
of whites w i t h the defiance leadership, regardless of the lack 
of c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence and gave the Government a p r e t e x t 
f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of draconian l e g i s l a t i o n which hastened 
the end of the campaign ( 3 ) . The disturbances exposed the 
A c h i l l e s heal of n o n - v i o l e n t resistance and the leadership was 
i l l prepared to meet the t h r e a t , once again being put on the 
defensive. 
(1 ) P. Mayer, Townsmen or Countrymen, p 82 . 
(2 ) The group was headed by M. Yengwa who claimed t h a t 
r e s i s t a n c e was gathering momentum m Na t a l a t the end of 
the year, a f t e r i t s l a t e s t a r t (30 September), encouraging 
the n a t i o n a l a c t i o n committee to continue the campaign. 
I n t e r v i e w , 16 May 1970. 
(3) PF309-310 
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CHAPTER V: REACTION 
This chapter i s concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h the r e a c t i o n of 
the Government and the White p o p u l a t i o n m South A f r i c a t o the 
defiance campaign and p e r i p h e r a l l y , w i t h the response outside 
the Country. I t complements Chapter 3-
Defiance took place against a "background of considerable 
ferment amongst white South A f r i c a n s - manifest m the Torch 
Commando and Springbok Legion, t a l k of secession m N a t a l , and 
a major c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s over the proposed High Court of 
Parliament Act ( 1 ) . Abroad, the United Nations was an i n -
creasing t h o r n m the f l e s h of the South A f r i c a n Government, 
and White South A f r i c a n s watched w i t h some alarm c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
developments m the Gold Coast and even more the d e c l a r a t i o n of 
emergency m Kenya m 1952 f o l l o w i n g the outbreak of the Mau Mau 
disturbances. None of these phenomena moved the N a t i o n a l Party 
Government t o consider a " l i b e r a l " approach m i t s a d ministra-
t i o n , and the prospect of a non-white campaign of defiance of 
the law was h a r d l y l i k e l y to do so. Dr Malan t o l d p a r t y 
supporters t h a t he saw Three i n f l u e n c e s a t work behind the 
campaign, "the United Kingdom's u n f o r t u n a t e p o l i c y m 
the Gold Coast , Communism and I n d i a " . He commented, " I t i s 
c l e a r the a s p i r a t i o n of the I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r i s t o make 
A f r i c a a dumping place f o r the superfluous p o p u l a t i o n of I n d i a " . 
A ssociating the defiance campaign w i t h the October /November 
r i o t s and w i t h the Mau Mau, Dr Malan t o l d h i s audience, "people 
overseas are now beginning t o see t h a t barbarism cannot be 
beaten m years or even generations ... the Kenya and South 
A f r i c a n n a t i v e s are not f a r removed from barbarism" ( 2 ) . I f 
such views could be expressed by the Prime M i n i s t e r i t i s 
( 1) p 206 
(2) At a N a t i o n a l P a r t y meeting m Johannesburg, 9 November. 
D a i l y D i s p a t c h , 1Q November 1952. For other M i n i s t e r i a l 
Comments, see p 3 1 5 
i 
3 0 1 
scarcely s u r p r i s i n g t h a t o f f i c i a l r e a c t i o n g e n e r a l l y t o the 
campaign was uncompromisingly h o s t i l e . O f f i c i a l o p i n i o n d i d 
not dismiss the campaign as being something so minor as t o be 
s a f e l y l e f t to w i t h e r of i t s own accord. Rather, t i l l the time 
of the r i o t s , the Government adopted a t a c t i c of " l i m i t e d r e s -
ponse". I t could not be c e r t a i n of the s t r e n g t h of i t s ad-
versary, but i t may have thought there was l i t t l e t o be l o s t by 
adopting a f a i r l y low p r o f i l e , w a i t i n g f o r the movement to 
collapse, v i r t u a l l y of i t s own v o l i t i o n , or f o r a s u i t a b l y 
damaging o p p o r t u n i t y t o give the coup de grace w i t h the minimum 
e f f o r t . I n the meantime, the Government and i t s agents kept 
a close i n t e r e s t i n the defiance of u n j u s t laws, sometimes d i s -
cussing i t a t the highest l e v e l s ( 1 ) . Whether the Government 
evolved a coherent s t r a t e g y t o t a c k l e the campaign seems doubt-
f u l but t h e i r r e a c t i o n bears the mark of more than casual, 
ad hoc decision-making. 
The f i r s t o f f i c i a l response to the proposed campaign came 
i n the r e p l y of 29 January 1952 from the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s 
o f f i c e t o the ANC.in response to t h e i r memorandum of 21 January 
c a l l i n g f o r r e p e a l of repressive l e g i s l a t i o n and t h r e a t e n i n g a 
, defiance campaign. L e w i n commented a t the time t h a t the 
l e t t e r "was r e a l l y the opening o f a new chapter of race r e l a -
t i o n s i n the Union ... the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s l e t t e r was a new 
departure because i t i m p l i e d r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t t h a t the 
A..N..C. i s the body t h a t speaks to the Government on behalf 
of the A f r i c a n s " ( 2 ) . Even i f t h i s were so, the "achievement" 
was s h o r t - l i v e d . The l e t t e r was uncompromising, though i t i s 
noteworthy Malan caused a f u l l r e p l y r a t h e r than a c u r t acknow-
ledgement to be sent. R e j e c t i n g any idea of r e p e a l i n g "the 
(1) Take, f o r example, the s p e c i a l Cabinet meeting c a l l e d 
i n mid-August to discuss the defiance campaign. P r e t o r i a 
News, 15 August 1952. Following t h i s , S i s u l u and 19 other 
leaders were a r r e s t e d and p o l i c e reinforcements sent t o 
the Eastern Cape. 
(2) Forum, J u l y 1952. 
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long e x i s t i n g laws d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between European and 
Bantu", which Malan claimed p r o t e c t e d the "Bantu" and t r a i n e d 
tnem,"m the performance of those d u t i e s which must be f u l l y 
observed by a l l who wish t o claim r i g h t s " , the Prime M i n i s t e r 
warned the ANC, "should you adhere t o your expressed i n t e n t i o n s 
of embarking on a campaign of defiance and disobedience t o the 
Government, and should yoa, m the implementation t h e r e o f , i n c i t e 
the Bantu p o p u l a t i o n ... the Government w i l l make f u l l use of 
the machinery a t i t s d i s p o s a l t o q u e l l any disturbances, and 
t h e r e a f t e r , deal adequately w i t h tnose responsible f o r i n i t i a t i n g 
subversive a c t i v i t i e s o f any nature whatsoever" ( 1 ) . 
The Congress/FAC organized boycott of the Van Riebeck 
c e l e b r a t i o n s may have offended the Government, and i t had t o 
deploy p o l i c e t o watch over the demonstrations mounted by 
Congress, but the prot'esb evoked and necessitated, m p h y s i c a l 
terms, l i t t l e o ' f f i e i a l response. 
Tlie Government response to the mainstream of the campaign 
had s e v e r a l f a c e t s , the f i r s t of which was recourse t o the due 
process of law ( 2 ) . Only comparatively r a r e l y d i d the p o l i c e 
exercise tne o p t i o n of not responding t o breaches or threatened 
breaches o f the law by d e f i e r s , though o f t e n r e s i s t e r s were kept 
w a i t i n g f o r some hours. But, i n Durban groups seeking a r r e s t 
f o r breach of curfew r e g u l a t i o n s were sometimes t o t a l l y and 
d e l i b e r a t e l y ignored by the p o l i c e (3) and i f u l t i m a t e l y a r r e s t e d , 
perhaps f o r some other offence, might be almost immediately 
released, being t o l d they would be summoned l a t e r ( 4 ) . At 
King Williamstown a group of " d e f i e r s " who sought a r r e s t by 
using f a c i l i t i e s set aside f o r whites m the post o f f i c e were 
(1) Malan's use of the term "subversive" i s i n d i c a t i v e of the 
Government's a t t i t u d e to any o p p o s i t i o n . 
(2) The other aspects of i t s response are considered on pp 3 1 1 f f 
(3) Advance, 6 November 1952. 
(4) i b i d - ' 27 November 1952. 
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served w i t h o u t question, whereupon they apparently f e l t o b l i g e d 
to leave ( l ) . An a l t e r n a t i v e , l i t t l e used p o l i c y , was t o 
prevent an act of defiance t a k i n g place. At P r e t o r i a the 
p o l i c e blocked the European entrance a t the s t a t i o n t o prevent 
i t s use by 50 d e f i e r s , only 15 succeeded m reaching the con-
course and being a r r e s t e d ( 2 ) . Such " o b s t r u c t i v e " t a c t i c s 
by the p o l i c e could be very o f f - p u t t i n g f o r the r e s i s t e r s , 
u n d e r l i n i n g the need to give volunteers t r a i n i n g before 
sending them to defy. The Government might have made more 
frequent use of these means of countering r e s i s t a n c e but 
there were r i s k s m being seen to countenance breaches of the 
law. Both sides were m a dependent r e l a t i o n s h i p d uring the, 
campaign and the i n i t i a t i v e was not e n t i r e l y w i t h the 
Government. 
A f t e r a r r e s t , r e s i s t e r s sometimes s u f f e r e d harsh treatment 
and i f they refused b a i l o f t e n had t o w a i t several weeks m 
pr i s o n before t h e i r case was heard. To c i t e one example. 
At Worcester, a group who "trespassed"into a white area a t 
the r a i l w a y s t a t i o n were, w i t h the exception of one person, 
who may have pleaded g u i l t y , remanded f o r over t h i r t y days. 
The man whose case was heard received a sentence of only 20 
days w i t h the o p t i o n of a £5 f i n e ( 3 ) . Sometimes those on 
remand were subsequently found not g u i l t y , but had e f f e c t i v e l y 
served a sentence ( 4 ) . 
As shown m Table IV,the three commonest offences i n t e n -
t i o n a l l y committed by d e f i e r s were breach of curfew, a p a r t h e i d 
and l o c a t i o n r e g u l a t i o n s , m t h a t order, r e s i s t e r s sometimes 
(1) Peoples World, 9 October 1952 
(2) P r e t o r i a News, 15 September 1952. 
(3) Cape Argus, 3" August 1952. 
(4) See, f o r example, the group a t Boksburg under Flag Boshielo 
which were h e l d f o r a month and r e p o r t e d l y maltreated by 
p r i s o n and other o f f i c i a l s during t h a t time Defore being 
f r e e d on a t e c h n i c a l i t y . C l a r i o n , 31 J u l y 1952. 
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a d d i t i o n a l l y being charged f o r c r e a t i n g a p u b l i c d i s t u r b a n c e , 
forming i l l e g a l p r o c e s s i o n s , having no s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t and 
not being m p o s s e s s i o n of a pass book. L a t t e r l y , those who 
d e f i e d the law were l i a b l e to p r o s e c u t i o n m terms of a 
proclamation (1) under the 1927 N a t i v e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act. 
T h i s proclamation gave way to the P u b l i c S a f e t y and C r i m i n a l 
Law Amendment A c t s m March 1952, h a s t e n i n g the end of the 
campaign. P a r t i c i p a n t s a l s o faced p r o s e c u t i o n under the 
Riotous Assemblies Act (l91^h amended 1930) f o r i n c i t e m e n t 
I n some ca s e s r e s i s t e r s were l i a b l e to d e p o r t a t i o n from the 
a r e a m which they l i v e d , back to the R e s e r v e s . Those who 
l e d the campaign, i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether they d e f i e d or not, 
faced s p e c i a l p e n a l t i e s under the Suppression of Communism 
Act. 
The r e a c t i o n of m a g i s t r a t e s to d e f i e r s v a r i e d from one of 
r e l a t i v e l y m i l d d i s a p p r o v a l and bafflement to o u t r i g h t and 
b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y m which no r e c o g n i t i o n was accorded e i t h e r to 
the problems faced by non-whites or to the r e s t r a i n e d manner 
m which they had expressed t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . A magis-
t r a t e m Uitenhague remarked to groups of d e f i e r s m h i s court, 
"you people are l i k e a goat which puts i t s head down and charges 
a t a w a l l . The goat u s u a l l y Knocks h i s b r a i n s out but the w a l l 
stands f i r m . The law i s l i k e the w a l l " ( 2 ) . I n another 
i n s t a n c e d e f i e r s were t o l d "you t a l k of freedom, but I don't 
know what you a r e complaining about as you a l r e a d y have 
freedom" (3)» Such m a g i s t r a t e s were u n l i k e l y to have much 
pa t i e n c e when d e f i e r s t r i e d to make p o l i t i c a l speeches m 
co u r t s , nor w i t h the crowds who sometimes f l o c k e d to hear 
c a s e s . Indeed m a t l e a s t one i n s t a n c e h e a r i n g s took p l a c e m 
the p o l i c e c e l l s to avoid p u b l i c involvement ( i f ) . 
(1) No 276 of 28 November 1952 ,read w i t h Government n o t i c e no 2753 
(2) E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald, 18 J u l y 1952. 
(3) E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald, 26 J u l y 1952. M a g i s t r a t e Moony, l i k e a 
number of w h i t e s , thought t h a t i f the d e f i e r s r e a l l y had g r i e v a n c e s 
they should have been a i r e d by " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means". ( T h i s was 
a t a time when the Government was t r y i n g to f o r c e through the 
High Court of P a r l i a m e n t B i l l * . ) . 
(k) E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald, 7 J u l y 1952. 
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No g u i d e l i n e s appear to have been l a i d down, l e t alone 
observed, on the s e n t e n c i n g of d e f i e r s , p e n a l t i e s v a r y i n g 
from town to town and from one time to another, w i t h some, 
a l b e i t c o n f l i c t m g i evidence of an upward t r e n d . Male youths 
u s u a l l y were sentenced to l a s h e s , but not so a d u l t s . Young 
females were normally discharged, however r e l u c t a n t they might 
be to avoid sentence of imprisonment. At the o u t s e t of the 
campaign m Po r t E l i z a b e t h the s e n i o r p u b l i c p r o s e c u t o r t h e r e 
s a i d m court t h a t the Attorney General had i n s t r u c t e d him to 
seek "the most d r a s t i c " sentences, a r e q u e s t w i t h which the 
m a g i s t r a t e d i d not comply imposing a p e n a l t y of £ 6 or JO days ( 1 ) . 
T h i s was higher than many m the e a r l y weeks of the campaign 
when sentences of from £1 or 10 days to £ 2 or 20 -30 days p l u s 
l e s s e r p e n a l t i e s f o r s u b s i d i a r y o f f e n c e s were commonplace ( 2 ) . 
By September imprisonment had r i s e n to 60 days and f i n e s to 
£ 1 2 m Po r t E l i z a b e t h and by the f o l l o w i n g month to 90 days or 
£ 1 5 , sentences t h e r e tending to be higher than m other c e n t r e s , 
r e g a r d l e s s of tne C i t y ' s " l i b e r a l " t r a d i t i o n s . Some of the 
s e v e r e s t sentences were meted out to the group of T r a n s v a a l 
r e s i s t e r s under P a t r i c k Duncan who were charged under the 
November Proclamation a g a i n s t i n c i t e m e n t of A f r i c a n s ( 3 ) -
Duncan was sentenced to £ 1 0 0 or 100 days, other members of the 
group r e c e i v i n g p e n a l t i e s of from £ 2 0 or 20 days to £ 5 0 or 50 
days, p a r t suspended. 
M a g i s t r a t e s were aware of the importance p a r t i c i p a n t s m 
the d e f i a n c e campaign a t t a c h e d to being given j a i l s entences 
and hence did not always "co-operate" though i t was t h e i r 
g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e to do so 
I n Durban,where o f f i c i a l s had had more r e c e n t 
(1) A sentence d e s c r i b e d by Die O o s t e r l i g , 11 J u l y 1952 a s 
"simply l u d i c r o u s " . I t s s o l u t i o n was "the cane and the 
l a s h " , followed by d e p o r t a t i o n . 
( 2 ) A t a b l e of sentences handed down m v a r i o u s p a r t s of the 
Country i s a t Annex B. 
( 3 ) p 309. 
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experience of handling organized non-violent opposition than 
elsewhere m the Country, some r e s i s t e r s received punishments 
m October as low as fines of 2/6d or k days imprisonment and 
m the same month m Mafekmg the sole group of r e s i s t e r s 
there were cautioned and discharged on the pretext that the 
j a i l was f u l l Occasionally, r e s i s t e r s were not given 
the option of imprisonment, money found m t h e i r possession 
being seized for payment of a fine (2) m terms of the 1917 
criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, but i t had limited 
application, a weakness r e c t i f i e d m the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act. 
The Government did not always achieve what they set out 
to do m bringing defiers before the Courts, as i s revealed by 
the case of Begma vs Lusu. Lusu was one of Zh Africans 
arrested for entering a European waiting room at Cape Town 
Station. The crux of Sam Kahn's case for the defence was 
that the railways had no right m law to discriminate against 
non-whites on t h e i r premises m the provision of f a c i l i t i e s 
and that since the amenities were not of an equal standard 
the charge against the defendants should be rejected. I t 
was, and the verdict was upheld on appeal both to the Supreme 
and Appellate Courts (3)- There were several similar cases, 
though pleas on the grounds of unequal f a c i l i t i e s were not i n -
variably accepted. 
A group of defiers arrested for supposed breach of post 
o f f i c e apartheid regulations m Port Elizabeth were acquited „ 
when i t turned out they had not obstructed business , the only 
basis on which i t was discovered a conviction might be brought. 
The Post Master's c i r c u l a r No 13, 19^9? the authority for 
(1) Peoples World, 23 October 1952. 
(2) Evening Post, 25 August 1952. 
(3) Cane Argus. 15 and 25 August (court case), 19 November 
(1st appeal). Eastern Province Herald, 2k March 1953 
(2nd appeal). 
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e n f o r c i n g post o f f i c e a p a r t h e i d simply s t a t e d t h a t A f r i c a n s 
should be requested to form separate queues, f a i l i n g which 
they were to be s e r v e d l a s t ( 1 ) . As a r e s u l t of t h i s b e l a t e d 
f i n d i n g a number of d e f i e r s h e l d f o r supposed breach of post 
o f f i c e a p a r t h e i d were r e l e a s e d D e f i a n c e l e a d e r s d i d not 
attempt to e x p l o i t the temporary loophole and though i t s 
d i s c o v e r y could be seen a s a " v i c t o r y " f o r the campaign i t d i d 
not make any e a s i e r the task of d e f i a n c e . A r r e s t f o r a p a r t h e i d 
" o f f e n c e s " became l e s s c e r t a i n . L. P h i l l i p s , a Cape Town 
a c t i v i s t , commented when h i s group was not a r r e s t e d ( f o r u s i n g 
European f a c i l i t i e s on a t r a m and a l s o , i n c i d e n t a l l y , f o r p a s s 
offences), "we a r e stuck ... there i s not much l e f t we can do 
m the way of r e s i s t a n c e " (2) The p r o s p e c t of n o n - a r r e s t was 
bad f o r morale. 
I t i s debatable to what extent the Government succeeded 
m i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the progress of the campaign p r i o r to the 
October r i o t s by t a k i n g d e f i a n c e l e a d e r s to court f o r v a r i o u s 
o f f e n c e s , notably under the Suppression of Communism Act. A 
p o t e n t i a l l y s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n arose a t the o u t s e t of the cam-
paign, Bopape, BhooTa, Dadoo, Kotane, Marks and Ngwevela had 
a l r e a d y been a r r e s t e d f o r d e l i b e r a t e breach of banning o r d e r s 
and were j o i n e d m p r i s o n by Mandela, S i s u l u , Yusuf C a c h a l i a 
and Seperepere who were a r r e s t e d unexpectedly f o r i n c i t e m e n t , 
under the Hiotous Assemblies Act, w h i l s t o b serving the f i r s t 
a c t s of r e s i s t a n c e on the Rand. A l l the members of the n a t i o n a l 
a c t i o n c o u n c i l and the most s e n i o r T r a n s v a a l Congress l e a d e r s 
were thus m p r i s o n . I f t h i s s i t u a t i o n had l a s t e d i t could 
c l e a r l y have had a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on r e s i s t a n c e , a t l e a s t m 
the T r a n s v a a l , but Mandela and those with him q u i c k l y succeeded 
m g e t t i n g b a i l . Bopape and h i s c o l l e a g u e s obtained b a i l on 
16 J u l y , having lodged appeals a g a i n s t sentence (ranging from 
(1) C l a r i o n , 2k J u l y 1952. 
(2) Cape Argus, 26 August 1952. T h i s was immediately a f t e r 
the v e r d i c t m the Lusu court case. 
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2-6 months imprisonment) T h i s l a t t e r group were n e v e r t h e l e s s 
s e v e r e l y handicapped m t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the d e f i a n c e 
campaign, as a r e s u l t of t h e i r banning o r d e r s , but having 
succeeded m e x p l o i t i n g t h e i r l e g a l r i g h t to b a i l they were f a r 
from i n a c t i v e behind the scenes m support of the campaign. 
I n August, as the campaign gathered momentum, the Government, 
a t c a b i n e t l e v e l , took the d e c i s i o n to a r r e s t S i s u l u and 19 
othei prominent, p r i m a r i l y T r a n s v a a l based, Congress l e a d e r s 
on charges of promoting the o b j e c t s of Communism a s defined m 
the Suppression of Communism Act. The f o l l o w i n g month ( 1 ) 
Njongwe and "\h f e l l o w E a s t e r n Cape d e f i a n c e l e a d e r s were charged 
f o r s i m i l a r o f f e n c e s . Kuper c l a i m s t h a t working under the 
t h r e a t of heavy p e n a l t i e s " t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s a s l e a d e r s must 
have been s e r i o u s l y impaired" ( 2 ) . But the evidence i s l a c k -
i n g . The l e a d e r s were not remanded m custody, nor r e s t r i c -
t e d m t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by the court and the c a s e s were heard 
only a t the end of November and e a r l y December, co n t i n u i n g 
f o r some months Suspended p r i s o n sentences were e v e n t u a l l y 
imposed m both c a s e s . 
Where the Government p e r c e i v e d gaps m the e x i s t i n g l e g a l 
powers to counter r a d i c a l o p p osition, such as i t f aced m 1952 , 
i t d i d not h e s i t a t e to s i e z e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to a c q u i r e a d d i t i o n a l 
powers. The October r i o t s ( 3 ) provided a p e r f e c t p r e t e x t , 
and as such, r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about the p o s s i b l e r o l e of the 
Government m the d i s t u r b a n c e s . Against the background of 
the s t a t e of alarm engendered amongst E a s t e r n Cape whites by 
the r i o t s , and the supposed widespread t h r e a t to law and order 
( g r e a t l y exaggerated by f a l s e rumours) the Government responded 
w i t h renewed vigour to the d e f i a n c e campaign, a t the same time 
b e r a t i n g the " l i b e r a l i s t i c " " n a t i v e " p o l i c i e s of United p a r t y 
dominated c o u n c i l s , s u c h as there were a t P o r t E l i z a b e t h and 
( 1 ) Why; t h e r e should have-been t h i s delay i s not c l e a r . 
( 2 ) P a s s i v e R e s i s t a n c e m South A f r i c a , p 193-
( 3 ) See pp298=9_above. 
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E a s t London ( 1 ) . On 7 November banning o r d e r s were i s s u e d 
a g a i n s t 52 E a s t e r n Cape def i a n c e l e a d e r s - v i r t u a l l y a l l the 
top l e a d e r s h i p m the Aegion. The 
Government e x e r c i s e d powers under the Riotous Assemblies Act 
to ban meetings o f * n o n - r e l i g i o u s or s o c i a l nature i n mam c e n t r e s 
of the E a s t e r n Cape and immediately agreed to a r e q u e s t from 
P o r t E l i z a b e t h C o u n c i l f o r the i m p o s i t i o n of a 9 p.m. - 5 a.m. 
curfew on A f r i c a n s m the c i t y . Government a c t i o n m banning 
p o l i t i c a l meetings and the ANC l e a d e r s h i p served to i n c r e a s e 
t e n s i o n m the Region. I n an outbreak of v i o l e n c e i n E a s t 
London on 9 November a t l e a s t 6 people were k i l l e d m b r u t a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Both the C i t y C o u n c i l and the ANC contended the 
Government a c t i o n had i n v i t e d .such a response ( 2 ) . 
The Government r e a c t e d s h a r p l y to the renewed r i o t i n g , 
deporting s e v e r a l hundred A f r i c a n s m the E a s t e r n Cape from 
the c i t i e s to the r e s e r v e s . As a f u r t h e r , i n t e r i m measure 
tne Government i s s u e d Proclamation No 276 of 28 November 1952, 
which contained a major extension of the o f f e n c e of i n c i t e m e n t . 
I t was f i r s t enforced a g a i n s t P a t r i c k Duncan and h i s group when 
they d e f i e d m December ( 3 ) - The Proclamation was superseded 
m March 1953 by tne C r i m i n a l Law Amendment Act, which, l i k e 
the Proclamation, was s p e c i f i c a l l y intended to counter the 
d e f i a n c e campaign. I t was enacted w i t h the P u b l i c S a f e t y 
Act which f a c i l i t a t e d the d e c l a r a t i o n of s t a t e s of emergency (k)• 
The C r i m i n a l law Amendment Act which had been m d r a f t f o r 
some months p r i o r to the r i o t s s t a t e d t h a t "any person (who) 
i s c o n v i c t e d of an offence which i s proved to have been commit-
ted by way of p r o t e s t or m support of any campaign a g a i n s t 
any law ..." i s l i a b l e to a f i n e not exceeding £300 and/or 
imprisonment of up to 3 y e a r s and/or whipping up to 10 s t r o k e s . 
(1 ) Port E l i z a b e t h C o u n c i l ' s " n a t i v e " p o l i c y was s e v e r e l y c r i t i -
c i z e d by Dr Verwoerd a t the time of the r i o t s , E a s t e r n Province 
Herald, 21 October 1952. For a wider ranging a t t a c k , see report 
of speech of J . G. S t r y iom ( M i n i s t e r of Lands), E a s t e r n 
P r o v i n c e Herald, 13 November 1952. 
( 2 ) Mayor F o x , E a s t e r n Province Herald,1 2 November 1952. A l c o t t 
Gwentshe, Advance, 20 November 1952. 
(3) p 3 0 5 
(k) A c t s No 3 and 8 r e s p e c t i v e l y , both promulgated on k March 1953. 
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In c i t e m e n t to p r o t e s t or campaign a g a i n s t a law c a r r i e d a 
f i n e of up to £500 and/or imprisonment up to 5 y e a r s and/or 
up to 10 s t r o k e s . There were h e a v i e r p e n a l t i e s f o r subsequent 
o f f e n c e s . The Act a l s o contained p r o v i s i o n s a g a i n s t s o l i c i t i n g 
f o r or r e c e i v i n g funds to a s s i s t campaigns m o p p o s i t i o n to 
the law, and blocked the loophole through which d e f i e r s had 
g e n e r a l l y been allowed to r e f u s e the option of a f i n e . L u t u l i 
admitted the Government a c t e d "more s w i f t l y and h a r s h l y than 
we had for e s e e n " ( 1 ) , the r e s u l t being to hasten the suspension 
of the campaign. 
The timing of the Government's i n i t i a t i v e s e t out m the 
two preceding paragraphs i s i n s t r u c t i v e , coming m the aftermath 
of the r i o t s . The new A c t s , the Proclamation and the banning 
order on the E a s t e r n Cape l e a d e r s were a d i r e c t response to the 
non v i o l e n t d e f i a n c e campaign, per se and only, by ext e n s i o n , 
to the r i o t s . Why then d i d the Government hold back t i l l 
the r i o t s occurred? As e a r l y a s August i t was e v i d e n t l y con-
cerned a t the development of the campaign, y e t i t s response 
was m a r e l a t i v e l y low key, even a l l o w i n g f o r the S i s u l u and 
Njongwe court c a s e s . I n p a r t tne Government may not have 
been s u f f i c i e n t l y concerned a t the " t h r e a t " posed by the campaign 
to b e l i e v e a d d i t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n was u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e d , i t may 
have a l s o been i n h i b i t e d m i t s response by the n o n - v i o l e n t 
nature of the campaign, mindful of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , 
but t h i s i s u n l i k e l y to have been a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r . There 
remains the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Government confronted f o r the 
f i r s t time with s u s t a i n e d and f a i r l y widespread b l a c k r e s i s -
tance, which was a t t r a c t i n g some sympathy abroad, took the 
d e c i s i o n to undermine the campaign and s u l l y i t s image by pro-
voking outbreaks of v i o l e n c e which would become a s s o c i a t e d 
with the def i a n c e of u n j u s t laws. M i n i s t e r Swart commented, 
s h o r t l y a f t e r the r i o t a t New Brighton, which a p p a r e n t l y arose 
out of a t r i v i a l i n c i d e n t s a i d to i n v o l v e the apprehension of 
(1) L e t My People Go, p 120 
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two petty thieves, "We are s a t i s f i e d that what has happened 
at New Brighton i s one of the direct r e s u l t s of the Defiance 
Campaign and the dangerous game being played by a number of 
the leaders of the ANC and SAIC" ( 1 ) . But there was no 
opportunity to in v e s t i g a t e , f u l l y and impartially, the possi-
b i l i t y that Government agents had been instrumental m provok-
ing the disturbances. The Government rejected demands from 
Congress and other sources for an independent enquiry. L u t u l i 
was m no doubt about the i n f i l t r a t i o n of agents provocateurs, 
at l e a s t m Port Elizabeth and Kimberley, at the time of the 
r i o t s , claiming i t was well attested. As he commented of 
the r i o t s , " I t was a l l the Government needed. The r i o t s and 
the Defiance Campaign were immediately i d e n t i f i e d with each 
other m the White South African imagination. The i n i t i a t i v e 
was with the Government"... ( 2 ) . 
The Government did not hesitate to use intimidation to 
deter r e s i s t e r s and thei r supporters. Kuper comments, "Police 
spies, raids, the displays and use of force not only harassed, 
but also discredited, the Congresses. Most people are so well 
trained to law and order that they believe there must be some-
thing disreputable about an organization of which the police 
disapprove" (3 ) - Police were almost invariably present at 
Congress public meetings - recording speeches, photographing 
those present and on occasions interrupting proceedings, often 
for t r i v i a l reasons. Occasionally,meetings were abandoned as 
a r e s u l t of police interference ik) but more usually the i r 
presence was an accepted fact of l i f e though i t may have 
prevented some potential sympathizers from becoming more 
closely involved with Congress The police attempted to d i s -
rupt Congress and defiance a c t i v i t i e s by raids, often without 
(1) Eastern Province Herald, 22 October 1952. 
(2) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, p 115. 
( 3 ) Passive Resistance m South Africa, pp 191-2. I t would 
seem surprising i f police disapproval of the ANC r e a l l y 
served to d i s c r e d i t the organization m the eyes of the 
black population. 
(4) An example at Evaton i s cited m Eastern Province Herald, 
23 June 1952. 
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w arrants, on Congress o f f i c e s , documents were s e i z e d on 
an i n d i s c r i m i n a t e b a s i s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to guage the ex-
t e n t to which such a c t i o n s impeded the campaign but probably 
not a g r e a t deal, given the nature of the Congresses' o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
There i s l i k e l y to have been e x t e n s i v e c o v e r t p o l i c e a c t i v i t y 
a g a i n s t the campaign, the ANC being i n f i l t r a t e d by p o l i c e s p i e s 
and informers (1) Kuper suggested the knowledge by Congress 
a c t i v i s t s of t h e i r presence "sows doubt and s u s p i c i o n , under-
mining the mutual confidence so n e c e s s a r y to co-workers m 
a movement over which hangs the t h r e a t of d r a s t i c r e p r i s a l s " ( 2 ) . 
The p o l i c e and s e c u r i t y a g e n c i e s may have employed agents provoca-
t e u r s to d i s c r e d i t the campaign. 
Throughout the campaign the p o l i c e made much p l a y of 
t h e i r p h y s i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y , though the n a ture of the d e f i a n c e 
of u n j u s t laws may have g e n e r a l l y a c t e d as a r e s t r a i n t on the 
use of the r e s o u r c e s a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l . I n mid-August, a t 
the time of i n d u s t r i a l u n r e s t m the E a s t e r n Cape and rumours of 
a proposed ANC-organized dock s t r i k e ( 3)1 "the E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e 
Herald, under a h e a d l i n e , " P o l i c e mass to combat E a s t Cape 
d e f i e r s " reported, "strong p o l i c e r e i nforcements are moving 
to P o r t E l i z a b e t h , Grahamstown and E a s t London by road and 
r a i l to d e a l ujith the non-European Defiance Campaign" ( A ) . 
T h i s show of f o r c e was c l e a r l y intended to i n t i m i d a t e , 
m a d d i t i o n , as Mandela pointed out, "the p o l i c e r e i n f o r c e 
ments a r e m l i n e with a Government d e s i r e to provoke v i o l e n c e 
and thereby to c r u s h the Campaign" (5)« Even before the 
r i o t s had occurred the p o l i c e d i d not i n v a r i a b l y r e f r a i n from 
u s i n g v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t those a s s o c i a t e d i n some way w i t h the 
(1) Informers gave evidence of their a c t i v i t i e s i n the case 
of Regina vs S i s u l u The People's World, h September 
1952, c i t e d an i n s t a n c e of a would-be r e s i s t e r being 
ordered to withdraw from a group about to defy on the 
s u s p i c i o n she was a p o l i c e spy 
(2) P a s s i v e R e s i s t a n c e m South A f r i c a , p 191• 
(3 ' A s t o r y put about by Die O o s t e r l i g , Evening Post,7 August, 
1952. I t had no b a s i s . 
E a s t e r n Province Herald, 13 August 1952. 
(5) E a s t e r n Province Herald, 18 August 1952. 
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campaign. They, for example, mounted a baton charge on a 
gathering outside the Queenstown Court where a ,ease against 
a group of defiers was being heard. The police action l e f t 
many people injured, the majority women ( 1 ) . 
Once the r i o t s occurred the police appear to have been 
givenavirtual carte blanche. The Minister of J u s t i c e , speak 
mg afte r the New Brighton r i o t said, "My instructions to the 
police are that they should act and act d r a s t i c a l l y " (2) He 
i s also reputed to have said " i f policemen go s l i g h t l y beyond 
the l i m i t s of t h e i r powers . . they should not be condemned m 
view of the d i f f i c u l t times" (3 . Some units used i n d i s c r i m i -
nate and excessive force at the time of the riots,and afterwards, 
and on occasions went out of the i r way to be provocative (k)• 
The mtimidatory effect on the black population, hardly unused 
to shows of force, p a r t i c u l a r l y outside the Cape, i s d i f f i c u l t 
to assess but the claim by the Daily Dispatch that the presence 
of police reinforcements m the Peddie D i s t r i c t was a reason 
for the suspension of defiance there (5) may have been equally 
applicable elsewhere. I t could be argued that the presence 
have 
of the police m large numbers could j u s t as welJ\ provoked 
people into active opposition, as indeed i t appears bo have 
done m Port Elizabeth, East London and elsewhere, but the 
circumstances scarcely encouraged the opposition to take a non-
violent form . Both the people who reacted with violence 
and those who were cowed into i n a c t i v i t y by the r i o t s could 
( 1 ) Daily Representative, 16 September 1952. 
(2 ) I n a speech at Klipkoppers 2 November. Eastern Province 
Herald, 3 November 1952. 
(3) Treason T r i a l Record, p 600. 
(k) Many contemporary sources a t t e s t to t h i s . Examples include, 
(1) a report of the situation m East London at the time of the 
n o t by A. Campbell, The Heart of Africa, pp 3 9 - ^ , ( n ) a 
c r i t i c a l assessment by the magistrate appointed to examine the 
conducb of the police during the disturbance at Denver, 
Eastern Province Herald, 25 February 1953i ancl (111) an account 
by a police o f f i c e r of a liquor r i o t at New Brighton shortly 
a f t e r the r i o t there. Evening Post, 28 October 1952. 
( 5 ) Daily Dispatch, k November 1952. 
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be saxd to have played xntro Government hands. Hie 
Government mrght, however., have been embarrassed i f 
non-violent resistance had again begun to develop. 
The defiance of unjust laws had, for example, already resulted m 
the Government deploying sizeable manpower and other resources. 
The Evening Post reported m August that prisons (presumably only 
m the Eastern Cape) were finding i t increasingly d i f f i c u l t to 
accommodate r e s i s t e r s and that the "already over loaded" system of 
Justice was under s t r a i n ( l ) . By the middle of September there were 
over 700 defiers m the Port Elizabeth j a i l alone. 
C i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s also contributed to the intimidation of 
Congress members and sympathizers, who might have defied the law. 
The Ciskei Chief Commissioner, Mr Brink, delivered a number of 
speeches intended to di s c r e d i t the campaign. On one occasion m 
the Peddie D i s t r i c t , when Brink was reinstating a formerly 
"errant" t r i b a l elder he warned, " i f headman Msutu does not co-operate 
(with the Government against) the many ignorant people preaching a 
violent and subversive doctrine ... i n t i n s d i s t r i c t he may find 
that things w i l l go hard with he and h i s people" ( 2 ) . I n October, 
Chief L u t u l i , increasingly prominent m Congress, was presented with 
an ultimatum by the Department of Native A f f a i r s (NAD) either to 
cease h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s or lose h i s c h i e f l y abatus. He was 
dismissed m November (3 ) - The powers of the NAD to harass Congress 
m the r u r a l areas were v i r t u a l l y l i m i t l e s s . I n the urban areas, 
black public employees faced the threat of dismissal for participation 
m the campaign ih). 
Ministers were at pains to di s c r e d i t the campaign and, 
l a t t e r l y , mindful of the impending general election, to demonstrate 
that they were handling i t firmly. They portrayed the 
(1) Evening Post 11 August 1952. Tnis led to a meeting between the 
Minister of Justice, the Commissioner of Police, and others at which 
new l e g i s l a t i v e sanctions to combat the campaign were discussed. 
(2) Daily Dispatch, 27 October 1952. 
(3) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, pp 108-12 
(k) Alfred Hutchinson and Duma Nokwe, both teachers, were sacked for 
participation. Interview, A Hutchinson, 31 January, 1970. 
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d e f i a n c e campaign a s a p a r t of a u n i v e r s a l " a n t i - w h i t e p l o t " , 
fanned by Communists, "mis-guided l i b e r a l s , s o c i a l i s t s and 
c l e r i c s " , over them a l l hanging "the shadow of I n d i a " ( l ) . Under 
the circumstances, i t was argued, "the Government i s e n t i t l e d 
to expect the support of every r i g h t t h i n k i n g c i t L z e n of South 
A f r i c a , i r r e s p e c t i v e of p a r t y , m any a c t i o n i t may take a g a i n s t 
the l e a d e r s of the d e f i a n c e campaign (2) The Government 
for a time during the campaign promotedthe p r o - a p a r t h e i d 
"Bantu N a t i o n a l Congress" which Dr Donges claimed had two 
m i l l i o n members ( 3 ) - Bhengu, i t s l e a d e r , m a message to the 
United Nations s a i d the d e f i a n c e campaign d i d not have the 
support of "the m i l l i o n s of Bantu whom we r e p r e s e n t " and argued 
i t was the "handiwork of a group of so c a l l e d l e a d e r s who had 
been bought by r i c h I n d i a n s " (h) Bhengu's stan d i n g was sub-
sequently confirmed by h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e f t and f r a u d . 
The r e a c t i o n of l o c a l c o u n c i l s to the campaign was s i g n i -
f i c a n t m c e r t a i n c e n t r e s , p r i m a r i l y a f t e r the r i o t s , though 
before t h i s c o u n c i l s sometimes put o b s t a c l e s m the way of 
d e f i a n c e - r e l a t e d meetings. I n November, a d e l e g a t i o n of the 
Municipal A s s o c i a t i o n of South A f r i c a c a l l e d on Mr Swart, 
pledging the A s s o c i a t i o n ' s t o t a l o p p o s i t i o n to the d e f i a n c e 
campaign, advocating the round up of r e s i s t a n c e l e a d e r s , and 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n , a s n e c e s s a r y , of f u r t h e r measures "to maintain 
order and a f e e l i n g of s e c u r i t y " . I t i s l i k e l y the d e l e g a t i o n 
i n t i m a t e d to the M i n i s t e r the g e n e r a l view of the r e c e n t 
(1) Mr Louw, M i n i s t e r of Economic A f f a i r s , London 23 November 
1952, E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald, Zh November 1952. 
(2) Mr Donges, M i n i s t e r of Finance, P i e t e r s b u r g , 9 November 
1952, E a s t e r n Province Herald, 10 November 1952. The 
q u a l i f i e d response of the United P a r t y to the Government's 
handling of the events of 1952 provoked N a t i o n a l p a r t y a l l e g a -
t i o n s t h a t the United P a r t y approved of the Campaign and were 
a c t i n g as " p r o t e c t o r s of Communism" (Mr Swart, Bloemfontem, 
9 September 1952, E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald,10 September 1952). 
The pro-United P a r t y E n g l i s h language p r e s s was s t r o n g l y condemned 
by the Government, the M i n i s t e r of Transport arguing i t was, 
" l a r g e l y to blame f o r the n o t m Po r t E l i z a b e t h " because of the 
p u b l i c i t y given to the d e f i a n c e campaign (Mr Sauer, Kimberley, 27 
October 1 9 5 2 ,Eastern Province Herald, 28 October 1952. 
(3) E a s t e r n Province Herald, 20 September 1952. 
(k) Peoples World, 9 October 1952. 
meeting of t h e i r A s s o c i a t i o n t h a t the Congresses were r e s p o n s i b l e 
fo r the outbreaks of u n r e s t ( 1 ) . 
I n the wake of t l e New Brighton n o t P o r t E l i z a b e t h C o u n c i l , 
requested the M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e to p l a c e the C i t y under m i l i -
t a r y c o n t r o l and proposed that wartime c i v i l i a n p r o t e c t i v e 
s e r v i c e s be r e v i v e d . T h i s was r e f u t e d , but, m the meantime, 
s e v e r a l c o u n c i l l o r s held meetings to organize c i v i l i a n p a t r o l s 
and these functioned f o r a time, heightening tension by t h e i r 
a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n s ( 2 ) . 
W h i l s t a c c u s i n g Congress of m t i n i d a t i o n , C o u n c i l s indulged 
m such a c t i v i t y themselves. P o r t E l i z a b e t h C o u n c i l warned 
t h a t i f the ANC organized p r o t e s t s t r i k e ( 3 ) went a h e a d , ( i t ) 
"must l e a d to unbearable c o n d i t i o n s m a r e a s such as New Brighton 
S a n i t a t i o n and r e f u s e s e r v i c e s w i l l cease immediately and c e s s a -
t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y and water supply may f o l l o w . Home b u i l d i n g 
w i l l stop. Incomes w i l l cease . . . " ( i f ) . The ultimatum was not 
c a r r i e d out m i t s e n t i r e t y but mu n i c i p a l and other employees 
who p a r t i c i p a t e d m the s t r i k e were d i s m i s s e d and those who 
were re-engaged were o f t e n put a t the lowest p o i n t on the s a l a r y 
s c a l e . There i s a r e p o r t t h a t some who st a y e d a t work were 
rewarded w i t h a pay r i s e ( 5 ) - The p u n i t i v e a c t s of the C o u n c i l , 
l i n k e d with those of the Government, r e p r e s e n t e d unequivocal 
warning not only to s t r i k e r s but to those who might s t i l l be 
contemplating d e f i a n c e of the law. 
L o c a l A u t h o r i t y response was, however, not e n t i r e l y n e g a t ive 
S e v e r a l C o u n c i l s announced p l a n s f o r new A f r i c a n housing m 
( 1 ) E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald, 21 November 1 9 5 2 . Evening 
Post, 22 November 1 9 5 2 . 
( 2 ) E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e Herald, 7 November 1 9 5 2 . Evening Post, 
8 November 1952 . 
( 3 ) PP 284 - 2 8 5 
(if) Statement of P o r t E l i z a b e t h C o u n c i l f o l l o w i n g i t s meet-
in g on 6 November. E a s t e r n Province Herald, 7 November 
1952 . 
( 5 ) Evening Post, 25 November 1952 . 
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November and December (1) and the Mayor of Johannesburg 
called a meeting of fellow mayors to discuss t h i s issue m 
the aftermath of the disturbances. In addition, Port Elizabeth 
City Council promised limited "concessions" at a meeting m 
November with representatives from New Brighton. The Council 
agreed to try to improve education and s o c i a l f a c i l i t i e s m 
the township, to try to secure some relaxation of apartheid res-
t r i c t i o n s m New Brighton, and to reinstate municipal workers 
dismissed for taking part m the Congress led s t r i k e ( 2 ) . 
White public opinion was overwhelmingly h o s t i l e to the 
campaign. This was re f l e c t e d with p a r t i c u l a r force m the 
pro-Government Afrikaans press where, i t seems, there was v i r -
t u a l l y no attempt to examine the nature or v a l i d i t y of the 
grievances at the root of the defiance campaign. An e d i t o r i a l 
m Die Transvaaler commented, "the brown hand of the Indian i s 
reaching for the treasures of Southern A f r i c a . . . The octopus 
arms of Indian imperialism are daily penetrating deeper into 
Africa and deeper into the economic l i f e of South Af r i c a , a l l 
i s happening with only one aim m mind, to sweep the European 
out of A f r i c a and to use the ignorant native for i t " (j>). Nor 
was there any apparent recognition, or sympathy for the non-
violent character of the defiance (k). Die Oosterlig, shortly 
after the Campaign began c r i t i c i z e d the Government for the 
inadequacy of i t s response arguing that the only language "che 
defiers understood was that of "the cane and l a s h " ( 5 ) -
(1) For example, Port Elizabeth, Evening Post, 19 December 1952 , 
East London, Daily Dispatch, 12 December 1952 , Durban, 
Daily Dispatch, 12 December 1 9 5 2 . 
( 2 ) Eastern Province Herald, 18 November 1 9 5 2 . 
( 3 ) Die Transvaaler, 5 December 1952 . 
(4) I t was never, for example, contrasted favourably with the 
violent disruptive t a c t i c s of National Party a c t i v i s t s at 
Torch Commando r a l l i e s ! 
( 5 ) Die Oosterlifi, 11 July 1952 . 
3 1 8 
Dagbreek ( l ) rejected t h i s approach as l i a b l e to i n c i t e non-
whites s t i l l further, instead advocating the deportation of 
r e s i s t e r s to the reserves where they could be put to forced 
labour. A statement from the South African Bureau of R a c i a l 
A f f a i r s (SABRA) revealed a similar intransigent approach ( 2 ) . 
There were, however, elements m the Afrikaaner population which 
took a more constructive view but they were m a very small 
minority (3 ) -
The United Party reacted uncertainly to the campaign. 
In an effort to stave off National Party c r i t i c i s m s and because 
of i t s innate conservatism i t condemned the defiance campaign 
urging that i t should be suspended. I t argued the campaign 
was not furthering the i n t e r e s t s of participants and that the [acceptable 
only! method of repealing laws was by "constitutional" 
means. I t voted m favour of the Public Safety and Criminal 
Law Amendment Acts. For e l e c t o r a l reasons, i t f e l t obliged to 
attack the National Party accusing i t of provoking defiance. 
J . G. N. Strauss, the leader of the Party, m a major speech 
on "non-European Policy", m November, advocated the removal 
of the "colour question" from the party p o l i t i c a l arena and 
envisaged a non partisan approach to "the peace-loving non 
European majority ... re-establishing consultation with the 
moderate non European leaders" (k). The "substance" of 
(1) Dagbreek, 10 August 1952. 
(2) Eastern Province Herald, 25 August 1952. Daily Dispatch, 
26 August 1952. 
(3) Their views diverged widely a group of +^0 "Outstryders" 
ca l l e d for a "return to a policy of r a c i a l harmony" 
(Evening Post. 19 July 1952), Mr Broeksrna, Q.C. advocated 
"progressive" changes and c a l l e d for a Council of State 
of Blacks and Whites to guide the Government on race matters 
(Evening Post, Zh September 1952), Bettie du Toit p a r t i c i -
pated m the defiance campaign. 
(k) Speech at Bloemfontem, 18 November 1952. Text m Daily 
Dispatch, 19 November 1952. 
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Strauss' speech^revealed the dilemmas of the United Party 
position, i s l e s s important than the fact that he made the 
speech at a l l , and that others, m a si m i l a r vein, were 
delivered by p o l i t i c i a n s during the defiance campaign. I n 
i 
part, at least,they were a reaction to the campaign (and l a t t e r -
l y the r i o t s ) which acted as a c a t a l y s t to the discussion of 
the'hon-white is s u e " amongst English speaking South Africans. 
This debate contributed to div i s i o n within the United Par-cy 
for example, some of the l e s s conservative elements 
subsequently joined the L i b e r a l Party. 
The English language daily press was generally c r i t i c a l 
of the Government's handling of the campaign, but showed l i t t l e 
appreciation of the rationale behind the defiance of unjust 
laws which they reported m an intermittent and often scanty 
fashion,indicative of the wish of many white South Africans 
to cub the i r mind from the, for them, disagreeable 
prospect of organized non-white discontent ( l ) . But there 
were occasional e d i t o r i a l s on the defiance campaign. The 
Daily Dispatch, for example, aft e r c r i t i c i z i n g the Government's 
record ( i t s mam purpose) commented, "m the circumstances, 
i t i s not surprising that the Bantu people have reached the 
stage when they f e e l that some form of protest against t h i s 
l e g i s l a t i v e trend (removing what "freedoms" the Africans s t i l l 
had) i s necessary. Whether they have chosen the best way of 
registering t h e i r resentment i s open to argument, but t h i s should 
be remembered the way chosen i s one that w i l l cause l e a s t 
embarrassment to the European community and which w i l l i n f l i c t 
suffering only on t h e i r own community" ( 2 ) . This i s one of 
the very few instances of expressed white recognition of the 
non-violent t a c t i c s adopted m the defiance campaign. The 
(1) I n the l a t e r sbages of the campaign, editors may have also taken 
cognizance of M i n i s t e r i a l statements c r i t i c a l of press "publicity" 
for the defiance of unjust laws. See, for example, Dr. Donge's 
warning statement at Parow, 9 December 1952. Evening Post, 10 
December 1952. There are e a r l i e r examples. 
(2) Daily Dispatch, 26 June 1952. 
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Evening Post, sometimes more open minded than i t s contemporaries (1), 
c a r r i e d an e d i t o r i a l i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i t would be f o o l i s h to be-
l i t t l e the campaign, warning, "we must expect ever i n c r e a s i n g p o l i -
t i c a l and economic unrest, i s o l a t i o n and despair as p a r t of 
the p r i c e of our N a t i o n a l mental i l l n e s s (the c o r r e l a t i o n o f 
colour w i t h a b i l i t y and o p p o r t u n i t y ) " ( 2 ) . The King Williamstown 
Mercury also warned of the dangers of dismissing ANC leaders as 
communists and a g i t a t o r s and accordingly b e l i t t l i n g Congress 
a c t i v i t i e s . I t noted t h a t Congress leaders "were w e l l educated ... 
many of them h i g h l y c u l t u r e d and there i s evidence also of a 
sLrong r e l i g i o u s background t o t h e i r t h i n k i n g " . Recognizing 
t h a t some of the leaders may s t i l l have been " i n t e r e s t e d " m 
Communism, the paper accepted t h a t " t h i s i s scarcely s u r p r i s i n g 
given the Communist Party's constant a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h A f r i c a n 
aims". The e d i t o r i a l concluded, " t o those who t r y t o take an 
o b j e c t i v e view of our problems m South A f r i c a and recognize 
the n a t u r a l urge m a l l men who have come i n t o contact w i t h 
Western c i v i l i z a t i o n to reach f o r a higher standard o f l i f e and 
l i b e r t y , the s t r u g g l e upon which the_non Europeans are now en-
gaged i s s i m i l a r m many ways t o the s t r u g g l e of A f r i k a n e r 
Nationalism i t s e l f " ( 3 ) . 
Whatever l i m i t e d comprehension the Eng l i s h speaking press 
revealed of the campaign l a r g e l y evaporated w i t h the r i o t s . The 
D a i l y Dispatch wrote, "much of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Saturday's 
events (New Brighton) must r e s t on the shoulders of those so c a l l e d 
leaders of A f r i c a n o p i n i o n who have i n c i t e d the masses to express 
resentment of and op p o s i t i o n t o the laws of the country ...". I t 
accused them of provoking "ignorant lackeys to proclaim an 
ins o u c i a n t n a t i o n a l i s m whichhas as i t s basis an u n d e r - l y i n g 
h a t r e d of the white man and a l l h i s works The paper 
(1) J. Matthews, i n t e r v i e w , 27 January 1970, s a i d i t s E d i t o r 
was a supporter o f the campaign. 
(2) Evening Post, 2 June 1952. 
(3) King Williamstown Mercury, 2 August 1952. 
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commented t h a t t h a t had been "the p a t t e r n of the c u r r e n t 
resistance movement" ( l ) . The E n g l i s h speaking press was, 
however, s t r o n g l y c r i t i c a l of the Government f o r imposing a 
ban on meetings m centres m the Easbern Cape f o l l o w i n g the 
New B r i g h t o n r i o t and subsequently voiced o p p o s i t i o n t o the 
c r i m i n a l law Amendment Act, which the Rand D a i l y M a i l des-
c r i b e d 'fes the most shocking measure ever placed before 
Parliament" ( 2 ) . 
The campaign, and even more the r i o t s , provoked much discus-
sion amongst English speaking South A f r i c a n s about the " n a t i v e 
question", but l i t t l e sympathy or comprehension For the average 
United Party supporter, l i k e h i s N a t i o n a l Party counterpart, 
the defiance campaign was a pawn m white p o l i t i c s from which 
p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l was to be made. I t was not a c a t a l y s t , a t 
l e a s t a t the time, t o fundamental r e - t h i n k i n g of the race issue and 
the m a j o r i t y of whites, seeing t h e i r own p o s i t i o n threatened by 
what they perceived t o be the a s p i r a t i o n s of defiance leaders 
sought to dismiss the campaign (3 ) -
But there were some whites,not a l l of whom were i d e n t i f i e d 
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r grouping, who recognized the need f o r a l e s s 
negative approach. They incl u d e d , f o r example, members of the 
Labour Party, the emergent L i b e r a l Party, the South A f r i c a n 
I n s t i t u t e of Eace Rel a t i o n s , the C i v i l Rights League and the 
Church ( 4 ) . Twenty-two le a d i n g l i b e r a l s published a l e t t e r , 
(1) D a i l y Dispatch, 22 October 1952. 
(2) Rand .Daily M a i l , k February 1953-
(3 ' White m s e n s i t i v i t y , a t i t s worst,was revealed m the l e t t e r 
columns of the press. " E x - K a f f i r Boetie" w r o t e , " I have done a 
l o t of t h i n k i n g since the r i o t s and I have come to the conclu-
sion the great m a j o r i t y of the n a t i v e s are s t i l l savage bar-
barians and no amount of c i v i l i z i n g or c o n s i d e r a t i o n given to 
tnem by Europeans w i l l ever make them d i f f e r e n t .. I am con-
vinced now t h a t they w i l l always have one f o o t m the bush". 
Evening Post, 28 October 1952. 
(k) The white orthodox churches, as o r g a n i z a t i o n s , h e s i t a t e d to 
support the campaign. Even the Methodists and Quakers who 
Kuper (Passive Resistance m South A f r i c a , p 161) says adopted 
"a more p o s i t i v e , L i b e r a l approach to passive r e s i s t a n c e than 
other churches" kept a low p r o f i l e . 
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m September 1952 ( 1 ) , i n response to the defiance campaign, 
c a l l i n g f o r the r e v i v a l of the Cape " l i b e r a l " t r a d i t i o n . 
They also advocated the repe a l of the Pass laws, m t h e i r 
e x i s t i n g form, and o f the Group Areas and Suppression of 
Communism Acts ( 2 ) . 
There remains the l a s t element m the spectrum of the 
white p o p u l a t i o n - the very small group who spoke out i n c l e a r 
support o f the defiance campaign, even i f they were not m 
t o t a l agreement w i t h i t s t a c t i c s . The defiance leadership 
h e l d a meeting m November 1 9 5 2 ,solely f o r whites, t o e x p l a i n 
the purpose of the campaign and s o l i c i t support (3)* The 
meeting was attended by 200 people, some o f whom took the oppor-
t u n i t y t o express t h e i r support f o r the campaign. A number 
of them formed a p r o v i s i o n a l committee from which developed, m 
l a t e 1953i the Congress of Democrats, subsequently to form p a r t 
o f the Congress a l l i a n c e . Twelve whites p a r t i c i p a t e d m the 
campaign by defying the law and there were others who were also 
c l o s e l y associated w i t h i t , such as B r i a n Bunting and Sam Kahn. 
Some belonged to organizations,such as the Modern Youth Society 
and the Democratic League, but they p a r t i c i p a t e d as i n d i v i d u a l s . 
The South A f r i c a n Trades and Labour Council and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t 
p a r t s , the Transvaal Peace Council and the Springbok Legion, 
gave the campaign moral support but these o r g a n i z a t i o n s were 
pre-occupied w i t h t h e i r own problems. 
(1) Text m D a i l y Dispatch, 29 September 1952. The l e t t e r 
was signed by the B a l l m g e r s , Senator Brookes, W i n i f r e d 
Hoernle, Fr. Huddleston, Bishop Reeves, Lewin, Keppel-
Jones, Leo Marcjuard, Molteno, Paton and o t h e r s ^ 
(2) The Congresses d i d n o t o-pertly^ c r i t i c i z e the " l i b e r a l s " 
d u ring the campaign but the Peoples World, 2 October 
1952, probably spoke f o r many m the ANC m arguing 
t h a t the L i b e r a l and Labour Party p o l i c i e s "are designed 
to preserve ,the e s s e n t i a l s of the South A f r i c a n way of 
l i f e by e l i m i n a t i n g through c o n c i l i a t i o n what appears t o 
be the most d i r e c t challenge to i t - the Defiance Campaign". 
(3) Advance, 27 November 1952. 
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Outside South A f r i c a , the defiance campaign provoked a 
considerable v e r b a l and w r i t t e n response ( l ) but very l i t t l e 
i f any m a t e r i a l assistance ( 2 ) . Most important, p r e s e n t a t i o n -
a l l y , of the e x t e r n a l responses was the de c i s i o n by Asian and 
Arab Governments to r a i s e the question of South A f r i c a ' s r a c i a l 
p o l i c i e s before the United Nations. This might have happened 
regardless of the campaign, as an extension o f the South 
A f r i c a n I n d i a n question ivhich had been w i t h the United Nations 
since "19^ +6, but the A p r i l boycott and the launching of the 
defiance of u n j u s t laws provided an a d d i t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e . 
The General Assembly appointed a Commission o f Enquiry which 
received no co-operation from the South A f r i c a n Government. 
I t produced a d e t a i l e d r e p o r t (3 ) -
The prospect, from September 1952, of South A f r i c a ' s 
r a c i a l p o l i c i e s being discussed a t the United Nations had no 
d i s c e r n i b l e favourable impact on the Government's approach 
to non-whites, indeed i t may have strengthened the Government 
m i t s view t h a t i t should pursue r e s o l u t e p o l i c i e s m the face 
of what i t perceived t o be a developing i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n t i -
/ United Nations 
white conspiracy. The/debates received extensive coverage 
and e d i t o r i a l comment m the English language South A f r i c a n 
press ajjjj may have given some encourage-
ment to defiance leaders and t h e i r supporters. 
The r e a c t i o n of whites m South A f r i c a , o f f i c i a l s and 
p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s , t o the defiance campaign »ras p r e d i c t a b l y 
and overwhelmingly, though not u n i f o r m l y , h o s t i l e . The cam-
paign d i d focus a t t e n t i o n on the widespread grievances o f non-
whites and made a nationwide impact probably greater than 
S o l i d a r i t y meetings were he l d and statements o f support 
sent from tHe communist and non-communist world. 
There was also press coverage. 
See p 25^ 
Report o f the UN Commission on the Raci a l S i t u a t i o n m 
the Union of South"Africa (1955)-
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
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the whites were p u b l i c l y prepared to admit. The d i s t u r b i n g 
question m the l a s t a n a l y s i s , i s whether a few hours of un-
b r i d l e d violence d i d not impress upon bhe white community f a r 
more s t r o n g l y the b i t t e r n e s s of f e e l i n g amongst the black popu-
l a t i o n m South A f r i c a and the need to take a c t i o n than nonths 
of d i g n i f i e d n o n - v i o l e n t defiance of the law. 
i 
CHAPTER V I AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEFIANCE CAMPAIGN 
Mary Benson described the campaign as "an amazing 
success" ( 1 ) , Mrs B a l l m g e r sees i t as a " f a i l u r e m i t s e l f 
(though i t ) drew the people bo the Congress ranks i n ever 
i n c r e a s i n g numbers" ( 2 ) . Gwendolen Carter, m The P o l i t i c s 
of I n e q u a l i t y , l i k e w i s e r e f e r s to "the f a i l u r e of the 
Passive Resistance Canpaign" (3) but r e f i n e s t h i s view m her 
j o i n t study w i t h K ans (k) There i s no simple answer, the 
question of the success or f a i l u r e of the campaign must oe 
considered i n r e l a t i o n t o the d i f f e r e n t and not always w e l l 
defined goals of the campaign. 
I t d i d not b r i n g about a repeal of the laws selected as 
t a r g e t s . Indeed immediately before, and dur i n g , bhe campaign 
the Government proceeded f u r t h e r w i t h t h e i r implementation (5) 
and nob only were the Acts not repealed or modified bub harsh 
a d d i t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced on the p r e t e x t of the 
October-November r i o t s , bub ?s much m response to the cam-
paign. However, a s - t h i s shows, the Government had not 
able simply t o dismiss the campaign as being of no consequence. 
And they had f e l t o b l i g e d to deploy s u b s t a n t i a l manpower and 
other resources, notably from the p o l i c e , p r i s o n and court 
services m response to the campaign. The speeches of M i n i s t e r s 
r e f l e c t e d some concern a t the development of the campaign. 
(1) Struggle f o r a B i r t h r i g h t , p 159-
(2) From Union ..to Aparthei d. A Trek t o I s o l a t i o n , p V19-
(3) The P o l i t i c s of I n e q u a l ] t y South A f r i c a since 19^8, p 376. 
(k) From Prot e s t to Challenge "(Vol 27," p ^25 f f . I n a d d i t i o n 
t o K aris and Carter's u s e f u l assessment of the campaign 
see also " C i r c u l a r l e t b e r t o a l l Congress Branches m the 
Cape Province" ( f o r t e x t see From P r o t e s t t o Challenge, 
p ^ 9 f f ) . Other assessments of i n t e r e s t i n c l u d e A. L u t u l i ' s 
Let My People Go, and L. nuoer, Passive Resistance m 
South A f r i c a . 
(5) See, f o r example,the numerous cases of banning under the 
Suppression of Communism Act m 1952, the i n t r o d u c t i o n m t h a t 
year of the Group Areas Aut i n v arious d i s t r i c t s , and discus-
sion m Parliament on the eve o f defiance o f the proposed 
Natives ( " A b o l i t i o n " „ o f Passes and Co-ordination of 
Documents) Act. 
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But the Government d i d n o t , and i t would have been a na j o r 
achievement i f i t had, suggest t a l k s w i t h tne Congres ses nor 
d i d i t i n t i m a t e t h a t i t might be prepared favourably zo mod-
T-f7 the laws selected as t a r g e t s f o r the campaign. The 
defiance leadership and many of the rank and f i l e cannot have 
expected much, i f any progress, m secuung the removal of 
the laws through the campaign. The combination o f the i n -
creasing implementation during 1952 of already announced 
apa r t h e i d measures and the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f . t n e Public Safety 
and C r i m i n a l Amendment Acts mu^t, nevertheless, have had a 
depressing i n f l u e n c e , as d i d the r i o t s , l e a d i n g t o the suspen-
sion of defiance s h o r t l y before the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the new 
Acts m March 1953 ( 1 ) - Mandela claimed t o see a p o s i t i v e 
development m Government t h i n k i n g m 1952, which he a t t r i -
buted p a r t t o the defiance campaign, notably t h a t previous-
l y the Government had r e l i e d on b l a t a n t "Bass Kap" (white 
supremacist) p o l i c i e s whereas i t subsequently r e f e r r e d , f o r 
example, t o "self-government" f o r A f r i c a n s ( 2 ) but whether 
t h i s was more than a semantic exercise and the extent to 
which the "change" r e s u l t e d from the defiance campaign i s 
questionable (3 ) • 
Walter Sisulu argued m September 1952 t n a t the defiance 
campaign "has proceeded according t o plan t o such an extent t h a t 
today i t has shaken the white people of South A f r i c a " (k). 
Nelson Mandela and other Congress leaders r e f e r r e d t o the achieve-
ment of the campaign m " p r i c k i n g "che consciences of the 
European p u b l i c " (5) W h i l s t , i f t h i s were so, i t could be 
(1) The defiance leadership perhaps gave too l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n as 
to how the campaign might best be concluded. But the r i o t s 
and t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e aftermath made i t d i f f i c u l t t o end the 
campaign on the Congresses' own terms. 
(2) Treason T r i a l , p 15790-1. 
(3) The Government had already e s t a b l i s h e d the Tomlmson Commission 
on the Socio-economic development of the reserves, i n d i c a t i n g 
some awareness of the need f o r a new s t r a t e g y . 
(if) "Appeal and D i r e c t i v e s to Branches, Areas, Groups, Members and 
O f f i c i a l s " , 19 September 1952. For t e x t see Treason T r i a l , 
p 1665. 
(5) i b i d - , p 15789. 
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i n t e r p r e t e d as an achievement, the p r a c t i c a l b e n e f i t to the 
popu l a t i o n then .and subsequently was very l i m i t e d . L u t u l i 
commented, "among Europeans the Defiance Campaign had some 
happy p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s . The L i b e r a l Party i s very much the 
c h i l d of these tmmes ... the f a c t t h a t the Party could be 
formed was a si g n t h a t some Europeans were beginning bo 
recognize our p l i g h t as something r e a l " ( l ) . Perhaps t h a t 
i s how i t seemed m the 1950 's t o many, but , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
the Eastern Cape working committee of the ANC appears t o have had. 
a more jaundiced view ( 2 ) . And w h i l s t the campaign may nave 
s t i r r e d the consciences of some whites, other whites may have 
been persuaded by i t t o adopt a more extreme p o l i t i c a l 
stance (3 ) -
Joe Matthews (k) s a i d amongst Eastern Cape Congress 
leaders there was a c e r t a i n impatience during the campaign about 
the time spent m " c u l t i v a t i n g " non-Africans, but whether t h i s 
was a f a i r c r r t i c i s m seems d o u b t f u l and, f o r example, the whites 
who took p a r t m or were very close bo bhe campaign provided 
s i g n i f i c a n t p r a c t i c a l and p r e s e n t a t i o n a l support, though few 
m number. 
Defiance leaders expended l i t t l e energy on winning p u b l i c 
support abroad. Nevertheless the campaign received p u b l i c i t y 
and support m a wide range of co u n t r i e s and a t the United 
Nations and was a c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r m the i s o l a t i o n o f the 
South A f r i c a n Government abroad. 
(1 ) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, p 125-
(2) This may be i n f e r r e d from the Working Committee's c i r -
c u l a r l e t t e r , dated December 1952, which c r i t i c i z e d a 
newly e s t a b l i s h e d " l i b e r a l " paper which "so st t c p i d l y 
advocates a r e t u r n t o the Old Cape t r a d i t i o n " . i)or 
t e x t see From P r o t e s t t o Challenge (Vol 2 ) , p ^91-
(3) Which some would see as a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t , hastening 
i n e v i t a b l e and d e c i s i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 
( 4 ) I n t e r v i e w , 29 January 1970. 
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The p r i n c i p a l p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s of the campaign are m 
the " i n t e r n a l " sphere - m b u i l d i n g up the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the 
Congresses - notably the ANC - and m generating increased 
support and p o l i t i c a l consciousness. There i s no sense m 
pretending -chat by the end of the defiance campaign the 
ANC had b u i l t up an e f f i c i e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l system l i k e l y 
to endure. During the campaign much of the o r g a n i z a t i o n 
was extremely rudimentary. F e i t saw o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weakness 
as the key f a c t o r m support of h i s contention t h a t the 
" f a i l u r e s " of the ANC could be explained "m terms other than 
the odds themselves" ( 1 ) . Congress i t s e l f was not unaware 
of i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l shortcomings ( 2 ) . But i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see how much more could have been done m the most a c t i v e 
areas during the campaign, given the very small number of ex-
perienced o f f i c i a l s a v a i l a b l e t o give guidance and i n s t r u c t i o n 
and the Congresses' general lack of resources. The Congresses 
were "weekend" org a n i z a t i o a s run on a shoe s t r i n g . Ax-guably, 
the ANC should have spent more time before launching the cam-
campaign fund r a i s i n g and strengthening i t s formal organiza-
t i o n a l network, but the ANC was caught m a v i c i o u s c i r c l e 
where, m order to make progress on these f r o n t s , the leader-
ship had f i r s t to demonstrate t o " p o t e n t i a l supporters i t s own 
commitment and determination. F i n a n c i a l assistance from 
wealthy South A f r i c a n s ( o f whatever race) or from abroad could 
have been of assistance m b u i l d i n g up a cadre o f f u l l time 
o f f i c i a l s who m t h e i r t u r n might, f o r example, have been able 
to help m c o n s o l i d a t i n g branches which had mushroomed m the 
Eastern Cape. But even i f the funds had been a v a i l a b l e i t 
i s questionable whether i t was r e a l i s t i c to contemplate 
developing a conventional p o l i t i c a l machine even m 1952, 
given the Government's i n c r e a s i n g propensity f o r leader " c u l l i n g " . 
Tlie "M Plan", Mandela's b r a i n c h i l d (3)1 introduced m 1953^ was 
(1) E. F e i t , A f r i c a n Opposition m South A f r i c a : the f a i l u r e 
of Passive Resistance, p v i1 
( 2 ) See, f o r example, " C i r c u l a r L e t t e r to A l l Congress Branches 
o f the Province" (Cape), op. c i t . , December 1952. 
(3) Some d e t a i l s are given ±n Spark f o r Congress, 13 February 1953* 
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a response to t h i s problem and presumably p a r t l y derived from 
the experience o f the l a r g e l y autonomous ANC branches which 
emerged m the Eastern Cape 1952 ( l ) . Too l i t t l e was done and 
too l a t e t o prepare f o r the ANC's demise as an o v e r t organiza-
t i o n . But the defiance campaign had a t l e a s t given a la r g e 
number of people a l l over the Country experience of organizing 
defiance and c o - o r d i n a t i n g on a d i s t r i c t , province and n a t i o n -
wide basis. Even i f Congress f a i l e d to c a p i t a l i z e on t h i s , 
p a r t l y because so many senior leaders suddenly found themselves 
banned by 1953 ( f o r which they may have been i l l prepared) 
there was m existence by -che end of the defiance campaign, un-
l i k e a t the beginning, a body of people, some of whom,at l e a s t , 
might be ready t o use their-experience a t some f u t u r e date, on 
the ANC's behalf. 
The success o f tne campaign i n s p u r r i n g people t o j o i n the 
Congiesses - notably bhe ANC - and t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n defiance 
i s noteworthy even i f the l e v e l of actiy_e_ support subsided 
f a i r l y r a p i d l y m the l a t e r months of the campaign and sub-
sequently. Through p u b l i c meetings organized by Congiess a l l 
over the country during the defiance campaign l a r g e numbers of 
people, f a r m excess of the formal membership, came 
to i d e n t i f y tnemselves temporarily, or m the longer Lerm, w i t h 
(1 ) The importance, f o r the f u t u r e , o f the development, 
of a t r u e grass r o o t s Congress network m tne 
Eastern Cape daring the campaign should not be ignored, 
f o r a l l the r i s k s i n v o l v e d i t i s u n f o r t u -
nate tih e development was not more widespread. 
(2) Over 3000 people of a l l races p a r t i c i p a t e d m the campaign, 
during which the ANC membership rose from under 20,000 to 
perhaps three or f o u r times t h a t number, some p u t t i n g the 
f i g u r e m excess of 100,000. (See, f o r example, M. Benson, 
The Struggle f o r a B i r t h r i g h t , p 1 5 9 - ) By December 1 9 5 J } 
though, the t o t a l (? paid up) membership was given as 
28.900, 16,000 coming from the Eastern Cape, Report of the 
ANC Annual Conference 1953- For t e x t see From Prot e s t to 
Cha3lenge (Vol 2 ) , p k39' Comparable f i g u r e s cannot be 
given f o r the SAIC which was organized on a d i f f e r e n t 
basis but i t s standing and a c t i v e support w i l l have grown 
during the campaign. 
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Congress and i t s a s p i r a t i o n s ( 1 ) . Mass meetings played a 
c r u c i a l r o l e i n b u i l d i n g up popular support and p o l i t i c i z i n g . 
Through defiance and mass meetings the ANC confirmed i t s p o s i t i o n 
as the p r i n c i p a l mouthpiece f o r A f r i c a n grievances and demands. 
I n the process the new, r e l a t i v e l y m i l i t a n t , leaders of the ANC 
(and of the I n d i a n Congresses) enhanced t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , 
demonstrating c o n v i n c i n g l y t h e i r popular backing. The Union 
Government had not faced such a widespread and sustained 
deomonstration of non-white discontent since the heydays of the 
I n d u s t r i a l and Commercial Workers Union and never before on a 
m u l t i - r a c i a l basis. The campaign provided f o r the f i r s t time a 
focus through which long standing discontent a t the l o c a l l e v e l 
could be co-ordinated and channelled i n t o a n a t i o n a l p r o t e s t movement. 
Even w i t h the suspension of the campaign, i n depressing circumstances, 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l achievement of the episode remained, 
passing i n t o Congress mythology. I f the campaign brought a heightened 
awareness of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of opposing the Government, i t also 
gave p a r t i c i p a n t s and Congress supporters a new sense of 
corporateness and purpose. 
The campaign a t t r a c t e d p a r t i c i p a n t s and support from a l l races. 
There were elements i n s i d e Congress of the " A f r i c a n i s t school", 
who were l e s s than e n t h u s i a s t i c about the Congress a l l i a n c e , and 
members of Thema's "Nationalist-minded Bloc" w i t h h e l d support f o r the 
campaign seeing i t as I n d i a n and 
( l ) A. L u t u l i , Let My People Go, p 122, commented " I n Zeerust ... 
Sekhukhuniland, on the Reef, i n the Free State, and elsewhere, 
there have (since the campaign) been upsurges o f passive 
resistance ... To our s u r p r i s e many of these r e s i s t e r s c a l l e d 
themselves "Congress" or "ANC". They were not on our books ... 
but they had caught the Defiance Campaign mood and sometimes 
i t s techniques". 
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communist dominated ( 1 ) . And the Government made play of 
I n d i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the campaign, as a way of b e l i t t l i n g 
i t . Nevertheless m u l t i - r a c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n m the defiance 
campaign,whatever complications i t brought w i t h i t , u n d e rlined 
•co non-whites and whites a l i k e the a b i l i t y of people of d i f f e r -
ent races, c u l t u r e s and p o l i t i c a l creeds m South A f r i c a not 
simply t o c o - e x i s t but to co-operate w i t h a high degree of 
harmony and f o r mutual b e n e f i t . I f a p r i c e had t o be p a i d 
f o r the r a c i a l , c u l t u r a l and i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s of the 
defiance leadership and the campaign's p a r t i c i p a n t s , i t was 
perhaps r e f l e c t e d m the c o n t r a s t between defiance m the 
Eastern Cape and elsewhere m the country, but the circum-
stances m the Eastern Cape were unique. 
I n commenting on the use of the t a c t i c of n o n - v i o l e n t 
r e s i s t a n c e , L u t u l i said "The Defiance Campaign was f a r too order-
l y and successful f o r the Government's l i k i n g , and i t was grow-
i n g . The prospect before the white supremacists, i f they were 
going t o r e a c t t o our challenge m a c i v i l i z e d way, was t h a t 
a r r e s t s would continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . Behind the thousands 
already a r r e s t e d there were more, many more. The challenge 
of non-violence was more than they could meet. I t robbed 
them of the i n i t i a t i v e . On the other hand, vi o l e n c e by A f r i c a n s 
would r e s t o r e t h i s i n i t i a t i v e to them - they would then be able 
to b r i n g out the guns and other techniques of i n t i m i d a t i o n and 
present themselves as r e s t o r e r s o f order" ( 2 ) I n t h i s he 
(1) Opposition t o Congress during the campaign from such groups 
as Thema's N a t i o n a l Minded Bloc, the A l l A f r i c a n Convention 
and Bhengu's "Supreme Council f o r the Federation of Bantu 
Organizations" d i d not amount to much. The Indians d i d 
have a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e say m de c i s i o n making a t the 
n a t i o n a l l e v e l and m the Transvaal and N a t a l m 1952 but 
the defiance campaign helped t o transform the ANC from the 
p o s i t i o n of t i t u l a r head of the r a d i c a l a l l i a n c e to one 
where i t was c l e a r l y the dominant p a r t n e r . People of the 
s t a t u r e of Mandela, L u t u l i and Njongwe were, m any event, 
not open to manipulation. 
(2 ) Let My People Go, p 115 . 
i d e n t i f i e d both a p o t e n t i a l s t r e n g t h and a very r e a l weakness 
of the defiance of u n j u s t laws and other campaigns of non-
v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e mounted m s i m i l a r circumstances. I n a 
l i b e r a l democracy, n o n - v i o l e n t defiance of the law/ or regula-
t i o n s might not be successful but g e n e r a l l y the o r g a n i z a t i o n 
against which the res i s t a n c e i s d i r e c t e d v i l l be o b l i g e d to 
act w i t h i n c e r t a i n c o n s t r a i n t s and even decide to n e g o t i a t e . 
I n South A f r i c a , m 1952, the Government reacted according t o 
i t s own a r b i t r a r y d i c t a t e s . Neither p a r t y to the "dispute 1 1 
held values m common. There was accordingly no d i s p o s i t i o n 
or ground f o r reaching a " r a t i o n a l " and mutually acceptable 
s o l u t i o n , regardless of the t a c t i c s selected by the Congresses 
to f u r t h e r t h e i r demands. 
Non-violent r e s i s t a n c e , as w i t h any other t a c t i c , had l i m i -
t a t i o n s and L u t u l i p i n p o i n t e d to what i s , a r g u a b l y , i t s a c h i l l e s 
heel. But i t could be sai d i f the p a r t i c i p a n t s m a non-
v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e campaign were of s u f f i c i e n t m e t t l e and ex-
perience, the use of violence by t h e i r opponents should not 
dissuade them from c o n t i n u i n g . However, there was never any 
i n t e n t i o n on the p a r t of the defiance leadership t h a t rank and 
f i l e p a r t i c i p a n t s should be expected t o pay the severe p e n a l t i e s 
f o r example, l a i d down m the Cr i m i n a l Law Amendment Act. And 
because the t a c t i c of non-violent r e s i s t a n c e d i d not b r i n g an 
immediate a l l e v i a t i o n m the p o s i t i o n of the black p o p u l a t i o n 
during what was e s s e n t i a l l y a "preparatory" campaign, i t should 
not be dismissed as having " f a i l e d " . As Ka r i s and Carter 
commented, "Whilst the Defiance Campaign never approached the 
stage of mass re s i s t a n c e t h a t had the dimensions of a general 
s t r i k e ... i t transformed the ANC i n t o an embryonic mass move-
ment" ( l ) . The adoption of the t a c t i c o f no n - v i o l e n t r e s i s -
tance was c e n t r a l t o t h i s achievement. I t was a means of 
oppo s i t i o n w e l l s u i t e d to the time and circumstances, t h r i v i n g 
(1) From P r o t e s t to Challenge (Vol 2 ) , p k26. 
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on and a t t r a c t i n g widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( 1 ) . I t also i n -
s t i l l e d a sense of d i s c i p l i n e and d e d i c a t i o n and,being eminent-
l y " c i v i l i s e d " , contrasted s t r o n g l y w i t h the Government's re s -
ponse. W h i l s t i t might be argued t h a t the very " c i v i l i s e d " 
nature of the Campaign was m one respect a weakness, the Cape 
ANC working committee noted, towards the end of the defiance 
campaign, "Congress has exposed the f a l s e and shallow d o c t r i n e 
of white supremacy and proved t h a t the white man r u l e s South 
A f r i c a , not because he i s f i t TO r u l e but because p r e s e n t l y , 
he'holds the monopoly of o f f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y and p o l i c e power. 
His r u l e r e s t s not on superior moral s t r e n g t h , d i s c i p l i n e or 
character but upon tanks, stenguUs * armoured cars and aero-
planes. That i s one important lesson which our people have 
l e a r n t during the campaign, t h a t the cowardice of f a c i s t s who 
are i n c l i n e d t o be s a d i s t s i s a r e s u l t of f e a r ... The i m p e r i a l -
i s t s are no more the "mKosi" but h i s sten gun, indeed" ( 2 ) . 
This statement, despite i t s i n f l a t e d language, should not be 
overlooked i n assessing the s t r a t e g y of r e s i s t a n c e used m the 
defiance campaign or when searching f o r p o i n t e r s t o a change 
m t h a t p o l i c y . 
The Congress a l l i a n c e was i n no p o s i t i o n a t the end of 
the defiance campaign to give up i t s r e l i a n c e on n o n - v i o l e n t 
t a c t i c s and the leadership as a whole,and probably the great 
mass of t h e i r supporters, had no wish to do so ( 3 ) . But the 
implacable response of the Government to the Campaign may have 
hastened the germination of the seeds of doubt m the minds, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y of the younger more r a d i c a l members of Congress 
about the f u t u r e e f f i c a c y of o v e r t and n o n - v i o l e n t t a c t i c s . 
(1) This could be seen both as a s t r e n g t h and a weakness of 
n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , depending how repressive are the 
circumstances and popular the campaign. 
(2) From P r o t e s t t o Challenge (Vol 2 ) , p k90. 
(3) L u t u l i , g i v i n g h i s impressions of a meeting he attended m Port 
E l i z a b e t h m January 1953 commented, " i t was made c l e a r to me 
t h a t the s p i r i t of r e s i s t a n c e had by no means abated. The 
provoking of the r i o t s had, i f anything, wedded the Congress 
more f i r m l y t o passive r e s i s t a n c e " . Let My People Go, p 127-
I t w i l l not have escaped t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t h a t w h i l s t the 
t a c t i c of non-violent r e s i s t a n c e brought s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r n a l 
b e n e f i t s and some r e c o g n i t i o n outside South A f r i c a , the months 
of n o n - v i o l e n t defiance of the law appeared to make a le s s 
marked impression on the white p o p u l a t i o n as a whole than a 
few hours of u n b r i d l e d v i o l e n c e during the r i o t s of October 
and November 1952. 
The conventional wisdom i s to take the e a r l y 1960's as 
the watershed m black r e s i s t a n c e p o l i t i c s m South A f r i c a 
but t h i s should not obscare the importance of the events of 
1952 which w h i l s t m p r a c t i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g the high p o i n t m 
the use of a m i l i t a n t n o n - v i o l e n t s t r a t e g y by Congress also 
c l e a r l y pointed to i t s p r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s m securing funda-
mental change. I t took a decade during which the Congresses' 
adherence t o non-violence was put to an i n c r e a s i n g l y severe 
t e s t , before they were f i n a l l y f o r c e d i n t o a fundamental 
change of s t r a t e g y , but bhe defiance campaign prepared the 
ground and may be sa i d , m r e t r o s p e c t , t o have brought the 
Congresses on t o the road of covert a c t i o n and v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e 
Report of the Joint Planning Council of the African National Coigress 
and the South African Indian Congress 
To the President-General aj J Members of the Executive 
Committee of the African National Congress and the President 
and Councillors of the South African Indian Congress 
WHEREAS the African National Congress, at the meetmsi of its 
National Executue, held on 17th June, 1951, decided to invite 
all other National Executn es of the National Organizations of 
the non-European people of South Africa to a Conference to 
place before them a programme of direct action, and WHEREAS 
a Joint Conference of the National Executn es of the African 
National Congress and the South African Indian Congress and 
the Representatives of the Franchise Action Council (Cape) 
met at Johannesburg on the 29th July, 1951; and WHEREAS 
it was resolved at the aforesaid Conference (1) to declare Avar 
on Pass Laws and Stock Limitation, the Group Areas Act, and 
the Voters' Representation Act, the Suppression of Com-
munism Act, and the Bantu Authorities Act, (2) to embark 
upon an immediate mass campaign for the repeal of these 
oppressive laws; and (3) to establish a Joint Planning Council 
to co-ordinate the efforts of the National Organizations of the 
African, Indian and Coloured people in this mass campaign 
KOV." THEREFORE, the Joint Planning Council, as constituted 
bi the aforegoing resolution, have the honour to report to the 
African National Congress and the South African Iidicn 
Congress as follows: 
1 We the undersigned, \ ere consntu'ca n^to a Jo±nt 
Planning Conr.rT in terms of the reioluuO" adcpted a: the 
Joint Conference of the executives of the African National 
Congress and the South African Indian Congress and the 
representatn e s of the Franchise Action Council of t h e Cape, 
held at Johannesbuig on the 29th Jul) , 1951. D r J S Moroka, 
t h e Piesident-General of the African National Congress, was 
elected as the Chairman and of the four remaining members of 
t h e Council, tw o each w ere nominated by the Executn e Organs 
o f the African National CongTess and the South African Indian 
Congress 
2. We a r e , i n terms of the resolution mentioned abo\e, 
charged with the task of Co _,rdinatmg the efforts o f t h e 
National Organizations of the African, Indian and the Coloured 
people in a mass campaign agreed upon at the Joint Conference 
for t h e repeal of the Pass Laws, the Group Areas Act, the 
Voters' Representation Act, the Suppress'on of Communism 
Act, the Bantu Authorities Act and for the withdrawal of t h e 
pohc\ of stock limitation and the so-called rehabilitation 
scheme 
3 Having given due and serious attention to the task before 
us, w e have great pleasure in reconurending the following plan 
o f action t o the African National Congress and t h e South 
African Indian Congress for consideration and decision a t their 
forthcoming Annual Conference. 
4 The African National Congress in Conference assembled 
at Bloemfontcrn o n the i ^ t h - i y t h December, 1951, should call 
upon t h e Government t o repeal the aforementioned Acts b y 
i \OT LATER THAN 29TH FEBRt-AJiY 1052 This call to b e sup-
ported by t h e Conference o f the So^th African Indian Con-
gress and b } all other democratic organizations which find 
themselves m full agreement with i t . 
5 I n the e\ent of the Go\ eminent failing to take action for 
the repeal o f these Acts ^ hich cennot be to^-ated b\ the 
people an) longer the tv o Cozzr-^ will embi'k upon n-'ss 
action for a redress of tlie j'_st and Icr^ma'e g-.evzrces of the 
majoritv of the South Af-.ciLz -tzz'z I t i> c_r cozs de_cd 
opmion tliat such mass acaon shr_!d comrre~:e en the € -
-\- _ r :j5- — - Van. P_earea^ T:"ei:;enary V> e consider tins 
ca_ to most appropriate tl e commencement of the 
struggle as rr.ar!o cae of the greatest turning points in South 
African c.~or' b the ac»en: ;:~ European settlers m the 
coantr. ico'.td bv co r>ma- ana imperialist exp'o^ation 
*%hich nas degraded, hum: ai.sa ana kept in bondpge the vast 
masses cf trie non- \hite people Or alternatively, on sGtn June, 
We consider this da eq_iliy as significant as Apr i l 
the 6th for the commencement ; f the struggle as it also ranks 
as one of the greatest turning pcuats in South African history 
On tins day we commemora-e the National Day of Protest 
held on 26th June, 1950, the da- on which on the call of the 
President-General of the African National Congress, Dr J S 
MoroLa this country witnessed the greatest demonstration of 
fraternal solidarity and unitv cf purpose on the part of all 
sections of the non-European p;-cple in the national protest 
against unjust Ia.\s The •z&tix J_ne was one of the first steps 
towards freedom I t is an histcr.rai duty that on dus day we 
should pa; tribute to the figoarg spirit, social responsibihty 
and political understanding of c_r people, remember the brave 
saciifices of the people and pa our homage to all those who 
had given tnelr very h\es m tne struggle for freedom Although 
we have suggested tv o alternau t dates, the Joint Planmng 
Council strongly favours the earner date as it considers that 
three clear calendar months \ .o j 'a give the people ample time 
to set the machinery of stiuggle -r o action 
6 With regard to the form of struggle best suited to our 
conditions we have been constrained to bear in mind the 
political and economic set-up of o^r country, the relationship 
of the rural to the urban populaaon, the development of the 
trade umon movement with pa-axular reference to the dis-
abilities and state of oigamzanoa of the non-white v.oikers, 
the economic status of the varn.js sections of the non-waitc 
people and the level of organization of the National Libciatory 
movements We are therefore of opimon that in these given 
historical conditions the forms of struggle foi obtaining the 
repeal of i^us*- la-, -s v Inch shodd ce z z s ' . d t i z i 
defiance of unjust Ia\ 3 and !b) industrial ar_ca. 
7 I n dealing with the f \ o forms of str-gg'e m^-zz-ti 
paragraph 6, we feel it necessary to re-ter2te the fc_Ic , "g 
fundamental pnnciple -vvL.cn is the kernel of our stn-^'e fcr 
freedom We behe\e that without the reaiiz?t:on of L ^ S 
principle race hatred and bitterness cannot be e m rated and 
the overwhelming majority of the people cannot find a Hrrn 
foundation for progress and happiness I t is to be noted, how-
ever, that the present campaign of defiance of unjust laws is 
only directed for the purposes of securing the repeal of those 
unjust laws mentioned in the resolution of the Jomt Conference 
A L L P E O P L E , I R R E S P E C T I V E O F T H E N A T I O N A L G R O U P S T H E Y M A Y 
B E L O N G T O A X D I R R E S P E C T I V E O F T H E C O L O U R O F T H E I R S K I N , 
A R E E N T I T L E D T O L I V E A F U L L A X D F R E E L I F E O N T H E B A S I S O F 
T H E F U L L E S T E Q U A L I T Y F U L L D E M O C R A T I C R I G H T S W I T H A 
D I R E C T S A Y EM T H E A F F A I R S O F T H E G O V E R N M E N T A R E T H E 
I N A L I E N A B L E R I G H T S O F E V E R Y M A X - A R I G H T W H I C H L \ S O U T H 
A F R I C A M O S T B E R E A L I Z E D N O W I F T H E C O U N T R Y IS T O B E S A V E D 
F R O M S O C I A L C H A O S A N D T Y R A N N Y A N D F R O M T H E E V I L S A R I S I N G 
O U T O F T H E E X I S T I N G D E N T A L O F F R A N C H I S E T O V A S T MASS5ES O F 
T H E P O P U L A T I O N O N G R O U N D S O F R A C E A N D C O L O U R T H E 
S T R U G G L E W H I C H T H E N A T I O N A L O R G A N I Z A T I O N S O F T H E N O N -
E U R O P E P E O P L E A R E C O N D U C T I N G IS N O T D I R E C T E D A G A I N S T 
A N Y RACE O R N A T I O N A L G R O U P , B U T A G A I N S T T H E U N J U S T H > \ 5 
W H I C H K E E P I N P E R P E T U A L S U B J E C T I O N A N D M I S E R Y V A S T 
S E C T I O N S O F T H E P O P U L A T I O N I T IS F O R T H E C R E A T I O N O F 
C O N D I T I O N S W H I C H W I L L R E S T O R E H U M A N D I G N I T Y , EQ_U \ I S I Y 
A N D F R E E D O M T O E V E R Y S O U T H A F R I C A N 
8 Plan of Action We recommend that the struggle for 
securing the repeal of unjust laws be DEFIAXCE OF UNJUST 
LAWS based on Non-co-operation Defiance of unjust laws should 
take the form of committing breaches of certain selected laws 
and regulations which are undemocratic, unjust, racially 
discriminatory and lepugnant to the natural rights of man 
Defiance of Unjust laws should be planned into three stages -
although the timing would to a large extent depend on the 
progress, development and the outcome of the previous stage 
Three stages of Den nee of Unjust Laws \a) First Stage Com-
mencement of the struggle by calling upon the selected and 
trained persons to go into action in the big centres, e g Johan-
nesburg, Cape Town, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth and 
Durban (b) Second Stage Number of volunteer corps to be 
increased as well as the number of centres of operation (c) 
Third Stage This is the stage of mass action during which, as 
far as possible, the struggle should broaden out on a country-
wide scale and assume a general mass character For its success 
preparations on a mass scale to co\er the people both in the 
urban and rural areas would be necessary 
9 Joint Planning Council In order to prosecute and put into 
effect the plan of Defiance of Unjust Laws and in order to 
co-ordinate the efforts of the \anous national groups as well as 
of the \ anous centres both urban and rural, i t wil l be necessary 
for the Planning Council from time to time to make recom-
mendations to the Executne Committee of the National 
Organization which will jointly conduct, prosecute, direct and 
co-ordinate the campaign of defiance of unjust laws as agreed 
upon by the Conference of the African National Congiess and 
supported by the Conference of the South African Indian 
Congress. The Council must be empowered —{a) to co-opt 
members of the Council and fill vacancies with the approval 
of the Executive organs of the African National Congress and 
the South African Indian Congress, {b) to invite representatives 
from non-European organizations which are in full agreement 
with, and active participants in, the campaign, to serve as 
non-\oong members of the Council, (c) to frame rules and 
recitations for the guidance of the campaign, for approval by 
the r en-Europeans, [d) to set up provincial regional and/or 
loca councils within the framework of the existing oiganiza-
t i nr (f to issue instructions for the organization of\olunteer 
co~ " a^d fra-ne the necessar) code of discipline for these 
10 T H E JOINT EXECUTIVES shall establish Provincial, Regional 
or where possible Local Councils, which will have the primary 
task of organizing and eniolhng \olunteers into volunteer corps 
on the following lines (a) A leidei to be m charge of each 
volunteer corps fo' maintenance of older and discipline in 
terms of the 'code of discipline' and foi leading the corps into 
action when called upon to do so, (b) Corps to consist of 
members of both sexes, (c) The colours of the African National 
Congress - black, giecn and gold - shall be the emblem of the 
Volunteer Corps, (d) Each unit of the Volunteer Corps shall 
consist of members of the organization to w hich the\ belong 
i.e A N C , S A I C and F A C The Colouied Organizations in 
the provinces of Ni ta l , O F S and the Traimaal participating 
in die campaign ^ ith the appro\al of the Joint Planning and 
Directing Council shall also be allowed to form units of the 
Volunteer Corps, (c) In ceitam cases, where a law or regulation 
to be defied applies commonh to all groups, a mixed umt ma} 
be allowed to be formed of members of \anous organizations 
participating m the campaign 
11 Laws to be Tackled In recommending laws and resnila-
tions which should be tackled we ha\e borne in mind the Laws 
which were most obnoxious and which are capable of being 
defied 
The African Xatwnal Congress In so far as the African National 
Congress is concerned, the laws \ hich stand out for attack are 
naturall) the Pass Laws, and Regulations relating to Stock-
limitation. 
Method of S'mggle on the Pass Leu s (a) A Umt of Volunteer 
Corps should be called upon to def\ a certain aspect of the pass 
law, e g enter a Location without a permit The Unit chosen 
goes into action on the appointed d?"v, enters the Iccaaon ar.d 
holds a meet g I f confronted b. the author: cs the leader 
and all the members of the Un i coart arrest azd bear t r t 
penalt) of i r p . sonTcnt {b, Selected leaders t : dec.^re t_at 
the\ A i l l nov c__!% rn> fo-m of— :_es m c L c i i : 11= L ^ - r - r : i 
Pass and th^s ^ prepared to hear the pen^rv cf —z la- " 
3 4 1 
ie pre: 
T - ~ ~ i y - - ; cr^ n~— t ~* tre — ra* areas 
-~-tat-cn 'z Stock Limrntion Peep e cr the n_ral areas to 
hr. ac-.ed no; to cooperate T i t : the n^tncrtries in an\ wa) in 
cuihrg cattle or I . — .tirg L~ estcc^- 'r ! feetmgs and demon-
itrattczs to be helc .r Rertcnal Conferences Such confer-
erces f n the n j a ! areas she^'d be caded to cLscr^ s the prob!eT.s 1 snc— ' 
of tne people and to decide on the mart su-tabie form of e c^ t 0 a t ' 
Defance cfUnjust La% s In the area c-""1?' 
T7-! S:-''~ Africa- Irz~a" Ccrgr&>s I n so far as appropriate a r > % - i C 
actfen a- trie South Afhcan IncLan Congress *s concerned the mea<.e be 
condlue-ns and effects of the la o \ a r in the three provinces, u s -° 
but-,.e snbnut the foio ang for tne cons* aeration of the Sci.th manner 
African Indian Congress (a Provmcal Barkers 'S, Apart- rs, ^ e a 
he.d La. a such as train post office ra^ a' stations etc {:> ceP> 0 d } c 
Gro_p Areas Act — S and / hen possible 
T7-; F~z : :e A Cz.vsl 'a) Geteral Apartheid seg~ega-
n tn m peat offices ra1!' a\ statiors trains etc :) Grc^p Areas 
A c ; - i f end '.hen poss.ole Both sa) and os v i l i appr. to the 
Cc CLreu people m the other produces as tl I n the Cape a 
strong pess Dihtv exists of ha' ing mixed un.ts rather tha i 
ha nng separate national orgamzaucn units 
12 Tt-i Pojja!a'i:» R'j s la ij Act During the conduct of the 
campaign it shoald not be forgotten that tne Go ernrnent is 
preparing the machinery for the enforcement of the Population 
Registration Act This Act is repugnant to all sections of the 
people and the camp?'gn must pa) particular attention to 
the preparing of the volunteers and l^suuct^g the masses of 
tne people to resist the enforcement of thus Act. The campaign 
on this Act ma) well take the struggle from stage one and two 
into stage three of mass actions 
13 We cannot fail to recognize that industrial action is. 
' 1 
that an implied National Pledge she lid be issued winch could 
be read out at public, factoty and gioup meeting1; .ind rtpcatt d 
by all those pitscnt A special day - eg. Apnl Gtli - should be 
set aside so that special meetings aic called cvciywhcic, in 
towns, villages and hamlets, in factoiics and locations, and 
special chuitli scivices be held on this day whtic the National 
Pledge could be publicly read out Tins day or any othci day 
which the Conference of the African National Congress sets 
aside for the puiposc should be called 'The Nahoral Day of 
Pledge and Prayer' 
0%^)J S MOROKA {Chairman). 
Y . M DADOO, Y CACHALIA (Representatives of the 
South Afucan Indian Congress) 
J B MAKKS, W M SISULU (Representatives of the 
African National Cong]ess). 
Thaba'Nclm, Novcmbei 8th, /05/. 
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Organized non-violent r e j e c t i o n of the law 
for p o l i t i c a l ends An assessment of 
uhe experience of Blacks m South_Africa 
Tne Campaigns which form the subject of t h i s abudy 
reveal a coherent pattern which permits the drawing of some 
general conclusions about trie achievements of organized 
non-violent r e j e c t i o n of the law m South A f r i c a between 
1906 and 196O. 
Tne points m common are mam fold. The Campaigns took 
p l i c e against a background of deteriorating circumstances, 
s o c i a l p o l i t i c a l and economic, for the race groups p r i n c i p a l l y 
involved. Each was directed against r a c i a l l y discriminatory 
l e g i s l a t i o n and practices m general, but focused on pa r t i c u l a r 
items of l e g i s l a t i o n , usually newly passed, which were subject 
to deliberate v i o l a t i o n by acts of organized non-violent 
resistance. And each had other, arguably more important, 
ends, of which the most important was to p o l i t i c i s e and 
organize blacks m South Africa with the aim of building up a 
momentum of opposition to the r a c i a l p o l i c i e s of successive 
governments m the hope that i t would eventually develop 
s u f f i c i e n t strength to bring about the fundamental changes 
sought by the participants of a l l three Campaigns. The 
leaders of the Camp-jigns arlopted s i m l a r forms of non-violent 
resistance, encouraged mass par t i c i p a t i o n and each placed 
heavy reliance on ad hoc arrangements for mobilizing support 
and generally conducting operations. The end r e s u l t s wece not 
di s s i m i l a r . 
As a means of securing the repeal of pa r t i c u l a r , r a c i a l l y 
discriminatory, laws or of winning a general improvement i n 
the treatment of blacks m South A f r i c a the Campaigns v/ere 
almost t o t a l l y unsuccessful, though Gandhi was able to exercise 
some influence on the form of the Immigration Act f i n a l l y 
passed by t i e Union Parliament m 1 9 1 3 ( l ) and h i s agreement i n 
( 1 ) P 7 7 
3 5 0 
191^ with Smuts which resulted i n the passage of the Indians' 
R e l i e f Act brought a few "concessions", of more presentational 
than immediate p r a c t i c a l benefit d ) . The Campaigns were not 
a s i g n i f i c a n t deterrent, i f a deterrent at a l l , to the imposition 
of further l e g i s l a t i o n r e s t r i c t i n g the freedom of blacks. 
The limited rights some had had m the early 1900's were 
steadily eroded, to the point of extinction, during the 
period spanned by the non-violent resistance Campaigns. There 
i s l i t t l e evidence even to support the contention that the 
Campaigns, to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree, caused governments to 
hesiiBte or delay before introducing new r a c i a l l y r e s t r i c t i v e 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
White intolerance of the black population strengthened 
rather than moderated as a r e s u l t of the Campaigns. On 
occasions, the Campaigns provoked anxiety amongst the whites, 
but the i r position was never s u f f i c i e n t l y threatened to persuade 
them of the need to make concessions to black demands. Instead, 
the Campaigns were the occasion for c a l l s for the adoption 
of extreme counter-measures to "safeguard" the future of the 
white population, popular emotion being excited by National 
Party and other p o l i t i c a l groups for t h e i r own e l e c t o r a l ends. 
The immediate r e s u l t m the period 1906 - 1960 was the 
imposition by successive governments of increasingly tough 
counter-measures against black p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s , leaving 
the black population l i t t l e option but to respond m an 
equally uncompromising manner or face subjection. The i n -
transigent response of the white population to the campaigns 
of non-violent resistance may thus have served to bring nearer 
the time of a decisive confrontation m South A f r i c a . 
During each of the non-violent resistance Campaigns 
there was a small element m the white population which was 
detached from the main body of opinion and which expressed 
(1) p 9k 
varying degrees of support for the aims of the Campaigns. 
But there was not a progression m which the s i z e of the 
detached element grew, proportionate to the white popula-
tion as a whole the number of active sympathisers was 
probably l i t t l e higher m 1952 than m 1914, though m the 
period 1945-1960 the proportion espousing " l i b e r a l " p o l i c i e s 
may have ri s e n , partly as a response to mounting black 
unrest. 
Abroad, the Campaigns gave l i e to the claims of 
successive South African Governments to enjoy the backing 
of the black population. They attracted f a i r l y widespread 
attention and, m the period 1946-1960, contributed to the 
decline m South A f r i c a 's international standing. South 
African Indian p o l i t i c a l leaders were p a r t i c u l a r l y intent on 
bringing pressure to bear on South African Governments by 
e n l i s t i n g the support of other governments, notably that of 
India . The influence of the Indian Government had a limited 
impact on the South African Government between 1906-1914 (1) 
but, for example, the debates at the United Nations m 1946 
and 19^7 about the treatment of Indians m South Africa, 
which had been occasioned by the Indian Government, m l i a i s o n 
with leaders of the passive resistance campaign, did not 
r e s u l t m any amelioration of the conditions under which 
South African Indians l i v e d and i f Smuts had won the 1948 
general election there i s no basis for supposing he would 
have taken early action to improve their l o t . However, the 
campaigns of 194-6 and 1952 played a part m the gradual build 
up of international pressure for change m South A f r i c a winch 
may one day be decisive ( 2 ) . 
But the pri n c i p a l achievements lay m other directions. 
The Campaigns resulted m the transformation of the black 
p o l i t i c a l organizations p r i n c i p a l l y concerned from e l i t i s t 
(1 ) pp 2 3, 53, 69, 74, 93,9 9 
(2 ) See^A. W. Johnson, How Long w i l l South A f r i c a Survive 9 
discussion groups into populist bodies with r e l a t i v e l y 
militant programmes of action and they presented unparalleled 
opportunities for people to demonstrate m an organized and 
meaningful way their r e j e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l economic and 
s o c i a l strucbures imposed on them by successive governments. 
Factors such as p o l i t i c a l experience and b e l i e f , educational 
and s o c i a l stetus and race did not a f f e c t an individual's 
a b i l i t y to participate ( 1 ) . The Campaigns, winch form the 
subject of the study, a l l won mass-support and from a wide 
spectrum of the population, though, m general, the number 
who took part m acts of resistance constituted only a small 
percentage of the race groups p r i n c i p a l l y involved ( 2 ) . 
The achievement of mass involvement was s i g n i f i c a n t for a 
variety of reasons Thousands of people, as a r e s u l t of 
each of the campaigns, were made p o l i t i c a l l y aware for the 
f i r s t time and many gained p o l i t i c a l experience through 
participating m acts of resistance or helping to organize 
the campaigns. The potential multiplier effect was i n -
calculable Although the campaigns were f a i r l y short-
lived, many participants and supporters joined the Congress 
organizations, which greatly expanded during periods of 
resistance whilst many members did not play an active part 
m the Congresses for very long, i f at a l l , others remained 
committed members. Not only did the Campaigns s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
contribute to peoples' awareness, both of domestic and i n t e r -
national issues and give them f i r s t hand experience of p o l i -
t i c a l a c t i v i t y but they served to boost morale. They 
demonstrated to the individual participant or supporter that 
he was a member of a popular broad based movement, drawing 
(1) I t should, however, be admitted that Gandhi did not 
encourage African participation m h i s campaigns. 
(2) I n 1907 the Transvaal Indian population, en masse, 
refused to co-operate m the imposition of the A s i a t i c 
Law Amendment Act, p 4 9 , but t h i s did not involve 
the majority m "positive" acts of resistance. 
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support from a l l p a r t s o f the country and from abroad, whose 
i n t e r e s t s were e s s e n t i a l l y h i s own, and gave him the means of 
challenging the government which he was otherwise unable t o do 
The experience of r e s i s t a n c e and imprisonment c o n t r i b u t e d to 
the sense of achievement. The element of s a c r i f i c e i n v o l v e d 
helped to ensure t h a t the campaigns won a place m the mythology 
o f black n a t i o n a l i s m m South A f r i c a 
The scale of involvement and the f a i r degree of success 
m s u s t a i n i n g r e s i s t a n c e over some months, m d i f f i c u l t 
circumstances, demonstrated the capacity of the v a r i o u s elements 
of the black p o p u l a t i o n to co-operate and to organize themselves 
Whi l s t t h i s had obvious t a c t i c a l importance m cha l l e n g i n g 
the government i t also served to undermine myths put about by 
the whites, m support of t h e i r r a c i a l p o l i c i e s , suggesting 
t h a t there was an e s s e n t i a l m c o m p a t a b i l i t y between the 
d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l groups m the country whose i n t e r e s t s were 
thus best safeguarded by a system of separation. 
To d i s t i n g u i s h the n o n - v i o l e n t phase of black n a t i o n a l i s m 
m South A f r i c a from t h a t which succeeded i t a f t e r Sharpeville 
by representing the former as being associated w i t h "middle-
c l a s s " leadership and "middle-class" values and the l a t t e r 
w i t h p o p u l i s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y leaders and i d e a l s has evident 
t a c t i c a l m e r i t m d i s t a n c i n g the c u r r e n t phase from the 
" f a i l u r e s " of the past but i t i s of questionable j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
Non-violent r e s i s t a n c e , as p r a c t i s e d i n the Campaigns 
which form the basis of the study,was not associated w i t h a 
s i n g l e class or stratum o f s o c i e t y , nor d i d i t r e f l e c t the 
values of a p a r t i c u l a r ("middle-class") group. I t was one 
o f the foremost achievements of the Campaigns t h a t they brought 
together people of a l l "classes" and a wide range of p o l i t i c a l 
persuasions. The background of many of the N a t i o n a l leaders 
m the Campaigns coald be s a i d t o be "bourgeois" and "middle-
c l a s s " ( i n s o f a r as those terms are r e l e v a n t t o blacks m South 
A f r i c a ) and the m a j o r i t y of them and t h e i r supporters would .101, 
/a"tnleast?a^%ne"'":^iX'e, have favoured/^ne^rans^ormabion of South 
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A f r i c a i n t o , f o r example, what might be c a l l e d a " r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
m a r x i s t - o r i e n t a t e d s t a t e " . And as people a c t i v e l y engaged m 
campaigns of r e s i s t a n c e they g e n e r a l l y showed themselves more 
cone erned w i t h / m & W S ' ^ f e s H * s%£ u r i n g the d i s m a n t l i n g 
o f the e x i s t i n g r a c i a l l y biased politico-economic system. 
Their commitment to t h a t end i s not t o be devalued by t h e i r 
background, by t h e i r " u n r e v o l u t i o n a r y " image or by t h e i r 
r e l i a n c e on n on-violent means. 
I f Blacks m South A f r i c a nad had the o p p o r t u n i t y m the 
years p r i o r to 1960 to mount a s u b s t a n t i a l campaign of organized 
p o l i t i c a l violence m response to the repressive p o l i c i e s of 
successive governments, y e t had baulked a t the idea m favour 
of sole r e l i a n c e on "passive" resistance there would be some 
grounds f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the p e r i o d as one where commitment 
to r a d i c a l change was a t most equivocal,being compromised by 
e s s e n t i a l l y bourgeois i n t e r e s t s . But i t was not so. The 
development p o s t - S h a r p e v i l l e m favour of v i o l e n t t a c t i c s 
gave the N a t i o n a l i s t movement, as represented by the Congresses, 
a more r e v o l u t i o n a r y , and, arguably "commited", image but 
whether i t was warranted or amounted to much m p r a c t i c e i s 
another matter ( 1 ) . 
P a r t i c i p a n t s m the Campaigns were d i v i d e d m t h e i r 
approach to n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e but the moral courage 
r e q u i r e d to engage m such a c t i v i t e s was the same whatever 
the nature of the commitment. I t would be a fundamental mis-
conception to see the n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e campaigns which 
form the subject of t h i s study as o f f e r i n g a " s o f t " o p t i o n m 
p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n , a c r i t i c i s m more p r o p e r l y l e v e l l e d m 
the circumstances a t r e l i a n c e on p e t i t i o n s , deputations and 
comparable forms of "passive r e s i s t a n c e " . 
( l ) The assessment of Richard Johnson i s i n s t r u c t i v e , How 
Long w i l l South A f r i c a S u r v i v e 9 pp 20 f f . 
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Broadly, the r e s i s t e r s d i v i d e d i n t o two groups i n t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e to non-violence the " o p p o r t u n i s t s " and the 
"Satyagrahis". The former comprised the overwhelming m a j o r i t y 
m each of the Campaigns. Their "opportunism" should not be 
misunderstood, m general the attachment to non-violence was 
s u b s t a n t i a l and i n v o l v e d a moral commitment. The t a c t i c was 
i m p l i c i t l y accepbed as being appropriate t o the circumstances. 
I f , m some, a t bhe time unforeseen, way the circumstances were 
fundamentally to change the " o p p o r t u n i s t s " could be expected 
to modify t h e i r views, but the t r a d i t i o n of n o n - v i o l e n t 
o p p o s i t i o n was such as not t o be e a s i l y supplanted. 
The "Satyagrahis", who under Gandhi's i n f l u e n c e , regarded 
the p r a c t i c e of no n - v i o l e n t resistance as c e n t r a l t o t h e i r way 
of l i f e , exercised s u b s t a n t i a l i n f l u e n c e as a group only m 
tne Campaign of 1906-191^. Their b e l i e f t h a t the means -
non-violent r e s i s t a n c e - represented an end m i t s e l f gave tne 
campaign a d i s t i n c t i v e dogged (and t o some " i r r a t i o n a l " ) 
character. The commitment of the Satyagrahis t o s a c r i f i c e 
was no l e s s than t h a t of the equally s e l e c t band who have 
subsequently engaged m organized armed r e s i s t a n c e f o r p o l i -
t i c a l ends m South A f r i c a . 
I n conventional terms the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the campaigns 
was o f t e n makeshift and has been the subject of much c r i t i c i s m . 
W i l l i a m M i l l e r , f o r example, m arguing t h a t "a candid assess-
ment cannot absolve the ANC i t s e l f a share of blame f o r i t s 
defeat ( m the 1950's)" drew a t t e n t i o n to i t s "weak and cumber-
some o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ... ( i t s ) v i r t u a l absence of 
any f u l l - t i m e p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f and i n s u f f i c i e n t finances" ( l ) . 
F e i t voiced s i m i l a r conclusions (2) and the ANC i t s e l f was not 
(1) W. R. M i l l e r , "Non-violence A C n n s t i a n I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
C i v i l i a n Resistance as a N a t i o n a l Defence, pp 282-3-
(2) PJ>238, 328 
unaware of x t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l shortcomings ( l ) . But some 
cognisance has t o be taken of the circumstances m w/hich 
the Campaigns took place. The leaders of the Campaigns d i d 
not have the resources a t t n e i r disposal enabling them to 
prepare f o r and conduct a campaign m the manner of a pros-
perous p o l i t i c a l p a r t y m a western democracy and there was 
never any prospect they would have, however popular and s k i l -
f u l they were. I n almost every respect they were operating 
m a h o s t i l e and d e t e r i o r a t i n g environment where there could 
be no p o s s i b i l i t y o f a campaign being "adequately prepared" 
m the sense t h a t Ebert (2) suggested was necessary f o r the 
"successful" use o f non-violent r e s i s t a n c e (3)- Before and 
during each of the Campaigns there were people who counselled 
against resistance on the basis t h a t the planning and organic.-
t i o n was inadequate but i f t h e i r advice had been heeded the 
record of n o n - v i o l e n t resistance m South A f r i c a would have 
been immeasurably weakened. I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t the 
Programme of A c t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r the development 
of mass support (and i m p l i c i t l y the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework 
necessary to marshall i t ) by means o f " c i v i l disobedience" and 
other forms o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I n the circumstances, 
there was no other way t o proceed. There were evident r i s k s 
m adopting such a course of a c t i o n and more could have been 
done to r e p a i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weaknesses. But such d e f i c i e n -
c i es as there were should be taken m context and were not of 
(1) See, f o r example, " C i r c u l a r L e t t e r t o a l l Congress Branche 
of the Province". Review of 1952 by the Working Committe 
of the ANC (Cape). December 1952. From Prot e s t to 
Challenge (Vol 2), pp h&9-k9k 
(2) p 9. 
(3) P a r t i c u l a r l y m run up t o the Campaigns of 19^ +6-8 and 
1952, the government would probably have taken d e c i s i v e 
pre-emptive a c t i o n i f the preparations f o r the Campaigns 
had been r e a l l y s u b s t a n t i a l , there was thus some t a c t i -
c a l m e r i t m proceeding through ad hoc arrangements. 
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pre-eminent importance n a t i o n a l l y to the outcome and impact of 
the Campaigns ( l ) , nor were they always as pronounced as might 
seem to be the case on a s u p e r f i c i a l examination 
Arguably, i t i s not so much the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weaknesses 
o f the Campaigns which should be the subject o f comment but bhe 
s k i l l of the leaders m e x p l o i t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s , as they 
occurred, to develop support f o r the Campaigns and thus, hope-
f u l l y , enhance t h e i r impact. I n p a r t i c u l a r , tne leaders 
s u c c e s s f u l l y b u i l t up networks o f i n f o r m a l contacts m p a r a l l e l 
w i t h and m p a r t as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r more "conventional" channels (2) 
and succeeded i n achieving a considerable degree of c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
over long distances and between p a r t i c i p a n t s of widely d i f f e r i n g 
backgrounds and outlook. I f the campaigns had oeen generally 
i l l - o r g a n i z e d and po o r l y l e d i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t so many 
people would have been prepared t o put t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d m 
jeopardy by p a r t i c i p a t i n g , even i f they s t r o n g l y supported 
the aims o f the Campaigns ( 3 ) 1 or t h a t the r e s i s t e r s would have 
so c o n s i s t e n t l y conducted themselves m a d i s c i p l i n e d , non-
v i o l e n t manner (k)-
Amongst the leadership o f the Campaigns were most of the 
foremost black p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s of the p e r i o d from the begin-
n i n g of the Century u n t i l 196O and, indeed, subsequently, and 
the campaigns played a major r o l e m p r o v i d i n g a p l a t f o r m from 
which they could e s t a b l i s h and enhance t h e i r s t a t u s as leaders 
o f popular o p i n i o n . They shared a common b e l i e f t h a t South 
(1) O r g a n i z a t i o n a l weaknesses had a more serious impact m 
between r a t h e r than during the campaigns 
(2) With the b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , i t could be argued t h a t 
congress leaders i n the 1950's should have p a i d more 
a t t e n t i o n t o b u i l d i n g up l o c a l i s e d networks m which 
i n f o r m a l l i n k s would have been v i t a l l y important. 
(3) This i s p a r t l y borne out by the f a i l u r e of the campaign 
m the mid-1950's against the Bantu Education Act. 
(k) Outbreaks of violence d i d occur m 1913 amongst I n d i a n 
workers m Na t a l but they d i d not belong t o the main-
stream of the Campaign. p 85 
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Afrxca should be governed according to democratic p r i n c i p l e s 
and t h a t r a c i a l l y based s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l systems 
designed to maintain white supremacy should be abolished,but 
the leaders were very diverse m other respects. This does 
not appear s e r i o u s l y to have impaired co-operation between 
them during Campaigns. Whatever l o s s of e f f i c i e n c y or c l a r i t y 
o f purpose there may have been as a r e s u l t o f the disparate 
nature of the leadership was outweighed by the advantage o f 
being broadly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f I n d i a n and A f r i c a n o p i n i o n 
and, hence, l i k e l y t o appeal t o a wide spectrum of the popu-
l a t i o n , p r o v i d i n g a s u i t a b l e focus could be found t o a t t r a c t 
t h e i r a t t e n t i o n . Most of the leaders had had l i t t l e or no 
d i r e c t experience of large-scale sustained p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
a t the outset o f the campaigns and t h i s may m p a r t account 
f o r the occasional lack of surety of purpose, apparent, f o r 
example, m t h e i r handling o f the passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign 
from the end of 19^6, a f t e r the passage o f the United Nations 
r e s o l u t i o n on the treatment of Indians m South A f r i c a d ) . 
And w i t h greater experience the leadership might have taken 
more r i s k s , such as Gandhi d i d m 191^ and the Eastern Cape 
leaders m 1952,m acquiescing m or a c t i v e l y encouraging 
spontaneous expansion o f the Campaigns or movements associated 
w i t h them as a means of undermining the morale and confidence 
o f the Government and i t s supporters. 
The leaders had few precedents on which t o base t h e i r 
decisions and each step c o n s t i t u t e d an experiment. For a 
combination of reasons, i n c l u d i n g the lengthy gaps between 
Campaigns, the f a i l u r e t o s u s t a i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y m the 
i n t e r v e n i n g years and, notably m the 1950's, government 
harrassment and imprisonment of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s , the 
lessons o f those experiments were not always a v a i l a b l e t o 
p a r t i c i p a n t s m subsequent Campaigns. 
The problem of maint a i n i n g a momentum o f popular 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y m o p p o s i t i o n to government p o l i c i e s 
(1) p 1 59 f f 
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when such o p p o s i t i o n was the s u b j e c t of i n c r e a s i n g l y h a r s h 
p e n a l t i e s and when c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means of redresswere not 
a v a i l a b l e to the mass of the population was to some extent 
r e s o l v e d f o r the d u r a t i o n of the Campaigns, but the,y 
could not be i n d e f i n i t e l y extended and a t the same 
time hope to make more than a very l i m i t e d impact e i t h e r on 
the government or the b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n . The Campaigns a c t e d 
as a powerful boost to r e g u l a r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y but they 
could not be expected to s u b s t i t u t e f o r such a c t i v i t y and, 
given the unfavourable p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e m South A f r i c a , 
could only be mounted f a i r l y i n f r e q u e n t l y i f they 
were to have a r e a l p r o s p e c t of winning popular backing and 
involvement, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the preceding campaigns had 
f a i l e d to secure any improvement m the c o n d i t i o n s of the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
Tne achievements and f a i l u r e s of the Campaigns m the 
p e r i o d from 1906-T960 p o i n t to bhe p o t e n t i a l and the l i m i t a -
t i o n s of n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e as a means of c h a l l e n g i n g 
long e s t a b l i s h e d , powerful and undemocratic governments which 
a r e i n t e n t on m a i n t a i n i n g and developing t h e i r e x i s t i n g p o l i -
c i e s . I n some r e s p e c t s the circumstances f a c i n g the l e a d e r s 
of the South A f r i c a n Campaigns could s c a r c e l y have been l e s s 
promising s i n c e , f o r example, they had few r e s o u r c e s a t t h e i r 
d i s p o s a l w i t h which to mount a campaign and were s u b j e c t to 
harrassment from the government and l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s 
from the o u t s e t , but, m o t h e r s , the p o s i t i o n could have been 
much more d i f f i c u l t . Rank and f i l e r e s i s t e r s might have 
r e c e i v e d f a r more severe sentences ( l ) , t h e i r l e a d e r s could 
have been detained before the Campaigns had even begun and new 
l e a d e r s a r r e s t e d a s they emerged. T h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s might 
have been banned and p u b l i c i t y denied them. Such measures 
a p p l i e d i n c r e a s i n g l y a f t e r 1952 but not, g e n e r a l l y , before 
( l ) A notable exception concerns the d e p o r t a t i o n of r e s i s t e r s 
to I n d i a and China m 1909 (p 6 4 ) , sentences which 
could s c a r c e l y have been more draconian. 
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t h a t I f they had been, the Campaigns would not have achieved 
what they d i d . 
The a b i l i t y o f the leaders t o operate openly was v i t a l 
t o the success of the Campaigns. By t h e i r very nature the 
t a c t i c s of non-violence could not be used other than o v e r t l y 
i f they were to make any impacb and the leaders could not 
mob i l i z e mass support f o r bhe Campaigns and, as an extension, 
f o r the parent Congresses, except openly and m public,though 
i n i t i a l arrangements and c e r t a i n t a c t i c a l decisions could have 
been taken c o v e r t l y . Mass meetings played a c e n t r a l r o l e m 
p u b l i c i s i n g the Campaigns, m a s s o c i a t i n g people w i t h them, 
and m keeping them informed of progress. 
W h i l s t i t remained possible to oppose the government, 
m any meaningful sense, through popular o v e r t a c t i o n , t a c t i c s 
o f n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e o f f e r e d a uniquely f l e x i b l e and 
p o t e n t i a l l y powerful mp>ans of doing so. The t a c t i c s em-
ployed m the Campaigns, ranging from p e t i t i o n s t o a mass-
s t r i k e , provided the means of b r i n g i n g together i n d i v i d u a l s 
o f diverse backgrounds who shared l i t t l e m common except the 
des i r e , v a r i o u s l y a r t i c u l a t e d , t o b r i n g about a r e v e r s a l of 
the successive governments' p o l i c i e s of r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
By j o i n t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g m programmes o f non - v i o l e n t r e s i s -
tance the p a r t i c i p a n t s o f f e r e d a c r e d i b l e challenge t o govern-
ment p o l i c i e s , a t the same time boosting t h e i r morale and 
c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and sometimes o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
experience, achievements which were o f p o t e n t i a l l y l a s t i n g 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . I n conducting the Campaigns the leaders could 
respond t o changing circumstances by r e s o r t i n g t o the many 
d i f f e r e n t forms t h a t n o n - v i o l e n t r e j e c t i o n of the law could 
take. T a c t i c s could be adjusted to provide f o r r e s i s t a n c e 
by tens or by thousands and m widely v a r y i n g circumstances. 
I t may be asked why, w i t h such a v e r s a t i l e t a c t i c a t 
t h e i r d i s p o s a l and w i t h popular backing f o r the cause which 
they espoused, d i d the leaders o f tne Campaigns have so l i t t l e 
success m e f f e c t i n g changes m government p o l i c i e s . 
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The answer does not l x e to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree, 
w i t h the s t r a t e g i e s they adopted m pursuing the Campaigns o f 
n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e . I f , f o r example, m 1952, leaders of 
the defiance campaign i n the Eastern Cape had attempted t o 
organize a sustained stoppage of work, i t i s u n l i k e l y i t could 
have been maintained f o r more than a few days, achieving tem-
porary p u b l i c i t y a t the expense o f many peoples' jobs and 
p o s s i b l y t h e i r g o o d w i l l . W h i l s t there was the prospect that 
"dramatic" gestures, such as the c a l l i n g of a n a t i o n a l s t r i k e , 
could have snowballed i n t o a d e c i s i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n m which 
the government was forced to make concessions, the chances o f 
success were very small. South A f r i c a n governments may have 
ge n e r a l l y f e l t constrained from using armed force against non-
v i o l e n t r e s i s t e r s , but i f they had perceived a s u f f i c i e n t 
t h r e a t to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s they virould not have h e s i t a t e d t o 
employ v i o l e n t counter measures. 
The spectacle of s u f f e r i n g was notably unsuccessful 
m winning over white o p i n i o n . 
W h i l s t i t i s conceivable i f thousands of people had been 
prepared t o adopt the more extreme s a c r i f i c e s advocated by 
Gandhi and h i s f e l l o w satyagrahis white sympathies might have 
been e x c i t e d and world o p i n i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y incensed to per-
suade Governments to exert pressure on South A f r i c a t o 
moderate i t s p o l i c i e s , the odds are h e a v i l y against such an 
outcome. I n any event i t was not a r e a l i s t i c scenario. 
The t a c t i c s of n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e have c e r t a i n l i m i -
t a t i o n s which became apparent d u r i n g the Campaigns and which 
had some bearing on t h e i r course. I t was not, f o r example, 
always an easy task t o f i n d ways of focusing r e s i s t a n c e on 
the laws which caused the g r e a t e s t offence t o I n d i a n and 
A f r i c a n o p i n i o n . During the 19^6-8 passive r e s i s t a n c e cam-
paign the Government c o n s i s t e n t l y refused to prosecute r e s i s -
t e r s under the law which they set out to v i o l a t e , namely the 
A s i a t i c Land Tenure Act, and on occasions governments chose 
t o ignore r e s i s t e r s e n t i r e l y . Both these responses were l i a b l e 
t o have an e f f e c t on morale and on the momentum o f a campaign. 
Non-violent resistance, m i t s p r i n c i p a l forms makes heavy 
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o r g a n i z a t i o n a l demands, p a r t i c u l a r l y m circumstances such 
a s e x i s t e d m South A f r i c a where, m g e n e r a l , i f n o n - v i o l e n t 
r e s i s t a n c e was to have any s e r i o u s chance of making an impact 
on the government and a l s o on the b l a c k population, i t 
r e q u i r e d s i z e a b l e , i f not mass, p a r t i c i p a t i o n and t h i s had 
to be s u s t a i n e d over montns r a t h e r than weeks or days. 
Moreover, a high degree of d i s c i p l i n e was r e q u i r e d i f the 
Campaigns ^ere to remain non - v i o l e n t , but t h i s «ras ve r y d i f f i -
c u l t to achieve when l a r g e numbers of p o l i t i c a l l y i n e x p e r i e n c e d 
people were i n v o l v e d and when i t was easy, because of the open 
nature of the Campaigns, to i n f i l t r a t e agents provocateurs to 
i n c i t e r e s i s t e r s to v i o l e n c e . Outbreaks of v i o l e n c e , whether 
on the parb of r e s i s t e r s , or, as happened during the d e f i a n c e 
campaign, simultaneous w i t h and a t c l o s e q u a r t e r s to the Campaign 
i t s e l f , could have a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on peoples' w i l l to r e s i s t 
a s w e l l as p r o v i d i n g the government w i t h a p r e t e x t f o r t a k i n g 
draconian measures a g a i n s t n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t e r s , a l l e g i n g 
t h a t they were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the u n r e s t . 
However e f f e c t i v e l y the l e a d e r s h i p deployed t h e i r r e s o u r c e s 
they could not m the time a v a i l a b l e overcome the p r i n c i p a l 
d i s a b i l i t y they faced, namely an overwhelming imbalance of 
c o e r c i v e power v i s a v i s the Government of the day. T m s 
was of c r u c i a l importance m opposing governments which showed 
themselves to be unmoved by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of conscience and 
e q u i t y and which were g e n e r a l l y not disposed to r e a c h an accommo-
dation w i t h t h e i r opponents. I f the two p a r t i e s had shared 
v a l u e s m common and the matters a t i s s u e had been l i m i t e d 
the d i s p a r i t y m r e a l i s a b l e c o e r c i v e f o r c e between tnem would 
not have been so s i g n i f i c a n t . The p r o s p e c t s f o r the r e s i s t e r s 
might a l s o have been v e r y d i f f e r e n t i f they had engaged an 
occupying power and p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t was under p r e s s u r e from 
other q u a r t e r s . Such f a c t o r s help to e x p l a i n why the p r a c t i c e 
of n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e m wartime Europe, pre-Indepen 
I n d i a and the United S t a t e s apparently made a m a t e r i a l c o n t r i -
b u t ion to campaigns f o r human and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , whereas 
m South A f r i c a , a f t e r many y e a r s of r e s i s t a n c e a c t i v i t y , few 
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i f any concessions had "been won, whatever the i n t e r n a l 
g a i n s f o r black p o l i t i c a l c onsciousness and o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
I n I n d i a , f o r example, where the h i s t o r y of n o n - v i o l e n t 
r e s i s t a n c e under Gandhi, i s very chequered, the most famous 
of the "satyagraha" campaigns, which took as i t s t a r g e t the 
S a l t A cts, r e s u l t e d a f t e r a nation-wide campaign,m an 
Agreement between the V i c e r o y of I n d i a and Gandhi which made 
s u b s t a n t i a l c oncessions to I n d i a n opinion ( l ) . Moreover, 
the B r i t i s h Government had a l r e a d y agreed two y e a r s before 
t h a t I n d i a would e v e n t u a l l y be granted Dominion s t a t u s and 
t h a t a conference should be convened to hear the views of 
the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . Thus, although the s t r u g g l e 
fo r I n d i a n independence was f a r from easy Gandhi and Congress 
were ab l e to wring i n c r e a s i n g l y s u b s t a n t i a l c o n c e s s i o n s from 
the Government, whose w i l l and power to stem the t i d e pro-
g r e s s i v e l y dimmisned p a r t i c u l a r l y as the m e t r o p o l i t a n power 
i t s e l f came under t h r e a t during the second World War. Non-
v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e c o n t r i b u t e d to the undermining of the Occupation 
by the N a z i s of Norway (2) and Denmark (3) but i t was only one, 
a l b e i t important element m the p r e s s u r e s brought to bear on 
the o c c u p i e r s . By i t s e l f i n t e r n a l o p p o s i t i o n , both v i o l e n t 
and n o n - v i o l e n t , d i d not secure the downfall of German r u l e 
m e i t h e r country. Both the Norwegians and the Danes, u n l i k e 
the B l a c k s m South A f r i c a , had a long h i s t o r y of "modern" 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , they were r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous and had 
a very s p e c i f i c t a r g e t m the occupying German f o r c e s who had 
taken away t h e i r n a t i o n a l freedom, v i r t u a l l y a t a s t r o k e . 
(1) There are numerous accounts of "Satyagraha" campaigns 
m I n d i a . See, f o r example, S. Panker-Brick, Gandhi 
a g a i n s t M a c h i a v e l l i a n i s m , M. K. Gandhi, Non-violence m 
Peace and War, D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma L i f e of Mohandar 
Karamchand Gandhi, R. Kumar(ed) E s s a y s on Gandhian P o l i t i c s 
Tne Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 
(2) See M. Skodvm, "Norwegian n o n - v i o l e n t R e s i s t a n c e during 
the German Occupation", C i v i l i a n R e s i s t a n c e a s a N a t i o n a l 
D_efence (ed. A. R o b e r t s ) . The t e a c h e r s ' r e s i s t a n c e i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy. 
(3) See J . Bennett, "The R e s i s t a n c e A g a i n s t the German Occupa-
t i o n of Denmark 19^0-'+5", i b i d . 
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Moreover, the occupying power, u n l i k e the (much l a r g e r ) 
white population m South A f r i c a was under p h y s i c a l a t t a c k 
on a number of f r o n t s and Denmark and Norway h a r d l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
the German h e a r t l a n d . I n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the n o n - v i o l e n t 
c i v i l r i g h t s campaigns of the 1960's, w h i l s t meeting i n t e n s e 
o p p o s i t i o n m the southern S t a t e s , had s u b s t a n t i a l support m 
Congress and, f o r example, from the Supreme Court ( 1 ) . I n 
the 1960's the b l a c k population m the United S t a t e s , though 
s e r i o u s l y disadvantaged v i s a v i s the whites, notably m the 
South, were m an uncomparably strong e r p o s i t i o n than the 
b l a c k s m South A f r i c a . 
The odds faced by the b l a c k s m South A f r i c a m seeking 
Fundamental change a r e more c l o s e l y m i r r o r e d by those con-
f r o n t i n g r e s i s t e r s m the E a s t German u p r i s i n g of 1953 (2) 
or the Hungarian R e v o l t of 1956 (3) where they were, m e f f e c t , 
c o n f r o n t i n g the S o v i e t Government and without the b e n e f i t of 
s u b s t a n t i a l e x t e r n a l m a t e r i a l support or str o n g N a t i o n a l 
r e s o u r c e s . Whatever the achievements of the r e s i s t e r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y m Hungary, they f a i l e d to undermine, except 
t e m p o r a r i l y , the confidence and p o s i t i o n of those who wielded 
e f f e c t i v e power m t h e i r c o u n t r i e s and who were commited to 
the maintenance of the s t a t u s quo. 
But because the b l a c k population l a c k e d the power m the 
1950's and e a r l i e r to coerce the government th e r e was no 
reason why t h i s should always be so and w h i l s t Congress l e a d e r s 
and t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s were s t i l l p e r m i t t e d to engage m 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , t a c t i c s of n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e continued 
to o f f e r them the b e s t means of p o l i t i c i s i n g an i n c r e a s i n g 
number ofxblack population, g i v i n g them experience which could 
(1) The Supreme Court, f o r example, took the important step of 
r u l i n g bus s e g r e g a t i o n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m Montgomery, Alabama, 
f o l l o w i n g Martin Luther King's "walk f o r freedom" campaign. 
(2) See T. E b e r t , Non-violent R e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t Communist 
Regimes", i b i d . 
(3) F o r a b r i e f account, see D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 
PP 835-6. Both v i o l e n t and n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e occurred 
during the R e v o l t 
be of value at a l a t e r stage m the campaign to win democratic 
ri g n t s . I f , instead of adhering to non-violent t a c t i c s , 
Congress leaders had, for example, i n the 1950's, found the 
resources to embark on limited acts of violence the r e s u l t s 
could only have been negative. The government v/ould have 
reacted with f u l l force eliminating groups d i r e c t l y involved 
and exploiting the situation to disrupt other associations 
which were not party to the acts. The achievements of the 
non-violent resistance campaigns m mobilizing and p o l i t i c i s i n g 
large numbers of people and contributing to the strengthening 
of the i r resolve through a "baptism of f i r e " would have been 
forfeited, and the leaders would not have secured the broad-
base of support which they did. And, perhaps, most important 
for the future, they would not so readily have been able to 
s h i f t the onus on to the government for the change to violent 
t a c t i c s as they could m the 19o0's when they and their 
organizations were banned or otherwise e f f e c t i v e l y precluded 
from engaging m overt p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , nor would they 
have been able to prepare the black population and opinion 
abroad for the t r a n s i t i o n to violence. 
The campaigns and certain related occurrences, whilst 
highlighting the positive role played by non-violent r e s i s -
tance, at the same time gave some insight into the potential 
of the two other t a c t i c a l approaches, namely violent a c t i v i t y 
and international pressure. I t was noteworthy both m 1913 
during the outbreaks of violence associated with the s t r i k e of 
Natal sugar workers and m October/November 1952 at the time 
of the disturbances m Port Elizabeth, East London and el s e -
where the extent to which these events provoked alarm amongst 
Europeans and they may have, temporarily at l e a s t , undermined 
the confidence of the white communities most closely affected. 
Seemingly,the whites as a whole were generally l e s s concerned 
by the spectacle of non-violent resistance. But for violent 
a c t i v i t y to have brought about r a d i c a l change i t would havt 
had to be sustained and probably widespread, not a p r a c t i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y at the time. The e f f o r t s of Gandhi and the 
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leaders of the ^3k6-8 passive r e s i s t a n c e campaign to win 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l support f o r t h e i r cause achieved a considerable 
measure of success, and w h i l s t the p r a c t i c a l b e n e f i t s a t the 
time ivere few, a foundation was l a i d to be b u i l t on as the i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l climate oecame more favourable. For example, the 
trade boycotts imposed by I n d i a and Pakistan i n the l i g h t of 
contacts w i t h leaders o f the 19^-8 campaign, though h a r d l y 
very s i g n i f i c a n t , i n themselves, xn p r a c t i c a l terms,represented 
an important pioneering step (1) . 
By themselves none of the three broad aeas of a c t i v i t y -
n o n - v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , violence or i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure - seem 
l i k e l y , judging by experience so f a r , t o b r i n g about r a d i c a l 
change i n South A f r i c a i n the foreseeable f u t u r e . But a 
combination of these t a c t i c s - such as was employed against the 
Nazi occupation of Norway and Denmark i n the 19*K)'s - might 
succeed m doing so. Moreover such an approach would have the 
m e r i t of o f f e r i n g the best prospect o f i n v o l v i n g a very broad 
spectrum of people w i t h i n and outside South A f r i c a which could 
be of c r u c i a l importance i n f u r t h e r ^ t?Le chances f o r the 
establishment of a s t a b l e , cohesive and genuinely democratic 
s t a t e m South A f r i c a . 
( l ) The p o t e n t i a l importance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l pressure 
i n b r i n g i n g about r a d i c a l change i n South A f r i c a i s c l e a r l y 
shown by R. W. Johnson, How Long W i l l South A f r i c a S u r v i v e 9 
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